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# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical  
Knowledge and Practice

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VOL. XXX

OCTOBER, 1919, JANUARY, APRIL, AND JULY, 1920

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Rumford Press, Concord, N. H.

James H. Tufts, The University of Chicago

London: George Allen & Unwin, Lt'd

1920

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# THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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OCTOBER, 1919

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## SOME NEW PROBLEMS IN EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP.<sup>1</sup>

DAVID SNEDDEN

**T**HE making of good citizens in the broadest sense, that is, of adults who will contribute to the harmony and co-operation needed within the social group, out of plastic childhood with its individualistic and "small group" instincts, has been a task to which societies appear to have addressed themselves since the beginnings of organized human life on earth. Education for citizenship is simply one phase of the complex process of social control. Preparation for citizenship has generally taken place in ways unperceived by the learner, and doubtless often, too, in ways only partially understood by the teacher—as parent, elder, chief, master worker, priest or lawgiver; for it is certain that the customs, dogmas, traditions, institutions and ideals evolved to perpetuate social control have a potency at any given time far beyond that which can be perceived and comprehended by any individual.

But the old ways of fitting for citizenship are not sufficient for the modern world. The citizen of a twentieth century democracy has responsibilities that are both greater and different from those borne by his forefathers. It seems very probable, indeed, that the spread of aspirations for democracy, accompanied by general social demands for,

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<sup>1</sup>An address given before the Columbia Institute of Arts and Sciences, January 28, 1919.

and approval of, freedom of thought, have rendered of small service much of the old machinery of social control, and have laid upon us the need of inventing and applying new means and methods.

These are the considerations which point to the urgent need, in modern societies, of new and more purposeful methods of education for citizenship. On the one hand we have rapidly developed a social order that is more complex and delicately adjusted than any with which our forefathers were acquainted; and, on the other hand, we have wrought certain fundamental changes in social insight and ideal, the effect of which is greatly to lessen, if not often to nullify, the effectiveness of the historic means and methods of social control which had slowly been shaped through scores of centuries. Simultaneously with the development of new necessities and new demands, we find ourselves obliged to "scrap" much of that long useful machinery, the motive power of which was authority.

Our own country has had, at least from the beginnings of our national life, vivid aspirations for good citizenship. Where specific programs of action have received general approval as means of realizing these aspirations, we have given them reasonably good support. The development of public school systems to insure general literacy has been the most conspicuous step in this process. These public schools have become steadily more democratic in their operation; they have assured us a nationally homogeneous speech; and in them a large proportion of our prospective citizenry have gained at least something of historical and geographical perspective.

Recently we have added a few new aims to our programs of citizen making. Our homely common sense has long warned us that the jobless or unemployable man is rarely a tolerable, and never a good, citizen; but only yesterday, historically speaking, did we accept a certain collective social responsibility towards insuring that our youth shall not mature into untrained or otherwise unemployable men and women. Our present programs for widely distrib-

uted opportunities for vocational education have not been designed primarily for civic ends; but the by-products of their operation will unquestionably contribute effects of the greatest importance to good citizenship.

Then, under the pressure of war, we have come to realize the indispensableness of more completely fostering and insuring a common language of communication on the part of those recently accessioned to citizenship. We now intend to enforce those of our laws which require that all reasonable efforts shall be made by the state, and seconded by the elders among our immigrants, to insure that the children of these immigrants shall receive and hold English as their principal language of social and businessintercourse.

Thus far have we translated our aspirations into programs of action. But we know that this is not enough. We often point to our high schools with their one million six hundred thousand pupils—the ablest, best circumstanced, and most promising of all our youth—as potential schools of American citizenship. But what, actually, do they now accomplish, worthy of their opportunities? The adolescent learners in these high schools come from good home environments and are predisposed and, in nearly all cases, actually predetermined to be orderly and well conducted men and women. But what are the actual contributions made through the high school curriculum to the highest habits, insights, and ideals of good citizenship expected of these potential leaders? Are civic aims explicit or implicit in the mathematical, English language, scientific, foreign language, historical and literary subjects as now standardized in high school curricula? Can we as yet detect any conscious adjustment of subject matter or methods of instruction towards the better attainment of civic aims? Our more progressive high schools are offering one or more courses in civics or government, but even the best of these are poorly oriented and show the inevitable abstractions of courses designed primarily to convey information. Pains-taking analyses of the structure and functions of government will not take us far. Very exacting studies of

contemporary public service problems will not serve if there is no actively co-operating motive. The motivation for the study of thousands of pages of history will be fruitless if, as must necessarily be generally the case, neither pupils nor teachers are able to reinterpret its messages in terms of the social realities of to-day.

We need programs of civic education especially for our young people between 12 and 18 years of age. We need to have a series of the concrete, specific problems of that civic education elaborated in detail, to the end that experimentation and research may be begun. To this end it is desirable that we should frequently take new bearings in order to determine as specifically as practicable what we mean by good citizenship, and by education for citizenship. Concurrently with these efforts, we must constantly seek to discover, formulate and submit to trial, new programs and methods designed to meet some specific ends in the needed education. Let me endeavor to exemplify my meaning.

Every true American recognizes that in matters of good citizenship he not only has obligations to meet on his own account, but that he is also in large measure the keeper of his brother's conscience. Few men are good citizens by virtue of the gifts of birth alone; most good citizens are made such by the processes of social control operated consciously or unconsciously within every social group, by the old on the young, the strong on the weak, the intelligent on the unintelligent, the co-operative on the non-co-operative.

There are a few cardinal propositions relative to citizenship in a twentieth century democracy which are to-day readily assented to by intelligent men everywhere. We agree, of course, that a worthy citizen must be, first of all, a willing conformist, a faithful team worker, an earnest co-operator. But he must be something more—something that is in a sense almost the reverse of all these. At proper times and places he should refuse to conform, to follow the herd, to uphold the laws. He must initiate, invent, seek followers, undertake new ventures, rebel, even in face of the opposition of his compatriots.

In many fields of social action which we call civic, we can easily see that good will, good intentions, "instincts for righteousness," are assets of primary importance in good citizenship; but it is also no less apparent that these do not carry far into other fields where issues are very complicated, where grounds for honest partisanship are many, and where the disposition to substitute even the highest forms of religious or other emotional guidance for the cool findings of reason may bring widespread ruin.

Can we not agree, too, that in the modern state there are few intentionally or consciously bad citizens? There are many self-satisfied, ignorant and lazy citizens. There are even more who elect to expend their time, energies and aspirations on the "small groups" which they can easily understand and fit into—families, clubs, parties, towns, vocational unions. But by their own lights these men are not lacking in civic virtues. Subconsciously they have accepted or made for themselves certain principles of division of labor, of "minding their own business," of "setting their own house in order," of standing by their friends, which serve, in their own minds, to exculpate them when confronted by charges of bad citizenship. These dispositions to revolve, act, and serve solely within the social orbits of local component and constituent groups is probably still produced and justified in large measure by the traditions and vestigial customs surviving into modern democracies from ages of autocratic control from without.

Finally, few of us will deny that the scope, variety and complexity of the issues upon which a citizen, if he be other than a passive conformist, is now called upon to pass, are increasing in almost geometrical ratio. It is not merely in matters of international relations, national finance, and interstate trade that even the well read man finds himself constantly balked by insufficient knowledge and inadequate interpretation; with the best of intentions most of us possess neither time nor ability, apparently, to understand the policies and practices of our parties, our municipalities, or



the economic organizations into which we put our labor or invest our savings. In a vague way we have learned from our president that never again can there be a great war in which America will not have vital interests; that economic interdependence among nations, widespread and exacting in the claims it produces, will be hereafter an inescapable condition for all nations; and that somehow we must, for the sake of peace and progress, discover the optimum resultants of "self-determination" on the one hand, and leagued co-operation on the other. But what a prospect of unsolved problems these imperatives open up to the average well-meaning citizen! Is it any wonder that, confronted by current new visions of responsible citizenship, we either resolve to "let George do it," or else cut the Gordian knots with the sword of impulse easily to be found among our stock of inherited feelings and preconceived ideas?

Perhaps those of us who are actively endeavoring to reconstruct or improve the processes by which citizens are made have not sufficiently realized how brief is the span of time of preparation and how limited are the energies and abilities of those who constitute the rank and file of voters, to say nothing of other citizens. Certainly, any well-meant programs of education for citizenship can only hope to succeed by taking full account of the limiting conditions affecting those whom we seek to educate.

I would, therefore, submit for your consideration as one of the new problems of education for citizenship, that of determining where and to what extent, among our various social classes, there now exist determinable, even if not fully measurable, defects of citizenship.

In New York City there are now nearly 6,000,000 people. These can be separably classified as adults and children; men and women; rich, prosperous and poor; well educated, moderately educated and illiterate; black and white; occupationally skilled and occupationally unskilled; unionized and ununionized; employers and employees; native born and foreign born. All of these, in the broad sense of the term, have been educated for citizenship—educated to be

bad citizens, educated to be indifferent citizens, or educated to be good citizens. They have been educated by their homes, their churches, their street associations, their political parties, their newspapers, their contacts with police, theatre and philanthropic agencies; and, finally, by the schools they have attended. Much of this education was unintended by either giver or recipient; most of it was only incidentally purposive; and all of it, substantially, was governed, in aim and method, by but slightly rationalized customs and traditions, where it was not wholly a matter of impulse and chance.

What are the results of this education as found in the citizenry of New York to-day? Surely only a very unreasonable pessimist would say they are all bad. Critical as we may be of the shortcomings of ourselves and especially of our less well known fellows, we must nevertheless recognize that a large proportion of our six million are trying with some success to observe the laws, to prosecute their own business without interfering disastrously with the business of others, and in a thousand ways to contribute to the general harmony, good will, and prosperity. And on the side of civic initiative the situation might, obviously, be much worse than it is. Our streets, water supply, parks, police, public schools and municipal bookkeeping are not perfect, but neither are they hopelessly bad. Our citizens through their votes and public opinion have somewhat muddlingly, but nevertheless with considerable efficiency, managed the affairs of what is, certainly, an appallingly complex enterprise.

But we cannot remain content with present accomplishments. The citizenship of to-morrow must be better than the citizenship of to-day—for one reason because it will certainly have still more difficult tasks to perform. Towards securing that better citizenship, in so far as we are to secure it through socially conscious processes including education, it is desirable and in large measure necessary, that we should evaluate in terms of distinguishable social groups and specific civic virtues and failings, the citizenship which

we now have as the result of the multifarious educative processes of the last fifty years.

For it will be on the basis of the knowledge thus obtained, largely, that we are to frame the policies and specific programs through which the hundreds of thousands of boys and girls now in the public schools of this city will become better qualified than their fathers and mothers to meet civic responsibilities during the years from 1920 to 1950.

Obviously what is called for now is social diagnosis of a more than impressionistic character. Little reliance can hereafter be placed on those "cut and try" proposals for civic (or any other) education which chiefly reflect the philosophical prepossessions of the proposer. In an excessively large amount of contemporary discussion of various phases of education for citizenship there is manifested an unquenchable disposition to offer aspirations instead of programs, to evade the difficulties of analytical thinking by resting serenely on pious generalizations of very equivocal significance. This disposition is not wholly unrelated, be it noted, to certain very passionately urged specific proposals, usually of a negative or repressive order, that are especially apt to be made in times of social crisis.

The first problem, then, is that of ascertaining where and in what respects the citizenship we now have fails to meet social necessities. As respects what civic virtues are our most recent immigrants conspicuously weak? Our college graduates in business? Our best educated women voters? Our unionized craftsmen? Our semi-skilled Negro workers? As respects what civic virtues are these groups, or subgroups within them or other ascertainable social groups or classes, commendably strong? What are the classes or levels or groups in which strong and worthy civic motives of definable kinds are accompanied by low or deformed civic understanding, also of definable types? Where do we find ample civic intelligence of stated types, corrupted or nullified by low or adverse motives of discernible kinds?

We need the facts called for by these questions as necessary means towards providing more effective programs of

civic education in or out of schools. Programs of civic training and instruction (at least those developed since the spread of aspirations for democracy and of demands for freedom of thinking have deprived us of the great old foundation stones of authority) have heretofore rested on the insecure groundwork of *a priori* thinking; the controlling objectives have been ill-defined; and the methods employed necessarily formal and opportunist.

Given necessary resources, it should be easily possible even now to set in motion research that would give us at least partial answers to the questions raised above. Modern social economy and applied psychology have evolved at least some applicable and reliable methods of inquiry. It rests with informed public opinion to provide the needed motive power.

The second problem here submitted for your consideration is of a very different nature. If we are to develop more systematic education towards good citizenship than we now have, we shall be obliged to make use, either of existing schools, or of accessory educational agencies like the Boy Scouts, moving pictures, public libraries, Red Cross service, and the like. In the case of students competent and financially able to go to college—and who may be expected in large part to be the leaders of the future, by virtue both of their superior natural abilities and their prolonged schooling—an almost bewildering variety of courses of instruction in government, economics, and other branches of social science is now available. Opportunities for directed *training* for citizenship may still be wanting, but certainly there is no dearth of means of learning from instruction what are the problems of citizenship.

But in the case of that large majority who never even knock at the doors of the colleges—those millions who are to constitute the rank and file of citizens whose compliance and initiative will often, in spite of the intentions of better instructed leaders, determine whether we are to have a harmonious and progressive democratic social order or a faction-torn chaos of warring social groups—what can be

done, during their school years, towards better preparation for citizenship? In some respects present day schools are improving their own internal conditions of social control, and are thereby making some significant contributions, especially to the passive or conformist virtues of the citizenship of the next generation. The schools of to-day, with the possible exception of those in a few largest cities, are unquestionably at once more democratic and better disciplined, more liberal and more orderly, than were the schools of previous generations. In spite of the outcries of an occasional alarmist, it is certain that the moral life of the American elementary school and even more so of the co-educational high school is to-day on a higher plane than has ever been the case, over a considerable time and area, in schools for corresponding classes and ages in the past.

But orderly or even perfect social behavior during school years will not suffice to give us the kind of citizenship we need for the future, any more than will acquaintanceship with village topography suffice to guide one in the cosmopolitan wanderings of adult life. What we can well call the *problems* confronting the citizen—questions and issues of economic, political, ethical, municipal, national, international, financial, and sociological nature—are increasingly of a kind that can not be resolved by well intentioned compliance and kindly initiative alone. More and more these problems resemble the problems of the physician, the engineer, the banker, and the manufacturer. Their strictly scientific aspects—one is tempted to say their non-humanistic aspects, meaning thereby, of course, their extra-feeling aspects—loom relatively larger all the time. Strict publicity, exact justice, scientifically adjusted means to well foreseen ends—these are to be factors of very large importance in the operation of the new social order.

These considerations bring into relief our second problem. For the millions of our prospective citizens who can profit only by the education to be offered in our elementary and secondary schools it is manifestly impracticable to offer instruction calculated to enable them independently



to form adequate judgments or to arrive at sound conclusions in relation to the numberless intricate issues as to which the average citizen, at least on election day, if not oftener, must perforce make decisions. The average man, even when exceptionally well read, now frankly confesses his incapacity, through sheer lack of time and ability, to act with proper intelligence on the questions of municipal, state, national and international politics which daily confront him. He is baffled by their number and complexity and mortified at his own apparent incompetence to deal with them. H. G. Wells, perhaps more successfully than any other recent writer, has assisted us to appreciate how like a legendary adventure in a monster haunted wilderness is the quest of the thoughtful man of to-day in his attempts to reach the goal of constructive good citizenship amidst the complexities of the social order now evolving.

What, under these conditions, shall, or what, indeed, can, be the practicable objectives of civic instruction in the schools? We may not rest back on an authoritarian form of procedure, instilling into the hearts and minds of our pupils dogmas and fixed prepossessions. That procedure stands hopelessly condemned as undemocratic and unscientific. On the other hand the futility of trying to enable the minds of fourteen or even eighteen year old youth to grasp the intricacies of modern social problems is comparable only with the futility of trying to have them understand for working purposes the technical complexities of modern astronomical, mathematical, engineering, medical and architectural problems. And yet, that is just what many a harried or emotionally striving teacher of history or social science is doing to-day in the schools. And in even greater degree that is just what ambitious spokesmen for educators and sometimes for laymen are recommending shall be done in the schools. Some of the requirements implicit in pretentious papers on the "teaching of citizenship" would be ludicrous if they could be crystallized out of the easy language of aspiration in which they are held in solution.

The educational difficulties here indicated are to be

resolved, probably, only by the development of certain new types of educational aim or purpose which have hardly appeared as yet in programs of education for citizenship. We must devise means of convincing our youth that their chief responsibilities as active or dynamic citizens must be met, not through their abilities to solve complex problems for themselves, but through their abilities to employ specialists to solve these problems for them.

To a very large extent we do just that thing now in another field of education, namely the physical. Here our schools aim to prepare children to live healthy lives as adults. They do this in part by instructing the children how to look after themselves in some minor matters of cure and of prevention of ailment; but in much larger and more important measure to consult and abide by the decisions of specialists. In physical education, it is frankly recognized that problems of teeth, tonsils, eyes, ears, arches, digestion, and contagion, are far too difficult for the average individual himself, that these are matters to be delegated to specialists. The effect of this education is that among our better schooled classes we finally produce a well defined set of attitudes, capacities and powers which can be described in a phrase—*the individual has become a good employer and user of expert service*. The individual has not surrendered his initiative or reduced his judgment to impotence; but he has differentiated them along lines that are most profitable. In other words, he has been trained to carry into this area of life the types of performance—the specialization of services, and exchange of products of service—which have long prevailed where more material relationships have been involved.

For we know that, in fact, the relationships which are suggested here have always prevailed in politics; but we have not yet learned to make proper use of them in our educational programs. The chieftain in clan or tribe was given place and honor because of his ability to do what his followers could not do. To king or priest were attributed powers that ordinary men were not able to exercise. Vot-

ing has always been in fact much more a collective employment of specialists than it has been a conscious evaluating of policies or determination of programs of civic action.

In purposive education for citizenship, we could, therefore, include two principal aims: (a) so to shape the individual's appreciations, habits, insights and ideals that to an optimum degree he will conform to the requirements of the various social groups in which he has membership; and (b) so to train him that on the dynamic side of his citizenship he will consider himself above everything else an employer and supervisor of expert service in the numberless fields now comprehended within the general area of political action. The second aim would certainly be peculiarly suited to learners of secondary school age, and no less well suited to adults ambitious more effectively to discharge their responsibilities as citizens.

Many of us have recently been interested in the efforts of women, just admitted to the franchise, to study the political problems upon which they expect to pass judgment at the polls. In most cases, naturally, these women have just been able to proceed far enough to become aware of the complexity and baffling character of the issues involved. However far they are able to penetrate into the mazes of municipal ownership, teachers' salaries, methods of taxation, state park systems, care of dependents and the thousand other technical problems that everywhere confront voters, they will find that in the last analysis courses of action and especially results of action will be determined by the competence and honesty of the specialists delegated to enact legislation or take executive action in these matters. The voter's largest problem, obviously, is to assure just this competence and honesty on the part of his employees, that is, those whom he, in conjunction with others, selects for, and supervises in, the performance of particular forms of public service.

But if, therefore, we aim in education to make our voters good employers of specialist service, we shall be obliged at once to determine what are the powers and capacities that

make of us good employers? Under what conditions are you and I good employers of physicians, ministers, plumbers, bankers, novelists, cooks, tailors, editors, and the like? In each of these fields we are all consumers, we must all choose among various offerings, and we are aware that the character of our selections of service and continued patronage exerts a determining influence on the character of the service more extensively hereafter to be rendered.

This is hardly the time or place to analyze the characteristic qualities of the good employer as he now exists in private life; but sooner or later we must do just that in the process of determining the qualities we should seek to produce in that co-operative employer of public service, the voting citizen. Only a few inquiries may be offered here as a basis for further reflection, possibly of eventual research.

Granted that an average man has neither time nor ability to become simultaneously a good tailor, cook, dentist, and preacher, what kinds and degrees of appreciation, knowledge and ideal of tailoring, cooking, dentistry and preaching will be required to make him a reasonably effective employer (in the social as well as in the strictly individualistic sense) of producers in these respective fields? Clearly a man completely without standards and insight here cannot be a good chooser, a wise utilizer. Suppose, having a limited amount of time at our disposal, we were to address ourselves specifically to the task of making a group of adolescent boys or girls good buyers of service, good employers in these four fields, what courses would or should we follow? Herein, I submit, will be found some of the keys to education for citizenship in the future.

It should be noted that every moderately cultivated adult is to-day the buyer of hundreds of varieties of specialist service—ranging from architecture, music and literature through engineering, medical and mercantile service down to food, clothing and amusements. Possibly we have not yet in our educational theory differentiated *high grade* utilization along these lines as a comprehensive aim of pri-

mary importance. Hence we are still easily victimized by the contentions of Utopians that we can only become good utilizers—of paintings, or furniture or newspapers—through having at least attempted to master the arts of the producer in each of these fields.

The analogies—it is here contended that they are parallels—in education for citizenship are plain. The citizen, as stockholder in the commonwealth, must elect directors (very foolishly he often attempts, what stockholders in private corporations never do, namely to elect technical specialists as well) and in so doing provide for the discharge of literally hundreds of functions, each of an increasingly complicated character. Somewhere and somehow, if he is to discharge his responsibilities well, he must have become so informed as to the requirements of the work to be done, and of the qualities of the men available to do it that he can choose and direct his servants in these fields as well as he selects and directs his dentist, editor, or steamship captain.

Difficult pedagogical problems are doubtless involved in this field of education, but surely the ends in view are far more practicable than those supporting the illusory procedures now so frequently found in our schools in which we expect study of American history, the Constitution of the United States and the complex mechanisms of municipal government to give the student ability to comprehend and solve the problems upon which he must pass as voter. "Every man his own physician" would not be a more unjustifiable principle of action than that of encouraging each man as a voter to trust his own judgment of complex issues rather than of a specialist whom he freely and intelligently should choose. The pedagogical difficulties involved in educating citizens to appreciate the importance, to understand the methods, and to experience the motives making for such right choice of service are by no means insurmountable, once the goals to be attained are clearly defined.

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Vol. XXX.—No. 1.

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## THE "INNER" LIFE AS A SUPPRESSED IDEAL OF CONDUCT.

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**T**HE death of Jesus,—not as the nucleus of a theological dogma but as an ethical fact,—has had a momentous social significance. The Master's death was the culmination of his teaching, the teaching that when we are smitten on one cheek we are to turn the other; that it is better to give than to receive; that when men take our coat we are to give our cloak also; that to save one's life is to lose it, and to lose it for the kingdom's sake is to find it! In the teaching and life of this man Jesus there came into the world the greatest ethical force known to human history. He brought a new view of man and of human society. For the old Hebrew and Roman ethnic morality with its blood bond and its local and class sympathies he substituted a new ethics, the ethics of human brotherhood. This new ethics did not rest on force; it was founded on the heart and the will. Jesus incarnated in himself this new world-view which was being slowly evolved in Greco-Roman thought also. In his crucifixion the world saw enacted as in a drama the historic conflict between the old ethnic world-view, incarnated in the Roman state, and the new ethics of the will and the heart, the ethics of freedom. In the crucifixion the old empire of force and the new kingdom of love came face to face. In the old Hebrew and Greek and Roman world suffering was a curse. The Roman state forbade the crucifixion of its citizens. In the ethics of Jesus the cross as the symbol of suffering became the badge of membership in a new moral kingdom. When things were thoroughly bad the Epicurean and even the Stoic advised suicide. The divine in the Stoic taught him to flee from an evil world. On the other hand, the message of Jesus was not a retreat from an evil world; it meant the creation of a new and a better world. His ethical ideal

brought a sword and not peace in its dealing with the older régime. The principles of love and service were incompatible with the ruling Roman principle of aristocratic lordship (Mark 10:42, 43). Jesus forced home on the hearts of men the issue of a view of man; and there was only one result possible. To press home such an interpretation of society would bring the Jews into opposition with Rome. Therefore, argued the priests (John 11:48, 50) "it is expedient that one man should die . . . and that the whole nation perish not." This is the explanation of the crucifixion. The death on the cross stamped itself on the imagination of men because it dramatized before the world the conflict which had been going on in western civilization since the teaching of Jeremiah and Socrates. Thousands of Christian martyrs followed the light which blazed on their pathway from the Master's cross. Sensitive souls with unusual ethical sympathy and imagination, souls like Paul and Francis, carried about in their hearts, and even on their bodies, the marks, the stigmata of the Master's suffering. It is no wonder that the cross became the dominant theme of Christian art and literature.

Neither the Roman government nor the Jewish priesthood could adapt itself to the new ideal of conduct. As Greece stifled the voice of her better self in the death of Socrates, so the Jews and Rome through the crucifixion of Jesus repudiated in the name of the state the greatest moral force in the history of mankind. And the same thing happened in the case of the followers of Jesus that took place in post-Socratic philosophy; the newer moral conscience of humanity withdrew from the sphere of public affairs to a world which Homer and Isaiah could not have understood, the world of the inner life. The old hope of a kingdom of righteousness on earth, suppressed by the hard world of political fact, was transformed into the new ideal of the inner life. This was the only way in which the newer conscience of Jeremiah, of Socrates, of Jesus, could keep itself alive in the world.

Such was the moral and social situation of the Hellenis-

tic world. Under such circumstances the Stoic fell back on an iron will to which all material and social interests that opposed this will were indifferent. Others followed the mystery religions which through a magical ceremonial conferred immediate immortality. Something of both these views is in the Fourth Gospel and in Paul. The Jew with his incurable passion for a social program looked for the realization of his social ideal in the future either on the earth or in heaven. If the kingdom of righteousness of Jesus still held to the earth under such circumstances then the mind of Jesus must have adhered to the older school of Jewish thought in opposition to all the ruling tendencies of the Hellenistic age. The Christian Church as a whole, which voiced itself in the New Testament, interpreted the kingdom of Jesus in a heavenly rather than an earthly sense. Indeed, it was the acceptance of this ideal which gave rise unconsciously to the organization of the Christian Church. The church as an organization for the preservation of the newer ethical values which were excluded from the political organization of the state was the logical result of the institutional development of the first Christian centuries. The dualistic philosophy which separated heaven from earth as a permanent ideal was elaborated by the Church Fathers and by the scholastics. It did not come from Jesus. If Jesus interpreted the kingdom of righteousness in a heavenly sense it was most likely due to the fact that political conditions made its realization on earth impossible. The social attitude of the Hebrew prophets was just as direct and powerful in the mind of Jesus as it had been in the minds of his predecessors. The differentiation of church and state arose because the traditional state could not or would not incorporate those newer elements of experience which came from Greek philosophy and Hebrew prophecy, and which reflected the deeper, inner, more self-conscious and voluntary side of life.

To attribute to Jesus an ethics including in its immediate scope the affairs of the state and what we think of as economic concerns does not seem to accord with the moral

and religious world with which the literature of the time makes us acquainted. The whole Mediterranean world in the Hellenistic period was turning away from the world to the sphere of the inner life. But if the kingdom of Jesus was a heavenly kingdom then the mediæval church was the logical development of the early Christian ideal. And if this be true how shall we avoid the conclusion that the ideal of Jesus, since it was projected beyond this world, is no longer a live issue for us to-day? If the ideal of Jesus does not concern this world does it not make just one of the chapters in the middle of our history of ethics? Is it not just one of the problems in the history of the past? Shall we go with Nietzsche and say that because our ethics must be a redemption of reality and not a redemption from reality the ideal of Jesus cannot function in our modern world?

The answer to this question can come only from a proper perspective of history. To project the ideal kingdom of righteousness into a heavenly sphere was not to surrender that ideal. It was placing it in the only realm where it could be preserved. An inner life interpreted in a heavenly sense was absolutely the most impregnable store-house for the new social vision. The organization of the Christian Church which grew about this new ideal gave it an institutional standing in the world. The kingdom of the prophets by becoming a kingdom of heaven called forth the institution of the church. Through the church this ideal society, albeit it was located in heaven, became the ideal of western civilization. The world brooded over it, unconsciously measured its standards by it, worked out a philosophy to justify it, embodied it in its art. Within the church at least the code of conduct was determined by the ethics of Jesus. This seemingly unreal vision of the new ideal through the work of the church actually won the loyalty of the world.

We of to-day look upon the ideals and values of the Christian Church not as ends in themselves, not as applying to an absolute world beyond our world. We are

coming to see in these Christian ideals standards of value through which all phases of life and conduct are to be remodeled. But we must remember that there was no possibility of an immediate application of these newer ethical ideals to the affairs of the state at the beginning of the Christian era. The ethics of Jesus seemed sheer madness to the old pagan world. What then was to be done with the newer ideals of Plato and the Stoics, of the prophets and of Jesus? The development of the Christian Church is the answer of history to this question. There is an unconscious reasoning in the way in which institutions develop in the unfolding of human history. The spirit of Socrates and Plato and the Stoics and the Hebrew seers built itself a new body; it founded the Christian Church. Here was to be the home of these newer ideals. Here was an organization which could keep alive the ideas of Socrates, the dreams of Plato, the sentiments of Paul, the ideal kingdom of Jesus.

The old pre-Socratic, pre-exilic unity of life was destroyed, as Nietzsche observes. But it was not the destruction of death. We are witnessing the reorganization of a growing world. In the Christian Church was housed the newer conscience of the Greek and Hebrew world. Through the church this new ideal was to win the intelligence and conscience of western civilization. The conscience of the Christ denied the world because the world as it existed was not the real world which was to be. The ideal kingdom existed in heaven because it could not yet exist upon the earth.

There has been no universally accepted ideal of conduct in western civilization since the fall of the city-state in Greece and the passing of the Hebrew state in the Babylonian exile. Since the days of Jeremiah and Socrates western civilization has lacked the old moral and social solidarity wherein was her ancient strength. The death of Socrates and the crucifixion of Jesus brought about a divorce between the newer conscience of western civilization and the traditional state; and this divorce has lasted

down to the present time. When Nietzsche says that the world has had no system of morals since Plato he utters a profound truth. Socratism, Platonism, Stoicism, the mystery religions, were phases of a new moral ideal which could not express itself in and through the traditional state. In the pre-Socratic Greek world, in the pre-exilic Hebrew world, knowledge, art, science, religion, romantic love, loyalty to the public good,—all the idealistic factors of experience, were in organic adjustment with the state. After Socrates, after the exile, this unity of life and conduct ceased to exist. A process of internalization began. The inner life, the heart, the will, the conscience, the subjective elements of experience, got divorced from the objective institutions incarnated in the state. Religion and morality came to be a matter of states of mind, attitudes of will. The old ideal of a kingdom of righteousness was no longer thought of as possible in the organized political state. It was now in a world within, not in a world without. But ideals, as psychology is teaching us, do not die when they are temporarily inhibited by an unsympathetic world of fact. Ideas which have behind them the deeper instincts of the race, when temporarily denied expression in the objective world, are forced down into the deeper unconscious levels of the mind. If the repression continues the deeper instincts will, through the instrumentality of the intellect, transform the suppressed ideal into some form of dream, some form of imagery, in which it can survive its temporary defeat. In this case the ideal of a righteous social order on earth took in the Hellenistic period the form of the inner life. In the early Christian development this ideal was transformed into an inner heavenly life. To give objective embodiment to the newer ideal there arose the institution of the Christian Church which provided a home not only for the newer Hebrew conscience but also for Greek philosophy and art.

During the long reign of the mediæval church there came about a stereotyped dualistic philosophy which divided the world into the ideal and the real, the holy and

the profane, a heavenly and an earthly world. And here in the very victory of the church lay her greatest source of weakness. For to store one's ideals in a heavenly inner life is to save those ideals so long as the world is in the hands of a pagan conservative government. But to keep one's ideal treasured up in the same heaven after that ideal has won the confidence and loyalty of the world at large, to regard one's ideal as applying permanently to just one aspect of experience, to a static heavenly inner life, is to deprive that ideal of its content, to make it formal and empty. The new ideal under such circumstances ceases to be real. With no external material with which to operate, the ideal of a purely interior life destroys itself by feeding on its own vitals. At the same time the state and its institutions are not only outside the control of the newer ideal but they are deprived of even those ideal elements which all public institutions had in the classic pagan days. The ideal of a kingdom of righteousness can save itself only by incarnating itself in the actual world. On the other hand, an inner kingdom which is only an asylum for the higher conscience of the world deprives the world of just those elements of experience through which alone it can be made a moral order. The newer ideal of a kingdom of righteousness must function in and through the actual world, otherwise both the ideal kingdom and the actual world are left in a condition of disorganization.

It was this disorganization which Nietzsche saw when he said that the world has had no moral system since Plato. The newer higher Christian ideal has won the world's loyalty away from the older pagan systems of life and conduct. But the Christian ideal concerns a heavenly world and not the earth! Loyalty to the old systems is gone; and the new ideal does not concern our earth! Such is Nietzsche's bitter interpretation of the world's morality.

And Nietzsche's interpretation is true! But it presents a transverse section of the history of morals which gives no perspective of what is to come. Nietzsche shows us

the disorganizing effect of the newer ideal of Hellenistic thought on the full-orbed ethnic morality of classical paganism. But the fact that the newer ideal of the prophets and of Jesus is in spirit one with the ideal of Socrates and Plato and the Stoics Nietzsche does not explain. The fact that the whole Hellenistic philosophy of an inner life was the logical result of the exclusion of the newer, higher moral ideal from the older ethnic moral order Nietzsche does not see. The old could never survive unchanged after it had caught the newer Greco-Christian vision. It is conceivable that the newer Greco-Christian ideal could have been wrought out in connection with the legislative and economic concerns of the state. But such a result did not occur. Even after the Christian ideal has theoretically won the loyalty of the world the morals of legislation and industry are for the most part untouched by the newer ideal. The organic adjustment of the ideal and the actual is always imperfect even in the lives of the best individuals. That there should have been an open break between the world of traditional institutions and the newer moral order of the prophets and seers is an illustration in the life of the race of the difficulty of adjusting the old and the new, a fact with which we are so familiar in the field of individual experience.

An ideal, a prophecy, a dream, is a projection of a repressed or an unfulfilled desire. Some deep aspect of experience has missed realization. Some profound phase of life has been repressed by the hard world of fact. But if there be an instinctive basis for such a repressed desire, if it be one of the permanent trends of the mind, it is not destroyed by repression. There results the formation of a dual experience. The suppressed ideal is forced down into the deeper levels of the mind and is thereby more or less disassociated from the field of experience of which we are ordinarily conscious. And unless there results some workable synthesis of the repressed system of ideas with the work-a-day personality the mind will become abnormal. To live a life in which are suppressed one's deepest desires,



one's profoundest loves, one's activating ideals, is to live a broken, and, it may be, an insane life.

Now the life of western civilization from the death of Socrates to the Renaissance was just such a repressed, disassociated, broken and therefore abnormal life. The visions of the cross, the dreams of heaven, the painful swoonings, the hysterias, of the Christian saints, are absolutely unmistakable evidence that the newer Christian ideal which was suppressed by the pagan state expressed the deeper longings of the world. The church embodied in a durable organization this new love, this dominant ideal. Christ on the cross shrouded in the crimson robe of his own sacrificial blood had won the heart, the will, the conscience, of the world. But Christ did not rule the state. The new ideal could only hover over the earth; it could not actually possess it. Such a situation actually tore the soul from the body.

Three solutions of this problem are possible. One is to surrender the dream and to return to the pre-Socratic, pre-exilic world. This is Nietzsche's solution. Another solution is to hold to the dream and ignore the world of fact. This was the mediæval solution. Either of these solutions is a form of disassociation. Nietzsche in his *Genealogy of Morals* shows conclusively with the grasp of a master that the mediæval solution led to a form of moral insanity. He does not see that his own solution would lead to an equally abnormal moral will. To hold to the once glorious world of Homer after the world has had the newer Christian dream would lead straight to a morally insane will. There is only one solution left. The new Christian ideal, the suppressed dream, symbolized by the cross, must reorganize without impugning the older, deeper pagan instincts which lie at the foundation of our institutional as well as our personal life. The old pagan institutions of property, of the state, of the family, of the school, must be reinterpreted in the light of the newer Christian conscience. Then will the church have saved itself. Then will she also have saved the world.

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ON SOME DEDUCTIONS FROM THE DOCTRINE  
OF CONSEQUENCES IN ETHICS.

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**I**F the majority of mankind based their conduct on ethical theory, and if the circulation of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS were as large as that of some daily newspapers, then an article which appeared in that JOURNAL some five years ago would already have caused a considerable commotion. For, if the statements made in that article ("The Doctrine of Consequences in Ethics," by C. D. Broad) are true, a certain conclusion follows—the conclusion that no one can ever know what actions it is right for him to perform.

This startling conclusion is not indeed put forward explicitly in the article. All that Mr. Broad proposes to do there is to examine certain ethical concepts employed by Mr. Bertrand Russell and Mr. G. E. Moore in recent works. His examination tends to show that these concepts have not in some cases been defined with sufficient clearness, and that they do not correspond, so nearly as their authors suppose, to the notions of common-sense. He concludes by defining some other concepts which he holds to be free from the defects discovered in those of Mr. Russell and Mr. Moore.

All this seems innocent enough. But no one, I think, could read the article attentively without observing that the positions there taken up lead inevitably to the sceptical conclusion which I have stated. In order to bring this out, I shall sketch briefly the relevant parts of Mr. Broad's argument. Those parts which are important for our present purpose are mostly contained in the section of the article which deals with Mr. Russell's position, and it will, therefore, not be necessary to touch, except incidentally, on what is said about Mr. Moore's.

The whole discussion starts from the notion, drawn from

the moral judgments of common-sense, of *right action*. According to Mr. Russell, the rightness or wrongness (in the most important senses of these words) of an action depends solely on its consequences, or on what the agent believes or should reasonably believe about its consequences. Mr. Broad, on the other hand, while agreeing that consequences are extremely important, is inclined to admit that motives may also have a bearing on the rightness or wrongness of an action.

Now the necessity of defining clearly several concepts such as objectively right, subjectively right, and so on, arises from the fact that common-sense, in deciding whether an action is right or wrong, does not take into account *only* the motive from which it was done, or *only* its actual consequences, or *only* what the agent thought would be its consequences; it usually takes all three into consideration. But being common-sense and not philosophical theory, it is a little vague about the relative weight to be given to each of these factors, and it is not possessed of a clearly defined terminology. The whole purpose of the discussion which we are considering is to define clearly a number of concepts which shall correspond as closely as possible to the more or less vague notions which common-sense seems to employ. Those concepts as defined by Mr. Russell are as follows:

(1) A *most fortunate act*. This is an act which has as good consequences as any that is open to the agent.

(2) An *objectively right act*. This is an act which, when account is taken of all available data, will probably be most fortunate.

(3) A *subjectively right act*, or moral act. This is an act which the agent would judge to be right after an appropriate amount of candid thought.

These distinctions are adopted by Mr. Russell as corresponding more or less closely to various distinctions recognised by common-sense. There is a sense in which a right act is one which will have as good consequences as any that is open to the agent; but if we simply define a

right act in this way, we are led to the paradox that often a right act cannot be an act that we ought to do. For it is impossible to foresee all the consequences of an act; and, as Mr. Russell puts it, "it may happen that the act which will in fact prove the most fortunate is likely according to all the evidence at our disposal, to be less fortunate than some other. In such a case, it will be, at least in one sense, objectively wrong to go against the evidence, in spite of the actual good result of our doing so. There have certainly been some men who have done so much harm that it would have been fortunate for the world if their nurses had killed them in infancy. But if their nurses had done so their action would not have been objectively right, because the probability was that it would not have the best effects." Mr. Russell therefore introduces the concept of an objectively right action, defined as above, as corresponding to one important sense in which we commonly talk of a right action.

Mr. Broad's criticism is directed to showing that this notion is not sufficiently defined by Mr. Russell, and that if we do proceed to try to make it unambiguous by expanding it, our attempts still leave us in the end with an ambiguous notion. He begins by pointing out that we cannot talk of the probability of a proposition, but only of its probability in relation to certain data; and that we must also distinguish factual data from ethical premises and principles of inference. A "probably most fortunate act" for any agent is, therefore, a more complicated conception than would at first appear. Further, the question of probability enters twice; we have to take account not only of the probability of certain consequences happening, but of the probability of their value being so and so. This being so, we have to state clearly (which Mr. Russell has not done) whether the objective rightness of an act depends on the actual value of its probable consequences, or on the probable value of its actual consequences, or on the probable value of its probable consequences. Even if we get rid of this ambiguity by accepting definitely the last

interpretation, we find that even within this an ambiguity remains. For (to quote Mr. Broad) "suppose that an agent has two actions,  $X$  and  $Y$ , open to him. Suppose, further, that relative to the propositions that the agent believes and disbelieves, the most probable consequences of  $X$  are  $A$ , and that their probability is  $p$ . Let the most probable consequences of  $Y$  be  $B$ , and let their probability be  $q$ . Further, let the most probable measure of the goodness of  $A$  be  $x$ , and the most probable measure of the goodness of  $B$  be  $y$ . Now suppose that  $p < q$  and  $x > y$ . What then is objectively right? Ought the man to choose the act whose most probable consequences are less probable, but most probably more good, or the one whose most probable consequence is more probable, but most probably less good?"

This certainly sounds very complicated, and we might be tempted to say impatiently that the distinction is only a piece of hair-splitting and utterly remote from any real problem of ethics. But, as a matter of fact, problems of this nature do actually occur, and it may be worth while to give an example, since Mr. Broad has not done so.

Suppose I am standing on the sea-shore or on a river-bank, and see that three children have fallen into the water. Summing up the situation rapidly, I realise that if I swim to the spot I can probably rescue one of the children, but that before I could bring it to the shore and return, the other two will almost certainly be drowned. I also know that there is a boat near at hand, and that if I run immediately and row out I have a fair chance of saving all three children; but that I am not so certain of being able in this way to save *any* of them as I am of being able to save one if I swim instead of going for the boat. Which course of action ought I to choose—that which will probably save one child but not the others, or that which may save all three but where the risk of failing completely is greater? It is clear, of course, that either of these alternatives is better than to stand pondering on the question until it is too late to do anything.

The notion, then, of an "objectively right action" which seemed at first so simple, turns out in the end to be exceedingly complicated and none the less infected with ambiguity; and while in its simple form it seemed a reasonable interpretation of one of the notions of common-sense, its developed form seems so remote from anything intended by common-sense that it becomes very doubtful whether it is a useful notion at all. Mr. Broad, therefore, turns to Mr. Moore's theory in search of a possible alternative. In this search it is not necessary, for our present purposes, to follow him; for, as we shall see later, the problems which have confronted us in seeking to define the notion of "a probably most fortunate action" arise again in another form, even if we try to dispense with this notion in passing judgment on the actions of others.

I pass on to another point made by Mr. Broad. He objects to the narrow sense in which Mr. Russell takes "consequences" when judging of the rightness of an action. Mr. Russell seems to consider as relevant only those "consequences" which follow an action in time and which are directly due to it. But, Mr. Broad argues, we need a wider conception than this; we need the conception of the total state of the universe, past, present, and future, as modified by the action in question. The reason why this wider conception is necessary lies in the Principle of Organic Unities. That principle asserts that the value of a whole is not necessarily equal to the sum of the values of its component parts, taken in isolation; it may even happen that the value of a whole is increased by the addition of a factor which taken by itself is evil; for example, pain is admitted by nearly everyone to be an evil, yet many people hold that the infliction of pain as a punishment for wickedness gives us in some way a better state of things than if wickedness were allowed to go unpunished. It follows, therefore, Mr. Broad argues, that an action whose direct consequences are good may yet make the total state of the universe less good than if it had not been done; for the addition to a whole of a factor in itself good may

make that whole worse. Now it would be paradoxical to say that an action which makes the total state of the universe less good is a right action; therefore it is more reasonable to define a right action (or most fortunate action) as one that makes the total value of the universe as great as possible, than to define it as one that has as good direct consequences as possible.

So far I have summarised Mr. Broad's position; possibly at too great length for those who have his article before them, and too briefly for those who have not.

As I said at the beginning of this paper, his arguments if accepted lead us to an almost complete scepticism; and I have now to show why this is the case. The sceptical conclusions do not appear in the article because there Mr. Broad is concerned simply to discover certain clearly-defined notions corresponding more or less closely to the notions used by common-sense in judging of the rightness or wrongness of actions. So when a notion such as that of "probably most fortunate action" turns out to be unprofitable, he simply rejects it and seeks for some other. And he is able ultimately, in choosing his list of ethical concepts, to avoid those which imply complicated calculations of probability; objective rightness is defined without any reference to probability, and subjective rightness is not considered as being a very important conception.

Now all this can only be done when one remains at the point of view of the spectator, which is the point of view from which Mr. Broad considers the question in his article. The moment the question becomes a practical one, the moment any individual has to ask himself, "What ought *I* to do in these present circumstances?" at that moment all these difficulties about probability come back.

For consider the case of such an individual who desires to act rightly. Mr. Broad would reply to his enquiry, "The right action, the action you ought to perform, is such an action as will make the total value of the universe at least as great as any other action open to you." Now no doubt there is a sense of "right" in which this is the correct

answer; but be that as it may, such an answer helps the enquirer hardly at all. For, not being omniscient, he does not know with certainty what action will produce this result; the conception of right which can alone be useful to him is that of objective rightness in the sense which Mr. Broad has shown to be so complicated. The answer to his question is, "You ought to perform an action which will probably, on your information, make the total value of the universe at least as great as any other action open to you." But as we have seen, this answer is ambiguous; for the question of probability enters twice: first, there is the probable result of the action and then there is the probable value of that result. The first difficulty arising from this—the doubt as to whether "actual value of probable consequences," or "probable value of actual consequences," or "probable value of probable consequences," is to be our criterion, is not I think a very serious one. Since we are now considering the matter from the point of view of the agent, who can only take probability as his guide, it seems clear that the last of these interpretations is the one which must be adopted here. And this question will be further cleared up in what I have to say later on the conception of "probable value."

The other difficulty, however, still remains: Ought the agent to choose that action the most probable result of which is less probable but most probably more good, or that action whose most probable result is more probable but most probably less good?

But even without this latter difficulty the position seems hopeless enough. For there must always be two calculations involved: First the calculation as to the probable consequences of an action, and then the calculation as to the probable effect on the total value of the universe of these consequences if they do happen. Now the first of these, taken simply by itself, presents considerable difficulties. Problems of mathematical probability, where the factors are simple and clearly defined, admit of exact numerical solutions; but when it is a question of ordinary



events of all kinds, and when we are not able arbitrarily to limit the material, exact numerical solutions cannot be given. In such cases the probability remains a vaguer magnitude; the most we can ever say is that one thing is considerably more probable than another, never that it is exactly so many times more probable. And in some cases, it is difficult to establish any relation at all between two different probabilities—between the probability, for instance, that it will rain to-morrow, and the probability that apples will be sold at threepence a pound next October. And when we remember that it is necessary to take into consideration *all* the probable consequences of an action, throughout the whole of future time, it becomes clear enough that this problem, by itself, presents great difficulties. And when on the top of all this, we have to go on and consider the effect on the total value of the universe of each possible result, remembering that a state of things which seems good when considered by itself may, when added to the universe as existing before the action was done, actually make the total state of the universe less good—when we have to do this, there is really only one conclusion that we can reach, and that is that it is as good as impossible ever to know which actions we ought to perform. The position forced on us is far beyond anything that common-sense would admit as to the difficulty of deciding in certain cases; it is not a question of certain cases only, or of mere difficulty. If Mr. Broad's theories are true, then it is not merely *often difficult*, it is *always impossible*, to know what it is right to do.

Such then is the conclusion to which, in the long run, Mr. Broad's arguments lead us. Ethics remains as a branch of pure theory; it can continue to define various concepts, to lay down certain general principles. But we shall never be able to apply those concepts or those principles in practical matters. In other words, the confession will have to be made that no guidance on questions of conduct can be looked for from reason.

Now since most people could not get on without some

rules by which to regulate their conduct (the solution of not worrying about right or wrong, but simply satisfying one's personal desires, would probably in the end fail to satisfy), the acceptance of this conclusion, were there any probability of its being generally accepted, would in all probability lead many to look to some authority which claimed that it could tell them what to do—very possibly to the Roman Catholic Church. When we remember the confident trust in reason with which the philosophy of Mr. Moore and Mr. Russell started out, we should I think be a little surprised if this were found to be its outcome.

It seems worth while then, before accepting such a desperate remedy, to scrutinise Mr. Broad's position very closely and see whether we are really shut up to those conclusions. To escape them, we must find reason for rejecting (or rather, show that there is no reason to accept) either the principles from which he starts, or some among the links of his argument.

It is natural, first, to direct our attention to the main principle on which everything else rests, viz., the doctrine of consequences.

Stating this doctrine from the point of view of the agent, we may define it as the doctrine that, in considering how he should act, a man must be guided solely by the probable consequences of his action. Now it is clear that in order to escape from our difficulties, it is not enough merely to deny this doctrine, *i.e.*, to assert that consequences are not the only question to be considered. It would be necessary to go further than this, and to assert that consequences need not be considered at all. For so long as consequences remain one important factor, even though not the only one, we cannot escape from the necessity of calculating probable consequences, and thus all our difficulties remain.

Now while many people might be ready to assert that consequences are not the only thing to be considered, there are very few, I think, who would hold that they need not be considered at all. It is true that something like this latter view has been held by certain philosophers,

whose view was that in acting all we need to do is to conform to certain rules or formal laws, regardless of consequences. But scarcely anyone among present-day writers on ethics holds such a view. Therefore it will be better, before resorting to this solution of our difficulties, to see whether there is no other part of Mr. Broad's argument which it is easier to attack.

Now the *impasse* in which our hypothetical individual found himself, when he attempted to decide, in certain circumstances, on a right course of action, consisted in two main difficulties: (1) The difficulty of calculating the probable total results of any action, and (2) the difficulty of calculating the probable effect, on the total value of the universe, of those results if they actually took place. Let us first consider the second of these difficulties.

It is to be noted that Mr. Broad has not explained the meaning of the conception which he introduces, of the *probable* goodness of a certain state of affairs. He appears to suggest that, just as any proposition about matters of fact has a certain probability relative to certain other propositions about matters of fact, so a proposition about the value of anything has a certain probability relative to certain other propositions about values. But the two things are not quite on a level. In the first case, the data with reference to which the probability of a proposition is determined are capable of almost infinite variety; they may be almost any propositions about individual matters of fact. Different persons calculating the probability of a certain event occurring will often each be in possession of different groups of data. But in the second case, that of the probable value of a given state of things, it seems at first sight as if the data were much more limited in character, and could only be propositions stating ethical principles. Now it is not clear that there is any such concept as the probable value of a given state of things relative to ethical principles as data. It seems rather to be simply a case of applying principles to a particular case. Thus if we hold the hedonist view, and if we know the exact

amount of pleasure and of pain in a given state of things, it would appear that we can judge immediately as to the value of that state of things, and that probability does not come in at all.

We can, however, give a sense to the notion of probable value if we accept a further principle, the Principle of Organic Unities, and accept it in a certain form; and it seems likely that Mr. Broad intends to refer to that principle when he speaks of probable value. If we accept this principle in Mr. Broad's form, then we may know the exact value of a certain state of things considered in isolation, but we may not be sure of the difference made to the total value of the universe by the addition of this extra piece. For it may be that the whole universe is an organic unity, and that its total value is quite different from the sum of the value of its parts, taken in isolation. Even, then, if we are in possession of the whole body of true ethical principles, we shall not be able to decide on the difference made to the total value of the universe by the addition of some given thing or things, unless we also know all about the condition of the universe before this addition. Now as no one knows all this, no one will be able to pronounce with certainty on the difference made to the value of the universe by the addition of some given thing or things; but it is possible that we may be able to say that, relative to what we do know about the universe, the addition of some thing or things will *probably* increase its value. We can thus give a meaning to probable value; the probability will be relative not merely to ethical principles but to propositions about the condition of the universe.

Now the introduction, into the definition of right action, of this conception of the total value of the universe was precisely one of the things which made our calculation as to the probable consequences of an action so complicated. If this conception could be rejected, and the rightness of an action made to depend simply on its probable direct consequences, a large part of our difficulties would disappear. For, as we have seen, the difficulties about probable

value do not arise until we bring in the doctrine of organic unities, and have to extend our view over the whole universe. If then we can show that this doctrine has been pressed too far, we shall be able not only to contract our view within reasonable limits, but further to simplify matters by getting rid of probable value.

Let us consider for a moment the Principle of Organic Unities. Mr. Moore, who was the first to state this principle and to claim for it great importance, formulates it as follows: *The amount by which the value of a whole exceeds that of one of its factors is not necessarily equal to that of the remaining factors.*<sup>1</sup> We can state this in another form by saying that if an addition is made to a whole of a certain value, the increase in the value of the whole is not necessarily equal to the value of the addition taken in isolation. It is important to notice just how much these statements assert. They are not assertions of a positive general principle, but rather denials. That is to say, it is not asserted that the amount by which the value of a whole exceeds that of one of its factors is *never* equal to that of the remaining factors; all that is asserted is that the opposite principle is not necessarily true. Even, then, if we grant the truth of Mr. Moore's principle, it may still be true that in the case of the great majority of wholes in the universe, the amount by which a whole exceeds that of one of its factors is exactly equal to that of its remaining factors; or in other words, that the value of most wholes is the sum of the values of their factors.

It is natural to ask at this point what reason we have for accepting Mr. Moore's principle. Mr. Moore himself does not actually assert it, but brings it forward as probably true. And he is led to this position simply by considering certain wholes, and finding that their value does not seem

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<sup>1</sup> *G. E. Moore's Ethics* (Home University Library), ch. vii. This is Mr. Moore's latest formulation of the principle. He does not here give it the name of Principle of Organic Unities; but it (or a similar principle) is so named in the earlier *Principia Ethica*, and I have, following Mr. Broad, retained this name as convenient.

to be simply the sum of the values of their factors. His chief instance is that of a state of mind containing some pleasure along with other factors, such as knowledge or admiration of beauty. He considers it very probable that no state of mind has any intrinsic value unless it contains some pleasure, and, therefore, if the pleasure were deducted from the state of mind in question, leaving only the other factors, what remained would have no value by itself. Now if the principle of organic unities were not true, it would follow that this remainder had no value even within the whole and, therefore, could not contribute anything to the value of the whole, and that all the value the whole originally contained was due simply to the pleasure in it, the other factors being quite indifferent. Mr. Moore thinks that this conclusion cannot be true; knowledge, admiration of beauty, etc., even though having no value apart from pleasure, do seem to increase the value of some wholes to which they are added; and therefore the principle of organic unities must be true.

The principle, then, is founded simply upon the examination of a number of cases. No more is asserted in fact than that some organic unities do exist; it is not asserted that all wholes having ethical value must be organic unities.

Let us now return to Mr. Broad's arguments for his view that, in deciding on the rightness or wrongness of an action, we must take into consideration its effect on the total value of the universe. He argues that it is not enough to take into consideration merely direct consequences, for although these may be good their result on the total value of the universe may be to make it less good; and this is so because the whole universe may be an organic unity of the kind we have been describing.

Now it is impossible to prove that the universe is not such a unity. It may be that the effect of all the good things in it is only to make it worse than it could have been without their existence, or again that the effect of all the evil things in it is to make it better than it could have been were there no evil; and this latter view has, indeed, been

held by some philosophers and theologians. But so far as I can see, no conclusive arguments for such a view have ever been put forward, and there seems no reason why we should accept it. The only safe method of procedure seems to be to consider carefully what classes of things do really appear to be organic unities, starting from those cases on which the principle has been founded. To do this completely, it would be necessary to consider every kind of whole which could lay claim to any value—and that would be in effect to construct a large part of a system of ethics. All that can be attempted here is to survey the ground very roughly.

First, we may attempt to fix a lower limit for organic unities; that is, to decide what are the simplest kinds of wholes which can be organic unities. On this point there is substantial agreement; nothing but states of consciousness can be intrinsically good or evil. Most people would say further that the state of consciousness (or mental state, as we may call it for the sake of brevity) must be of a certain complexity, or that the conscious being whose state it is must have reached a certain degree of development, if it is to have value. It may be doubted whether the mental state of a protozoon (if protozoa have mental states) can have any value.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Moore's view is that nothing can be an intrinsic good unless it contains both some feeling and also some other form of consciousness.

So much then for our lower limit. Passing on, it is clear that any wholes which have value must, if they are not mental states, contain mental states as parts. Of such wholes there appear to be three classes:

(1) A number of mental states of the same individual following each other in time and constituting as it were his mental life-history. It seems probable that a whole of this kind can have a much higher value than a mere collection of mental states (if such a thing be possible) could

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<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, I think we must admit that the mental states of some comparatively low kind of living beings can be good or evil. This is certainly admitted by anyone who holds that it is wrong to boil crabs alive.

have. Most systems of ethics which are not hedonistic appear to hold that the supreme good is such a whole, or a combination of such wholes. Whether we consider the system of Aristotle, or the Stoic view that virtue is the sole good, or the doctrine of modern idealism which places the good in self-realisation, it is clear that in all these cases a conscious existence extending over a considerable period of time and forming a developed individuality is essential. Now in the case of a whole of this kind there seems some ground for holding that its value partly consists in the balance or just mutual proportion of various qualities which are themselves valuable; and if this is so, the value of the whole will be greater than the sum of the values of its parts.

(2) The combination of a mental state with some external object. It is unnecessary here to raise the question whether every mental state must have an object; for it seems clear that all mental states which have any value do have an object. It may, therefore, be agreed that we were wrong in taking a mere mental state as our lower limit; for the real unit is the mental state along with its object. To this it may be replied that while the mental state cannot exist apart from some object, it is, nevertheless, distinct from its objects, and that the value of the whole may reside entirely in the mental part of the whole. If this were so, the whole would not be an organic unity; but on the other hand, it is possible that organic unities of this kind do exist. Consider, for example, the mental state of a man who was admiring some beautiful object which did not as a matter of fact exist but was only an illusion; it is a plausible view that such a state of things would not be so good as one where the man's state of mind was exactly the same, but the object of his admiration was real. If now we grant that a beautiful object by itself, apart from any mind being conscious of it, has no value, it follows that the state of things in the second case forms an organic unity. There is, however, a possible objection to this view. It may be said that the state of mind of the man in the first case included a wrong judgment about the



existence of the admired object, and that it was the existence of this error which decreased the value of his mental state.

I conclude then that it is doubtful whether there exist organic unities of this second type.

(3) Wholes consisting of a group of minds in certain relations. The simplest instance of a whole of this kind is a friendship. Such a state of things is commonly admitted to be good; and by its very definition it is a whole which must contain at least two minds. Is this whole an organic unity? The answer seems doubtful, for the same kind of reason as applies in the case of a whole formed by a mental state and its object. The two elements of the whole—the mental state of the two friends—cannot exist apart. And although they are distinct from each other, and each has its own value (the value of one may clearly be greater than that of the other), I see no reason for supposing that the value of the whole is not equal to the sum of the values of its parts.

More complicated groups consist of a number of individuals forming a society, such as a state. It is sometimes held that a state has a value greater than the value of the individuals composing it; but exactly the same remarks apply as in the case of a friendship. No doubt the individuals forming a state may have a higher value than they could have in isolation, but in the latter case they would not be exactly the same individuals, for a great part of their personality consists in their social relationships. No arguments of this kind, therefore, can show that a society is an organic unity in one sense of the phrase.

I conclude then that there is no good reason for supposing that there exists any organic unity more complicated than the whole composed of the total mental states of one individual.

The bearing of this conclusion on our main problem, to which it is now time to return, is obvious. So long as it seemed a probable view that the universe might be an organic unity, it was always possible that consequences which were, when considered by themselves, clearly good, might yet in combination with other elements of the

universe which were outside the range of our vision, produce a universe less good than if those consequences had not existed. But if there is no reason to suppose that very complicated organic unities exist, if we can as it were safely break up the universe into pieces of a manageable size without thereby falsifying our judgments of value, then it becomes possible rightly to evaluate any given group of consequences and hence to decide whether an action issuing in such consequences is right or wrong. It remains of course *possible* that the whole universe forms an organic unity, and it is permissible to speculate as to this possibility and its results on the practicability of right conduct, just as it is permissible to speculate as to what song the Sirens sang. But we should scarcely permit of any speculation of the latter kind being used as the foundation of a history of primitive music; and we are equally within our rights in refusing to consider a speculation of the former kind when our problem is one of practical ethics.

So far then we have got rid of the necessity of bringing the whole universe into every judgment of right and wrong, and we get rid at the same time, as has been shown above, of the conception of probable value. The whole problem is, therefore, much simplified.

There remains, however, the difficulty which I have exemplified in the case of the drowning children. For in that case, the value of the consequences was taken as ascertained; it was not the question of probable value which caused the difficulty. We are, therefore, no nearer a solution of this problem; nor have I any solution to offer, though it is possible that the notion of "expectation of goodness" may not be so unprofitable as Mr. Broad seems to think. But although the definition of "a probably most fortunate act" remains imperfect until this point is cleared up, the difficulty is not so serious from the practical point of view, which is the one we are interested in at present. This is so simply because cases of this kind are rare; in far the greater part of the decisions we have to make, it is not this particular difficulty which causes the

trouble. And when such cases do occur, there is this to be remembered: That although it is difficult to decide which of two courses of action is right, we at least know that one of them is right; all other courses of action except these two (for usually it is not a question of a choice between two only) are, *ex hypothesi*, less good than either of the two.

There remains, further, the first group of difficulties, those which consisted, not in uncertainty as to the final value of a given set of consequences, but in the uncertainty as to what the consequences of any action will be. On this point I have few remarks to make. The difficulty is a real one, and is recognised to be so by common-sense; but it was only when combined with the other difficulty which we have been discussing that it seemed so insuperable. The decision as to the probable consequences of an action is difficult enough; but the problem is somewhat simplified when it is remembered that only the consequences which *are* probable need be considered. Any action, of course, is bound to have remote consequences which cannot be foreseen; but just in so far as it is impossible to foresee them, they cease to be important from the point of view of probability. Where almost anything may happen, the probability of any one thing happening must be small; the remote consequences, therefore, can be ignored in comparison with the direct consequences which have a much higher degree of probability. If, therefore, any practical conclusion follows from a consideration of this difficulty, it is that we ought to take short views. The probable immediate consequences of an action must weigh more with us than those which are only probable consequences of probable consequences. And this will supply an argument in favour of the maxim condemned by Mr. Broad in his first paragraph, that "you must never do evil that good may come." For the evil in such a case is an immediate consequence and, therefore, highly probable; the good is only a further consequence hoped for, and, therefore, less probable than the evil.

ALAN DORWARD.

GALASHIELS, SCOTLAND.

## HENRY ADAMS.

ROBERT SHAFER.

HENRY ADAMS "knew no tragedy so heartrending as introspection, and the more so, because—as Mephistopheles said of Marguerite—he was not the first." These words seem to me perhaps the key to the larger meaning of a remarkable book. *The Education of Henry Adams* was printed some years ago, for its author's friends, and it had attained a species of fame—through the mysterious references of those who had, by one means or another, got an opportunity to read it—before the book was, in the fall of 1918, given to the public through a new edition. One fancies that on the score of humour, of fully expressive style, of richness and sweep, the expectations of no new reader can have been disappointed. And these qualities of personality and developed style unite with the often extraordinary substance of the narrative to give it a permanent place in literature.

This has been recognised, and in periodical and daily press much space has been given over to the praise of Adams. Some reviewers, too, have attempted to picture forth his autobiography in little, offering as it were a prospectus to possible purchasers. Appreciation and portraiture, these are often the very proper methods of criticism, but neither of them fits with my present purpose. It occasionally happens that in the midst of an active life a man pauses for a moment to ask, with more or less interest, what its meaning may be. This autobiography forces the same question, though a quick answer is impossible. The book seems in its variousness, its inconsistencies, its fullness, as baffling as life, and one recalls Donne's satiric lines:

"Infinite worke, which doth so far extend,  
That none can study it to any end.  
'Tis no one thing, it is not fruit nor roote;  
Nor poorely limited with head or foot."

Yet, as I think over the matter of Adams's book, the words quoted at the beginning seem to indicate one answer at least to the central problem raised by it. That the study of his own mind was the one kind of study which this man would rather have avoided and indeed did cast aside is a fact, the more full of meaning the more his final analysis of humanity is pondered; and it is fit that attention be called to both the analysis and its meaning.

Under Adams's searching gaze man becomes simply a force of nature. We boast that through our beneficent handmaiden, Science, we subdue nature to our will and make her serve human purposes; we believe that particularly of late years we have made tremendous strides in bending natural energies to our service for the betterment of life—or we did before the War, and there is as yet no sign that the War has taught many persons its lesson. Of this Adams will have nothing: "the fiction that society educates itself, or aims at a conscious purpose, was upset by the compass and gunpowder which dragged and drove Europe at will through frightful bogs of learning." In other words, the forces of nature capture man and bend him to their will. As himself one force of nature man merely assimilates other natural energies and sends them out again in new directions, but he has no more 'control' over the latter process than over the former. The reduction of the world, of society, to order is a notion that exists only as a dream, an illusive mirage, in the eternally hopeful mind of man. He pushes on to new achievements in the ordering of knowledge, of society, merely to find that his apparently successful efforts have brought him face to face with new disorders, with greater chaos, than any before imagined. Not only is man simply a deluded mechanism, but the forces of nature, of which he is one, cannot be reduced to any harmony or common measure. To use Adams's own easy contradiction, "chaos is the law of nature." This means, as far as can be made out, that natural phenomena cannot be reduced to any one set of formulae, that the phenomena are of diverse

kinds operating in diverse ways, and that the so-called laws of mechanics are convenient rules-of-thumb, of very limited application, but are not—as natural scientists blithely imagined until their own discoveries forced them to abandon the notion—true in any universal sense of the word. This means, in fine, that the world is a congeries of forces or energies—not moving in unison towards “one far-off divine event”—but floundering foolishly, hopelessly, purposelessly in eternal conflict and in consequent eternal chaos. We live, then, not in a universe but in a “multiverse” “where order is an accidental relation obnoxious to nature; artificial compulsion imposed on motion; against which every free energy of the universe revolts; and which, being merely occasional, resolves itself back into anarchy at last.” Adams notes that this description of the “multiverse” “explains much that had been most obscure, especially the persistently fiendish treatment of man by man; the perpetual effort of society to establish law, and the perpetual revolt of society against the law it has established; the perpetual building up of authority by force, and the perpetual appeal to force to overthrow it; the perpetual symbolism of a higher law, and the perpetual relapse to a lower one; the perpetual victory of the principles of freedom, and their perpetual conversion into principles of power”; but, he adds, “the staggering problem is our immediate outlook ahead into the despotism of artificial order which nature abhors.”

This is not a pretty picture. It is hard to grasp its meaning even in outline; but the more fully it is understood the less pretty does the picture become. It is not necessary to set forth here all its implications, or to observe how closely the description fits in with many events of the world to-day. Those who hunger for greater detail should read the book itself. Our present business is but to write down the bare conclusion that man is a mechanical force, comparable to a child's jumping-jack, hopping perilously he knows not whither through a weltering chaos which commonly overwhelms him; that his dream of progress

consists actually in the unearthing of new divergencies and conflicts of force; and that these conflicts of energy extend to man's own expenditure of force, so that each fresh triumph of social order really brings social anarchy so much the nearer.

The unlovely conclusion is far from what the most of us habitually believe about ourselves. To some it may seem preposterous—the merely fantastical speculation of an embittered and lonely old man. Preposterous perhaps the picture is if man is something more than merely a social being, but let no one deceive himself. Adams is voicing no eccentric or daringly original opinion; on the contrary, his description of our world is precisely that of every natural scientist of the present day who knows what he is about, and Adams is also at one with the natural scientists in assuming man to be a purely natural force. It is from this that his book derives a large part of its importance, and because of this it is likely to be more and more recognised as a significant piece of work.

“Know thou this,” said Edmund to the Captain in *King Lear*, “that men are as the time is,” and Adams, as he cheerfully admits, agreed with Edmund and the Captain. His life was one long attempt to conform himself to “the time.” This attempt led him to follow with open mind the process of scientific discovery and conclusion from Darwin's *Origin of Species* into the present century. Darwinism, to be distinguished from Darwin's own cautious generalisations, Adams found a frail bark. He had resolved that “the current of his time was to be his current, lead where it might,” and from beginning to end he was true to his resolve;—only he could not help trying to understand what the current was and where it led. Thus he became a Darwinian for a time, although he could see behind the vast and imposing edifice of Natural Uniformity nothing save pure inference or assumption. Ponder the evidence as he might, he could only observe “natural selection that did not select—evolution finished before it began—minute changes that refused to change anything during the whole geological

record—survival of the highest order in a fauna which had no origin—uniformity under conditions which had disturbed everything else in creation”; and “to an honest-meaning though ignorant student who needed to prove Natural Selection and not assume it, such sequence brought no peace. He wished to be shown that changes in form caused evolution in force; that chemical or mechanical energy had by natural selection and minute changes, under uniform conditions, converted itself into thought. The ganoid fish seemed to prove—to him—that it had selected neither new form nor new force, but that the curates were right in thinking that force could be increased in volume or raised in intensity only by help of outside force.”

This severely questioning attitude made Adams the more ready for the revolutionary developments of natural science in the decade from 1890 to 1900. He had had, indeed, the veil lifted from before his eyes in 1870, when the accident that caused the death of his sister revealed the world to him as merely a complex of anarchic and purposeless forces. But this illumination had lasted only for a moment, and then again the world had clothed itself “with the illusions of his senses.” In the decade just mentioned, however, when the amazing discovery of such supersensual forces as radium plunged man into Spencer’s forbidden Unknowable and tumbled to the ground all comparatively comfortable uniformitarian theories, Adams had no recourse but to fall back on his earlier moment of illumination. And Adams’s statement of the present position of natural science is one that would be agreed to by all scientists to-day who have any interest in meanings as well as facts.

Adams continues, it should be understood, his questioning attitude. In fact from beginning to end his narrative is the record of a consistent effort not simply to familiarise himself with the facts of the surrounding world, but to understand their implications, their meaning; and this of course is why he terms it the record of an education. This, too, gives the book a very great part of its interest and value. For Adams through his constantly questioning

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attitude, through his effort to arrive at the actual bases of theories, at the real meaning of facts, has succeeded in presenting for all men a picture astonishingly candid, clear, unequivocal, of the trend of his time. Men can see now with his help—what many of them with the best will in the world before could not—precisely where the age is going. With his help all men may now grasp and understand alike the discoveries and the problems left us by the remarkable age just past. It has been no small matter for regret that both the assumptions and the conclusions of modern science have been for the most part stated in formulae or words which only the interested specialist can understand, and that the popularisers of scientific knowledge—Huxley and his followers—have been so largely wanting in disinterestedness, or intelligence, or candour, or all three. But *The Education of Henry Adams*, it may be hoped, has at length put the fundamental issues of the present day squarely before the generality of men. They are at length told in language singularly clear and vivid, that in the eye of science the world is a complex of anarchic and purposeless forces of diverse kinds acting in diverse ways, that man is simply one of these natural forces, and that as such he is a mechanism tossed hither and thither in conflict alike with himself and other natural energies in fashions beyond his control.

Adams's book not only performs this very great service, but it further exhibits distinctly the type of man who can subscribe to such a conclusion. The type divides itself into two classes. The commoner variety we all know. He is the type of man whose beliefs are easily fixed; who, without much insight or critical talent, needs only to believe concerning the deeper meaning of life what his own little world already believes, and what consequently to his rough judgment figures as "correct," in order to set free his nature for practical activities. We cannot say that the age's answer to life's riddle is to this kind of man unimportant or indifferent; but we do him no injustice, surely, in pointing out that he expends little time or thought upon the question,

and that the stimuli to which his energies most readily and effectively respond lie within the so-called practical sphere and are largely connected with life's material, day-to-day needs. Consequently this type of man tends to accept his surroundings from age to age as he finds them. His problems arise from the attempt to satisfy his appetites under conditions already given. He becomes anxious to change those conditions only when they force upon him an undue or intolerable repression of his acquisitive nature. Hence such a man's fundamental beliefs, though they may influence his character and happiness more than he realises, are accepted by him from others; and he tends to scoff at any dispute about their nature or basis—confidently assuring us that life is much the same whatever one's beliefs, since we are what we are in any case and life consists mainly in the performance of deeds for which there is other stimulus—winning a wife, procuring subsistence, making a "name," achieving power. This man, as I say, we all know, and we find him for casual purposes, as long as we do not interfere with his interests, a delightful companion. It is a part of his business to fit easily into the social order. And he it is who gives mass, weight, authority, compelling force, to any cause once it is well started. He it is who enables powerful leaders to extend themselves over the four corners of the earth and into its forgotten crevices, and to project themselves indefinitely into the abyss of time. His stabilising influence is incalculable, and it is the greater pity that it works so blindly and may lend itself to harm as easily as to good.

Henry Adams by his intelligent and vigorous scepticism proves that he had a deeper and more independent nature than this. It is a wise remark of Pascal's that the truth lies in scepticism—*le pyrrhonisme*, as he calls it; though of course one may put questions idly as well as purposefully. Well, Adams seems to question all things under the sun, and not in mockery, but in simple honest effort to understand, to penetrate beneath the shifting shows of things to some firm keystone of reality.

And yet despite his vigorous intellect, his fearless originality, and his searching questions Adams turns out to be fundamentally the same species of man as that just spoken about. He is so because he did not after all question everything under the sun. He stopped short of doubting the natural scientist's basic assumption of materialism. He had resolved, as we have seen, that the current of his time should be his current, and he was one with his age in that it apparently never occurred to him to make that last negation. The fact is decently blurred in the narrative, but it is a plain fact that Adams coveted power, position, in early life perhaps office; that he yearned to meddle with the destinies of men. And so although he did seek truth, he sought—as he himself says—only enough for his practical purpose. That purpose was to gain prevision of the movement of society—the one kind of knowledge most necessary to the workaday wielder of power. For this he was impelled to look beneath the changing appearances of the world, but not dangerously far beneath them. He complains, and rightly, that his scepticism did in fact take him further than he intended; but it did not carry him beyond materialism, or naturalism, tacitly the foundation for the view-point of the worldly or practical man. Because, then, of his purpose and of the limitation of his scepticism Adams was immersed in the world of affairs just as is the average man of the street. He had a more ambitious purpose and was after a bigger prize than generally urges on this latter person, but the direction of his vision was the same; that is, it was consistently outward into the world of practical activity. And this outwardness one takes to be the keynote of Adams's personality. "Of all studies the one he would rather have avoided was that of his own mind." The truth of the statement is written large throughout his book.

Introspection is a heartrending tragedy, says Adams, because all one does is "drown one's self in the reflexion of one's own thought." What this means becomes more clear when it is remembered that to Adams the mind is only a

storage-house for natural force, thought being the middle stage between a human being's reception of natural energy and his subsequent expulsion of it in a new direction. Thus there is no originaive power in thought, and consequently in a person, and only the illusion of directive power. Further, since what we see in the mind is only the reflexion of external force of various kinds, we are merely withdrawing ourselves from reality or truth by looking within. By looking outside ourselves, then, we approach reality, and so we must glue our eyes to this solid-seeming earth for any possible illumination, any glimpse of truth.

It is not surprising to find that for a man of such outwardness of vision religion simply did not exist. It is perhaps not Adams's fault that the desiccated religion of his youth seemed to him unreal, and that as early as possible he deserted the Unitarian fold. But later in life he came to see, from the outside, what a place religion had occupied historically in the life of humanity, and he imagined something of how much it must have meant to those for whom it was real. Then he attempted to see if it could not still mean something to him but, very naturally, it could not. It remained as unreal as in his youth. The only difference was that in the light of his increased knowledge he could not now dismiss it—he was forced to assign to it some meaning. This he interestingly did by putting it on a par with the conquering hero's love of power. Practically, he remade it in his own image. His reasoning is fairly simple: all men love power and seek it, though only a few achieve it; and thus men adore or worship the manifestation of power, the more so the more mysterious it is. Adams's treatment of mediaeval worship of the Virgin in *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*—also a remarkable book—here gets its explanation. Pointing out that “the monthly-magazine-made American female has not a feature that would have been recognized by Adam,” he goes on to remind us “that neither Diana of the Ephesians nor any of the Oriental goddesses was worshipped for her beauty. She was goddess because of her force; she was the animated

dynamo; she was reproduction—the greatest and most mysterious of all energies; all she needed was to be fecund.” And thus the Virgin was worshipped because she was the manifestation of mysterious energy. For us of to-day her place has been taken by the railway train, the radio station, and the like, spite of the artist’s complaint that the power embodied in these instruments cannot be shadowed forth in art. And Adams proves how true this is by mentioning that at the Paris Exposition in 1900 “he began to feel the forty-foot dynamos as a moral force, much as the early Christians felt the Cross,” and that “before the end he began to pray to this new machine, instinct teaching the natural expression of man before silent and infinite force.” The dynamo, Adams admits, “is not so human as some symbols of ultimate energy” that have had vogue, but to him it seemed “the most expressive.”

In this manner did religion become materialised when examined from the outside, dissolving itself under Adams’s eye into something not recognisable by the religious. What then is to be expected from Adams’s reluctant study of his own mind, or soul? Is it astonishing to learn that he considered it an appropriate method of conducting this study to pore over the reports of abnormal psychologists? He so contrived to scrutinise his own soul by reading stories of what other persons had observed and inferred from the behaviour of still other people suffering from disease. He extenuates this evasion by explaining that what he wanted to learn through introspection was whether or not the soul or mind was a unit, was one. And he got from abnormal psychologists, of course, what he was seeking—he found that they were splitting personality up into complex groups. “To his mind the compound  $\psi x h$  took at once the form of a bicycle-rider, mechanically balancing himself by inhibiting all his inferior personalities, and sure to fall into the sub-conscious chaos below, if one of his inferior personalities got on top. The only absolute truth was the sub-conscious chaos below, which every one could find when he sought it. . . . If his mind were really this sort of

magnet, mechanically dispersing its lines of force when it went to sleep, and mechanically orienting them when it woke up—which was normal, the dispersion or orientation? The mind, like the body, kept its unity unless it happened to lose balance, but the professor of physics, who slipped on a pavement and hurt himself, knew no more than an idiot what knocked him down, though he did know—what the idiot could hardly do—that his normal condition was idiocy, or want of balance, and that his sanity was unstable artifice. His normal thought was dispersion, sleep, dream, inconsequence; the simultaneous action of different thought-centres without control. His artificial balance was acquired habit. He was an acrobat, with a dwarf on his back, crossing a chasm on a slackrope, and commonly breaking his neck.”

This long quotation may show the expressiveness of the language with which Adams has clothed his thought, but it also shows clearly enough that he saw within himself simply what he had already seen in the world outside. Here once more is a picture which could only result from a singular blindness to first-hand knowledge and, it may be added, a singular keenness in dealing with the second-hand variety.

And again in the larger field of his observation of man Adams shows at once his keen intelligence and the outwardness of his vision. Adams, it need scarcely be said, coming of a family of statesmen, was brought up in an atmosphere mainly political, though somewhat literary as well. These surroundings helped early to develop in him what must have been already present as inborn talent, a faculty for closely observing and diagnosing political affairs. His notes on politics and society, continued throughout his narrative, are always full of interest; and some, though not all, of them show such accuracy of judgment as to appear, in the light of more recent events or later knowledge, well-nigh prophetic. And yet this talent, of course, led Adams into the habit of observing man in the mass, and betrayed him into thinking that what might be true of society, of the aggregate, was equally valid for the individual. We need

not follow out the workings of this absurd and yet dangerously tempting notion. The first thing perceived under such an external view is the death of morality, because of "one law that rules all others"—"masses of men invariably follow interests in deciding morals. Morality is a private and costly luxury." In precisely this manner a man of the street will admit some friend's superior morality in one direction or another, but will "explain" it by saying that his friend can afford it, financially, while he cannot. We have already seen where this outward vision finally led Adams. We have here seen the grand conclusion of all his search; that the world is a complex of anarchic and purposeless forces of diverse kinds acting in diverse ways, that man is simply one of these natural forces, and that as such he is a mechanism tossed hither and thither in conflict alike with himself and other natural energies in fashions beyond his control.

Adams says it surely was not his fault that the universe seemed real, and that "despite the long-continued effort of a lifetime" he perpetually concluded that not he but the appearances, not the poet but the banker, not his thought but the thing that moved it, spelled Reality. It is not my purpose to decide the question of fault. I wish only to ask, in contemplating this orthodox modern answer to the deepest questionings of man, whether we have to admit the implied necessity of pronouncing unreal *either* the universe *or* man?—or whether the positing of such a necessity is a pernicious absurdity, an evil snare set in place by the powers of darkness and death to entrap man in the very moment of his greatest pride?

It is plain, I hope, without further words that such a necessity is posited by natural science and answered in favour of the universe. It is plain that everything recognisable as distinctively human is swept away, swallowed up in the anarchy of mechanical energies into whose presence the modern scientist proudly ushers us. It is plain that we are conveyed into a world unreal, having no connexion with the earth we know or with ourselves—into a waste

place inhuman and desolate beyond words to cry our woe. This unescapable fact is no novelty; through ages it has been the disturbing visitant of every materialist. And if since Hobbes's day any of these gentlemen has not taken account of this intolerable dilemma it cannot be because he did not know of it. It should not be forgotten that some scientists, recoiling perhaps in horror from the abyss they have opened up, claim that they draw no conclusions, that they merely describe phenomena. The claim may be allowed for whatever it is worth; it can hardly be pretended that it rises far above quibbling, that these descriptions are not worded in terms of materialistic or mechanical assumptions. And in the meantime this suicidal doctrine is spreading over the earth, to the accompaniment of no one knows how much of misery and despair.

Let us by all means admit that the universe is real, let us insist upon it, but let us not therefore deny our own humanity, distorting ourselves into mere helpless mechanisms. The race has so far submitted itself to the dreary and hopeless gospel of mechanics, probably, because of the vast field of practical activity opened up by newly discovered natural energies and by the huge, unwieldy structure of present-day society. There has been so much, in our recent years of vertiginous change, crying to be done that the man of the world has swallowed the mechanical doctrine without digesting it, in his hurry to perform deeds of profit and renown. But to all men whose lives are thus at variance with themselves, who have consciously or tacitly denied not the world but themselves, reversing Christian ordinance, there must come sooner or later a day of weary, if not of agonised, reckoning—a dark day, at the best, of final realisation of the emptiness of the phantoms which they have so actively spent themselves in chasing.

The lives of such men are perilously at variance with themselves because, though all of Henry Adams's dead mechanic facts be true, man is something more than a merely social being; because there are two orders of fact



which every man must take into account if he would avoid disaster. These orders represent the external world, that alike of nature and society, and the inner world of our own human nature. The inner and the outer worlds are equally real, and men must pay heed to the laws and fact of both if they are to conduct their lives aright; but—and here lies the fundamental difficulty—these worlds are different, are even at many points opposed to each other. It is a dark saying, and yet men have always known this; every Christian must remember that he cannot serve both God and Mammon. The Author of this saying stretched the opposition to the breaking-point; but through the ages men have generally tried to soften the opposition, to harmonise, to reconcile inner knowledge with outward fact. The attempt has never succeeded. Perhaps it is not chimerical; but the fact is that such attempts have always ended in the denial of the reality of one world or the other.

Every one knows in which direction the pendulum has swung in our own 'practical' age. And every one knows with what insolent assurance men have proclaimed that at last we know the Truth. Yet Henry Adams, asking himself what he truly thought, discovered that "what he valued most was Motion, and that what attracted his mind was Change." He made, that is, the great discovery that the movement of the practical world feeds upon itself, growing into a mere love of excitement, a restless search for distraction from inner emptiness. And this man towards the close of his life-long sojourn in the outer world could only say that he was kept alive "by irritation at finding his life so thin and fruitless"; could only say with thinly concealed bitterness that "Noah's dove had not searched the earth for resting-places so carefully, or with so little success," as had he.

No, the external world of nature and society is real and studded with facts which every man in the ordering of his life must take into account, but it does not contain the whole truth. Every man is aware of a different world within himself which is his sole possession, by virtue of

which he is an individual—that is, not wholly merged in his surroundings. For men of insight this is an arresting and illuminating fact, but for all men it is a practical certainty, whether they consciously take it to mean much or little. In itself such awareness does not carry a man very far, and yet it may be termed the beginning of wisdom. For the man thus led to explore himself is on the track of knowledge certain, uncontrovertible, and of the essence of his being. No one has yet penetrated the mystery of personality, but all men are at times conscious of inward promptings of the heart—intuitions some call them—which speak with an authority final and absolute. This inward light is not an easy thing to distinguish. It is no more than a guide, something akin to that severe negative gesture known to Socrates. And it is in its essence incommunicable. It is a matter between man and his God, and may only be bodied forth in “likely stories” such as make up the greatest art and literature of the world; but, if the inward light once distinctly seen is followed, it leads man towards a world of changeless reality where fortune is not variable and happiness does not cloy and vitality does not flag. And only the man who is conscious that there is a portion of his being which thus differs from, and even opposes itself to, his mortal constitution and its surrounding world of nature and society—only that man has become in the full sense of the word human and has freed his whole nature for the tasks and problems of life.

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## LUMPING VERSUS INDIVIDUALIZATION.

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**A**S little societies coalesce into a big society; as tribal and local cultures vanish before the spread of a general culture; as men are drawn into organizations and more departments of human life are regulated, less play is given to individuality. All of the same group or class are lumped together, the differences among them being ignored. Industry, manners, morals, laws, policies are fitted not to the individual, but to the average. Since most men vary appreciably from the average, most men experience a certain discomfort under the social régime. It is as if all had to wear clothes of the same size and cut.

Compare individual labor with collective labor. In handicraft industry the artisan works with his own tools in his own shop at his own pace, beginning and ending the day to suit himself. When he feels like it, he can knock off a bit to stretch himself or smoke a pipe. To-day he may be up with the lark in order to quit early; to-morrow he may sleep late and make up for it by working into the night. Factory industry, however, subjects the workers to an impersonal régime. The speed of the machine regulates the pace of work. Length of the working day, time of beginning and ending, rests, holidays—all are accommodated to the average workman or else to the stronger. Aside from the companionship, labor under such circumstances will be more irksome than an equal amount of the go-as-you-please labor. Since this is so and since machine production is here to stay, the machine tender's workday should be short in order that he may individualize along cultural lines.

Impersonal, too, is the product of the machine. In olden days the carpenter made a chest for the silversmith one day, the silversmith a cup for the carpenter on another and they wrought in sympathy. The knowledge of human

necessities and the consciousness of human good will entered into their work and thus men were linked together. But to-day the factory operative makes only a bit of a thing and has no thoughts about the man who will use the thing he helps make; while this thing is not made for any particular person but for "the public." If you are suited by some one of the types turned out by the machine, well and good; if not, it is almost impossible to obtain the kind of thing you really want. Artists agree that machine production for the market is without the interest excited by hand production for an individual and the products are neither significant nor beautiful.

Nor is impersonalization confined to the satisfaction of the lower wants. When the art economy was dominant the people acted their own "mystery" plays in the churches. Each parish chose its "mystery," the parts were assigned to the best actors in the parish, and the representation was the result of the creative personal effort of the community. Oberammergau long harbored a survival of this drama. Nowadays, when the machine economy is dominant, a motion-picture syndicate decides what shall be filmed. Each film must be suited to the average audience, for it will be shown all over the country. The local manager has no option as to the films he shall present in his theatre. The films are dispatched from one town to another in their strict turn and an exception made for one town would derange the whole centralized distribution. Hence the photo-plays fall into well marked types—the Far-Western play, the ante-bellum Old South play, the detective play, the drama of the big-city underworld, the historical pageant type, the play with the child-woman heroine, etc. Who can detect in these productions the personality of the maker? Yet that personality gives the stamp of true art. No wonder they all die a natural death in a few months!

Before the day of the motion film the theatre bade fair to go in this same direction. But the organization for making and presenting plays was never so tight and close

that gleams of personality could not show through, while there were always some independent actor-managers who fitted into no centralized machine economy.

The military régime takes little account of personal *differentiæ*. Since in warfare joint action triumphs over individual action, the tyranny of the average is well-nigh absolute. Little consideration is given to the exceptional man, or to the flow and ebb of energy and feeling in the individual. Barracks and camp are the places of sacrifice of myriads of innocent personal desires. Compare the pleasure from a beautiful stroll with that from marching with a platoon over the same route. The chief points in the soldier's day are fixed, the chief processes standardized. His golden moments are when "on leave" he can lay off this irksome harness and indulge in an orgy of self-prompted actions.

Imperial governments, being without check from the governed, over-ride national, local and individual differences. The later Roman Empire became a cumbrous mechanism which bore cruelly upon the hearts and lives of men. The present government of India, although conscientious and well-intentioned, is felt by the more sensitive natives to be something alien and soulless. Eloquently the Indian poet Tagore characterizes it as "untouched by human hand" and likens it to "a hydraulic press whose pressure is impersonal and on that account effective." It is "a mere abstract force in which the whole population of a distant country has lost its human personality." The subjects feel themselves bound by "iron chains of organization which are the most relentless and unbreakable that have ever been manufactured in the whole history of man." The perfection of its espionage and intelligence service appalls one. Its "tireless vigilance being the vigilance of a machine has not the human power to overlook or to discriminate. At the least pressing of its button the monster organization becomes all eyes whose ugly stare of inquisitiveness cannot be avoided by a single person among the immense multitude of the ruled. At the least turn of its

screw, by the fraction of an inch, the grip is tightened to the point of suffocation around every man, woman and child of a vast population."

The religious bigot eager to make one form of religion prevail and to suppress by force all variants is victim of the lumping fallacy. Individuals differ in the demands their natures make upon religion. They will be happier if they may choose freely among several types with unlike emphasis upon dogma and rite, upon thought and emotion.

How personal one's religion ought to be is brought out by William James:

You will probably make your own ventures severally. If radically tough, the hurly-burly of the sensible facts of nature will be enough for you, and you will need no religion at all. If radically tender, you will take up with the more monistic form of religion; the pluralistic form with its reliance on possibilities that are not necessities will not seem to afford you security enough.

But if you are neither tough nor tender in an extreme and radical sense, but mixed as most of us are, it may seem to you that the type of pluralistic and moralistic religion that I have offered is as good a religious synthesis as you are likely to find. Between the two extremes of crude naturalism on the one hand and transcendental absolutism on the other, you may find that what I take the liberty of calling the pragmatic or melioristic type of theism is exactly what you require.

A like liberation comes from looking upon truth as a personal relation so that truth for you is not necessarily truth for me. As William James puts it, "Ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience." Such a doctrine simultaneously justifies an immense variety of different beliefs in different people.

The educator has been an arch-sinner against human diversity. One would suppose that from the beginning teachers would adapt mental pabulum to immature minds. Yet for thousands of years the content of children's education has been the religious and literary classics. The idea of starting the child with simple matter adapted to its comprehension is scarcely three centuries old. In religious

instruction the idea of graded material has hardly even yet won the day. The rigid curriculum of study has been a Moloch to which personal tastes and needs have been ruthlessly sacrificed. Another insatiate idol is the examination system. Some intellects above the normal cannot "stand and deliver" under this system. In excusing his daughter William James remarked, "No James ever could pass an examination." To rate ability and proficiency by the answers made to given questions in a given time is something that would occur only to unimaginative minds; yet in England it is said to be a common practice to give a man a university position on his performance in the examination room.

In the little ungraded school the child progresses according to its capacity. Then a system grows up which impounds the child with thirty-nine others in a class the pace of which is adapted to the powers of the average member. All forty move in lockstep. The bright children are bored and demoralized; the dull learn next to nothing. No one would insist that they should all wear clothes of the same size; yet we lace them in an educational strait-jacket, because we cannot see the grotesque misfits which result.

In dealing with the poor the besetting vice is lumping them together. One social philosopher looks upon them simply as the unfit. Another regards them as the unadapted. To a third they are by-products of our industrial system. To a fourth they are victims of social injustice. Thrift, temperance, godliness, hygiene, education, single tax on land values, socialism and communism—each has been offered as a sure cure for poverty. A hundred schemes have been broached for relieving the poor by wholesale treatment. But close acquaintance with the dependent discloses a great variety of characters and causes. No social worker expects poverty to disappear save by the co-operation of many agencies and policies. The only method followed in modern charity is the "case" method. Just as nostrums have been discredited and no physician thinks of treating disease save after study and diagnosis

of the individual patient, so the social worker insists on full knowledge of the case and adapts his form of help to that particular family.

There is a stage at which impersonal treatment of the wrongdoer seems very splendid. We expect officials to depersonalize their relations to the public, to act "without fear or favor." We praise the editor who is impersonal in printing the news, who publishes impartially the disgrace of his best friend and the triumph of his worst enemy. We call for a clergyman who shall be "no respecter of persons." He must denounce the misconduct of his trustee or "pillar" as he denounces that of his humblest parishioner. The bandage over the eyes of Justice symbolizes that Justice knows not whether the suitor is lord or hind.

Out of this horror of partiality comes, however, the classical school of criminology which will have offenders dealt with impersonally.

The eighteenth century reformers assumed that each law-breaker is morally responsible. It follows, then, that all who have committed the same offense are equally guilty and should receive like treatment. Punishment is to be meted out not according to the nature of the offender but according to the nature of his offense. Hence the legislator attaches a fitting penalty to each type of crime and the sole duty of the court is to ascertain whether or not the accused has broken the laws. This system does away, to be sure, with the old-time arbitrary judge, harsh or lenient according to the social importance of the culprit before him. But in order to rid justice of this offensive personal element, there is created a machine which grinds up alike the young and the hardened, the simple and the cunning, the well-intentioned and the wicked, the chance offender and the professional.

Little by little the administration of Justice has been humanized by admitting exceptions and discriminations. Is the offender of sound mind? Was he in full possession of his faculties? Were there extenuating circumstances? Was there great provocation? Is it his first offense or is

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he a repeater? Finally the idea that what is being punished is not a *deed* but a *man* triumphs and we have the modern school of criminology, which likens sentencing an offender to prison for a fixed term to prescribing so many weeks in the hospital for a sick man. The patient is let out when he is well and the criminal should be let out when he is fit to be at large.

On the exceptional lumping imposes the pain of misfit. Too much of it produces a chronic distress like that of wearing clothes that "bind," sleeping on a slope, walking on soles of differing thickness or rowing with oars of unequal lengths. In those who are brought up under the lumping system, *e.g.*, the inmates of the old-fashioned orphan asylum, personality is stunted and they go through life less eager and reactive than they should be. Under the later Roman Empire the unfortunate Graeco-Latins, prisoners of a contracting system, felt themselves emasculate, incapable of the grand emotions and initiatives of their forefathers in the old free heroic days.

If we are not to become automata as more of life is standardized and we come under the stricter discipline large organization imposes, we must take more account of individual differences and make proper discriminations. When possible school children of each year should be grouped according to mentality and the class for teaching should compose those of about the same mental gait. Or class work may be individualized by encouraging the child on each topic the class takes up to do an amount of work corresponding to its powers. Promotion, instead of being confined to certain times, should occur whenever the child is ready for it. Mere passive absorption by the pupils should content no teacher; they should be stimulated to react. In the high school no single text should be swallowed whole. The pupil should do collateral reading and compare viewpoints. In college the rigid curriculum should give place to the free choice of studies under advice while the lecture should be relegated to a subordinate place in teaching.

In the care of dependents, the orphanage should make way for the placing-out system. The doling out of supplies to needy people should be anathema. The maxim "not alms but a friend" strikes the true note. Almsgiving which is promiscuous should be thought of not as God-pleasing but as God-offending. Each poor family should be held to present a problem by itself. For certain kinds of dependents guarded outdoor relief is more individualizing and humane than institutional care. By sorting out from it the children, the sick, the feeble-minded, the insane and the vagrant, the almshouse from being a dumping ground for the refuse of humanity becomes a home for the aged and respectable poor.

In the treatment of wrongdoers, lumping survives in the unhesitating and sweeping condemnation of the "scarlet woman," in the "jail bird" stigma which bars the discharged prisoner from honest employment, in the confusion of "political" with "common" offenders, in the treatment of "conscientious objectors" as if they were vulgar recalcitrants, in uniform treatment of types so distinct as the born criminal, the habitual criminal, and the occasional criminal. Individualization calls for the recognition of nervous disorders, passion, suggestion, and obsession as limiting responsibility in the sane; for the application of the suspended sentence with probation and the indeterminate sentence; for the establishment of the juvenile court and the detention home for juvenile offenders; for the differentiation of work house from jail and prison, for the restricted use of the prison stripe and for the treatment of convicts as so many human individuals.

Government passes from arbitrary discriminations based on birth, sex, income, creed, nationality or race through a period of flat democratic treatment to fresh discriminations based upon logic. "One man one vote" looks good until it is discovered that  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of our draft registrants are weak-minded. They were held unfit to be soldiers and they are equally unfit to be voters. After Negro domination has done its worst Negro suffrage is qualified

by a literacy requirement. After the "open door" has filled this country with people who look upon it as a polyglot boarding house we apply the reading test to immigrants. We cease to lump children with adults. We remove them from the factory and send them to school. Discrimination is set up between the sexes, working women being given a protection which does not extend to men workers. If a class is not able to protect itself against another class and there is a public interest involved, the courts deem a law on its behalf not "class legislation" but "reasonable classification." By this means that stiff plane "freedom of contract" has been bent in a dozen places.

Instead of multiplying laws the detailed regulation of industry is effected by means of the easily-modified orders of a state industrial commission. Exemptions are granted that a statute would never allow and special orders issue to take care of peculiar cases. Marriage, once an indefeasible right of the unwedded adult, is denied certain classes of defectives. Instead of the old genial assumption that any citizen is fit for any post, the law creating a board provides that the members shall be engineers, physicians, psychiatrists, economists, social workers, accountants, employers, merchants, practical farmers, etc., according to the work to be done.

The wiser employers are not lumping their workfolk as employers used to do. The individual workman is studied in order to land him in the job he is best fitted for. Physical examination at hiring helps to a more intelligent dealing with the employee. A watchful nurse and a doctor look after the ailing. A well-handled "suggestion box" draws out of the force a surprising number of valuable ideas. The prompt and fitting recognition of unusual individual service or merit improves morale. A brass plate bearing the engine-driver's name is affixed to the locomotive. The highway commission puts up a sign on each stretch of state road showing who patrols it. In a business house the name of the man at the wicket is shown by a bronze marker. In

some establishments each man's performance is studied and if it falls off unaccountably investigation is set afoot to locate the source of the trouble. Employees are not poisoned trying to digest their grievances, for there is a bureau which will look into every man's complaint and see that he gets justice. Instead of "firing" a workman at the instance of a single foreman, he is tried out in different departments until he fits in or proves hopeless. The making of these discriminations costs time and money, but science is providing precise means of making them and the results in greater efficiency, good will and happiness prove that they are worth all they cost.

There will, of course, be a certain amount of lumping when, as in warfare or class strife, effective mass action is called for. Aside from such dictated instances, lumping is due either to heartlessness or to ignorance and stupidity. In centralized military empires there is tenderness for the interests and feelings of the individual members of the privileged class but ruthless iron uniformity for the despised masses. In green democracies flat treatment prevails, not from heartlessness but because the past has made every form of discrimination hateful. But in time it is seen that equal treatment of unequals is crying injustice. As the odious old classifications of people are forgotten men dare to make new classifications based on need, service or social value. The finer these classifications, the less is the sacrifice to the average. In the end every normal man can be well cared for just as every normal man can be fitted with a ready-made suit of clothes, provided that suits are made in a sufficient number of shapes and sizes.

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## DEMOCRACY AND THE LOGIC OF GOODNESS.

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COVERED by the above phrase is an issue which one would imagine must soon compel the attention of thinkers in a fresh way. It is an issue to which the war has given added urgency; but it would have been a vital one even if the war had never been fought. Democracy has been making headway all over the civilized world. As was inevitable, questions have arisen in the minds of many reflective people as to the conditions of its permanence. It is plainly an institution for peace. Is it of a nature fitted to bear the strain of peace; the strain, that is to say, of the cultural development which peace brings with it, to the masses of men?

Any survey of such a subject which is to prove a beginning of real light must try to get it whole. Only if democracy, taken in its broadest outlines, can be held up and seen against its background in the general world of life and mind, can we hope to determine in a helpful way what the main conditions of its permanence are. It is proposed here to try, however sketchily, to block in some of these outlines.

Democracy is a word of very various signification, but we must not let this disconcert our inquiry. Let us make the best of ordinary usage. It is clearly a fact that men live in communities. Equally clearly, benefits arise from this way of living which are not otherwise attainable. The question to be essayed is: On what conditions can the good that is won through communal life continue to be shared, and not merely produced by one set of persons for the enjoyment of another? We may say at once what we believe an adequate survey of these conditions would show them chiefly to be: they are first, a revised conception of what the good things of communal life really are; and secondly, a cleansing of the channels through which they filter

down to the mass of the people. The former is the more important of the two. Were our conceptions of the relative goodness of things once approximately squared to their real worth, the cleansing and purifying of those human channels through which, in an organized society, the good which social life wins for man must always flow down to the rank and file of us, would probably come of itself. The important matter is our notion of goodness.

Hitherto, we do not seem to have had very adequate conceptions of what is good. The evidence of the war is conclusive on this point if on no other. Civilization is man's confession of what he values. And upon the European civilization built up since the Renaissance the war is the commentary. The one clear lesson of it all is that a transvaluation of some radical values is the condition of a stable civilized life.

We hesitate to believe, however, that the war is the only witness against our current valuations. It is an unwelcome one. It only proclaims that something has been wrong; it does not tell us what. Pessimists though we may have to be in regard to practical remedies, for the present and for some time to come, we hesitate to abandon ourselves to the utter pessimism of not being able so much as to see what is amiss. Nor is there reason that we should. "The miscarriage of life in the West" seemed to some to be already manifest and capable of a degree of definition before the war came; and it seems possible still to consider our civilization in relation to the conditions of its permanence with some hope of result without reference to the mere brute fact that it has just so narrowly escaped catastrophe. With sufficient insight some helpful knowledge might perhaps have been gleaned from a scrutiny of things even before a world-event had arisen to pass its rough judgment upon them. This is what is important. What is important for us to get at is not the mere knowledge that our valuations have been out, but some knowledge of how and where.

The question with which we are left, then, if we are not afraid to handle it, is, what relation is borne by the valua-

tions of things betrayed in our civilization to their actual worth; that is to say, to their nature as defined by the station they occupy in the real economy of the world, so far as our limited vision allows us a glimpse of that?

First, what have our valuations generally been? To what things have we been giving place and prominence? What, on the widest view we can take, does our civilization seem to have been doing? Obviously it is not a promising question; yet it is one which, following the distant hint of some of the world's great teachers, we venture to think capable of a not unenlightening answer. True, on the objective side of civilization, its works are vast, bewildering, multitudinous; but on its subjective side it has been doing just one thing—fostering self-consciousness. And its “mis-carriage” is probably capable of correspondingly short statement. It has been fostering self-consciousness indiscriminately. It has been valuing it simply as such, and so merely maximizing its amount without due regard to its kinds and quality.

Postponing for the present all consideration of the question whether its method of producing self-consciousness has shown our civilization to be in accord with the true economy of the world or not, we seem at least entitled to say that this is what our civilization has produced. Self-consciousness truly is—what it has often been said to be—the central fact of the modern time. Mind is on the throne. The inwardness of all that is happening under the aegis of democratic institutions is simply that mind is being revealed to itself at an unprecedented rate.

The full tale of the evidence has to be gathered from many more quarters than we can here touch. For a beginning we need look no further than to the results of industrial development. The most obvious of these is in the sphere of man's material possessions. These, reckoning from the time when human beings first began to co-operate to produce them, have increased in a measure almost beyond the power of imagination to envisage. The number

of different types of physical things used by a primitive hunting tribe is not at the largest very large. A tolerably small enclosure might be made to hold a sample of each and every sort of things which such a tribe would use. Can we imagine side by side with such a modest collection a parallel modern display, a complete assemblage of everything needed or appreciated by a typical modern civilization during a typical period of its existence? What size of a market-hall, for instance, would expose for sale even a single specimen of absolutely everything that could be bought for money in this country, say, in 1914? How many times over would the edifice be able to contain one which should perform the same office for a tribe of Papuans or Eskimos? Only by figuring to ourselves some such contrast can we obtain a tolerably concrete picture of how far modern industry has travelled.

But the increase in civilized man's material possessions bespeaks increased self-consciousness; and in a way not realized by many who have learnt to speak of the place of mind in the modern world. There is one obvious sense in which the number of man's material goods bears witness to the place of mind. It shows mind's power. It is right to dwell upon this fact because it is a fact. It is right to dwell upon the vast store of accumulated forethought and skill, science and organization which the production of a modern nation's material equipment involves. But it was not its dominion only that we had in view when we referred to mind's being on the throne. It was its consciousness of itself. This is the really important matter, and it is an inevitable accompaniment of its sway.

The sheer multitude of the different types of material goods with which a modern civilization normally overflows is familiar to everybody. But in essence, their existence is nothing else then the soul's self-revelation—quite literally, its holding up of its own nature before its own eyes. These myriads of articles did not come there merely by an act of God. They were invited there. The creations of human manufacture are things wished-for, appreciated, needed.



Now plainly every new variety of needed thing indicates somewhere a new variety of human need. Every desired thing bespeaks a desire; every appreciated thing, an appreciation. It is the elements of man's soul that have been multiplying, then. Such is the true story of industrial progress. A transformation of himself keeps strict pace with man's transformation of the earth. As he fructifies it, he multiplies his own soul. As man progresses, his original needs differentiate themselves into wants exactly as numerous as, under his labor and ingenuity, the earth sprouts into varieties of material wares. If our civilization has a soul at all—and it must have—the complexity of its soul is measured just by the number of things on the stalls of our bazaars, the length of our tradesmen's catalogues, our articles of dress and the items on our menus. Every distinctive new piece of manufacture which succeeds in getting itself tolerated at all, owes its entry into the currency of marketable goods to the fact that it has somewhere addressed the human soul, has excited it, and has successfully elicited appreciation. "Poor human soul!" one may exclaim; and so far correctly. For there is no escaping the tyranny of things, if as tyranny we are going to regard it. No corner of the land is so remote as not to hear the call of the market; and as for the cities, those ganglia of our civilization, no dweller there can so much as turn himself about, walk down a thoroughfare or take up his morning paper, but innumerable things, armed with all the devices of scientific advertisement, will besiege his soul on the right hand and on the left, in the hope of capturing some stray interest of his or awakening in him some new desire which hitherto had slept in his bosom, peaceable and unknown. Self-consciousness? How is it possible that anyone should live in the midst of modern industry and not at least be conscious of his wants and wishes, whether he be quite clearly aware that these make up his "self" or not? So far, the work of civilization, if not producing self-consciousness, is at least heaping up on every hand the means and instruments of self-consciousness.

If modern industry contributes so much indirectly towards the revelation of the mind to itself, what shall we say of the more direct contributions of other departments of modern life? What of the products of the fine arts, music, sculpture, painting, building? What of the "demand for printed paper" which Carlyle thought so enormous even in his day? What of the elimination of manual work and the spread of the professions?

When we try to bring before us in its totality the evidence of what one might call the de-materialization of life which has taken place, it almost seems as if mind had cut itself loose from its occupation with matter altogether and were making free to live, move and have its being entirely in its own lighter air. In the arts, for example, has any stone been left unturned to devise for us fresh ways of exercising our capacities for aesthetic enjoyment? Is there a device not exploited, a material unwrought? One sometimes rises from the effort to take a conspectus of the artistic side of modern life wondering whether, soon, there will be a single sound left in all nature which has not been made to serve in somebody's music, a single possibility of shape or color that is not upon some canvass, a form of edifice capable of hanging together at all which has not somewhere been built; and, quite similarly, whether there be a possible viand which has never been cooked or a single possible potion in all the cellars of nature which has not somewhere been concocted and drunk.

Yet, putting all the products of industry and of art together, we are only at the beginning of the story of the bringing out of man's conscious mind. The awakening of sleeping desires, faculties, potencies is not merely the effect of the civilizing process but—at certain points—its purpose, its confessed and explicit business. What else is the modern phenomenon of education—one of the few things upon the desirability of which modern peoples are still fairly unanimous—except civilization's setting itself to do deliberately and of set purpose what it was already doing in countless ways indirectly? For surely education is

what its name implies, a drawing-out of the mind. We need not dwell here upon the conspicuous facts, the increasing masses of people in the world who are having their minds thus drawn out, the increasing proportion of the years of life spent in having it done. Think only of the perplexing bulk of the potential materials of education; how here—as in the study of psychology—the fields multiply by the very effort to overtake them; how the number of things people could conceivably be educated in, increases in a fatal arithmetical progression. Let anyone venture merely to write out a list of all the “sciences,”—all the ‘-ics’ and ‘-isms’ and ‘-ologies’ and ‘-osophies,’—which have ever been propounded and named, and the result, one might confidently assert, would be staggering. Many have objected to this meaningless multiplication of lines of possible intellectual pursuit: Tolstoi, for instance, and Ruskin. But none of them could stop the tide.

Is it any wonder now, that the human soul, thus roused into consciousness at every turn and made to feel itself in every fibre of its being, should at length have become frankly curious about itself and settled down to the orgy of “psychology” of all shapes and shades, which is so prominent a further feature in the currency of modern culture? For there can be no mistaking the fact. To cite one instance, and not the most glaring, think of all that is implied in the existence of the modern experimental psychological laboratory; how despite all ridicule and despite all failure, it has won its way to acceptance among the recognized channels of the higher culture, by a process the story of which if rightly written would be something of a romance. And this is, of course, but the fringe of what the mind’s interest in its own nature has produced in the field of psychological study. We have to add to the laboratory the whole volume of the interest now taken in pathological psychology and the whole practice of psycho-therapeutics; and even this is to say nothing of the immense literature of business efficiency; nor again of the growing labors of such bodies as the Society for Psychical Research, or, for that

matter, the extraordinary expansion of the field for such labors as theirs, the increase of the very material for their studies, the growth in the phenomena of the occult, all the crystal-gazings and spirit-rappings, the fortune-tellings and faith-healings, the whole tale of those manifestations of the supersensible which press and crowd so hard upon our good old well-tried realm of nature and of natural law, that they seem at times ready to swamp it altogether. All of this, together with the mystical literature and new religions of our time, must be entered in the same ledger and put into the same account with the products of modern industry and the complexity of educational materials and practice, if we are to gather the full answer to the question, what has our civilization been doing? All contribute to the same result, self-consciousness. Mind is on the throne. It never had such power, never such consciousness of itself, never such interest in itself. Never was there such multiplication of its being, such drawing out of its sleeping powers, needs, wishes, interests, such educating of it in the literal sense of the word. And never, consequently, did it bask and bathe so much in its own atmosphere. One used to think of ancient Athens as a forcing-house for human potentialities. Since the Renaissance, Athens has re-arisen, and not as a mere spot upon a creek of the Aegean Sea. It has spread over both hemispheres and veers towards both poles.

It does not appear, however, from the survey just given of the modern conditions of life that they are at all well adjusted to bring out anything which could be called the logic of the mind. Are they not adjusted rather to bring out anything that will come? The soul of man is the real centre and fund of all economic values. The soul it is, in the last resort, around which all makers and vendors of things gather and pay their court. It they solicit with their offers of goods and services. From it they vie with each other in evoking some response and recognition and every response it grants is a development, right or wrong, of itself. Moreover, its resources are exploited pretty much on the

principle on which men in this country have dug for coal, each adventurer making straight for the richest seam and tearing it out, irrespective of how many others he ruined in the process. The conditions of the competition assign the prize to whoever can discover in people a new taste to minister to, no matter what happens to the rest of their tastes meanwhile. He is surest of his reward who can find one which is permanent, not easily dropped, and has constituted himself the channel of supply. One straight road to a fortune would be to create a new vice.

This crude practice of bringing out of man—and bringing out of the world, for man—not the logic of his mind but simply whatever will come, may not, perhaps, be the cause solely responsible for the great and perplexing fact of the present hour, the fact that out of the general rise of democratic social life amongst us there should have come an Armageddon; but that this has been at least a central feature of that life and a feature which had the seeds of some kind of miscarriage in it, is a view which, the longer it is reflected on, is the harder to see past. Our working idea of good has been amiss. Judging by what we have done, it has been the idea simply of life, life and still more life. We have gone in for quantity of it rather than quality. We have set ourselves to maximize the mere amount of our conscious life, make as large as possible the mere number of points at which we are sensitive and alive. What is important is a revision of this conception. And we have now to ask very briefly what such a revision involves. What exactly is the alternative to the mere indiscriminate fertilizing of the mind which we have condemned? In what, more precisely, does the “logical” character which we oppose to mere fertility, consist?

The distinguishing feature of that which possesses logical character, in the sense in which we are here using the word, is its power to contain its own differentiations. Such character in anything is the condition of permanence; or rather it is the condition of the union of its permanence with worth.

To show what is meant, we may advert to a somewhat crude and unguarded but much canvassed illustration from Hegel, his reference to the sequence of bud, flower, and fruit as an instance of a logical process, each successive stage being the "refutation" of the last. Is this a proper application of the idea? The answer depends on whether, in this case, each result contains its own previous stages as its internal differentiations. As each succeeding stage arrives, has the last simply disappeared? When the flower arrives has the bud clean gone? Have both gone when the fruit comes? To say no, to say that each of the various stages has not simply made way for the next, but that, on the contrary, each still lives on in the next one's life and all survive in the end, is to say that the process is "logical," in the sense in which we are using the term. Assuming that it is so, two things become clear. In the first place, every separate stage in the process has a certain character or worth conferred upon it which it could not have had, had it been purely and literally transitory; and further, and for the same reason, a certain permanence is bestowed upon even the most transitory stage. Each stage has the support of the others to keep it stable. The first points forwards, the last backwards. Memory and anticipation qualify present possession. The object has character to entertain the mind with, and for that reason, has the resource not to give out and fail. It is stable because it "reverts to itself." The promise of the bud and the glory of the flower are not forgotten in the satisfaction of the fruit, but are still appreciated fully. What is finally gathered and garnered and prized is not a fruit barely, but a fruit which has come from those; not a bare undifferentiated result, but a result with all its process still alive within it. We have in the complete object not employment for one faculty only, but for a coherent order of faculties, as many as the object had distinguishable stages. The object is the source not merely of a series of joys coming one at a time as its several stages pass, but of one, a many *in* one, a deathless one, a genuine "joy forever."

To grasp what is meant by this idea is, we believe, to see exposed the essence of that "miscarriage of life" which Western civilization has occasionally been suspected of effecting.

Democracy, viewed in its largest outlines, consists of unions of men banded together to get out of the universe not whatever will come, but good which shall last; and to share that. Its congenital weakness has been the tendency of its members to quarrel about the shares, the suspicion on the part of rank and file that those at the top are using for themselves the good for which all have wrought, instead of passing it fairly and evenly down. This, or some disease of which this is the essence, has overtaken most historical democracies. Now, only part of the trouble is explained by the corruption of those at the top. Part of it is explained by the fact that the good clamored for is not of a nature that can be shared at all. It is not a good which lasts. And only that can be shared.

What good lasts? And whence does it come, so far as it ever comes at all? Or let us put the question negatively; why does the good we have, not last? For we have good. It may be somewhat shiftless and shapeless; but only prejudice could deny the existence of potential value in the chaos of man's creations. Modern society stands in the midst of achievement. Everywhere about us are the symbols of the fact. Edifices, communications, books, clothes, utensils, every commonest thing we know or handle is the cumulative result of centuries of improvement, and is perfected in multitudes of cases far beyond the boldest dreams of the first inventors. The good here gained does not last. Confessedly, only the fewest continue to relish these things. And who are those select spirits? Surely they who realize the things and what is in them; they to whom every triumph of man over nature still is a triumph, a result in which they continue still to see the achievement; because for them the earlier partial achievements are still vividly present though transcended in the completed one;

the stages of the process which led to the result still live on in the result and constitute, for them, its vital internal differentiations. Why is the modern world so full of achievements gone all flat and commonplace so that, *e.g.*, not even the shining triumphs of modern surgery can do much to diminish the numbers of the people who say "doctors are no good"? What is the source of the leakage of good from us? Why do so many good things like telephones and motor cars and fountain pens—miracles all of them—degenerate so rapidly into mere husks and disappointments and trials of temper? Why, except that these wonders are not wonders any more? They are taken for granted. They have lost their background. We have forgotten all about what went before. These things are not, to us, the culmination and reward of a long succession of great failures and meagre successes, through which they came to be. They are not the culmination of anything.

The whole secret is that we are incapable of seeing the bud in the flower, the promise in the reward, the problem in the achievement. What man really feels the space daily vanquished under his feet by the locomotive engine which carries him to town in the morning? Almost none, except perhaps a poet here and there of the type of Émile Verhaeren. But the men of the sixties and seventies felt it. To grasp this is to see the tap-root of the whole infirmity of what is called "high civilization," its restlessness, its rush, its danger of exhaustion. The broad fact is we are tired of our achievements and perversely enough, must for that very reason go on achieving more. The reason we are tired of our achievements is that we cannot feel them. Having done something, we cannot retain the sense of its earlier stages; and so we cannot continue to see in it what we have done; it immediately becomes nothing. With one triumph still hot on our hands, therefore, we are nevertheless forth immediately to seek a new one, one we can feel; and since it too perishes in the birth for the same reason, we are caught in the vicious headlong chase after

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more achievement and more and still more, in a process which really has not any end at all. We only chase things; we have lost the art of possessing them. We acquire but have forgotten the way to realize. There is no road towards permanence in possession of the good, in this direction. The one condition of permanence in anything good, is that it be "all in every part" and so self-sustained. And without this "logical" character, democratic social life must be crucified between the horns of a dilemma. It must lose either its permanence or its worth. Its permanence will be the mere permanence of fossilization and so worthless, like a system of oriental caste; or else, if it have worth, if its life be rich and varied and intense, its brilliance will be meteoric, it will have worth without permanence, like the social life of Athens. Both it cannot have, except through self-containedness. Of this kind of cohesion, a civilization has only a certain amount; it may strain it; and it can go on just so long as the strain can be borne.

Where is any salvation to come from? If we are determined to press this question, the best thing we can remember is our position. For our position, as compared with most generations of men and all the economy of the lower creation, is not normal. The normal condition of the human and animal creation alike is to live pre-occupied; and pre-occupied with an ultimate stake—fear of extinction in the case of the animal, and "fear" of God in the case of man. All of them who do "right," to the degree necessary for their continuance, do it because too pre-occupied with an all-consuming interest, to do what is fatally "wrong." The source of our internal unrest is that we do not have that ultimate stake any more. We have no mortal pre-occupation. We are not really afraid that we may lose all. Although we say in words that we may "lose our own souls," we only think we believe it; it is not a real risk to us; especially if we "gain the whole world." The reason is that we are members of an established democratic social order, and are too safe. Democracy is the child of peace; and it is the

child of plenty. It is the recurrent period in human history when the dead weight of arbitrary social necessity is lifted for a time, and man ceases to be visibly and palpably "up against" the ultimate. With his release, all the inherited potencies of his nature, so long and so arbitrarily repressed, begin to shake themselves loose for a little, get freedom to grow, and so enter upon a period of unusual bloom. The great danger of democracy is its tendency meanwhile to remove man's pre-occupation, and in consequence leave him playing with his own potentialities, bringing out of them simply what will come, instead of inducing in them and educating from them that order which they assume when they all strain in one direction. It tends to deprive man of an ultimate stake, to leave him no authentic Absolute. Hence the disorder in the soul. Hence the transience in the form of social community. The whole problem, when it comes to be stated in terms of practical life, is religious; and so is the solution of it.

Democracy arises just when the literal physical "fear" of God has somewhat abated, and a freer, ampler life is seen to be permissible to man. If that free life be transient, it is transient only because it has ceased to be religious. It will not be transient if the ultimate, while it ceases to be palpable, does not cease to be real. It will not be transient if the old God of Battles whom men feared, and in following whom, according to the mysterious economy of the world, they have overcome enemies, secured sustenance and survived, can be seen to have but revealed the rest of his character in the ampler later light, and not surrendered his Deity; it will not be transient if, in stating to man in different terms—terms more in accordance with man's maturer mind—the conditions of his tenure of his earthly life, the Deity can be seen to be a Deity still, and his imperative still an absolute imperative. Nor is the condition a very extravagant one. For the very changes which have multiplied mental life and created the difficulties for democratic civilization have also in certain ways—by linking together the

social group, and binding up the fortunes of the private self more vividly with the fate of the whole—brought the possibility of the individual's feeling a religious sanction behind moral duty perceptibly nearer realization.

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WARTIME GAINS FOR THE AMERICAN FAMILY.<sup>1</sup>

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**W**AR and the family have fought a long duel. From the earliest beginnings of history we hear voices and see pictures which typify many of the tragic features of this conflict. For War has not merely taken away son and husband and father from the home; it has sacrificed its Iphigenias to speed the fleet; it has compelled Jephthah's daughters to bewail virginity upon the mountains; it has brought home as spoil, even as Sisera's victorious hosts were expected to bring home, a damsel, two damsels to every man; with Agamemnon and his fellow Greeks, it has robbed fathers and husbands of daughters and wives whom it has taken to the tents and households of haughty victors; it has returned warriors to their Penelopes only to find themselves like Ulysses, restless until they have again set forth "roaming with a hungry heart."

In general, war and militarism have developed the power and assertiveness of the male, and tended to subordinate the woman. Denied his normal family life the warrior has often claimed great license, and has felt impatient at the standards of peace. War has tended to build up aristocracies, and as Sumner puts it, "In aristocratic society a man's family arrangements are his own prerogative." We may perhaps place to its credit some part in establishing the greater permanence and unity of the family which male dominance favored—so long as male dominance was unchallenged. But if we put this to its credit we must also charge it with thereby laying the basis for a long history of struggle against such dominance when democracy began to assert itself, and the pair-marriage ideal, fostered by the middle class and by peace, gained more and more the ascendancy.

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<sup>1</sup> An address delivered before the National Conference of Social Work, 1919.

So firmly, indeed, does our family type seem now to be fixed that it has not merely come through the great upheavals of this war less disturbed directly than the seemingly more powerful institutions of government and property; it has even received a notable tribute from radical sources. So long as Russia was overthrowing her government all Western Europe and America said Amen. When land was redistributed and private property changed hands, radicals at least acclaimed the swift advance of the proletariat. But when there came a report that the Bolsheviki were proposing to replace the private family by a nationalizing of women, there was denunciation not merely by conservatives but by radicals. The proclamation in question was declared to be from the Anarchists and not from the Bolsheviki; then the Anarchists were quick to brand the decree as an invention of their enemies. It does not matter for our purpose whether any group in Russia actually attempted a revolution in the family system; the point is that no one in this country hailed such a revolution as a sign of progress. It was rather denounced as a clumsy fabrication of the enemies of radical movements. Certain other possibilities which loomed large at one time or another soon disappeared below the horizon. War babies and official polygamy no longer threaten. It may well seem that the family has emerged from this war safe from violent overthrow or from organized attack.

In this country, moreover, we have no such directly destructive influence as the war has exerted in those countries which have borne the burden of the struggle. "How young your soldiers are!" was the exclamation in France as our boys passed to the front. The French armies were no longer young. The generation just coming upon the stage of action in 1914, as well as those who had just begun their family life, had almost to a man gone on, or else had returned as cripples and invalids to undertake as best they could a broken and patched existence. "In England," Mrs. Mary McArthur Anderson is reported as saying, "there are no marriages now. Our young men are

dead." In this country, despite the gold star which is found here and there upon the service flag, our homes as a mass are not directly destroyed. There is little change in the balance between the sexes.

Further, the direct effect of war upon the families of soldiers in this country is bound to be less than in Europe. Mr. Galsworthy, in a recent lecture upon the new factors in the society of the future, named as the first the difference in attitude between men who have been in the war and those who have not. Something as yet undefined, a certain disturbance of all values, a certain shaking loose from older foundations and an uncertainty as to things once settled, which as yet cannot be precisely described or estimated, marks the men who for four years have lived away from home and native land and have been led to measure many things with a different standard. Our boys have many of them been in the army for two years, but most of them have been out of the country but a short year; during much of this time they have been thinking more of home than of the world events; they are still in essence much as they were. Most of them have but one thought when discharged, which is to get off their uniform and get into civilian clothes where the sergeants cease from troubling, and saluting is no more.

But it would be hasty to assume that because war and revolution do not assail the family structure directly such an upheaval in civilization can pass without effect upon even the most ancient and stable institutions in the social order. Anything that affects health, disease, and housing, birth, marriage, or death, the work of women or education of children, the distribution of wealth and property, the drift from country to city, the standards of living in different social groups and classes, the political status of women and their place in industry, the stability of manners and morals, is bound to affect family life. It is the indirect effects of war that have most decisively affected the family in the past. Changes in form from polygamy to monogamy or from patriarchal dominance to democratic equality

have never come as a direct result of a battle or a campaign. They come rather as the slow cumulative effect of changes in work, in power, in wealth, in class, and in general moral attitude as men continually build and rebuild their civilization.

# I.

First of all, is the war likely to produce any effect upon the human stock itself? For we should be foolish to fix attention purely upon the problem of making the best use of our materials but never taking thought as to the quality of the materials with which we work. Is there any likelihood of increase in either the eugenic or dysgenic factors for the race? From this point of view increase in birth rate or death rate or marriage rate is of less importance than the selective character of these changes. That the birth rate in the country as a whole should fall or rise, that the death rate of babies should be lowered, that marriages generally should take place earlier or later might mean a great deal to the immediate happiness of the persons concerned, but would mean little as to the improvement or deterioration of the national stock or as to the prospects of future generations.

The important question is, in what sort of families will more or less children be brought up? It is a matter of common knowledge that the birth rate varies almost directly in proportion to poverty and inversely as to education. It is not necessary to be hopelessly conceited or bourgeois in one's outlook to suppose that people who are anxious to get an education and do get an education are on the whole a decent sort. It even seems possible to admit, with all due allowance for the predatory character attributed to the successful classes in the financial world and with all respect for the virtues of the poor, that the more vigorous, reliable, and industrious types do make their way up a little in the scale. And the very interesting point has been made by Major Leonard Darwin recently that if, as the result of the war and of the progress of democ-

racy, we make progress also in social justice—that is, in rewarding ability and usefulness more accurately than at present, and giving less of this world's goods to those who merely inherit from ancestors or have merely pecuniary ability—we are likely to be confronted with this paradox: Our genuinely superior stocks will less and less reproduce themselves. Unless some change is effected in the relative birth rates of the more and the less successful classes in society, of the better educated and the less educated, we shall more and more be having the children in the race from the less desirable stock.

This decrease in birth rate in certain classes is due partly to the postponement of marriage, partly to the voluntary limitation of families. Any attempt to deal with the situation must, therefore, consider either making it possible for the particular classes to marry earlier, or offering encouragement for larger families, or limiting the families of other groups either by raising their educational and economic level, or by encouraging direct control of the birth rate.

It is the latter group with which the social worker has most direct contact. It is the problem of the large family poorly housed, poorly fed, living in unhealthful or at least depressing surroundings, with small ambition and little knowledge or responsibility on the part of the parents, which weigh most upon her sympathies and her conscience. With this group it may well be that half measures are as good as none or even worse. Heretofore we have relied upon half measures. We have made only a beginning in segregating feeble-minded women during child-bearing age. This is the first step, even though a small one, and no state in the country can hold up its head or talk about teaching patriotism or preparedness or any of the other watchwords made current in the war, until it has taken this step. In Illinois I am thankful to say we have the legislative basis for commitment well established, and we are proceeding towards adequate administrative provision to take care of the many feeble-minded that should be segregated.



But we have been half-hearted also as regards both methods of dealing with the large families in the poorer group which are not of unsound stock. We have neither put them on their feet nor allowed them to starve. We have neither put them in good houses nor left them with none. We have legally forbidden instruction as to limitation of births although everyone assumes that such information is a matter of common knowledge among all educated people and many who are not educated. Whether we can, as the economists tell us, abolish poverty or not, certain it is that we have not yet thought it worth while to try with a tithe of the seriousness with which we have attempted to abolish autocracy in Europe. We have undoubtedly had certain very unfavorable conditions for making a fair trial. We have been receiving an enormous number of immigrants who have, in so far as they were willing workers, contributed toward abolishing poverty for some of the rest of us, but have not been equally successful in many cases in abolishing their own. We have kept our let-alone policies for wage rates and the conduct of industry which were natural under pioneer conditions and have largely ignored the changed conditions of modern industrialism. During the war we began to think nationally about certain questions. We began to see that to have good health, to produce wheat, to economize fats and sugar, were matters not of private concern but of national safety. Is it not time to begin to think nationally of the matter of poverty? Is it not time for a country which boasts of its great resources, which has discovered the presence of an army of experts willing to aid the nation in its chemistry, its physics, its agriculture, to begin to consider it also a national affair to ask as to the sources of its future generations? Is not poverty, as well as wealth and production and shipping and transportation, a national matter?

The birth rate falls in a class which aspires to a high standard, but has a small income. The class with whom the birth rate is now too low falls into two groups: country dwellers and city dwellers. The country dweller is likely

to find himself for a time at least in more comfortable conditions. The farmer has been having his chance. For him there is not likely to be any pressure that will tend immediately to lower the birth rate further.

Clerks and professional classes have high standards of living with low incomes. Notoriously the salaries of these classes have not advanced in proportion to the cost of living. Like city dwellers in general they marry later than country dwellers. Postponement of marriage in this group is likely to increase. Voluntary limitation of families is likely to go further. The difficulty of securing any domestic help is, to say the least, not an encouragement to the weary mother. The wife of one of my colleagues advertised for a maid and was cheered by a ring at the doorbell. Negotiations seemed to be proceeding until the question of children was reached. My friend admitted two. "I think," said the applicant, "I would rather take a position in a regular family." "A regular family?" queried my puzzled friend, who was not conscious of having done anything irregular. "Yes, a regular family—just husband and wife." Such regular families are undoubtedly favored by many city conditions, and for those with whom caution outruns impulse or for those who prefer other satisfactions to those of children, the tendency to regularity may become increasingly strong. For despite the strength of natural impulses, they are repressed by our civilization for so long a period that it is small wonder if at last they cease to function.

As over against these tendencies, two possibilities of improvement may be set. In a confidential report gathered by Professor Cattell as to families of scientists, health was given as a reason for limitation in more cases than was the economic or prudential factor. The war has directed our attention to the health of young men and it seems not too much to expect that we shall be interested not merely in the health of the possible future soldier but as well in the health of the future mother. Perhaps we need something like the draft-board examinations to direct attention to

the health of future mothers. With the conditions of city life and of schools which furnish an environment so totally different from that in which the race has developed, and with only a beginning of measures to offset these fundamental changes in condition, it is evident that in this, as with poverty, we have thus far taken only half-way measures.

The other suggestion of improvement which the war has brought is that of a change in our principle of taxation which shall encourage instead of discourage the birth and education of children in professional and medium income groups. Our government has made a very small exemption for each child in reckoning the income tax. This is a small beginning, but it may be welcome as a first step. Previous national taxation had been largely in the opposite direction. It imposed taxes upon consumption. The man with the large family must not merely pay all the expenses of the children; he must pay into the national treasury two, three, four or five times as much as the unmarried man or the man with a "regular" family.

One suggestion is offered by Mr. Whetham of Cambridge, England, which may not have a wide applicability, but I will pass it on. Mr. Whetham comments upon the fact that in the professional and middle classes it has been rather the custom to urge prudence upon young people and to advise them not to marry until able to provide comfortably for the household. He urges that parents and the older generation in general transfer their thought rather toward making it possible for the younger generation to marry earlier. Instead of holding on to business or professional resources until death, let, wherever possible, enough aid be given to the young people to enable them to begin their married life before the courage and passion of youth are beginning to pass. A woman from whose wisdom I have often profited has long insisted that the system of things is fundamentally wrong at this point. When people are young and in the full tide of their capacities for enjoyment, when life can make appeal

to all the avenues of sense and feeling, the limitation of income shuts the doors of expansion and compels ascetic denial as rigorously as did ever the vow of chastity, poverty and obedience. In middle life the efforts of years and the increased income give us the means, but then we have too often lost the impulse and the zest to respond to the call of joy and adventure. I am certain that as regards the teaching profession this is a sound doctrine. The young instructor in college and university, the young teacher in schools, must either have no family or must choose between children and practically all other satisfactions. I was once looking over some "model tenements" of two, three, and four rooms. "How large a family," I asked the janitor, "do you ordinarily have in the four-room apartments?" "Not so large," he said, "as in the two- or three-room apartments, for if they have several children they can't afford a four-room apartment." The same parable holds for other things than apartments. I believe that children are the best investment for young people. They are practically indispensable for the proper moral training of their parents, not to mention other joys and satisfactions, but it ought not to be necessary for the parents to forego all other good things. In any case, whatever we may say as to the "ought" of the matter, the actual fact is that of the people in these groups, many of them choose to forego the children.

## II.

Let us glance now at the effect of war upon the family status, not as regards the stock but as regards the conditions produced by economic, political, social and religious forces.

Five lines of influence stand out conspicuously: first, the establishment of new standards of public health, particularly with regard to the health of children and to venereal disease; second, the establishment of national prohibition; third, changes in standards of living, including wages, hours, and housing; fourth, the greater entrance

of women into industry and responsible public service; fifth, the drive toward equality.

The movement for greater care of the health of children was a natural outcome of the terrible devastation of war and of the lowering of the birth rate in those European countries which had been longest exposed to war's effects. It is unnecessary to dwell upon this point before the Conference of Social Work. Our National Children's Bureau has properly taken the lead in setting on foot measures that will mean a higher standard of infant welfare. To measure and weigh babies is of course only a first step, but it is the most difficult and important step in every reform to get some kind of standards established toward which we can reasonably work.

Far reaching in its possibilities, not merely for good health but for the happiness and morals of the family, is the new attitude toward venereal disease, which has been forced upon the nation by military necessity. Prior to this war we have had so small an army that the effect of army standards upon the general attitude of the community has been negligible. The tradition in the army has been that sex indulgence is necessary for men who are away from ordinary associations and occupations and shut up to a life of strict discipline with no home environment. The mobilization upon the Mexican border served the valuable purpose of illustrating what this theory meant, when vice interests took advantage of it to provide opportunities for indulgence. The experience of European armies as to the reduction of fighting strength by sexual immorality reinforced the moral argument that a revolution in the program was necessary if our army was to be efficient and if the morale of American women at home was to be sustained. To send their sons into an organization which maintained the old military attitude was more than could be asked of the women of this generation, even though the appeal came from the highest and holiest of causes. The vigorous campaign waged in this country and in France by the Commission on Training Camp Activities, the

National War Work Council of the Young Men's Christian Association, and other agencies, has in the opinion of military authorities had a great direct effect upon the attitude of the army. In the opinion of Dr. Exner, it has produced the cleanest army the world has ever seen, in freedom from the venereal diseases; it has all but disposed of the question of "a sexual necessity." But aside from these results of immediate bearing upon the army—results which would doubtless have been still greater had army officers not so frequently taken the attitude in speaking to their men of "Do as I say and not as I do"—more permanent and significant effects of the movement are, according to Dr. Exner:

(1) It has greatly advanced the movement for the conquest of gonorrhea and syphilis; (2) it has brought about a new and significant public attitude toward the special problems of sex, an attitude of readiness to discuss these problems frankly and to deal with them constructively; (3) it has dealt the death blow to segregated or tolerated prostitution in America; (4) it has largely broken down the prejudice against sex education; (5) it has committed our government to a policy and program and secured appropriations of adequate funds for dealing with the social problems of sex in aggressive and constructive fashion.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the possibilities in this change in general public attitude. Some have been critical of the disposition of the medical service of the government to feature prophylaxis rather than to insist upon absolute continence. But when I think of the enormous saving in the health of innocent wives and children which would be brought about by conquest of these diseases, I am disposed rather to let the medical people work in every conceivable way for the prevention and cure of disease and to rely upon other agencies for the very different task of moral education. I believe that we have in the past made entirely too much use of venereal disease as a moral agent. It has too often played the part which hell played in the religion and morality of the past generations. Probably few are now deterred from wrong-doing

by the fear of hell; yet on the whole I do not discover that the morality of the community is noticeably lower by this change in belief. Other motives have come in to take the place of fear. Is it not likely also that the actual deterrent effect of fear of disease has been much exaggerated? If this were operative anywhere it might be assumed to operate in the case of women leading a life of prostitution. But a woman who had talked with hundreds of prostitutes in an effort to understand their psychology and find out as much as possible about their attitude, told me that so far as she could discover the fear of disease played almost no rôle whatever with them. They supposed that others did occasionally contract disease if they were not careful, but they feared nothing for themselves—and this despite the fact that many of them were shown by medical tests to be infected. If we can by any means diminish disease, let us do it, and at the same time let us take advantage of the new public attitude and see what can be done by education, by wholesome recreation, by removal of public temptation, by encouraging early marriage, and by a better and more sympathetic study of the actual motives in human conduct. The old methods of suppression, repression, silence, and fear, have worked very ill. We can at least give the new policy a fair trial.

Closely related to this matter of public health is the new national policy of prohibition of the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages. In a recent suggestive article by Floyd Dell in the "Liberator," the writer holds that the most important aspect of the changes to be expected is sexual. "Women hate alcohol," he says, "not so much because their husbands sometimes come home drunk as because it keeps them away from home so successfully." "Alcohol is truly the enemy of womankind; it competes with them all too successfully for what they know belongs to them, man's leisure hours, which should be their mutual play time." And for yet another reason why alcohol is an enemy of women, Mr. Dell says "the uglinesses of prostitution are so gross that the young and unspoiled

part of each male generation is only able to view them through an alcoholic haze. The hucksters of the underworld do well to mourn the passing of alcohol; for without that pink mosquito netting of illusion to spread over its rotten fruit, who will buy?" Mr. Dell points out, however, that if men and women spend their play time together, this will not necessarily ensure a happy home. "For if a man has been able to put up with a home only on the absentee plan, he will hardly bear its unmitigated wretchedness; and so with women."

In the case of prohibition, as in that of sex morality, it goes without saying that negative and repressive action will not get far alone. To open up new ways of enjoyment in which the whole family can share is a pressing problem. The moving picture theatres have probably been the greatest single agency in this direction. When I occasionally visit one of these to see what millions of my fellow citizens are doing every evening, I see a great many families going together. The saloon in this country has never been what similar institutions have been in Europe, a family gathering place. Doubtless shrewd purveyors of amusement will devise still other means of entertainment, but social workers and public agencies should press vigorously the campaign for parks and playgrounds and all sorts of outdoor and indoor instruction and entertainment. In my own city an Art Institute and a Museum attract not merely "high-brows" but a great stream of all sorts and conditions. Some take away much, others probably a little, but it is an inspiration to see how many respond to what might seem a rather limited appeal.

The third point at which the war will touch family life will be through its influence upon the standard of living and the cost of maintaining the family in health and vigor and with some regard at least to the decencies and conveniences which mean so much for the smooth conduct of living together. No one can know precisely what is to come. The enormous amounts of capital goods which have been destroyed during the war will lay a heavy



burden upon industry for their replacement. Great wars in the past have usually been followed sooner or later by periods of distress. For many years after the great Napoleonic wars the condition of the laboring classes in Great Britain was bad, despite the great increase in production which the power of steam and the new machinery made possible.

Two problems now confront the world. Can our total production be so increased by greater economy and efficiency as to reduce the burden, and in the second place, who is to carry what must be carried? Although the first of these is probably the more important, the second is more fruitful in unrest and a sense of injustice. The burdens of this war have thus far been laid to a higher degree than usual upon the well-to-do. The graduated income tax, the larger income tax for larger incomes, ought to stay. Taxes upon luxuries ought to stay. A headline in the morning paper a few days since read, "Rush bills to lift tax burdens." This looked well, but the next line read, "Plan speedy repeal of the levies on luxuries." I believe in keeping the taxes upon luxuries instead of shifting the burden to necessities. It is unthinkable that we should go back in principle to the older methods of taxing the consumer for the principal part of national burdens. An important factor is, no doubt, the resolute attitude taken by organized labor that wages shall not be reduced. Employers are disposed to acquiesce in this policy and to pass on to the consumer the charges necessary to maintain high wages. Those labor groups which have a strategic position have undoubtedly benefited at the expense of other groups. Nevertheless the very fact that many families have gained a glimpse of larger incomes, of a higher standard of family life, is bound to help in preventing the laborer from carrying so much for his share as he has had to carry after wars in the past.

Yet we cannot improve the condition of all laborers to anything like a desirable standard if we give to labor all the profits now going to capital and the salaries now going

to management. We cannot (as a mechanic recently maintained in conversation) "give five thousand dollar salaries to every one" so long as the country is only producing about one thousand dollars; but if labor and capital share hardships there will be more energetic efforts put forward to increase production and improve the condition of all. An engineering friend tells me that high wages are a great stimulus to the invention of labor saving machinery. How far can the nation move forward to a new plane of greater production? One of my economic colleagues is inclined to doubt whether our national production at present is more than 5 per cent efficient. Our wastes in agriculture by bad soil, poor methods, by pests of various sorts; our wastes in coal mining and coal burning; our labor turnover, our strikes, our absurdly expensive distribution of milk and groceries, would go far to substantiate such an estimate. Yet this same colleague believes that we have gained a conviction that production is a national enterprise and not a matter for private profit. If both employers and wage workers can get this point of view, and if the wage worker can be protected so as to receive his share of increased production, a most important step toward family comfort in large will be taken.

The fourth line of effect of the war upon the family which I shall mention is that which relates to the greater employment of women in industry and other out-of-the-home occupations.

As has frequently been noted, the interests of the middle-class woman and of the factory worker or those who come from the less well-to-do families, are not the same. The middle-class woman on the whole probably needs more outlet for her activity and would be better off with more definite work. The opening of new occupations is distinctly welcome to her. At the time of our Civil War, we are told by Mr. Arthur Calhoun in his recent work on the *Social History of the Family in America*, there was a great entrance upon many new occupations on the part of women. And on the whole they have remained in possession of

many of the fields which they occupied at that time. It is likely that as a result of our present war women will continue to fill many of the places which they have been found so capable of filling. Is this to be loss or gain for the family? If it means that more women are to be childless, or if it means that no distinction is made between mothers or prospective mothers and those who are not in either class, the result is bound to be bad. Instead of talking about the employment of women as a class, is it not the more hopeful line to concentrate public attention upon the problem of the mother and prospective mother? Is it not one of the next lines of attack to make sure that every woman shall have that free period and suitable care for the birth of her child, and that attention after, which has already been secured in other countries? And then further that the mother with young children shall be given the opportunity to be at home and to care for them?

I cannot feel that the present indiscriminate raid of industry upon women regardless of family ties can be justified. I am not sure but that the statisticians would find it more destructive than war to the life and health of children and to the morale of family life.

The influence which in the long run may well prove greatest of all is the great drive of the war toward equality between men and women—equality in work, in wages, in political rights, in social responsibilities, in authority in the home. Not that the war initiated these things, but it speeded up the movement already started in this direction. To have more occupations open to women means power; to enter into organized industry and get training through labor unions in leadership and co-operation means power; to manage war campaigns of all sorts means power. What will be the effect of this new power and this new education of woman upon the family? Will it tend toward any wiser mating? Will it tend to increase still further the divorce rate which for many years has been mounting steadily? Probably the effects will be mixed. Education in all these various lines, and the greater freedom and

power of woman will probably make on the whole for more careful choosing of a mate. But it is not likely for a time at least to lessen the frequency of divorce. For since three-fourths of the divorces are sought by women, divorce seems to be largely a matter of what a woman will put up with. If she has more power, she is likely to be less tolerant. For it is true in domestic life as in industry that democracy is far more delicate and difficult to manage than is autocracy. This is not to say that it is hopeless. The rate of divorce in the country as a whole is now about one divorce for nine marriages. In the group that I know best it is about one for a hundred. I do not think this is because the college professor is less exasperating, or the college professor's wife less of an equal. I incline to think it is because she is somewhat more cautious in her original selection and more philosophical afterwards—that is, that she views large and small with better perspective, for the courts tell us that it is more often the small than the large that wrecks marriage.

But whether divorces increase or decrease, the movement toward equality can no more be blocked than the tide. And it ought not to be if it could. If the family were committed to the older type, it would remain only at the cost of a perpetual conflict between impulse on the one hand and certain well-considered goods on the other, between social duty on the one hand and self-respecting life on the other, between parental affection and other almost equally imperious demands. It is because the family not only satisfies passion, but sublimates it; because it not only involves sacrifice, but on the other hand opens up new fields of thought and emotion, action and living, that it will keep its place in genuine democratic development. For democracy means co-operation, and the family is not only the oldest, but in many ways by far the finest type of co-operation.

Yet none of these gains for the family is greatest. The greatest is the hope and the deep resolve that war itself shall cease.

The Greek story of Agamemnon which told of the warrior disregarding family ties for military necessity, disregarding family morals under military thrill of power, and finally after his victories falling himself a victim to the passions of maternal love and conjugal jealousy, suggests in its outcome the issue of the duel between war and the family. War has disregarded the family under plea of higher necessity; it has habitually trampled upon many of the family sanctities; it has lowered birth rates and loosened marriage ties; it has often quenched in death the family life so happily begun. But now, what lies behind the insistent and compelling demand in all countries that this war shall be the last? What gives its deepest urge to that demand for a league of nations and for international co-operation and justice, which the peoples of the world have so deeply felt? Not, I take it, so much that war is expensive, or irrational, or risky. Is it not chiefly just this: That the family at last rises to avenge itself upon its ancient enemy and destroy it? This time, the first possibly in history, there is the chance that the family, like Wordsworth's Happy Warrior, may turn its "necessity to glorious gain."

JAMES H. TUFTS.

## BOOK REVIEWS.

**ROUSSEAU AND ROMANTICISM.** By Irving Babbitt. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1919. Pp. xxiii, 426. Price, \$3.50.

It is to the ethics of Rousseau and romanticism that Professor Babbitt devotes himself. And his primary concern is not with the ethics of a past movement, but with a philosophy of life which the author believes to be dominant. Rousseau and romanticism stand for naturalism; more specifically, for emotionalistic naturalism as distinguished from scientific and utilitarian naturalism, with which, however, the author believes emotionalistic naturalism to be closely connected. On its positive side Professor Babbitt defines his position as that of an ethical positivist and individualist, in that he rejects authority and tradition. His criterion is affirmed to be that of "fruits," and in particular the fruit of happiness, but the criterion most in evidence in the actual discussion is that of "decorum." As historical representatives of his position or one closely allied to it he names Confucius, Buddha and Aristotle. He aims his attack against such modern writers as Bergson, James, Dewey, Croce, and "smart young radicals" who favor novelty—the Many rather than the One—although he has no admiration for "the new realists, flat on their faces before the man of science."

Rather strangely for one who proclaims himself a positivist, the author accepts the distinction between appearance and reality and identifies the real with the one, the illusory with the many and with change. But he holds that the problem of the one and the many can be solved only by a right use of illusion. "There is always the unity at the heart of the change; it is possible, however, to get at this real and abiding element and so at the standards with reference to which the dream of life may be rightly managed only through a veil of illusion." The problem of conduct is to be solved "only by a deeper insight into the imagination and its all important road in both literature and life." And what is this function of imagination that is to make life whole? "Man is cut off from immediate contact with anything abiding and, therefore, worthy to be called real, and condemned

to live in an element of fiction or illusion, but he may, I have tried to show, lay hold with the aid of the imagination on the element of oneness that is inexplicably blended with the manifoldness and change and to just that extent may build up a sound model for imitation." The noteworthy thing in this philosophy of life is, therefore, the quest for unity as contrasted with variety or change.

Practically applied, this moral ideal means chiefly a control of impulse, repression rather than expression. Favorite phrases are, "pulling back of impulse," "the veto power in man." The morality of decorum is to be found in "the habits that make for moderation and good sense and decency." The moral law condemns not merely the lust for power, but humanitarianism as well. "That the brutal imperialist who brooks no obstacle to his lust for dominion has been tampering with this law goes without saying; but the humanitarian, all adrip with brotherhood and profoundly convinced of the loveliness of his own soul, has been tampering with it also and in a more dangerous way, for the very reason that it is less obvious." The leading topics under which the author's criticism of the romantic philosophy of life is pursued are: Romantic Genius, Romantic Imagination, Romantic Morality, Romantic Love, Romantic Irony, Romanticism and Nature, Romantic Melancholy, and The Present Outlook. The method of treatment is that of the essay rather than that of logical analysis.

Broadly speaking, if we neglect technicalities and look to the content of the moral ideal, we may well divide moral theories with Nietzsche into those which say Yes to life and those which say No. Undoubtedly romanticism says Yes. Professor Babbitt is fair enough to point out that its emphatic Yes was due in part to the narrow and harsh order of society and law of life which it found in possession of the field. Undoubtedly its conception of the beautiful soul lent itself easily to exaggerated individualism. Undoubtedly the love of the sexes, which directly or indirectly played so large a part in the romantic literature, is a dangerous human passion, even though it has all the potency for suffusing life and thought with subtle interest which Plato suggested in his doctrine of the Eros and which makes the novel the art of most universal appeal to-day. It is desirable to have the full scope of this attitude toward life presented for consideration, although no advocate of this philosophy would consider Professor Babbitt's

presentation a comprehensive and all-sided one. Yet one is inevitably moved to ask whether the proper measure to be found for an indiscriminating Yes is a simple No. Granted that life cannot be lived on the purely naturalistic level, in which every emotion and passion is welcomed and expressed without limit, does it follow that "decorum" is the most effective watch-word with which to find real values, or that "unity" represents a large enough meaning to satisfy the human spirit?

To state the moral situation in another way, do we understand Rousseau and the great movement of which he was a part if we look at them purely in psychological terms of feeling and emotion versus reason? We deceive ourselves if we fail to consider them as rather part of a great democratic process. Order may for the philosopher be conceived as a numerical or logical symbol, but as an ethical power it usually means the control of a ruling class. In the age of the French Revolution laws of every kind had a flavor of rules imposed by military, political, ecclesiastical and social authorities. If our democracy to-day is prone to excesses, can we meet the situation by ignoring all social problems? There is no suggestion in Professor Babbitt's treatment that human nature gains its ethical world, in part at least, through the give and take of common struggles, common joys, and mutual help. Class consciousness is undoubtedly responsible for many of the harsh and unlovely traits of human character. Nevertheless it is so fundamental that it is not likely to be transformed by the mere ideal of unity, however persuasively presented. A theory of education which relies purely upon the humanistic ideal in this narrow sense of the term may appeal to the imagination of a gifted few, but it is not likely to "produce leaders." For a leader must not merely imagine a goal; he must have power with his fellows.

Professor Babbitt has half-opened a window. He wishes to oppose naturalism as a philosophy of life. He sees that ethical civilization means not accepting "what is," whether in external nature or in inner emotions, as a final criterion for conduct. The moral standard must be sought in a moral ideal, and this ideal must be constructed through imagination. Well and good. But having cast out naturalism, he turns and opens the door wide for its metaphysical counterpart, which is equally unavailable for ethics. Instead of seeking what is "good" with an eye single to the problem of values, he allows himself to be caught by



the ancient confusion between the "real" and the "good." He identifies the real with the "One," the "abiding." This is the more surprising as he lays down the sound premise: "It [life] gives a oneness that is always changing. The oneness and the change are inseparable." From this premise we might expect the inference that oneness and change are equally real and equally essential to life. And if one looks to the realm of art, one finds that the great artists never separate these factors. But Professor Babbitt goes on to the remarkable inference that the change is illusion, the oneness real. In the passage already quoted, he asserts: "Man is cut off from immediate contact with anything abiding and therefore worthy to be called real." He finds the only sound model for imitation to be "the element of oneness."

Why, if one is seeking the real, should the abiding be regarded as more real than the change that is inseparable from it? And why if one is seeking a value (good), should he decide upon this by asking what is real? Are not some "real" things evil? And finally, if, as I think is profoundly true, the imagination has an indispensable function in forming ethical standards, why limit it to the one path of finding unity and assume that whatsoever is more than this cometh of evil? If man had never imagined anything other than unity, the world might have had law of a certain sort but it would surely have had no prophets and no gospel. It would have had no Plato's "Republic." And, to take one of Professor Babbitt's favorite poets, it would have had no "Antigone." For the passionate appeal of Antigone to a "higher law" is no logician's quest for a unity which is its own sufficient reason; the real reason why Antigone buries her brother is that the tie of kin is superior to that of political allegiance. The law is used to lend sanction to the imperious demand of the heart.

It is of course futile to set up the claims of either emotion or reason to be the sole guide of life; and one may adopt, though with a somewhat different implication from that intended by the author, his plea that our modern experiment has not been sufficiently modern in the sense that it has not yet followed out fully the implications of a moral world which cannot rely upon sanctions of past authority and tradition. Professor Babbitt criticizes the uncritical giving place to emotion; it is equally necessary to criticize, as Professor Babbitt does not, the uncritical insistence

upon "reason" and unity. The law which will ultimately reign in the moral world, the world of genuine freedom, must be the law of life. And life means change as truly as it means the abiding.

J. H. TUFTS.

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GREEK POLITICAL THEORY: Plato and his Predecessors. By Ernest Barker, M.A. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. xiv, 403. Price, 14s. net.

Mr. Barker's fresh and valuable study of Greek political theory up to and including Plato is the first volume of a reconstruction of his earlier work, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle* (1906), a reconstruction so thorough and fearless that it cannot be looked upon as a new and enlarged edition. The second volume, *Aristotle and His Successors*, will be written "as soon as the position of national affairs justifies the author in undertaking such work." The present study, which thus entirely supersedes his earlier book is both an analysis and mature appraisal of every Greek political thinker of whom we have any distinct record, up to and including Plato, to whom as the greatest of these thinkers, the major portion of the book, chapters vi to xvii, are devoted. An interesting feature in the book is the translation of two newly discovered fragments of the Sophist Antiphon *On Truth* (p. 83), in which he maintains that "justice consists in not transgressing (or rather, in not being known to transgress) any of the legal rules of the state in which one lives as a citizen. A man, therefore, would practise justice in the way most advantageous to himself if, in the presence of witnesses, he held the laws in high esteem, but, in the absence of witnesses, and when he was by himself, he held in high esteem the rules of nature. The reason is that the rules of the laws are adventitious, while the rules of nature are inevitable."

The book is essentially both in matter and arrangement written for students, but apart from the chapters upon the Greek state, and the political theory of the sophists and the minor Socratics, the study of Plato has a wider appeal. Plato has come to mean more to us and to the author, on many points, than he would have meant if the war had not stirred the deeps; and the issue of might against right (pp. 71-74) as set out by Callicles in the *Gorgias*, the significance of militarism (pp. 298-301) as

stated in the *Laws*, and the scope of a true national education (c. xvii) have a double interest and message. In the *Gorgias* Callicles rejects all law as a product of contracts made by the weak to defraud the strong of the just right of their might. Law institutes a "slave-morality"—the very phrase of Nietzsche—and slave-morality is no true morality, for Nature and Law are opposite, and Nature is the true rule of human life. In his *Laws*, Plato tells us that to the militarist "peace is only a name; and every State in reality is in a constant state of war with every other, without any declaration, but also without any cessation." So peace is subordinated to war, instead of war to peace.

Mr. Barker's point of view and his style are fresh and free from pedantry; he can illustrate Plato's theory of crime from Samuel Butler, and the Russian convicts in the revolution of 1917, who when "they were told that they were free, answered: "We have no right to be free. We have committed crimes, and must expiate them." "Straightway they elected warders from among their number, swore to obey them, and to hang any man who should attempt to escape." The writing of this study was as Mr. Barker writes in the preface, "pure pleasure" to the author, and its reading is equally pleasant to the student.

M. J.

London, England.

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THE FORGOTTEN MAN AND OTHER ESSAYS. By William Graham Sumner, edited by Albert Galloway Keller. New Haven; Yale University Press; London; Humphrey Milford, 1918. Pp. 559. Price, \$2.50.

This volume forms the fourth in the series of collected essays of the late Professor Sumner. The plan did not originally contemplate more than a single volume, but the discovery of a number of unpublished manuscripts and the reception accorded to the first venture have led to the publication of the four with an enlarged bibliography and a complete index in the present volume. The essay which gives the title to the present book was written in 1883 and it has seemed to the editor appropriate to use this title "in view of the fact that Sumner has been more widely known, perhaps, as the creator and advocate of the 'Forgotten Man' than as the author of any other of his works." In the volume as a whole, economic essays occupy the largest

space. "Protectionism, the -ism which teaches that waste makes wealth," leads off with 100 pages, and is followed by sundry tracts for the times on Free Coinage, The Crime of 1873, etc. An essay on Politics in America, reprinted from the *North American Review*, and another on the Administration of Andrew Jackson, represent one of the side lines which Sumner taught at Yale so effectively to large classes. Of more general ethical interest, besides the title essay, are those upon Integrity in Education, Discipline, and what the editor styles a "curiosity" consisting of the contents of a socialist newspaper of the date July 4, 1950, with paragraphs of news, editorial items, and announcements of various sorts, intended as a parody upon socialist arguments.

The primary interest of these four sumptuously printed volumes, which make a worthy memorial to the powerful mind and clear-cut personality of the great teacher whose influence in the world of affairs it would be difficult to measure, is of course historical. They are an unequalled presentation of many aspects of *laissez-faire*. Such teaching day after day in the university which has trained such a great number of lawyers and public men will need to be understood by any student of the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth. The intellectual vigor, the penetrating analysis, the absolute clearness of statement, the genius for illustration, gave a drive to Sumner's arguments which could not fail to make them count in the very mental structure which his pupils were building. Read to-day, they seem undoubtedly to have a certain hardness, a certain blindness to the interdependence of social groups, and to certain large sides of human nature. Yet, curiously enough, just at the time when this present volume appears, we are having on a large scale an illustration of "The Forgotten Man." Since the beginning of the war, certain individuals and certain groups who have been in strategic positions have either profited by peculiar conditions or at least have been able to hold their own. But a large number of "forgotten men" have been struggling on in various occupations, seeing prices go up and wages or salaries practically stationary. In this case, to be sure, these people have not suffered because "well-meaning reformers" have aimed to benefit the "poor and weak" at the expense of the ordinary taxpayer whom Sumner portrays so sympathetically. Nevertheless they are suffering because of a "mixture" in our

institutions of diverse theories. Sumner declared the mixture to be between the "old mediæval theories of protection and personal dependence and the modern theories of independence and individual liberty." At present the mixture is between the theory of independence and individual liberty as it might work in a world where no two people ever used their liberty to combine and where liberty to hold property did not imply power over others, and that same theory in a world where liberty to combine and to hold property gives almost unlimited powers. The former mode of operation of the theory is supposed to regulate prices we pay as consumers and the wages or salaries we accept or secure as producers, if we work in an "open shop." But it is the latter mode of operation of the theory which actually determines many if not most prices, and fixes the profits or wages of those groups or individuals that are in a position to take advantage of the situation. In other words, we have war prices without government regulation.

J. H. TUFTS.

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#### SHORTER NOTICES.

**THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE GOOD: AN ESSAY ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.**  
By Vladimir Solovyof. Translated from the Russian by N. A. Duddington, M.A., with a note by Stephen Graham. London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1919. Pp. 114, 475. Price, 15s. net.

Solovyof's *Justification of the Good* is here translated for the first time, and very ably translated. It is a massive book, giving the sum of the Russian idealist's theory of the universal basis of morality, which he analyses into three elements, shame, pity and reverence. These fundamental feelings, he considers, exhaust the sphere of man's possible moral relations. Taking Solovyof's three elements separately, pity is not only akin to love, but the origin of love, and a better thing than love. "Love in itself is not a virtue; the virtue behind it, the unconditioned value is always pity."

His attitude to shame is even more debatable. The roots of all that is real are hidden in the darkest earth, he prefaces, and morality is no exception. To him the whole of human morality grows out of the feeling of shame and this feeling of shame is purely sexual in origin (p. 29). Animals are incapable of shame, while man can be defined as the animal capable of shame. "It is precisely at the moment when man falls under the sway of material nature and is overwhelmed by it that his distinctive peculiarity and inner independence assert themselves in the feeling of shame." But what is he ashamed of? Nature itself which is, Solovyof answers, evil. There is no mistaking here the deep undercurrent of oriental pessimism always foremost in Russian religion. The true force of sexual shame, he states, lies in the fact that we are not ashamed of submitting to nature, but "of submitting to it as a bad thing, wholly bad" (p. 40). In that

feeling man acknowledges as shameful and, therefore, bad and wrong, not any particular and accidental deviation from some moral norm but the very essence of that law of nature which the whole of the organic world obeys." And the very fact of his being ashamed of the very essence of animal life, of the main and supreme expression of natural existence, proves to Solovyof that man is a supernatural and superanimal being. It is this Manichæan instinct that has written both the *Justification of the Good* and the *Kreutzer Sonata*. Solovyof is, of course, convinced of the necessity of asceticism, in order to preserve the moral dignity of man, and by this he means that the animal life must be destroyed by the spiritual. "The carnal means of reproduction is for man an evil . . . our moral relation to this fact must be absolutely negative. We must adopt the path that leads to its limitation and abolition; how and when it will be abolished in humanity as a whole . . . is a question that has nothing to do with ethics!" (P. 53.) The third element in his scheme of things is reverence, defined as a voluntary submission to the superhuman principle.

There is much that is of interest in this remarkable essay of Solovyof, which is introduced by a perfunctory preface by Mr. Stephen Graham, the impresario of Russian literature, with the meaningless formula "Tolstoy we know; Dostoevsky we know, and now comes a new force into our life, Solovyof, the greatest of the three!"

E. F.

**SELF AND NEIGHBOUR: AN ETHICAL STUDY.** By Edward W. Hirst.  
London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1919. Pp. xx, 291. Price, 10s. net.

Mr. Hirst's aim is to prove that goodness is not merely some form of similar activity of self and neighbour, but an attitude of each to the other; and that goodness is community. Naturally, therefore, he considers that moralists have erred in regarding the individual as an end in himself; they have conceived his life as isolated and detached, and have "supposed that, like some Robinson Crusoe, he could be good all alone." This, in brief, is his thesis; he hopes to set the principle of fraternity upon a more solid foundation. But he is not content with this thesis alone: to this is added the section of the book, which is historical and critical, reviewing with great thoroughness the classical systems of ethics from Hobbes to Spencer, "in order that their individualism and consequent inadequacy might be made apparent." Considering the small compass of this review (pp. 1-59) this summary is adequate.

In the second part he essays reconstruction. He wishes to establish that the individual knows himself and his neighbour by co-intuition; and "that such knowledge is organised into the system of the great instincts, such as the parental instinct." The tenderness with which the recognition of offspring is accompanied is very significant. The mother not only knows her child but "feels for" it. This type of sympathy naturally tended to extend itself beyond the bounds of the family. It was felt and practised in relation to the members of the same tribe. Tribal devotion developed into wider loyalty, and a regard even for the interests of humanity began to express itself in the form of a conscience. Mr. Hirst's principle of fraternity, thus developed, is the hub of existence. It is characteristic of his somewhat emotional standpoint that he prefaces his book with a motto from Walt Whitman, who hymns the "life-long love of comrades."

He will have nothing to do with the absolutism of Mr. Bradley, the singularism of Dr. Bosanquet, but is a believer in a creationist theory, by

which all beings are derived from God. The Deity, being Triune, is (p. 254) the supreme instance of community of persons. His belief in fraternity is buttressed by religion. "In our exercise of parental solicitude we find it easy to conceive of the Deity as a Father. His created world reveals his 'protective' activity. The Universe is thus a moral product, and from this point of view, the *ought* and the *is* are indistinguishable. This belief in the supreme Father makes brotherhood reasonable." Some passages in the book are reminiscent of the comfortable words of preachers explaining away the problem of pain. Mr. Hirst sees, for instance, a "mercy" in the arrangement by which the numbers of certain appallingly prolific fishes and animals are thinned by stronger or more cunning neighbours who use them as their food, and recognises in this "a faint adumbration of a principle of service which is built into the structure of the universe."

N. C.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS. Edited by James Hastings, with the assistance of Dr. John A. Selbie and Dr. Louis H. Gray. Volume X: Picts—Sacraments. Pp. xx, 915. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918. Price in cloth binding, 32s. net; half morocco, 40s. net.

For this tenth volume of an indispensable work, 179 contributors, mostly very well-known men and women, have been collected from practically all nations: Great Britain and its colonies, America, France, Belgium, Holland, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland,—and even Germany, in spite of difficulties of communication for the last four years and more, is represented by four scholars, Prof. Richard Garbe of Tübingen, Prof. Julius Jolly of Würzburg, Prof. Edward König of Bonn, and Dr. Felix Perles of Königsberg. In a work like the present one, it is very useful to have cross references such as are given in the present volume (p. xv), by means of which we are instructed that, for example, *Proclus*, *Pope*, *Prohibition* and *Property*, which might be expected to be treated in this volume, are considered in certain other articles of the work. There seems to be a particular difficulty in a work such as the present one in finding the whereabouts of a subject on which information is desired, and it seems that only a special index when the whole work is completed would satisfy needs in this respect.

Broadly speaking, the *Encyclopædia* contains extremely full and valuable historical and philosophical data about the leading conceptions of religions and ethics, life and work of men eminent in the histories of religion and ethics (in this volume Plato, Plutarch, Protagoras, Pusey, Rothe, and Rousseau, for example, are dealt with), anthropology, ethnology, economics, and some parts of psychology and general philosophy are included. Thus we have in general philosophy articles on *Reality*, *Realism and Nominalism*, *Pragmatism*, *Psychology*, *Probability* (very slight), *Reason*, *Principle*, *Power*, *Rationalism* (in which unfortunately there is the old, unsound, depreciation, so dear to the uneducated clergy, of "negative criticism"), *Pluralism*, *Positivism* (in which there is no mention of that modern school of general history—P. Tannery, G. Sarton, F. S. Marvin, and others—which seems principally due to the inspiration of Comte, and which is of great ethical interest), and *Psychical Research*. On the other hand, the article on *Relations* is limited to the treatment of relations in Buddhist philosophy. From a more general philosophical point of view also Professor Burnet's article on *Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism* and Professor Henry Jackson's article on *Plato and Platonism* are particularly valuable;

in the former particular stress is naturally laid on Pythagorean religion as distinct from science; the latter contains a summary of the author's theory of the grouping of the *Dialogues* and Plato's earlier and later theories of ideas,—and the work of Burnet and Taylor is merely referred to in a list of books (p. 64). From the point of view of its title the learned article on *Points of the Compass* may seem at first surprising, but it will be found to be a learned treatise on orientations in ritual, buildings, and modes of burial, for example.

In ethics more particularly, we must mention the article *Politics*. In the article on *Resistance and Non-Resistance* there is a short reference to the doctrine advocated by some in the recent war (pp. 738-739); and we find that in many other cases the bearing of ethical and religious principles on modern events is considered. One of the chief points that strike one about this excellent work of reference is the close connection that there is between abstract philosophy and the most practical ethics. Lastly, there is surely sly humor in the remark (p. 515) that "grave lapses from chastity in old Testament times were of frequent occurrence."

PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN.

ON SOCIETY. By Frederic Harrison. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1919. Pp. xii, 444. Price, 12s. net.

Mr. Frederic Harrison is the last survivor of the old guard of Comtism, and has collected in this book his last thoughts as "a real testamentum in procinctu." They are not, as we see by the dates of the various addresses which form the chapters, very recent thoughts; for most of the addresses date from the years immediately subsequent to 1880, when he was chosen to lead the society which had its centre at Newton Hall. It would be difficult to discover a more whole-hearted adherent to the founder of Positivism; to him Comte is God, and Frederic Harrison is his prophet; and the value of this last effort of propaganda depends on the present position of Comte. Does he, in fact, stand in the eyes of an impartial judge, where he did, in the eighties? Does Positivism absorb young men as it then absorbed Mr. Harrison, and still absorbs him, so that he can speak of the wonderful creations of a Comte's genius (p. 83)? Mr. Harrison is well aware that "the reputation and influence of Mr. Mill are much less than what they were in their high water mark of 1888." He is unaware of a similar serious subsidence in the case of his master. The fact that the bulk of the addresses were delivered in the eighties gives them a curious complexion. Matthew Arnold and Mahdi are still troubling the waters; a recent trial is *Reg. V. Foote* 1883; withdrawal from Egypt is counselled (pp. 430-432). They are indeed printed exactly as delivered, and there is no trace of any attempt to bring them up to date, but here and there, an *Eheu*, and the date of delivery emphasised in square brackets. In 1893, he hoped that the day was at hand when "Europe may abolish its huge armaments, renounce all military habits and prejudices, and having paid off the vast debts, the sinister inheritance of past wars, at one stroke reduce the national expenditure by one-third or even one-half." Again, when government is "released from the care of vast armies and vast fleets, from the load of debt, from irritating questions of religion and education, from ecclesiastical patronage, from hereditary pensions, from the absurd paraphernalia of courts, embassies and sinecures, little would be left to struggle for; the National expenditure, even if doubled and trebled for public works, central museums, galleries, libraries, and so forth, might be reduced to one



third of our actual budget expenditure." He is forced to add here a note of disillusionment. The book appears in this world out of due time; a little later than *Liberty*, it appears curiously alien to the problems of to-day. Interesting and sincere work as it is, it should have been given to the world earlier, and have been judged by its contemporaries.

M. J.

London, England.

GUILDS AND THE SOCIAL CRISIS. By Arthur J. Penty. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1919. Pp. 103. Price, 2s. 6d. net.

This is an attempt, by one of the pioneers of guild socialism, to formulate a policy for guildsmen in the event of a revolution. It is closely argued that the only issue of the economic policy of "maximum production" is revolution or other wars. To avoid this, or to convert a revolution into something more than a welter of anarchy, a "return to Mediævalism" is urged. And an exceedingly attractive case is made out, without shirking any of the difficulties in the way.

A. E. H.

SYNDICALISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL REALISM. By J. W. Scott. London: A. & C. Black, Ltd., 1919. Pp. 215. Price, 10s. net.

Mr. Scott's book has the lucidity and persuasiveness of the best lectures, and the idea suggests itself that it is a compound of two independent sets, firstly upon syndicalism; and secondly, upon M. Bergson and Mr. Bertrand Russell. As studies upon these two subjects, the book could hardly be bettered; but there is some doubt as to whether syndicalists really base themselves upon the "realism" of M. Bergson and Mr. Russell, which is the leading position maintained throughout the book, and whether there is, as he claims, an intimate connection between the much current philosophy and what is sometimes spoken of as the new philosophy of labour.

His analysis of syndicalism is highly interesting. Syndicalism is "simply the failure of social construction." It is socialism's lack of faith in its own power to achieve its greater constructive aims. It is its confession—perhaps momentary only—of its inability "to conduct the social revolution scientifically." According to Sorel, the chief exponent of syndicalism, the worker's apprehension of that state of things which is the end of all their movements is to be *integral*. Their grasp of it is not to be rational but intuitive, because intellect disintegrates, while intuition keeps whole. They must, above all, *act*; must strike for the immediate need and keep on striking. The impulse to seize the immediate is to be fostered.

Realism, also, is a predilection for the immediate and given. In the second part of the book, Mr. Scott deals with M. Bergson, "the best of all the pragmatists," and Mr. Russell, one of the most consistent of the realists. Bergson's "involuntary benediction" upon the given, and his anti-intellectualism is precisely in tune with the syndicalist course of action.

The connection between Mr. Russell and syndicalism is not so obvious. Mr. Russell is also knit up, according to Mr. Scott, with syndicalism in the *narrowness* of the given will. It is convenient, from Mr. Scott's point of view, that Mr. Russell is both a mathematician and a critic of social institutions. Mr. Russell is antipathetic to the excessive power of a vast state, and finds that most people can find little political outlet

"except in subordinate organizations framed for specific purposes." He is enthusiastic for the autonomy of the individual, considered rather as an impulsive than a rational being.

M. T.

London.

**THE WAR AND SOCIAL REFORM.** By W. B. Worsfold. London: John Murray, 1919. Pp. viii, 248. Price, 6s. net.

This small book is a lucid statement of the very considerable war-time activities of the British Government, arranged under the headings of agriculture, public education, social reform (including housing), the liquor trade, the combating of venereal disease, and the admission of labour to a real partnership in industry. The sum of these activities, at a time when the country was strained by the burden of the war, is an answer to the question, "What advantages are likely to accrue to the United Kingdom and the British Empire as the direct result of the war?" and the far reaching improvements augur good for the new age. The book is a record rather than a critique or programme for the future.

M. J.

**WHY DO WE DIE?** By Edward Mercer, D.D. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1919. Pp. 202. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

This book is divided into two heads, the earlier consisting of a popular discussion of death and senescence, the latter of a restatement of the theory of monadology. The treatment savours of the pulpit and is full of vague generalities such as "It would seem that if we could understand this (*i.e.*, death), link it on to the course of the cosmic process—we should go far towards solving other problems which have so consistently eclipsed it," and (p. 78) "Who shall set bounds to man's command over his physical environment? It must be confessed, however, that it will be a stupendous task to conquer death."

M. J.

**A TEXT BOOK OF SEX EDUCATION FOR TEACHERS OR PARENTS.** By Walter M. Gallichan, author of *The Psychology of Marriage*. London: T. Werner Laurie, Ltd., 1919. Pp. viii, 216. Price, 6s. net.

Mr. Gallichan's book systematizes, honestly enough, a method of teaching helpful to parents and teachers of children, based on the now generally admitted fact that the state of "innocence" is an impossibility among modern boys and girls. It is an attempt to substitute rational direction of the sexual impulse for haphazard mystifications; showing the real advance that has been made since the days when Mary Wollstonecraft declared that the teaching of botany and the reproduction of plants to young women would soil their innocence and imperil their sense of modesty.

E. F.

**CONSCIENCE AND FANATICISM: AN ESSAY ON MORAL VALUES.** By G. Pitt-Rivers. London: W. Heinemann, 1919. Pp. xvi, 112. Price, 6s. net.

On reading (pp. 26–27) that Mr. Pitt-Rivers approves of the line taken by Disraeli over the controversy with regard to the opium trade between India and China, because he "firmly refused to ruin our export trade in

opium for any quixotic considerations involving the moral effect upon the Chinaman," a budget of paradoxes might be expected. But this is an isolated instance; the essay is, in the main, a serious criticism of the intuitive school, and a vindication of the utilitarianism of Mill and Lecky. Mr. Pitt-Rivers' point of view is that, "stripped of the sentiments and emotions with which they are obscured, moral systems must be judged by principles of utility, while they are enforceable according to the universality with which they are desired." To reinforce his attack upon the intuitive school, he brings into full prominence the influences that bear upon the dictates of conscience, which are often affected by "cosmic," or "mass" suggestion or prejudices based on subconscious instincts. "There is hardly anything," said Mill, "so absurd or so mischievous that it may not by the use of external sanctions and the force of early impressions be made to act on the human mind with all the authority of conscience." As may be gathered from Mr. Pitt-Rivers' pages he is out of sympathy with those "wanton phantoms of men's wild fancy, called religion, which, by attempting to expound everything, explain nothing."

M. T.

**AS A MAN THINKETH.** By Ernest Ewart Unwin. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1919. Pp. 120. Price, 2s. 6d. net.

This book illustrates admirably the weakness of a certain rather vague, religious type of pacificism. For a more "spiritual conception of life" may just as well lead to militarism; it may provide a means of glossing over the bestiality. And to counter the evolutionist argument for war by claiming that there is a spiritual as well as a material environment, and that "this spiritual environment is God," will satisfy neither theologians nor biologists.

A. E. H.

**THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE: THE TRUE BASIS OF A LEAGUE OF NATIONS.** By J. L. Garvin. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1919. Pp. xxiv, 574. Price, 12s. net.

Mr. Garvin's book is encyclopædic in size and scope, an eloquent and exhaustive discussion upon every point that has arisen and might conceivably arise in connection with the foundation of a League of Nations and the establishment of peace. It is well-timed, for the League is in being, but its form and its activities are not yet settled. The book differs from many books about the League and its problems in its persuasiveness, a well-known quality of Mr. Garvin's oratory in the *Observer*; its full and well-ordered information; its imaginative tone (which is shown in his treatment of the aerial revolution, and some other aspects of the new condition). The main theme of the book is that the Great War, while laying some political causes of the war, has aggravated others, and that war, the most intolerable form of national competition, should be replaced by the extending practice and confirmed habit of international co-operation.

The League of Nations, he believes, should not only control the activities of bellicose states, but pacify them by sympathetic economic treatment. The system he devises is an extension and prolongation of the Allies' supreme economic council, to control the distribution of new materials and food, guaranteeing to each country its fair share, so that Germany could no longer complain of economic encirclement; so that no state would venture to break the peace for fear of the resultant economic boycott. The League, he also argues, should deal with the internationa

aspect of labour questions and he reminds us that it was by the international and not very powerful machinery, already in existence before the war, that considerable reforms were carried through and the use of white phosphorus was prohibited in forty-four states, and night-work for women in twenty-five. These are auguries of further reforms which might be effected by combined action and international agreement.

The chapters dealing with the criticism of the Covenant and the influence that America might wield in the League are full of interest, but it may be doubted whether she would accept his suggestion and assume the guardianship of the old Turkish possessions. A criticism that may be hazarded is that impatience of control has not diminished during the war, and is an element to be reckoned with.

The energy and fullness of Mr. Garvin's exposition, for Mr. Garvin is a "full man" in Bacon's phrase, entitles this book to serious attention, and its accuracy and scope and the fruitfulness of many of its suggestions are remarkable considering the rapidity of the composition.

M. T.

**THE PRINCIPLES OF CITIZENSHIP.** By Sir Henry Jones. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1919. Pp. x, 180. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

This little book is intended for the use of such men as attended the Y. M. C. A. lectures in the British Army abroad. The purpose is to give a general view of the duties and rights of citizens; and the language is, therefore, simple and expressive. An initial distinction is drawn between two conceptions of the State. The non-moral idea is said to be German. Suggestions are then made as to the problem of individuality which are held to refute the pacifist. "Pacifist and German theorist," the author says, "commit the same blunder"; for as the State stands for moral good, no one should object. The usual idealist confusion is made between "the State" and the Athenian *polis* (p. 92 seq.) and very lofty, if somewhat vague, sentiments are expressed as to the "infinite" in man and the dignity of the State. There is, at the end of the book, some indication that all is not well with the institution of property; otherwise the book is sufficiently Teutonic to be Hegelian.

C. D. B.

**INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY.** By Bertrand Russell. Pp. viii, 208. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

This book appears as a volume of the "Library of Philosophy" and contains a more or less popular exposition of some of the work done by Cantor, Frege, Peano, Mr. Russell himself, and others on the logical formulation of the principles of mathematics. No use is made of the special technical symbolism of logical ideas that Messrs. Russell and Whitehead have used elsewhere for an allied purpose, and the book is pleasantly written. But it cannot be said that the philosophy is particularly mathematical; a better description would seem to be a strictly logical philosophy of mathematics. There is very little that is new in the book, and that little either does not seem true in fact or else is unscientific in method. Thus mathematics is said to be reducible to "tautology" (pp. 203-205); and in spite of Mr. Russell's assertion (p. 167) that he would preach logical truth even in the discomforts of a prison, he introduces some dogmatism (p. 117),—in spite of a claim (p. v) that he does not,—and defines "individuals" by the kinds of symbols that symbolize them (p. 142).

J.

**PANTHEISM AND THE VALUE OF LIFE.** By W. S. Urquhart, M.A., D.Phil. J. A. Sharp, 1919. Pp. xii, 732. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

An able and well-written study. The greater part of the book consists of a detailed analysis of Pantheism in Indian philosophy; but there is an interesting account of its place in both systematic and popular western thought. The main line of Dr. Urquhart's very sympathetic criticism is that an undesirable abnormality—a notion which is not left vague and question-begging, but is clearly defined—follows on the heels of either of the twin formulæ of Pantheism: God is all, tending to acosmism; All is God, to sentimental materialism; and both, ultimately, to some form of quietism. There is, however, a distinction (recognised by Dr. Urquhart) between practical consequences and philosophical validity; but his treatment of the latter question is less satisfactory.

A. E. H.

**THE GREAT WAR BRINGS IT HOME: THE NATURAL RECONSTRUCTION OF AN UNNATURAL EXISTENCE.** By John Hargreave. London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1919. Pp. xvi, 367. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

Mr. Hargreave finds the source of all evils in the town and the street, and tells us so, with emphasis. "Civilisation" is to him such an unmixed evil, that he overstates his case as to the degeneracy of the rich and well-to-do classes (p. 5) whom he describes as "almost sterile," and producing "weak and afflicted specimens, or unable to produce any children at all." Mr. Hargreave has worked out a scheme of open-air life and training in theory and practice to remedy these conditions, adapted to all classes and both sexes, and has expounded it with arresting clearness and enthusiasm. Some of the picturesque details of the new way of life, however, appear an almost too deliberate mimicry of the noble savage.

N. J.

**DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY: A STUDY IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION.** By H. J. Mackinder, M.P. London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1919. Pp. 272. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

Mr. Mackinder asks many riddles to which he does not always supply an answer. He utters a warning that, unless we would lay up trouble, we cannot now accept any outcome of the war which does not finally dispose of the issue between German and Slav in East Europe, and suggests an old and drastic remedy in the case of certain hopelessly mixed nationalities—a transfer of population in the case of Posen and East Prussia. He believes in the realisation of the democratic ideal, the League of Nations, provided that there is no nation strong enough to have any chance against the will of humanity, and no predominant partner in the League. In domestic affairs he is, like many French thinkers, in sympathy with the organisation by localities, the substitution for class organisation of an organic ideal, that of the balanced life of the provinces, and under the provinces, of the lesser communities. The strongest part of his book is the vividness of his realisation of geographical conditions, and continental history assumes a new coherency in his exposition of its landmarks.

It is excellent lecturing, arresting and eloquent, but at the close of the book we wonder whether he has done more than give the continent a new nomenclature; for the "Heartland" and the "Island" are names that do not add much to the sum of our knowledge.

M. T.

**NATIONAL MUNICIPAL REVIEW.** Published monthly by the National Municipal League. Concord, N. H. and Philadelphia, Pa. Price, \$5.00 per annum.

The number for May of this year announces "a new policy, a new editor, and an every-month issue." The new policy is to be "less of a review and more of a crusader." The field is no longer purely municipal, but deals also with state and county government. The new editor is Mr. Richard S. Childs. The *Review* will also have editorials and opinions. The older departments of Notes and Events and Publications which enable one to keep track of all important movements toward good government, are to be continued. We congratulate the *Review* upon its ability to add to its usefulness.

J. H. T.

**SOCIAL HYGIENE.** Published quarterly by the American Social Hygiene Association, New York. Price, \$3.00 per year; 75 cents per copy.

This journal, now in its fifth volume, is indispensable for those who would follow the present movement for an aggressive policy toward prostitution and venereal disease. The advances in scientific knowledge and the experiences of the war find representation in various important articles, and there are bibliographies of all important books and articles in the field.

**JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY.** Published quarterly. The Northwestern University Press, Chicago, Ill. Price, \$3.00 a year; 75 cents a copy.

This journal, now in its tenth year, is the official organ of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology; of the American Prison Association; and of the American Society of Military Law. The first named institute works largely through committees whose reports at the annual meeting are subsequently printed in the journal; for example the current number (August, 1919) has a report on insanity and criminal responsibility which recommends a positive program providing for radical changes in the present criminal procedure, as may be judged from the first two items: "(1) That in all cases of felony or misdemeanor punishable by a prison sentence the question of responsibility be not submitted to the jury, which will thus be called upon to determine only that the offense was committed by the defendant. (2) That the disposition and treatment (including punishment) of all such misdemeanants and felons, i.e., the sentence imposed, be based upon a study of the individual offender by properly qualified and impartial experts co-operating with the courts."

So much has been said with regard to the inequities of military justice, which in its treatment of officers and privates seems to upset entirely what we have come to regard as a fundamental principle of "equality before the law," that the reader is somewhat startled by the title of Dean Wigmore's address in this same number: "Some Lessons for Civilian Justice to be Learned from Military Justice." Dean Wigmore does not undertake to defend military justice, but points out the glaring need of centralized supervision for state criminal justice to prevent the present helter-skelter treatment of crime. Other needs are "verbatim record of trial," "automatic appellate scrutiny for every accused's case," "minimum indeterminate sentence," and "psychiatric examination of the accused."

**BROKEN HOMES: A STUDY OF FAMILY DESERTION AND ITS SOCIAL TREATMENT.** By Joanna C. Colcord. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1919. Pp. 208. Price, 75 cents.

This volume in the "Social Work Series" is an excellent illustration of the rapid growth in the development of scientific method and its application to the treatment of individual cases of social maladjustment. The picture that is presented is not that of the older "experience" which depended so largely upon the individual judgment and equipment of the worker; nor that of a general blanket method of dealing with all wife deserters. We have rather the picture of a growing knowledge of the causes of desertion, a growing appreciation of the complexity of many if not of all cases, and finally of the many resources upon which the modern worker can rely. We are shown how, after the rather looser charity of an earlier day, came a period of reliance upon legislation and court action followed by a realization that after all court action is a matter for last resort to be employed only after case work methods have been tried and have failed. Numerous concrete illustrations make the book interesting reading and add to its instructiveness.

**AMERICAN MARRIAGE LAWS IN THEIR SOCIAL ASPECTS. A Digest** by Fred S. Hall and Elizabeth W. Brooke. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1919. Pp. 132.

Part I of this useful digest contains proposals for marriage law reform; Part II, marriage laws by topics; and Part III, marriage laws by states.

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# THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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JANUARY, 1920

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## RIGHT AND HUMAN PERSONALITY IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT.

GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO.

**T**HE philosophy of law or right, as the name implies, is made up of philosophy and jurisprudence. Hence it is sometimes presented as jurisprudence raised to a plane of universality, and again as philosophy applied to a special field, namely law or right. If we take this second definition, the dependence of the philosophy of right upon general philosophy is evident; but even if the philosophy of right is viewed as emanating from jurisprudence—a projection, as it were, of jurisprudence into the world of general ideas—its doctrines necessarily participate in the dominant philosophy of the day, since they translate back into philosophical terms the philosophical spirit which has more or less consciously found expression in the positive data of jurisprudence. The philosophy of right springs from that part of law and jurisprudence which is more directly in contact with philosophical thought and more immediately influenced by it.

Philosophical speculation and philosophy of right have, therefore, been closely and constantly connected historically. In classical antiquity the proper term would be “mixed” rather than “connected.” Jurisprudence in the strict sense did not have a great scientific development in Greece and philosophers did not feel the need of bringing their doctrines in this field into well-defined *rapport* with positive legal institutions, whereas this relation between

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speculative justice and judicial fact, however understood and determined, is an essential part of the philosophy of right. The balance between jurisprudence and philosophy was imperfect because jurisprudence was as yet inadequate; hence philosophy of right among the Greeks was taken up into general philosophy and to a certain extent absorbed therein.

Among the Romans the opposite was the case; no adequate philosophy corresponded to the great efflorescence of law and jurisprudence. The doctrines of the Stoa certainly exercised a profound influence upon Roman lawyers and had a considerable rôle not only in legal science but also in the formation and historical development of legal institutions. In the Stoa's imperious, austere, and cosmopolitan doctrines, sublime in their rigidity, Roman lawyers recognized the same ideal which the Roman people had endeavored and were still endeavoring to realize through their laws and their institutions of peace and war. For this profound reason, Stoic theories became the foundation of the philosophy of right in Rome. The doctrine of *jus naturale* as there constituted was certainly on the one hand an outcome of the internal development of Roman positive law, especially of the *jus gentium*; but on the other hand, it also reflected Greek speculative activities which had not perhaps found great acceptance in Rome. On this basis—let us note incidentally—we believe that opposing theses, held as is well known by Voigt and Hildenbrand, can be reconciled.

In the Roman world, however, the philosophy of right did not make extensive systematic progress because of the lack of research in general philosophy. Speculative elements are indeed found in rich abundance in Roman jurisprudence; but these are not themselves the object of a real scientific investigation. They are not brought out and systematized in abstract form. Thus, while Greek thought represents right absorbed by philosophy, Roman thought represents philosophy mixed and actively fused in right. The two bodies of thought remain, however, the

classic sources of the philosophy of right, which, through all its historical progress, has had to derive speculative elements from the Greek world and juridical elements from the Roman.

Human nature also, especially in Greek inquiry, had been considered in its more general aspects. But as a rule, especially in his relations to law and right, the man had been identified with the citizen in Greece as well as in Rome. Just because the individual's absolute need of the state had stood out clearly, it was only in those who were in possession of civil rights that human personality appeared to philosophers as complete. There was indeed the philosophical conception of what a man is "by nature" as contrasted with what he is by institution or "convention." This served certainly to mitigate the condition of non-citizens, strangers, and slaves who had, indeed, never been treated as "things" (*res*), as the strictly dogmatic construction of ancient law would imply. However, in their actual working assumptions, both Greek philosophy and Roman jurisprudence contemplated man's juridical personality only as it was found verified in terms of the state.

The analysis of the relations between psychological personality and its political recognition, between rights rationally deduced from human nature and those which in the positive law of the day actually belonged to existing social classes, was precisely the part of ancient philosophy of law which was weakest. Theoretically, the ancient philosophy of law was not critical; practically, it was not revolutionary.

The Christian conception of the world was in its origin an attempt to exalt the dignity of the human being, recognizing in man, solely as man, a divine and eternal principle, and, therefore, placing all men in common in an ideal order of equality. In this ideal order they were to be raised above the accidents of their various earthly lots. It is to be noted, however, that in such a conception the value of the individual is placed not so much in his actual nature as in a supernatural expectation or aspiration of which the

individual himself is capable; the *seat*, so to speak, of his moral and juridical dignity, is not really in him but above him. However, so long as this relation between the individual and the divine principle was conceived in its original form as a purely internal bond holding directly between man and the divinity above him, it was in its juridical implications a title or reason of freedom. But as a result of the gradual formation of a social power which formed a third term in the relationship between man and God and imposed its mediation as a necessary agency to lead the human back to the superhuman, the same idea which at first had meant redemption and elevation of the individual was converted into an instrument for his unconditional subjection. The dependence which in its proper idea was purely spiritual and *intime* between man and a divine voice (*vox divina*) manifesting itself in man's own conscience, became objective, external; that is, it changed into a hierarchical dependence of dominated men upon dominant men, of the subjects of divinity upon the ministers of divinity. And notwithstanding this mutation, this relation of dependence preserved the same characters of absoluteness and of introspective evidence which were proper to it in its original form.

The principle of the moral elevation of human personality, which belongs to the original spirit of the doctrine just described, became thus entangled and lost in the hierarchies which encompassed not only man's exterior activity, but also the intimate fountains of thought. The virtual dignity of the human person who was to find his adequate development in a transcendent future only, remained meanwhile in the actual world of nature a mirage. The principle of the divine essence of the soul and the hope of an eternal salvation, far from raising all men to a social basis of liberty, served in fact to legitimate any form of government or dominion, however oppressive, that was exercised in the name of that principle, or in relation to that hope.

And yet this was all logical. Liberty is essentially the position of a being who is an end. But when the life of

man is considered not as an end, but rather as a means for obtaining an end which has been set for it by superior will, then it is no longer in itself an object of respect; it becomes such only in so far as it is effectively directed toward the prescribed end. The reason of life is placed outside life, and to demand during this life an absolute liberty for man would appear as a negation of that outside future end, as a wrong attitude toward that superior will. Concretely, it would appear as a rebellion against the organs of social power, which affirm themselves to be representatives and trustees of that power.

Human personality as conceived by law and justice during the Middle Ages presents itself, therefore, as bound up with a philosophical doctrine. The soul of the individual is created and does not create; the human will is the subject, not the author, of its law. As in the theoretical, so also in the practical sphere. The human mind is regulated by its objects. It is not the regulator of these. Aspiration toward liberty—the great motive force of every historical development—gives place, therefore, to an inextinguishable thirst for authority. The principle that life has a provisional value and that all depends upon a supreme and inconceivable will which imperiously points out the end for life, suffocates all initiative of individual reason, frustrates every attempt at free and direct speculation upon nature, and compels the thought of the time to converge upon a ruminating and necessarily sterile elaboration of preconceived dogmas; it limits action to the passive observance of the same.

This passive demeanor of the spirit, submissive to external authority, inverts the visual angle from which human personality can be conceived as an absolute principle in the realms of metaphysics or in those of morals and jurisprudence. If the philosophical theory of right was to emerge and acquire the definite character of free science, a profound crisis must give occasion for restoring the lost sense of the essential humanity of right and for freeing the natural vision of what justice is from the foreign elements which had deformed it.

The return to classic fountains was the first incitement to such a restoration and renewal. The philosophy of right began in fact to spring up at just the time when the growing studies of Roman law on the one hand and the recovered books of Aristotle's *Politics* on the other, had in the thirteenth century brought new intellectual problems to the great political contests of the time. In that laborious period in which the germs of successive theories may easily be discovered, the theological conception of the world was still dominant and was still saturating with its temper of authority the activity of thought, giving too a peculiar stamp to those attempts at new speculation which were initiated on the foundations of the classics. This explains the singular and intrinsically contradictory fact pointed out by Oncken that the work of Aristotle was canonized by the scholastics and afterwards bitterly opposed by the first champions of modern conscience and of the method of observation; whereas, if Aristotle had been well known, exactly the contrary should logically have happened.

A true and completely scientific reorganization of the philosophy of law was only possible when a corresponding regeneration took place in general philosophy; that is, in the directive principles of all knowledge. It is all a vast movement, eminently complex and concatenated, completing itself by ways which are apparently different but in reality concurrent. It takes different names according to its different aspects; it is called "Renaissance of the fine arts and of the natural sciences," "religious protest," "reform of method," "beginning of modern philosophy," finally the establishment upon an independent basis of the science of natural right, which is merely the traditional and classical name of the philosophy of right. It is all a process of emancipation of the spirit, a triumph—long in preparation and achieved by laborious and sometimes bloody struggles—of reason and human personality which now takes on new consciousness of its force and sovereign dignity in every department of life.

This great revolution must be considered more closely

in order to disclose the connection between the philosophical conception of human nature and its application in the theory of right.

What distinguishes the new age from the preceding and determines the new direction of all thought is in general this great capital fact: man, who in the Middle Ages derived his worth and personal standing from an external principle and looked upon himself and the world only through prisms of dogma, set before him by higher authority, has recourse now to his own reason and relies on this as on the highest criterion of truth, and thus places himself in direct relation with nature.

This is the general principle which shows also the psychological meaning of the vast and profound crisis in human development. The new position of the human spirit partly represented a return to the classical conception of life; and to the wide and liberal study of Greek and Latin intellectual treasures, is to be attributed especially the new and freer sense of form, the prevailingly æsthetic element which is revealed in all the works of the Renaissance. Another great fruit of that study was the reawakened cult of the human; that is, the full and balanced appreciation of all that is really natural to man. Such an appreciation eliminated those ascetic prejudices which made the body an object of contempt and the mortification of the sense the most advantageous and meritorious means of lifting and purifying the spirit. The harmonious vision of life, which was the greatest glory of Greek civilization, returned in this new dawn; it was congenial to the motive which inspired the scientific revival.

Certainly the dogmatic medieval spirit did not relax its hold forthwith; it still held its empire in part and offered powerful opposition to the new intellectual currents. Nevertheless, as if in partial recompense, methods of patient analysis fostered by the scholastics' treatment of dogmas had borne some good fruit. Reason served a hard probation in an arid field where it was compelled to work within narrow and pre-established limits, but the result



was an extreme refinement of the capacity to abstract, distinguish, and argue. And although a great part of the actual product lost all significance when the premises on which it rested fell away, an active and acute sense for dialectic had been acquired which was to find a much more fruitful employment thenceforth in unprejudiced study of the mind and of nature.

In that decisive hour of its history, humanity may have felt a general need of subjecting itself to a process similar to that to which Descartes submitted when he would begin a new intellectual life. "I persuaded myself," he writes, "that as regards all the opinions in which I had till then believed, I could not do better than to undertake once for all to divest myself of them, in order afterwards to take on others that were better, or even the same, when I had adjusted them to the level of reason." The regenerating crisis which did its work in the mind of the father of modern philosophy was an analogy of the more general crisis in all thought. Mental idols imposed by tradition and previously accepted as *a priori* were deliberately cleared away. Critical reflection took the place of dogmatic reception; knowledge was treated as subjective, that is, it was brought back to its first principle, consciousness; these reversals of method took place in all departments of the activity of the spirit, and gave rise in all to new and powerful revivals.

The renewal of natural science was in especially close connection with the renewal of philosophy. The works of Bruno, Bacon, and Cartesius could hardly be understood without those of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo. A series of common presuppositions determine both. Then the idea began to assert itself which was to have such a wonderful subsequent development—that science must work on the foundation of unprejudiced observation of natural phenomena. This conception, so simple in appearance, which in Germany is customarily called "science without presuppositions," implies rather a whole rational program. Faith in experimentation is legitimate only when it is admitted that the human mind is in itself alone

adequate to the knowledge of truth. Not by chance could the sciences of nature rise up and celebrate their most glorious triumphs at the same time that reason was declared by philosophy the first and most certain criterion of knowledge.

That same critical demand which in physical science brought everything to the natural light of reason alone for scrutiny and decision must inevitably show itself also in matters of faith. Here too it recognized the individual consciousness as ultimate. The religious reformation, which had an incalculable influence upon all succeeding civilization, meant exactly this. As the letter of ancient dogma could no longer chain the human mind in its contemplation of nature, so its coercion must cease in that of God. Here too a direct relation was sought between the thinking subject and its object—a relation free from intermeddling and based on internal autonomy of the subject.

Although, for reasons that it will be superfluous to state here, the Reformation soon gave place to a new dogmatism, it is certain that its principle corresponded to the general tendency we have stated, in accordance with which the human spirit came to substitute its own authority for external authority imposed by tradition.

The right to doubt—having for its presupposition a single certainty, namely, that of the subject which doubts—had thus asserted itself in the sciences of nature with the demand for experimental observation, in religion, with the demand for free examination and individual interpretation of the Scriptures. It was only in philosophy, however, that it could find a sufficient systematic explanation. In this consists the immense importance of the work of Descartes, which, although it worked out into dogmatic conclusions, was in its original principle gloriously and invincibly critical.

Methodic doubt assumes a special significance in the philosophy of Descartes because there it is consciously and systematically deduced from its two suppositions—from the liberty of the spirit. It is "*l'esprit, qui usant de sa*

propre liberté, suppose que toutes les choses ne sont point," to use the words of Descartes. The spirit in its hypothetical flight through objects which dissolves reality by its dialectic, finds finally in itself the fixed point whereon to stand; finds in itself the substrate and sufficient reason of its own crisis, the unshaken, irremovable, and indivisible foundation of every truth and of every doubt. "Cogito, ergo sum"; that is, I am absolutely thought, and my thought is the first law and first guarantee of every existence.

The spirit, *res cogitans*, is, therefore, a substance, a thing of freedom, absolutely a *prius*. The "I" has in its very self the faculty of producing ideas which do not derive from external objects but from the substance itself of "I"; whence in this sense they are called innate.

How afterwards in the Cartesian system the idea of a God which is a projection of the thinking subject may come in fact to have an objective value which exceeds that of the subject itself, we must not here examine. That belongs to the internal logic of the system. What is important for us is only the initial point, the fundamental assumption: that is, the elevation of the individual consciousness to be the supreme principle of the conception of the world.

The absolute value of the human person in its theoretical aspects was recognized in the doctrine of the substantiality of the soul. But this same principle must be asserted also in the realm of action, that is, it must be retranslated into the doctrines of ethics and politics. The principle of reality and of knowledge must become the principle of morality and law. The idea that man is by his very essence a something absolutely *prius*, a free substance, is as valuable for the theory of knowledge as for that of right, and is applicable to the latter in the same way as to the former.

As then human nature had become the pivot of new speculative systems, it must become also the foundation of new construction in jurisprudence. In place of the conception of a divine will which institutes and determines social regulations for its own sole authority—an authority

subject to no censure or control—a different conception is now substituted, namely, that these regulations ought to have their principle and sovereign law in reason and in the natural constitution of man. Thus was brought about the distinction between legal philosophy and theology, a distinction which has immense historical importance because it made possible a free exercise of reason upon the problem of the foundations of society and of right. Philosophy of right, which had so long been compelled to build upon what had been given through revelation, could now proclaim itself a free science. The celebrated declaration of Grotius in which he expresses this fundamental conception runs as follows: "Natural right would exist even if we should grant that God did not exist or that he did not care for human affairs." (*Etiamsi daremus non esse Deum, aut non curari ab eo negotia humana.*) Such a principle, which made it possible to treat justice on the basis of reason alone without implying any object of mere faith, had, however, already been accepted and employed more or less extensively by the numerous writers who are called precursors of Grotius. And aside from the general theoretical motives which had suggested it, the changed conditions of political life had also brought it to the front; for it is a general rule that the same requirements of reason which are expressed in systems as speculative deductions present themselves in the world of reality as the effects of historical forces.

The idea of a universal state which was a lawful continuation of the Roman Empire and the correlative idea of a like universal church, image of the kingdom of God on earth, had dominated all the Middle Age and constituted, so to speak, the poles of its complicated political history. Those ideas had now lost a great part of their old moral force, and in their place emerged with power the idea of the lay state, limited in territory but absolutely sovereign within its confines and, therefore, not subject to any foreign tutelage. From this sprang the demand for a new juridical theory of sovereignty and a new foundation for the whole

of public right. The basis of all these political constructions was necessarily that conception of human nature which had been assumed by the supreme canon of the intellectual Renaissance and which in the specific field of right had already an established tradition and peculiar grounds of fitness. To place the ultimate foundation of right in the nature of man was singularly opportune for a revival of the Greek and Roman point of view and assumed a new meaning when the state was to be purified of the theocratic infiltrations of the Middle Age and to be restored to its character of an eminently human institution.

When this conception had been established in doctrine and confirmed by historical reality, a new principle followed: law was distinguished not only from theology, but from morals. Its central principle in this respect was the complete recognition of a sphere of liberty in the individual, not to be violated even by the state. In truth, if we admit that the state has only human ends and that its existence is founded not on a transcendent will and a supernatural end, but upon the demands of the nature of the individuals who compose it, it follows that its activity should be limited to what is required by their living together. Divergence of doctrines will begin when we seek to define precisely in what human nature consists; that is, to state what are the essential anthropological and psychological factors of society and of right. From the diversity of doctrines on this point, other discrepancies will arise as to the most appropriate form of government and the natural limits of its power.

But meanwhile a series of common principles remain fixed which constitute the characteristic traits of the school of natural right. Man is the substance of every right; the individual and the requirements of his nature are the originating and intrinsic reason of social decrees. The quality of a "person" as viewed by the law (*subjectum juris*) does not come to man because the state imparts to him his necessary organs and instruments by its statutes, but on the contrary, the state has for its presupposition the rights of

the individual. Positive law, which reveals itself through legal forms and what is externally given, is, therefore, subordinated to another law or right which has its foundation in human nature and is known directly by reason. The law or right of nature is known by the thinking of a tranquil mind. (*Jus naturæ cognoscitur ex ratiocinatione animi tranquilli*), as Thomasius says in remarkable words. So we see retranslated into terms of jurisprudence that rationalistic principle which was the herald of all modern thought. The psychological doctrine of the "I" as substance corresponds to the judicial doctrine of the individual as substance; the *a priori* in the order of knowledge is also *a priori* in the order of ethics and jurisprudence. As in general philosophy, the greatest problem will be hereafter the relation between the mind and the external world, between subject and object, so in legal philosophy the most urgent problem will be the relation between the individual and society, between the subjective assertion of right and its objective structures. To the place of the old efforts of dialectic to define the relation between spiritual and temporal power another series of inquiries and doctrines will succeed, having as their aim to define the relation between the rights of the individual and the authority of the state. The opposing terms which must henceforth be co-ordinated are no longer church and empire, but individual and political body, liberty and law.

Such is, as it were, the arch of the new philosophy of right which once more demonstrates the profound connection between the philosophic and the juridical conceptions of human nature. The idea that every man is by nature subject of right—only vaguely and by piecemeal affirmed in Greek philosophy and Roman jurisprudence, confirmed but in indirect and vanishing fashion by evangelical doctrine—is developed and becomes the basis of complete systems in the Renaissance and the modern age. It is at the same period that the conception of human personality is given a corresponding position in metaphysics and the theory of knowledge.

It is important, however, to show that political and legal systems of that period do not proclaim themselves in general as something new nor do they expressly repudiate what had gone before; rather they treasure all the elements of the earlier doctrine of natural right and follow its tradition in many places. The profound revolution which was worked out is less apparent in this field and, it may be said, less conscious than in theoretical philosophy and natural science. The reasons for this are sundry. Above all, preceding doctrines not only of classical antiquity but of the church contained a mine of arguments and propositions regarding right which, if not in strict conformity with the new orientation of political thought, were at least adaptable to it. There was then a natural tendency to accommodate to present exigencies and ends analogous doctrines and partial supports which tradition offered. There was a tendency to reclothe in old formulas even new ideas without much care as to whether, by such a proceeding, the true meaning of these new ideas would be rendered less clear or even in part be lost. In general, it may be noted that political doctrines are by nature more closely bound in their development to particular historical movements than are doctrines of pure philosophy; new principles are consequently developed more slowly and laboriously in the former than in the latter. A newly asserted right always meets greater opposition and obstacles in its course than does a new speculative truth; a new way of conceiving the political world installs itself with more difficulty *a priori* than a new way of understanding nature. The dominant conceptions of law are so intimately interwoven with historical reality that a reformation in them cannot be completed unless this same reality is modified or tends to modify itself, and this can happen only by degrees. The new doctrines must, therefore, arise at different times and appear in diverse attitudes according to particular exigencies and historical occasions before they can present themselves or be sustained in systematic form. They must often advance through events and without being announced at the outset in their

true character. They must maintain their stand in the field of action in order to bring about gradually a new meaning in formulas and conceptions which originally had a different sense. This was just what happened in the period which we are now considering. The school of natural right from the Renaissance to the French Revolution had substantial contents and a genuine spirit quite distinct from those of preceding schools, and corresponding to the subjective rationalism which reigned in the philosophy of that time. It clothed itself, however, largely in old formulas, and giving the guise of historical narrative to what was in reality a rational process, it wove the new demands for rights which the individual consciousness asserted upon the warp of traditional legends about the primitive state of humanity. Only by degrees and through a very significant process was the historical problem distinguished from the philosophical. It was recognized finally that the origin of society is one thing, the principle of its justification another. The true fundamental purpose of the new political speculation thus came to light, namely, the construction of the legal foundations of the state, the deduction of the authority of the social body from the principle of the rights of the individual.

We cannot take time to trace this process minutely. Enough for us to remark that already in the doctrine of Locke the rational element preponderates over the genetic, and we can see that what he really wishes to determine is the principle of right and not the facts as to the origin of human society. This intention is demonstrated still more clearly and perfectly in the system of Rousseau. The state of nature and the social contract are for Rousseau regulative principles, not historical facts; that is, they are ideas necessary for understanding the absolute and inalienable rights of the human person. The state of nature is, he says, a state "which no longer exists, which perhaps never has existed, which probably never will exist, and of which nevertheless it is necessary to have correct notions in order to judge of the present state." "We must not," he says



again, "understand the inquiries upon which we may enter in this subject as historical truths, but only as hypothetical and conditional reasoning, more proper to explain the nature of things than to show their true origin." The true object of the political speculation of Rousseau is the legitimate state, that is, the state which in its constitution conforms to the principle of equal individual liberty.

So the system of the rights of man and citizen was in preparation in the doctrine, which, already verified in part in the English constitution, was soon to have the most solemn political sanction in the American and French revolutions. By that system the human person is conceived as the first principle and absolute end of every political institution; his right is affirmed as the immanent and constituting reason of every government. The liberty of all men and their consequent equality before the law are declared the condition *a priori* of the validity of laws and of the legitimacy of public power. The individual, therefore, attains sovereignty in the order of right, as the individual reason had been assumed to be sovereign criterion of truth.

The philosophy of Kant represents the meeting and synthesis of these various motives, theoretical and practical, of rationalistic subjectivism. On the one hand, it marks the most complete systematic elevation of the critical principle of Descartes by which the human mind seeks its own laws within by introspection and finds in itself the foundation *a priori* of every experience. On the other hand, it recognizes in subjective consciousness an absolute moral dignity and declares man an end in himself. The essential rights of the person correspond in this way in Kant's political doctrine to the essential prerogatives of reason revealed by the criticism of knowledge. Both these capital elements associate themselves again in harmony in the system of Fichte, which is closely connected with that of Kant but goes beyond it. The "I" is declared by Fichte to be the thing in itself, to be the absolute principle in the realms of knowledge and being as well as in those of ethics and jurisprudence.

To this gradual triumph of reason in doctrines correspond the progress of institutions, the foundation of political liberties, and the still wider acknowledgment of human rights. The state which gives guarantees of right, which has for its presupposition the consciousness of the absolute value of the person, is established.

If now we were to trace the synthesis of the dominant doctrines in the last century and especially in the second half of it, we should find a new and ample confirmation of our thesis: that is, we should find preserved in various conditions that connection between the philosophical and the juridical conception of the human person which we have met heretofore. We shall, however, give this but a fleeting glance, both because of lack of space and because a few allusions will be sufficient to recall and distinguish what really belongs to our own time.

How a great empirical or positivist reaction followed the dominant rational idealism shortly after the beginning of the nineteenth century is known to all. The study of entities and ideas as such was abandoned; most investigators desired to limit all inquiry to phenomenal reality. The conception of a psychic substance was rejected and human consciousness was studied in its data only; that is, in its apparent activities in experience. Psychological personality was thus decomposed and the whole was considered as if it was made up of the accidents of its superficies. It was expressly denied, for instance by Wundt, that a substantial unity or substrate immanent in the variety of conscious states can be admitted. This would be only a "collective conception"; it would denote, that is, the sum of the different psychic processes. Such an empirical society, cleverly defined by Lange as "psychology without a soul," has still great vogue to-day, although it has even recently been confuted by several illustrious philosophers. Vacherot states that when Michelet read the well known book of Taine on Intelligence, he exclaimed: "*Il me prend mon moi!*" (He takes away my self from me!) In this simple exclamation there is, it may be said, a victorious criticism

of that method which tends to deny in effect what should be the presupposition and fundamental object of the very science itself.

The empirical disintegration of personality which has operated in philosophy in general has had its exact counterpart in the philosophy of right. Although the political and legal institutions of our age are, in fact, as we have remarked, inspired with the idea of the essential rights of the person, which was the laborious fruit of a long anterior process; and although—notable fact—they tend also in their present development to realize it much more widely, the dominant theories in the philosophy of right to-day deny that idea, and deny the substantiality of the human being as a legal conception, even as in the other field psychological substantiality is denied. In jurisprudence too the process is one of externalizing; that is, being, or reality is reduced to external phenomena. It is declared that right is only a relative historical fact, a function of needs and changeable forces, not an objective and constant truth directly recognizable by reason. And this was the inevitable procedure; for if it be admitted that human nature does not exist as an entity but exists only in attitudes and concrete contingencies, we cannot subsequently admit a principle of law and jurisprudence which shall be universally adequate and in conformity with human nature as itself an entity.

No longer, therefore, do we have an order of rights belonging to the individual because he is an individual, an order which is involved in his very nature; we have only the series of positive historical rights, only the legal relations which are regulated by effective rules. The philosophy of right is to be in this way pushed indefinitely toward science, and is to be confounded with history or with the doctrine of positive law; or, if, mindful of its philosophical aspect, it seeks to rise to a synthetic conception of its object, it will run the risk, having already lost the notion of right as objective and independent entity, of being carried away bodily by the most general inductive science of human facts—sociology, so-called. That the tendencies so con-

stituted are actually at work in the philosophy of right to-day, those who are even slightly acquainted with actual conditions can easily vouch. It is hardly necessary to recall how many attack more or less openly its very existence as a science, wishing either to have its work greatly restricted, or else calling for a radical transformation which would be an abjuring of its past, or, finally, regarding it as in reality absorbed by other more positive disciplines. The same war was indeed waged against it which for analogous reasons was waged against philosophy in general. Merit, however, belongs rather to those who have dedicated the efforts of their genius to defend the glorious queen of juridical sciences from inconsiderate attacks; who have sustained her autonomy and demonstrated the perennial necessity of her office.

We, however, do not believe—and this too is the outcome, it seems to us, of our hasty survey—that the philosophy of right can really spring up again and recover in all its fullness the sovereign position that befits it until philosophy in general has emerged from the crisis in which it is now tormented. That this may occur before long is not only permissible to hope, but can be with good reason foretold. Modern thought, in abandoning itself to the mere examination of what is externally given, has forgotten too much the subjective presuppositions of such “data”; it has forgotten too much that nature is in substance a representation of “I.” Science has thus found itself in contradiction with consciousness. Above all, the moral principles which still live in the human soul and which, by their very essence, are such as to go beyond experience, have found themselves abandoned and betrayed by the exclusively empirical and superficial conception of the world. In vain has the human for a time attempted to go beyond itself by plunging headlong and sinking itself in what is only one of its own projections. It has been obliged to see at last that in this way it is still but following its own shadow and that the principle for the explanation of all is not outside but within itself. There, in the sanctuary of consciousness, in the intrinsic constitution of the subject, it must find for itself the first

law of being and of knowing; there too, the fountain of duty and of right.

Our age, still impregnated with empiricism and scepticism, has shown at last the need of leaving such an unquiet state of mind and of regenerating itself through criticism. Revision of fundamental conceptions, discussion of methods, examination of assumptions, are requirements that urge themselves upon all sciences. This fervor of criticism, although still ill-defined in its conclusions, is already in itself more than a symptom and preludes without doubt a renewed conception of the world through which earlier and existing conceptions may be overcome. The fruits of scientific inquiry will certainly not be lost by such a renewal; rather these and all that are still to be added to them will be made philosophically whole through greater knowledge. As the enlargement of the visual angle does not destroy or lessen the original unity of the point from which all the rays proceed, so the mind of the thinking subject remains necessarily the condition and law of every objective truth, however greatly the extension of this truth may be multiplied and increased. In the essence of the "I" will, therefore, be found the absolute principle on which a systematic comprehension of the universe may rest.

By analogy and through that intrinsic connection so often exhibited, it is in the human person that the absolute criterion of every value and the metaphysical *prius* of the truth of right must be found. In all the material which history presents throughout its course, the various legal facts must be grasped and interpreted through a conception which has its adequate seat in consciousness and is the condition *a priori* of the intelligibility of these facts. There must be admitted, moreover—and this is the criterion for the *contents* of the determinations in law and jurisprudence—an absolute need of justice which, though revealing itself only by degrees in experience, is yet ideally fixed in the very nature of man and interpenetrated therewith. This need or necessity of justice must be so conceived that when human nature is regarded in its full essence we can categori-

cally deduce from it the absolute and universal principles of human right, without awaiting their positive revelation in the historical field, but rather anticipating and preparing this field where it is still as yet wanting.

Certainly right proves its truth historically through struggle, and nothing is more complicated and laborious than the process by means of which an idea passes from the state of a mere speculative demand in legal theory to that of a positive social force. But its truth does not begin when such a historical process has been completed; on the contrary, the truth of the idea is anterior to the process and above it. The struggle for right is then struggle for a right which already is; the issue of the struggle may result in the recognition and concrete application of the right—never in making it become what it was not.

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## THE UNIT OF CIVILIZATION.

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THE last century has been notable for its tendency to human integration. This is illustrated in the political realm. Not only has nationalism asserted itself in the unification of peoples of kindred race, language, and aspirations, but vast empires have been organized, subordinating the lesser units to themselves and sweeping within their domain the outlying, less developed portions of humanity. Again empires have ranged themselves into alliances of empires, at last coming to deadly grip for the dominance of the earth. And now we are witnessing the final act in the drama, the attempt to organize the civilized peoples into a league of nations. With the integration there has been a corresponding tendency to centralization to insure efficient control and an exploitation of the masses for the furtherance of the idea of power. The larger more inclusive units show an inherent hostility to the smaller component units—the hostility of selfpreservation. Even as in Palestine of old, so the modern prophets of nationalism and empire have inveighed against provincialism and localism until the smaller units have often been emaciated into mere geographical names. And so we laugh at the petty conflicts among the nations of old—Athens, Bœotia, and Sparta, and bully the small nations of to-day.

The same tendency that has operated in the sphere of political control has operated in the economic sphere. Imperialism and capitalism are at least Siamese twins. The root of both at any rate is the lust for power. Both have been characterized by ruthlessness in absorbing smaller units into themselves. They are both power-organizations and subordinate everything to executive control. Both aim at universal dominion. The logic of both tendencies has found its consistent and shameless expression in the Prussian bid for power, though it is not obvious that the

nations now striving to organize the world have essentially different ideals, spite of their greater humanitarianism. The crust of custom upon which they build is essentially the same.

There are signs, however, that the organization of humanity on the basis of power is failing. At the very moment when the climax of integration seemed to be in sight, the tendency to disintegration set in at an alarming rate. The imperialistic dream has become a nightmare as humanity has been confronted with the cost. Latent national ambitions and national jealousies have been set loose and threaten to upset the equilibrium. But what is even more portentous: internal diversity in the form of class strife has broken out, upsetting the calculations of statesmen and threatening to make scraps of paper of diplomacy. Somehow power-integration has failed to satisfy human nature; and there is a growing murmur that humanity when it cried for bread was given a stone.

The process of integration has not been accompanied with a corresponding process of differentiation. Whether in the political or economic sphere, the tendency has been to efface localism and to ignore the personal human equation. The larger the integration, the more impersonal has become the relation between management and the human units involved. From the point of view of imperialism, the individuals have become so much potential cannon fodder in the realization of imperial ambition; from the point of view of capitalism, man has counted only as part of the wealth-producing machine. The tendency has been to delocalize and to depersonalize human enterprise. To the exponents of this tendency there seemed to be no end to this process. But now we are facing the law of diminishing returns. Is the old imperialism, political and economic, worth the increasing overhead cost, financial and human? Is not human nature, instead of being realized, balked and cramped in the process? Human nature has not fundamentally changed. It is constituted for a life of personal relations and hence is not satisfied to be a cog in an imper-



sonal machine. Human nature, by instinct, imagination, and sympathies, is made for small groups, for face-to-face relations and hence is not at home in the artificial, dehumanized leviathan which, like Moloch of old, has only an instrumental interest in the human individual. It may fatten the sheep, but it is only in order to devour them. The old inhumanity of man to man has come to seem only more brutal when robbed of the old personal sanctions. And man, when delocalized and depersonalized, reverts easily to the anonymous mob.

The argument for integration has always been economy, efficiency. Yet through the irony of events, the old system has failed at this very point. In the economic realm it has been shown conclusively that impersonal management has been wasteful and anything but economic in its results. It has become trammelled by a network of red tape. It has produced antagonism by its ruthlessness; and it has failed to stimulate initiative and thrift. The more personal form of management, where the individuals are respected and given an opportunity to participate, has shown itself vastly more efficient for operator and laborer alike than the old system. Whatever may be the course of the present unrest, it is certain that personal participation and local interest will be part of the future system of industry. In the political realm we have the anomaly that the loosest of the imperialistic systems, that of Britain, where the parts were held together merely by sentiment, where non-conformism asserted itself in its boldest form and where no government dared to limit the personal right to criticize it, has shown the most coherency, while the abstract power-unities have one and all gone to pieces.

One thing seems to be clear—the one sided tendency to integration has failed in both the political and the industrial realm. A tendency to decentralization and disintegration has set in, of which the Russian Soviet is the most striking instance. The pendulum may vibrate back and forth between the extremes for some time before a golden mean is reached. But whatever form the eventual organisation

of humanity may assume, it must rest on two fundamental facts: on the one hand, the reality of personal relations, and on the other hand, the vital importance of those face-to-face groups which furnish the sphere, as they indicate the limitation, for the realization of human nature. All else is scaffolding, means to an end, which will last only while it fills its instrumental purpose. We may well take to heart the lesson of Aristotle and Rousseau who both emphasized the face-to-face unity as fundamental—the Greek city, the Swiss Canton, where men could get together and discuss the common weal, or at least hear and see their leaders and react upon the discussion. As we come to realize the moral significance of personal relations and of our own personal groups, it is also to be hoped that we may realise the moral significance of other groups and learn to co-operate with them in those instrumental relations which tend to the common weal. Thus we shall have a moral basis for the executive organization of humanity,—an ideal of democracy. Not pangermany, nor panslavism, nor pancapitalism, but panhumanity. Toward such a democracy we have at best made only a start, and the travail and pain in its begetting is likely to exceed anything in the past, unless we see the signs of the times.

One thing is certain: industrial democracy, the democracy of tools, is only part of the problem. We must have ethical democracy, the democracy of the spirit, the joy in common creativeness before we can satisfy the deepest human demands. For "man doth not live by bread alone," though of course he must have bread and the economic problem seems to be the crying problem now. But even if we get that adjusted, we shall only be ready to begin to live; and the chances are that we shall not get it adjusted unless we realize that the essence of life is creative goodwill. We would rewrite Kant's famous maxim to read: The only thing good in the world is goodwill, helpful and wholesome human relations. We must have a deeper appreciation of humanity everywhere, before the greater day can come. The old civilization was concerned with an

aristocratic plane and its interests were correspondingly limited. The new civilization must express the fundamentally human plane, not as an abstract universal merely, but in all its complexities, starting from the concrete associations with their color of tradition, climate and race, and working out towards the infinite. It must, as Nietzsche insisted, develop strong, resourceful, courageous individuals, not slaves of tradition or of the herd instinct, but they must be individuals with the community consciousness, joyfully giving of their best to enrich all.

If integration, with its centralization and impersonalism, has failed in the political and economic realms, what about the realm of spiritual values? In the field of religion, it would seem that the ethical effectiveness of a religion varies inversely to its centralization and mechanism. In ecclesiasticism, the institution becomes the end and the individual soul a mere means. The motive of salvation is swallowed up in the insatiable passion for power. The best moral results seem to be attained where the local congregation is the unit, with the minimum of machinery for co-operation and the maximum of tolerance for other units. In education, while centralization tends toward uniformity of standards, the danger is that the process loses vital relation to the community. In a large country like ours, the nationalizing of education is in danger of producing a dead level—the sacrificing of variety of experimentation and of rivalry in attainment for bureaucracy and red tape. This is what the large European nations have suffered from in the past. Religion and education, instead of following the flag of empire, should first of all minister to the community and make real the life of personal relations.

That power-integration is unfavorable to happiness values there can, I think, be no doubt. We have paid little attention as yet to happiness organization. But it is clear that personal association is a fundamental condition. The number with which we can associate in a friendly way at any one time is limited by human nature. Graham Wallas is led to believe from his observations that twenty-

five or thirty is as large a number as can meet on that basis. That is the number in the English "house" system, so successful in English higher education, and in our American college fraternities. A great deal can be done in the direction of proper organization of neighborhoods whether at work or at play on a basis suited to the limitations of human nature. Of course the external conditions, material and social, must also be healthy and favorable, but those are more easily appreciated than the need for personal association. One of the great problems of the future is that of promoting happiness organization and its favorable conditions, in order to redeem the artificiality of our modern life. And this need is felt not merely in the crowded industrial centres, but in the rural communities as well. We must learn to respect and further real human values, if civilization is to be enduring and to endure.

If again we look at the problem from the point of view of the production of the highest culture, we may well doubt whether the scramble for power has been favorable in this direction. Large units tend to bring out new qualities, hostile to spiritual production. The lust for power and the quest for the good do not form congenial companions. The higher human relations are essentially personal in their nature—religion, art, friendship. Truth, too, is personal in its incentive and goal, however impersonal its method. It works for social understanding and communion. Hence it is not to be wondered at that impersonalism and mechanism are hostile to culture. There can be no doubt that Germany, long before the war, had deteriorated in cultural ways. It had been poisoned by the mob spirit, while culture requires sanity and personal poise. We note a decay in the culture of the United States as between the days of the Revolution and the days of empire. The relations in the colonial days were strongly personal. Men were the masters of the institution, while later the institution became their master. In a general way, we may say that spiritual values vary in inverse ratio to impersonalism and centralization. The greatest culture

productiveness has been attained when the culture group has conformed most nearly to the personal group which Aristotle had in mind. Athens in the days of Pericles, with a population of perhaps 50,000 freemen, Florence in the later Middle Ages and the early Renaissance, stand out as illustrious examples. But there were other Italian city-republics, contemporary with Florentine greatness and scarcely less distinguished. Paris in the days of Abelard and after, London in the Elizabethan age, Jena at the end of the eighteenth century are illustrious in the history of the human spirit and show the stimulus of association and personal reaction. The small nations of western Europe in the last generation seem to have contributed to human culture out of all proportion to their size as compared to the power nations. I quote from Graham Wallas: "The United Kingdom has a population of forty-five millions and the United States one of a hundred millions. The Norway of Björnson and Ibsen and Grieg had a population of two millions, and the Italy of Dante and Petrarch one of perhaps four millions. No one even dreams that the first rate intellectual output of the English speaking world of the twentieth century will be twenty-five times that of nineteenth century Norway together with fourteenth century Italy. But our wealth and knowledge and organizing power may perhaps make us together equal to one of them." Professor Wallas might have used Sweden, Holland, or Belgium with equal effect. And Spain, since she was rid of the incubus of imperialism, has had a wonderful era in the realm of culture. The awarding of the Nobel prizes is at best but an approximate way of estimating contributions to civilization, though in the course of years it cannot help coming nearer the mark. There has been a great deal of criticism in the big nations of supposed favoritism to the small nations in the awarding. Perhaps the shock of this may lead others as it has led Wallas to closer observation of the actual facts, and, if the facts should seem to be as indicated, into a closer scrutiny

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<sup>1</sup> *The Great Society*, p. 286.

and criticism of the present organization of culture. If the boasted power-organizations fail in the spiritual fruits of civilization, what have they to commend them?

The reasons for the better showing of the small European nations are not far to seek. They have given up the race for power and have turned their resources in other directions. We have seen that the atmosphere of power is not favorable to spiritual results. It is fundamentally ruthless in its treatment of the human individual and the personal community. It tends toward centralization and impersonalism. It substitutes machinery for human values. Size tends to stimulate the instinct for power which grows with what it feeds on in geometrical progression, *i.e.*, the more the instinct is realized the more it takes to satisfy it. Where power becomes the dominant passion, the energies of men, their best genius, are drained in that direction. They are needed for management, military and economic. When the passion for power dominates a people, the power-values are the ones that come to seem worth while and therefore fascinate men; spiritual values come to seem incidental or instrumental. In other words, the passion for power inverts the true human perspective. But so far as we can learn anything from the past, genuine culture flourishes in proportion as social organization approximates moral organization, *i.e.*, the respect for personal association and personal values. Hence it is that progress in culture is in inverse ratio to the passion which makes power the end and human beings the means.

If we are made for personal relations, if anything beyond this is necessarily artificial and unreal, then we must readjust our notions of control. We must encourage instead of suppress the individuality of the smaller units. Nationality, provincialism, localism, clan loyalty, personal freedom—these are great motive forces which we cannot afford to lose in a vague, anonymous sentiment of internationalism. We must leave to the smaller unit all that it well can do, reserving for the larger unit only those things which must necessarily be done by co-operation of the smaller units.

But it should be co-operation and not suppression. We must give the small unit sufficient to do to make its life real and vital. And it is especially in the realm of spiritual realization that the rivalry and interaction of small units becomes of the greatest importance—a rivalry like that of the city republics in Italy at the end of the Middle Ages. For mutual protection they must indeed co-operate to safeguard their spiritual life, but this must not mean the bullying by larger units but a free co-operation based upon goodwill and mutual interest. There may be local rumblings now and then, but that is preferable to a universal earthquake such as that brought about by the power régime. When political control becomes, as it is now tending to become, positive instead of merely negative, it will be found that the unit which conforms most nearly to the moral unit will have immeasurable advantages in stability and effectiveness over the impersonal units. In the smaller units, experiments can be tried and corrected, and local needs and peculiarities conformed to. If socialism is not to be a dead weight of tyranny, it must be tried in the small unit. It was in the small Greek states that self-government first developed, and it is in the smaller states to-day—New Zealand, Switzerland, Denmark, etc.—that we see new experiments most successfully tried.

While we have emphasized the small unit, it must be obvious that smallness alone does not produce culture. The small unit must have sufficient material resources to encourage the best in education, science, and art. The unit must be sufficiently large and varied to furnish adequate complexity and sufficient interplay of forces. Nothing could be deader than some of the small rural towns or some of the small nations of the past. With the means of communication to-day, the geographical size may be greater than that of medieval times, but it must not be too great to make possible personal contact and interchange. Impersonal associations, scattered over large areas and getting together at long intervals, have little effect on culture. The unit must have not only spiritual complexity, but conflict

of ideals in order to bring out the resources of the spirit, whether this conflict be within or without. It must not boast of magnificent isolation, but must cultivate the maximum of culture contacts with other groups. It must encourage spiritual production by the high social esteem it bestows and in such material ways as will make it possible for genius to do its work without succumbing to poverty. Obviously the encouragement should be such as to preserve the spiritual integrity of genius and not prostitute it to material gain. Above all, the group must be inspired by a high bond of unity. It must be rooted in the noblest traditions of the past, but venturesome for the best attainments of the future. It must be intersected by a spiritual plane worth while. If there is no corrupter like the public Sophist, as Plato shows, there is no inspiration like a noble public sentiment. The love for poetry among the Scandinavian nations, the passion for music among the small nations of Southern Germany (previous to the days of empire), the love for clarity on the part of the French, of common sense by the British, of beauty among the Italians, of freedom among the Swiss have produced their immortal results. All other disadvantages might be surmounted if we could once get the passion for spiritual values, or rather the passion would produce the proper organization. We must put the instrumental values in their proper place, whether it be the organization of power, or more hogs, more corn and more corn, more hogs, and learn to emphasize the intrinsic, the personal values.

While it is true that some of the small city states like Athens and Florence and some small modern nations have offered exceptional instances of cultural development, it does not follow that such development is necessarily bound up with political independence. Florence at best had but an uncertain independence, and some modern nations which have contributed in a marked way have not preserved their political independence. Instance Scotland in a happier way and Finland in a more tragic way. No doubt oppression and uncongenial association among nations as among



individuals tend to produce balked tendencies and to block cultural expression. Some nations with a brilliant past, like Poland and Bohemia, have for generations been pre-occupied with their national grievances and felt impotent in the realization of their national aspirations. It is to be hoped that the liberation of several national units from age long bondage may result in the release of spiritual forces which may to some extent compensate for the appalling cultural loss from the recent world-tragedy. They will now be able to organize their material and spiritual resources in accordance with their national genius, and we may look for unique results. If they and their neighbors can liberate themselves from the ghosts of past animosities and enter upon a new era of creative co-operation, their terrible sacrifice will not have been in vain. Nationality, with a noble tradition and a high level of life, does offer a wonderful incentive. But such units cannot be artificially made, and in some way our large units must be reorganized for spiritual purposes. It is not likely that the small units have had more genius in proportion than the others, or that Athens for example had more genius in the time of Pericles than before and after. The development of culture is in large part a matter of spiritual incentive. Pericles set about with his usual energy to make Athens a culture centre (which it had not been before) by inducing great men to come there and by offering incentives for genius. Our municipal and provincial units might follow his example.

Perhaps we have overemphasized nationalism as a culture medium. Nationalism has too often been blind, narrow and intolerant, a mere manifestation of the herd instinct. To be worth while, it must be enriched by cultural contacts without and still more by spiritual organization within. A one-sided patriotism offers at best a narrow incentive for spiritual production. We must grasp the universal in humanity and the universe in order to create; and this is not a matter of national boundaries, though a true national spirit will encourage us in this respect. Some of the gen-

iuses of small nations, like Ibsen and Strindberg, have reacted against their nations rather than with them, though no doubt inspired by the heroic background of their native tradition, while a poet like Maeterlinck may be said to be part of French civilization as much as of Belgium. Goethe was accused of lack of patriotism in his day and defended himself by saying that he found it impossible to hate the French since he had received his chief inspiration from them. It is not the sentiment of nationalism, so much as the fact that the nation has been the unit of spiritual organization that has made the nation so important culturally in the past. But in the future we may look for an extension of international incentives to spiritual cultivation and production not only in specific ways, such as the Rhodes Scholarships, the Nobel prizes, etc., but in the way of furnishing international communities of co-operation and appreciation. We may also hope for a more intensive organization of humanity within the nation in the way of stimulating provincialism and localism. Who can tell how much provincial loyalty and rivalry have done to make the French civilization great in times past? And before the war there were striking evidences of the intensification of such provincialism. In our country, Boston, whose provincialism we have laughed at, has had an enviable culture record; and New York as the melting pot of the races is becoming more and more a great culture centre. Suppose it were dominated as a city by a high idealistic purpose, instead of by Tammany, what might it not accomplish in the way of attracting and developing genius.

In our passion for the larger units of human association we have been too prone to neglect the significance of the local. Yet it is a homely and truthful proverb that charity begins at home. The roots of the human spirit are in the soil. The appreciation of human nature and nature alike must start with the neighborhood of which we are a part. Certainly some of the finest of human inspirations have come from local associations. However cosmopolitan genius may become, it is apt to draw fire from some local

altar, for the love of locality in most human beings is strong and ineradicable. How can we separate the genius of Thoreau from Walden Pond, Emerson from Concord, Whittier from his snow bound New Hampshire, Wordsworth from the English lake region? There is the inspiration of the homely life of the Highlands in Robert Burns and there is the flavor of Scottish accent and of Scottish heather in Carlyle. Who could understand Mark Twain without his early life on the Mississippi or the rugged idealism of Lincoln except as the fruitage of the pioneer spirit of the West?

We may expect great gain in the future from the development of a new community consciousness. Once we realize the reality of the community, of the immediate relationships of human beings with their clashing, overlapping interests, and live ourselves into the tissue of life of our neighborhood as a moral and not merely an external relationship then culture shall come to have new reality and meaning. The literary man will not simply nose about his neighborhood to find quaint types, but to interpret the real life, the real aspirations and struggles of real people sharing a common life. Then law will become the registration of conscious human individuals in co-operation, instead of class interests as it is now. What an infinite fountain of culture—the beautiful community!—But first we must create the community, for in the present newspaper age we seem to live least at home and mostly at a distance.

Perhaps, if in a vast country like the United States of America, we could once develop sectional and municipal rivalries in spiritual things, we might have a renaissance as great as any in the past. This seems all the more promising because of the variety of human material and the wealth of traditional background. If there are race qualities, conditioning the overtones of spiritual production, we should have them here. Nor does it seem wise to conventionalize our country by a bigoted eradication of the culture heritage that some of the nations are bringing us. Why

not rather encourage these roots into the past with the unprecedented loyalty which our immigrants have already shown to the country of their adoption? Why not develop a new Scandinavian culture of the Northwest, a new Irish era in Boston and a new Hebrew epoch in New York, not to speak of spiritual cross-fertilization in all our larger centres? What is certain is that we have been leaving our spiritual tendencies largely undeveloped and balked in our mad chase for wealth and power. It is the irony of history that now the power-and-wealth-crust on which we have largely reared our social structure is breaking, and the false prophets are thus becoming exposed by the drift of events. Had some of the nations served the intrinsic values more and the instrumental less, they would not now be destitute and outcast. Even from the point of view of stability and prosperity, a saner respect for the demands of human nature may seem to be the best policy; but what is more important is that it is the only policy which makes life worth while.

The unit of personal relations and the unit of political control never have coincided nor can they at best wholly coincide. A unit, large and complex enough to furnish a substantial basis for independent political organization, must necessarily be too large for intimate personal association. Our memory and imagination, as well as our moral capacity for helpfulness, are limited. A political unit, moreover, must include all varieties and conditions of men with their division of labor and variety of interest. It must have its crust of custom as well as its pioneers for truth. The culture unit of ancient Athens not only excluded the slaves who were probably three fourths of the population, but those who shared in active sympathy and co-operation for higher ideals, included only a fraction of the freemen. The fate of Phidias, Anaxagoras, and Protagoras in Pericles' own reign, and of Socrates a generation later, shows how far Athens was from being a moral unit for progress. The culture epoch of Florence was after all carried by a small aristocracy. While in our modern democracies we may

look for a more wide-spread interest in culture, the actual co-operation in culture production must naturally be limited to small groups. What we can hope is that the unit of political control shall further the means of cultural co-operation and, by the atmosphere which it can create, stimulate instead of thwart the creative spirit. The creative culture group is necessarily selective and should include those gifted by nature, training and nobility of aim to co-operate in a creative purpose. The best results for culture seem to be produced in friendship groups such as the Pythagorean fraternity and the Socratic group in ancient times, and the masonic guilds that built the Gothic cathedrals toward the end of the Middle Ages. There should be the widest tolerance of differences in view-point and the greatest desire on the part of each to furnish his creative increment in the erection of the temple of truth and beauty. Such masonry of the spirit has always been rare.

One would naturally look to the universities and colleges for the spiritual organization of friendship. The situation, however, is disappointing. This is due in part to the autocratic organization of our higher institutions of learning. They have so far been, for the most part, power-organizations instead of leaders in the democratic movement. This has created an atmosphere of suspicion between the administration and the faculty. In a large proportion of institutions, there is a chronic state of irritation and unrest which cannot help being unfavorable to culture production. Again, the department organization, which should furnish a natural unit for first-hand discussion and interstimulation, has been dominated by the same power motif. This condition has tended to have a depressing effect and to militate against such comradeship as is necessary for spiritual co-operation. The artificial character of departmental divisions has likewise been instrumental in producing undue rivalry and segregation and thus been unfavorable to likemindedness of purpose. But the power-system, with its disadvantages, is itself the outgrowth of the chronic individualism and *laissez faire* atti-

tude of the American scholar. He has not been prone to team-work. He has been apt to look upon the pursuit of truth as an individual affair,—too eager for individual credit, and, one might add, for individual advancement. When there has been co-operation, as there has been in recent instances, there has been so strong a sectarian emphasis as to create a suspicion that the interest was more in propaganda of a particular doctrine or school than in advancing truth. But that, no doubt, is due to the rawness of our culture and, we hope, presages a more liberal and disinterested co-operation after awhile. Contrast with this the wide diversity which characterized the Pythagorean fraternity where Zeno and Empedocles could sojourn under the same roof with the mathematical realists, with their “units” or “simples” (who were not “new” in the fifth century B. C.) or the even greater richness of the Socratic group where such different temperaments as Plato and Xenophon, Antisthenes and Aristippus could unite in the common purpose of following the argument whithersoever it leadeth. Evidently we are far from such red-blooded masculinity of comradeship.

One thing is certain: we need to reorganize our educational life, not only in higher institutions but generally, not only faculty life but student life, into moral groups, if we are to get the best results. Our fraternities, while filling a social need, lack, it is to be feared, a serious cultural purpose. They are primarily hedonic organizations, with dancing often the chief interest,—a rather inverted emphasis one must admit. They are not from a cultural point of view to be compared with the old-fashioned literary and debating societies. There can be no doubt that the fraternity unit not only expresses a psychological need, but has great possibilities in true moral stimulation, and by moral stimulation I mean the stimulation of all those tendencies which should characterize a full-grown man or woman in our modern life. The possibilities are best illustrated in those instances where fraternity rivalry has been turned into account not only in technically social,

but in literary, physical, and practical development as well—an ideal which has been realized in the English “houses” or “colleges” to an extent which we should do well to emulate. In short, we need a new spiritual organization among both faculties and students.

In fact, the real work of organizing humanity into moral unities has scarcely begun. Our political democracy, so far achieved, is only a shell or framework for such spiritual organization into moral neighborhoods. From every point of view,—political, economic, religious, cultural, etc.,—the greatest problem in human organization for the future is not, to borrow the terminology of physics, the creative discovery of mass units, though this appeals to our imagination and is pressing, but the more subtle and basic problem of the creative discovery of the molecule of civilization. Only by this intensive creativeness can our larger social compounds become stable. We must create such moral unities of personal association as shall realize to the greatest extent, the capacities of human nature, if our larger impersonal unities are to be worth while. In fact the objection to large human units will disappear once we have created the real moral unit. Under comparatively homogeneous conditions, such as presented by rural life, the creating of a natural neighborhood community may largely answer the purpose now as under earlier conditions of civilization; but in our vastly complexer urban life, produced by the Great Industry and the modern division of labor, the neighborhood community, while it is imperative and must be created, must be supplemented by artificial interest-communities, with their inter-organization. This becomes especially true in the highest creative realms of culture, where the participants are few and in danger of being submerged in the mass, unless brought together by a spiritual bond for mutual reinforcement. This is peculiarly the task of the educational profession.

In the meantime, while we are waiting and working for a saner social organization, we must do what we can to get together and warm each others' spirits at the fire of mutual

interest and fellowship. Something can be done in this way to increase the spiritual output, we all know. And we shall thus save our souls.

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## ART AS AN ANTIDOTE FOR MORALITY.

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THE quarrel between the man of art and the man of morals has long been notorious. The grounds of the quarrel have changed little throughout the course of the centuries. To the artist the service of morality has seemed to bring with it a rigorism and a stiffening of the mind which shows itself in illiberalism and an excess of seriousness. He watches principle hardening into prejudice and austerity into deliberate joylessness. He sees men pursuing virtue and achieving only Puritanism. From such a fate he is glad to be free.

If the feeling of the artist in presence of his opponent is that of contempt, the feelings of the moralist are those of fear. There is something dangerous about the love of beauty: Plato identified it for all time when he set his hand against the *luxury* of the poets. Your lover of beauty is inclined to be a free and easy person, not sufficiently serious about the business of life, dealing rather cavalierly with the distinctions between good and evil, altogether too quick to see through the artificiality of our moral judgments. As the dweller in Philistia, or, if you prefer it, in Puritania, studies the ways of his neighbour in Bohemia he sees a whole population clothed in loose jackets and flowing ties, and he points eagerly to the appropriateness of this symbolism. In Puritania, the land of moral effort, you must keep *wound up*, disciplined, alert—as though life were to be passed in the atmosphere of a fire-station. Bohemia is the land of relaxation. Its inhabitants are like children playing in a gap of sunshine. Go not in among them or Heaven only knows what may happen to you!

So, not altogether playfully, one might suggest the substance of the historic opposition between these two human interests. There is nothing to be gained at this time of day by trying to add counts to the indictment on either side,

partly because the charges have been pretty well exhausted, but chiefly because, even if this were not so, the sharpening of the antithesis brings the claimants no nearer together. And in the end they must make their peace. After all, the issue between art and morality, so far as it is significant, is not a dispute between two groups of extremists, but a conflict between contending loyalties in the soul. Each of these seeks to enlist the devotion of the whole man; but if we care for the integrity of human life we shall attempt to serve both masters without alienating either.

I propose to ask, therefore, what morality may have to learn from art, or, to put it at once less ambitiously and more accurately, to enquire what the citizen of Puritania may gain from occasional sojournings in Bohemia, that forbidden land over the border.

The loyal Puritan will at first resent the suggestion that he ever needs a change. To him, Puritania is what his province is to the complete provincial,—an oasis of sanity in a desert of dementia, vaguely referred to as “Abroad.” Yet the Puritan is wrong. No one, so far as I know, has written a book on *The Tediousness of Being Moral*, either because the thing is too obvious or because it is too heretical. Yet there is room for such a work. For morality produces its own type of strain, a strain which continued moral effort intensifies rather than relieves.

This assertion calls for explanation.

Morality demands decisiveness; for if we are to be moral in any other than an Oriental sense we must act, and the prerequisite of action is decision. This sounds a harmless truism, but it has important consequences. Since our knowledge of the facts in any situation requiring a moral choice can never be exhaustive, our decisions are always unjustified and frequently wrong. It has been said that the maxim of conservatism is that nothing should ever be done for the first time. The epigram is truer than most epigrams; for it is obviously wrong, by any ideal standard of righteousness, to pass judgment on a man or a movement or an institution, or to decide on a policy, before the evidence is all in.

Yet, for a finite being, the evidence can never be all in. So nine times out of ten we have to cut short the processes of reflecting and weighing of alternatives, to make our choice and plunge into action, consoling ourselves with the thought that we are making the best of a bad job, and that there comes a point in every situation where, as William James put it, not to decide is really to decide. Of course investigation and reflection are good things, but when they mean the indefinite postponement of action they threaten to paralyse the will. It is good to be a Hamlet,—but only up to a point; for it is not, after all, through your thorough-going Hamlets that the business of the world gets done. This then is what some philosophers have called “our finite situation”: it is never right to act before the evidence is all in; it is always right to act before the evidence is all in. Thus we are all original sinners in this sense, that whatever we do, no matter how excellent our intentions, we do wrong.

At present we are interested in this misfit between human beings and the world they live in only as it shows itself in the sphere of morality. To see its workings more clearly, let us imagine a being who was moral and nothing else, and then let us see at what points “mere morality” would prove inadequate, and how that inadequacy would declare itself in a certain discomfort of the mind.

In the first place morality requires of us that we *take sides*. Doubtless no institution or policy or human being is wholly evil, just as none is wholly good. But there will always come a moment when we must throw in our lot with one side or the other, when we are forced to assume that one way is right and the other wrong, that one choice is the representative of the good, and the other of the evil. If we are effectively to destroy evil we must attack it with the best weapons at hand, even though by so doing we run the risk of destroying much that is good at the same time. But the refusal to compromise with evil too easily becomes a readiness to condemn everything with which evil is associated. The result of living too much with these necessary assumptions is that morality degenerates into partisanship,

the spirit which divides the world into hostile groups whose mutual opposition is their very life, and whose members can see no good whatever in their opponents. Dominated by this spirit we shall look out upon a world hopelessly divided against itself; we shall see men and their works as either wholly good or wholly evil, the ugly as one thing and the beautiful as another, these things as proper and those as improper, the white sheep as pure white, and the black sheep as dense black. And our theories of the universe will reflect our prevailing moral temper: the life of man becomes an episode in a cosmic warfare between the powers of Light and Darkness, God and the Devil, Spirit and Matter; while his destiny swings between a Heaven of unalloyed bliss and a Hell of unmitigated torment.

But, fortunately or unfortunately, you cannot cut up the world with the hatchet of moral discrimination. Things have not been designed to suit the convenience of virtue's pilgrims. The map of life cannot be so easily made, nor the reefs and shoals so clearly charted. The persons, the institutions and the customs which we are called upon to judge reveal themselves as a confusing mixture of good and evil. We find ourselves in some unguarded moment discovering pleasant and even admirable qualities in those whom we ought to condemn as vicious; serious faults often turn out to be merely the seamy side of virtues; damnable practices have beneficent results; the boundary between pleasure and pain becomes, on scrutiny, surprisingly difficult to mark, and the heretics everywhere seem capable of giving a few points to the orthodox. All this is very disturbing for that hypothetical figure, the merely moral man; for, however admirable impartiality may be, it is not favourable to decisive action. When one has reached the point of seeing that "there is much to be said on both sides" one hesitates before making a choice. Yet just here is the rub. For no one can live long without having this rudimentary kind of impartiality forced upon him. The facts are all against the over-simplification which strenuous morality seems to require. And this is the first type of strain which

mere morality produces: the strain that comes from trying to fit all life into a simple system of classification.

Now if there be any place to which the human mind can always repair, where the distinctions of morality do not prick us into action, and so do not trouble us, then there is hope for the survival of our sanity. And this is one of the great contributions of art to life: it offers a rest-cure to the weary moralist. For in contemplating the work of art we escape from those limitations which morality imposes on our judgment. Good and bad, right and wrong, pious and impious,—these terms represent a way of looking at life which for the moment is superseded. Just as the artist does not aim to edify or to instruct, so the function of his work is not to arouse that moral ambition to take sides with the good forces of the world against the evil. "The drama, like the symphony," wrote Synge, "does not teach or prove anything. Analysts with their problems, and teachers with their systems, are soon as old-fashioned as the pharmacopœia of Galen,—look at Ibsen and the Germans,—but the best plays of Ben Jonson and Molière can no more go out of fashion than the blackberries on the hedges. . . . The drama is made serious—in the French sense of the word—not by the degree in which it is taken up with problems that are serious in themselves, but by the degree in which it gives the nourishment, not very easy to define, on which our imaginations live." In the world of the imagination no verdicts are prescribed: everything is possible. We shall find a Mephistopheles sublime, while the rogues and the villains and the other moral outcasts shall so appear as to make us cry out

Excellent wretch! Perdition catch my soul,  
But I do love thee!

It is as though the mind had been set free to play. The facile distinctions of everyday living wash out, and all our habits of judgment are in abeyance. We recapture innocence at some higher level of the mind.

For the present we need not try to define more positively our state of mind in the moments of æsthetic experience.

It is enough if we have shown that art has a *corrective* function in life, bearing much the same relation to the ills attendant on moral strenuousness as physical relaxation to muscular fatigue.

There is a second kind of spiritual cramp which comes from maintaining too long the moral posture. Life is real, life is earnest,—especially the life of duty. Duty is categorical and imperative, say the philosophers. “Stern daughter of the voice of God,” exclaim the poets, adding a touch of austerity to the already forbidding figure. There can be no trifling in this Presence. We must take the choices of life seriously, as though the continued integrity of this entire scheme of things demanded the dutiful action from us. This indeed is the assumption which, as moral beings, we are forced to make: that the fate of the universe depends on our choice. The moral decision thus becomes critical and momentous: according as we choose thus or thus, so will the very fabric of the world be shaped definitely and irrevocably. We stand at the parting of the ways, at the very growing point of things; and the parting of the ways is a parting not merely for us but for the real world. Here is where reality is made. We choose not alone between two courses of action, but between two worlds. If, then, we were moral beings and nothing else we should be burdened literally with a cosmic responsibility: we should be, each one of us, an Atlas holding up the moral order of the universe.

But Atlas may not rest: he may not sleep or take holidays. Such vigilance must be exhausting for Atlas; it is certainly too exhausting for human nature. Some relief we must have from this strain, or we shall break, and man has not failed to hit upon assumptions which allow him to relax the seriousness of his effort and to replace the set lines of the moral visage with the confident serenity of the optimistic countenance. The belief in Providence is one of these comforting devices. If Somebody or Something is looking after the world to compensate for the mistakes of fool or sinner and to guarantee that “things

will come out all right in the end," then there are times when we may shift the burden of responsibility to this Power without fearing that by this action we may be putting the Cosmos in jeopardy. Without such a belief we dare not even go to sleep.

But art has another way of providing for this relief. For if morality offers us only a vista of a world perpetually in the making, with the ideal of strenuosity disguised under the names of Progress or Self-Realization, art presents to us a picture of a world in some sense finished and complete. It transforms us from participators in a struggle into spectators of a drama. We need not decide: we appreciate. Even if we see ourselves as somehow in the struggle, we yet know that we are merely playing a rôle. We may share the passion of Lady Macbeth and feel the guilt of her husband, but these feelings are subordinated to the major emotion of æsthetic satisfaction. The power and beauty of the whole composition give a consciousness of unity which is able to contain the moral distractions. We no longer take the moral issues seriously.

Thus, from the point of view of morality, art is a luxury,—and a dangerous luxury; but, considered in itself, it is no more dangerous than play, of which indeed it is the highest form. If all work makes Jack a dull boy, all morality makes him unbearably pompous and self-important. Some philosophers, excelling even Kant in the worship of Duty, have maintained that "the world is the material for my duty made manifest to my senses," so that presumably we are to see in the death of a friend merely an opportunity for the development of character, and in the casual primrose the occasion for a moral reflection. Pity the poor moralist with his whole being ever alert for the problem in ethics! Art is one deliverance from such stuffy egotism. To the artist and to those who share his vision the world becomes "not a *datum* but a *donum*." He creates in us the holiday mood in which our moral seriousness is seen to be, if not ludicrous, at least, for the time, misguided and irrelevant.

This need not be taken to mean that art is frivolous,—

far from it. Great tragedy and great music have their own seriousness, and leave us with a profound realization of the depths and the heights of human existence. But our feeling on the whole is one of *reconcilement* to whatever evil or sorrow is displayed. The moral nerve in us is not stirred to life. We do not feel that "something must be done about it." All the emotions of the moral situation are present, but not the need for action. We are content to *rest* in the contemplation of what the artist has given us. "What do you feel," I once asked a friend, "after reading *Lear*?" The reply was: "It's terrible; but it's worth it." That is the utterance of one who is not so much remote from the moral struggle as lifted above it. The possibility of such attainment is one of the things which art contributes to human life. It offers to the spirit of man a place of refuge where there is rest and, with rest, an opportunity to recover that saner estimate of the importance of ourselves and our tasks which the devotion to duty constantly threatens to destroy.

Art, however, has a function more positive than that of correction and supplementation. It is not only the sane critic of the extravagant claims of mere morality; it has its own work to do. Art, we may say, in effect, if not in intention, redeems the world from ugliness. The intuition of the artist so tyrannises over his material that it finds room in its world of beauty for that which in our haste we condemn as ugly. A human soul is lost if it knows itself outcast from the scheme of things; saved, when it discovers that someone wants it and can find work for it to do. The goal of artistic endeavour would be attained when it had been shown that nothing was outcast from the world of beauty, when a rendering of life had been given in which ugliness was included and transformed. This statement may well appear as cryptic as it is dogmatic. An analogy may rescue it from both charges. The analogy I propose is that between the artist and the saint.

When our judgment is not prejudiced we believe that there is a soul of good in things evil. No man, we think, is



wholly beyond redemption. People are a mixture, and if we could only get at them we should find some saving virtues. But for the most part we hold this as a general principle: when it comes to particular instances we find it difficult to see the good, and we move, if at all, by faith rather than by sight. Everyone can think of examples of unmitigated meanness or barbarous cruelty which seem to us to damn completely their authors. We may struggle to preserve our general belief that they are not beyond hope, but as far as our human perceptions go we simply cannot see any good in them. We leave that task to the all-seeing eye of God. This is just where the saint differs from the common run of men. He shares in the divine insight. The saint is one who has a genius for perceiving that soul of good in things evil. Gifted with some power of penetration, he does not need to postulate, he actually discerns, the good in men whom the world abandons. The saint is able to love his enemies, not by some inconceivable effort of the spirit, but because he actually finds them lovable: he sees beyond the evil and the hostility to the saving powers within. And his method of dealing with the evil is dictated by his perception,—the method of non-resistance. The name is a bad one, for the significant thing about the saint's technique is not so much that he passes over the evil as that he addresses himself directly to the good. In his dealings with the enemy he holds on tenaciously to the truth of his intuition that the real part of the sinner is the part which the world, and even the sinner himself, cannot see, but which he, the saint, sees. If one ask the saint how he can justify this intuition he may point to the results: for "the method of non-resistance, when it is successful, turns enemies into friends and charity regenerates its objects." By his faith in the good, the saint elicits the good. Faith and generosity create their like. That is why the method of non-resistance is the most powerful method of redeeming the world from evil: it arouses and sets going in the places where it is most needed a new force against evil. It does not merely suppress evil, it adds to the sum of moral energy at work in the

world. The genius of the saint consists in this: that he can see farther than the average man, that he knows that the last word does not rest with evil. His value consists in the fact that he enables us to become sharers in his vision, widening our horizon, and removing some veil of darkness from the eyes with which we look habitually on our fellowmen.

Now the artist is he who has a genius for perceiving beauty where most of us see the commonplace or the ugly. He does not assume beauty or invent it where it does not exist: he *sees* the soul of beauty in things ugly. He is not bound by the distinctions which the greater part of men use to label their world: he is mastered by an intuition of beauty which may at any moment transform the common things of life under its radiance.

The angels keep their ancient places;—  
 Turn but a stone, and start a wing!  
 'Tis ye, 'tis your estrangèd faces,  
 That miss the many-splendoured thing.

It is sometimes said that, just as the saint deludes himself into denying the existence of evil, so the artist, because he selects, is a liar. But what gives him his power to select, and determines that selection, but his own commanding inspiration? That is what comes first and what makes him a man apart. Like the saint, he is first and foremost seer and prophet. He holds to his insight against what the world calls fact because he knows it to be truer, than the facts. And he will make his prophecy come true by showing that the world does indeed conform to his vision of it. "Canst thou give unto thyself thy bad and thy good?" asks Nietzsche. "Yes," replies the artist; "and I will yet show you that it is yours and everyone else's as well." His method follows from this authoritative inspiration. It might be called the method of non-resistance towards the ugly, but better, the method of addressing oneself exclusively to the beautiful. The artist elicits beauty from the world by bringing to it his own vision of the beauty that is there. The proof of his perceptions is the response that the world

gives, the response that he translates in music or sculpture or poetry or whatever it may be. "But I cannot see, I cannot hear," complains the outsider. "Come and stand here where I am," replies the artist. If the faith of the saint is that there is nothing absolute and final about the judgment of evil, the faith of the artist is that there is nothing absolute and final about the judgment of ugliness. And this is indeed the redemption of the ugly. Every work of art is a proof that some judgment about what was ugly must be revised. The ugly and the commonplace become disappearing factors as our vision clears.

"Modern reproductions of Rembrandt and Millet," writes Mr. Graham Wallas, "have enabled thousands of young people to look with genuine kindness upon the quiet self-satisfaction of an unintellectual old woman, or the heavy walk of a sweat-drenched labourer." Arnold Bennett's stories of life in the English pottery district offer another illustration of the transforming miracle which art works upon our ordinary powers of perception. Anyone who has visited the Five Towns will recall with a shudder the sordidness, the murk and the hideousness of that region, and the mean and grimy lives of its troglodytic inhabitants. Yet Arnold Bennett makes us realize that these judgments are merely superficial. That this or that person or circumstance is ugly seems merely irrelevant, for he has lifted us out of the region where such distinctions are important, and into a place where our hate has been transformed if not into love at least into something very like it. What he shows us is just sheer humanity: we are content to contemplate, to sympathize, to recognize our kind.

Thus it comes about that art nourishes the spirit of charity and understanding among men. For the greater part of our lives we are occupied with the business of getting through this world as decently as may be. We have not much time for fine discrimination. The need for action urges us into precipitate decisions: we have to use labels and other rough and ready methods of classification. Yet these gross discriminations, just because they estrange men

from each other, dividing them into sects and parties, into castes and classes, into social groups and national groups, are in the end intolerable. They do violence to our sentiments of a common humanity wherein the sinners often have a strange charm, and the sanctity of the saints is frequently malodorous. The artist confirms us in these sentiments, demolishing the barriers which morality or convention or prejudice set up, showing us that if it is necessary to establish distinctions it is just as necessary from time to time to rise above them. Someone has said that it is impossible to imagine Falstaff in Hell: we might add that it is just as difficult to imagine that "old globe of sinful continents" in Heaven. The artist who can bring us to that point of vision has destroyed for us the ancient illusion of a Heaven and a Hell with a great gulf between, together with all that such symbolism stands for. But he has done more than that: he has put us in the way to look upon human nature with wisdom, justice and tolerance; he has opened doors outwards from the narrow-minded egotisms of daily life upon a large sympathy with our fellow men; he has given us as it were a glimpse of that perfected humanity which hovers on the horizon of our hope.

En unissant les hommes les plus divers sous l'empire d'un sentiment partagé; en supprimant, provisoirement, les distinctions qui les divisent, lorsqu'elles ne les arment pas les uns contre les autres, l'art, somme toute, prépare ses adeptes à l'union définitive et intégrale. Il leur donne, non par le raisonnement, mais par l'ébauche qu'il en essaie sur eux, un avant-gout des joies de l'entente universelle: il éblouit leurs yeux aux splendeurs entrevues de la cité future, promise aux hommes de bonne volonté.

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## THE PROPHETIC OFFICE OF MR. H. G. WELLS.

HERBERT L. STEWART.

THE enormous popularity of Mr. H. G. Wells is a sign of these present times, and not a bad sign. Piquant humour, imaginative brilliance, skill in characterisation, and the alluring flavour of anti-conventionalism, have made many a great success among novelists. Mr. Wells has all these gifts in a high degree. But he showed them long ago, and at a time when his public was more at leisure to appreciate them. They were at least as conspicuous in *Kipps*, in *Marriage*, in *The New Machiavelli* as in *The Research Magnificent* or *The Undying Fire*. But men are seeing in this author just now a quite different sort of merit, a merit which was always there, but which circumstances have invested with a new appeal. To call him a prophet may suggest that one has in mind his numerous sketches of a coming Utopia, or his daring predictions about the development of machinery. But to our sceptical age the very term "Utopia" has become almost derisive, and guess-work about machinery is liable to be found out. Mr. Wells has made many a remarkable hit in his forecasts, but his fame as a soothsayer has been badly shaken at least twice. He told us that aircraft would be of little account in warfare until about 1950. And he allowed just three months for the combined British and French forces to carry the Tricolour across the Rhine!<sup>1</sup> If we value him as a prophet it is in the nobler sense of one who denounces, expostulates, exhorts, and leads his generation. This he has undoubtedly done and is doing with immense effect. There are some who say that they cannot read him for his "flippancy," and, prophet though he is, he can at least seem very flippancy indeed. There are many whom he offends, and few can be more offensive than Mr. Wells when his temper is up. There are superior reviewers who

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<sup>1</sup> *The War that will End War*, p. 16.

affect to regard him as *vox et præterea nihil*. But this at least he can never be.

Our author was a biologist before he discovered his aptitude for fiction, and he has never quite lost his first love. The centre of his message is the thought of bringing the exactness and purposiveness of science into the collective business of mankind. For in its collective business the world, as Mr. Wells sees it, is a muddled world, with its movements unplanned, its inevitable changes unanticipated—a chaos of traditionalism, use and wont, rule of thumb. The confusion is greatest just where the concerns are most important. We have long, he reminds us, had efficient railroads, efficient post-offices, efficient factories. But we have hardly taken a step commensurate with our knowledge towards the arresting of race decay. It should be looked upon as a scandal for an infant to die, yet we still keep those conditions of random parentage, unassisted motherhood, ignorant nursing, and slum environment, which make the struggle for existence acute from the very hour of birth, and which ensure that only a modest proportion shall survive.<sup>1</sup> With all our talk about pædagogics education is in a bad way. For we have not sat down to think out the sort of tasks which our children will have to meet, and then plan the discipline which will give them most help, as an architect or an engineer would suit his means to his purpose. We are content—apart from a few spasmodic exceptions—with some old, old method, though the needs have become very new, priding ourselves upon the ancient tradition of our schools; as warriors might pride themselves on an obstinate adherence to the bow and arrow while aircraft and machine guns are at work against them. We think we have a science of sociology, yet we arrange our commerce on such a wasteful and stupid system that ten small traders are engaged, each on an impoverished scale, on doing what one municipal store could do far more effectively. And in the name of unrestricted competition we make ourselves an easy prey to the quack,

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<sup>1</sup> *New Worlds for Old*, p. 51.

the cunning profiteer, the trusts, the pools, the corners. We have even developed our professional expert in the mendacious advertising placard. Religious and moral guidance are in no better case. Cant and phrase-making and outworn formulæ are still depended upon. The rising generation simply doesn't believe in the old moral maxims or the old theological creeds, and where no intelligent attempt is made to substitute anything better, the masses, as they awaken, will on their own impulse substitute something worse. So long as we keep demanding from a young, struggling, incompetent, married pair that they shall organise by their own wisdom an idyllic household like that of *The Cottar's Saturday Night*, and that with no public supplementing of their deficiencies they shall bring up a numerous and healthy offspring, too many will meet the case otherwise by concealment of birth or the procuring of abortion, nor will all our pulpit denunciations and legal penalties convey a real sense of guilt. The people of our time have become deaf to those "strange battered old phrases that were coined ages ago in the seaports of the sun-dry Levant,"<sup>1</sup> and yet nothing more modern is served out by the official representatives of faith. To all this the war is a natural climax. It is the culminating tragedy of muddle in *haute politique*. "I see the world staggering from misery to misery . . . the good things come by chance and the evil things arise and slay them."<sup>2</sup> "What else can happen when men use science and every new thing that science gives and all their available intelligence and energy to manufacture wealth and appliances and leave government and education to the rusting traditions of hundreds of years ago?"<sup>3</sup>

One object of Mr. Wells in writing his romances was to drive home this moral of unorganised and improvident society, to point out how fallacious are the defences set up for *laissez faire*, and in how inconsistent a fashion we use in

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<sup>1</sup> *Tono-Bungay*, p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> *The Research Magnificent*, p. 304.

<sup>3</sup> *A World Set Free*, pp. 85, 86.

one matter a principle which shocks us when its application is suggested in another. He is not, indeed, to be placed among those authors, now in such disrepute, who produce the "novel with a purpose" and whose fiction is mere thinly disguised homiletic. He is not like Harriet Martineau with her *Tales in Illustration of Political Economy*. That sort of title would be passed over with one hurried glance in these times by the Saturday afternoon crowd at our circulating libraries; yet—taking the compliment for what it is worth—Mr. Wells has long been a king in that miscellaneous realm. And the truth is that he is an artist quite as much as he is a pamphleteer. It is very vivid, very life-like figures that move upon his canvas, and their creator seems to be watching quite as much as he is guiding the evolutions. In the compass of a short article one can attempt no detailed estimate either of so varied accusations or of so complex remedies as our author has set before us. But there are some general facts worth noting about him and worth pondering.

The present writer confesses to an intense admiration for Mr. Wells, and in regard to some of his books to a feeling that is less admiration than gratitude. It is a great thing that a man of such brilliant gifts and such compelling popular appeal should exert himself just now to focus thought upon the problems that supremely matter. This has not always been our fortune. Literature even in a period of crisis has not seldom held aloof from the most throbbing interests of life. *The Heart of Midlothian* appeared just one hundred years ago, at a moment of social reconstruction which may, not unfairly, be likened to the present. It may, no doubt, be said that one who could write that supreme romance would have been ill employed as a "pamphleteer for the times," and Mr. Wells himself would be the first to deprecate any absurd comparisons between him and the wizard of the north. But it is equally true that Scott in that distraught age, when the Holy Alliance was sowing the seed of so many horrors yet to come, had no word for the times at all, except a word of encouragement to the forces



of reaction. As Carlyle rather savagely put it, "the sick heart will find no healing here, the darkly struggling heart no guidance, the Heroic that is in all men no divine awakening voice." Literary history will be able to say at least of Mr. Wells that at this decisive hour he dedicated what power was in him to enlightening his age upon its own special need, that by the only instrument which could reach so wide a circle he worked upon the public intellect, the public conscience, and the public imagination, and that whether his judgments were right or wrong they were fearless, well-informed, set forth with unsurpassed lucidity and with a candor that no one could mistake.

Moreover, he has been less concerned to propagate a special doctrine than to provoke his readers to independent thought. One feels about him that he would rather be opposed intelligently than supported stupidly. His warfare is against the habit of mental laziness in what touches public well-being, and he hates with a perfect hatred that use of edifying phrase which he has called the "soul's refuge from realities." He is always putting to us the question: why do you permit your thought and practice on social affairs to lag behind your thought and practice in other fields of science? Why be content with unscrutinised tradition in politics, in education, in morals, when in mechanics, in medicine, in chemistry you are eager for the daring experiment without which knowledge cannot grow? If it is objected that there is room for growth in the one sphere, but things are satisfactorily settled to all intents and purposes in the other, the teeming imagination and incisive satire of Mr. Wells can supply us with scene after scene of muddle,—perfectly natural and, as the critics say, "convincing" muddle—where the average reader is forced to recognise the lineaments of himself and his kind. The problem these scenes suggest is, Are you sure that human intellect has no alternative to confusion and inconsistency like this? Volumes of abstract argument would not be half so effective in driving this moral home as one book like *Mr. Polly* or *Tono-Bungay*. And it has to be driven home

to the man in the street, just because, though the laboratory experiment can dispense with the man in the street's co-operation, the social experiment cannot.

Again, the authentic character of the prophet has been shown by Mr. Wells in that he does not make us laugh at the follies of our grandfathers but at our own follies, and that he does not caricature the French or the Americans to Englishmen but Englishmen to themselves. The thing he mocks is often the thing about which his reader is very sensitive indeed. For example, he wants religious convictions to be disentangled, simplified, clarified. But he must first overcome the English tradition of reticence, the genteel pose of "thinking more than one says" on such a topic, the affected flippancy which is supposed to cover a thought that is too deep for words. Our critic frankly believes that his countrymen are reticent because they are too lazy to think things out, like "Old Booch" in *Marriage* of whom Trafford said that a man who could swallow oysters as he did could swallow the Thirty-Nine Articles or anything else. And the prevailing etiquette on this subject he traces back to the model set in a girls' school! Marjorie Pope had been brought up in a system of muffled Christianity. She had been shielded from all questioning, not because questioning was impious, but because it was unladylike. Pressing deeply into the tremendous affirmations of faith was represented as "rather foolish . . . and in the worst possible taste."<sup>1</sup> Lady Harman's mother treated religion with a reverence that was almost indistinguishable from huffiness, threw a spell of indelicacy over the matter, put God among objectionable topics—albeit a sublime one.<sup>2</sup> Kipps had it explained to him as part of his equipment for his new social position that it is a mark of breeding not to wear one's heart on one's sleeve, and that the true gentleman never shows his religion outside the walls of a church, "except perhaps now and then in a

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<sup>1</sup> *Marriage*, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> *The Wife of Sir Isaac Harman*, p. 86.

pause, a profound look, a sudden avoidance."<sup>1</sup> Poor Kipps drank it in with the rest of "Manners for Men." Satire like this catches Englishmen, as they would say themselves "on the raw." But a Scot can appreciate it. So, for that matter, can anyone else who is wont to think of religion in terms of brain as well as in terms of behavior.

The way his countrymen are formed for political leadership is another field for Mr. Wells's satire. He has nothing good to say of the Oxford Union Debating Society as a portal to parliament. Learning to coin epigrams and to sparkle with repartee is inferior, he thinks, to a discipline in political science. He defines a free press as a press that is free to be bought by anyone, a description more pointed than agreeable to those who reverence the Fourth Estate. Sir Peter Laxton in *Bealby* who had bought his rank for twenty thousand pounds and a tip to the Whip on the Peptonised Milk Flotation, should appeal to those who raise once a year in parliament the scandal about traffic in titles, and the ludicrous figure of the Lord Chancellor in the same piece—whom, by the way, Mr. Wells might as well have named—illustrates the need of that reform which will make law no longer "the muddled secret of the legal profession."<sup>2</sup> Cromwell once called English law a tortuous and ungodly jumble. That was two and a half centuries ago, and England, unlike France, has not had the iron hand of a Napoleon to make the lawyers see how possible it is to codify.

Readers of Mr. Galsworthy will remember the political week-end at an English country house. Mrs. Freeland had her dinner party at which tame Cabinet Ministers with their wives discussed the economic discovery of a Bulgarian *savant*. A labourer's family of five was to be fed for a shilling a day upon brown bread, potatoes, and margarine. "The carbo-hydrates—or was it the hybo-carbrates—ah, yes!—the kybohadrates would be present in really sufficient quantity. . . . Faces flushed, eyes

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<sup>1</sup> *Kipps*, p. 224.

<sup>2</sup> *In the Days of the Comet*, p. 76.

brightened, and teeth shone.”<sup>1</sup> Mr. Wells has been an observer of this fashionable sociology too. It is not what he means by an application of science to politics. The very truth, he says, must rouge its cheeks and blacken its eyebrows in order to tell! And he has shown us those young Imperialists, with their lady patronesses, of the day before Kipling’s star had set. They used to profess a vivid sense of the White Man’s Burden. Benham in *The Research Magnificent* was advised that a young man of his wealth should seek a career in the gilded paths of high politics, but he was warned against the Balkans. That region had been overworked, for since the opening of good hotels in Servia and Montenegro and Sofia “everyone” went there and “came back with a pet nationality.” Lady Beach Mandarin would advise against pet nationalities. Let Benham specialise in social reform, join the Fabian Society, and consult the Webbs. “Quite a number of able young men had been placed with the assistance of the Webbs.”<sup>2</sup>

How true this is to life only those who have been on the spot can realise. The writer of this article recalls how at Oxford fifteen years ago, in the heyday of the gospel according to Joseph Chamberlain, a group of ingenuous youths talked incessantly about “Empi-ah,” and were understood to be marking themselves out for proconsulships. They were one and all perfectly prepared, at a handsome remuneration, for the Burden of the White Man. An ex-Premier came down from London to meet them in esoteric conference, and their faces for months afterwards were those of men to whom a veritable *arcanum imperii* had been confided. The first sacrifice for which they declared themselves ready was that of their possible distinction in university examinations, and of the severe reading which this would involve. The names of these empire-builders are thick strewn in the Third and Fourth Classes of the Oxford lists, but the transfiguring of the world, for which they so patriotically paid this price, remains still quite inconspicuous.

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<sup>1</sup> *The Freeland*, pp. 209–10.

<sup>2</sup> *The Research Magnificent*, pp. 146, 147.

Mr. Wells is at heart a true born Englishman, and he is as proud as the rest of us that even such political diletantism, and choice of leaders by a social coterie, and absence of scientific preparation for the business of governing, have not prevented the predominance of the British Empire. But the times have become ever more strenuous, and he would have his countrymen presume no longer upon their native sagacity for muddling through. He would call into action a real collective intellect, organising Great Britain politically with something like the effectiveness of a big railroad organised commercially. He would have the common citizen as much alarmed for his political interest and danger as the common proprietor of stock for his interest and danger in finance, and he knows that this is just what the common citizen is not. He would have the electorate as keen-eyed for the country's business as a meeting of shareholders for a company's business, as rudely inquisitive into what is going on, as hard to put off with excuses, as inexorable towards incompetence or neglect. And he knows that this is just what the electorate, crowding round the hustings, has never been. Above all, he would have the Cabinet chosen as directors are chosen, not for their plausibility, or their ancient names, or their bursts of parliamentary eloquence, but for their proved insight into what this national corporation wants to effect, and into the surest means of attaining it.

Our prophet calls his own plan Socialism, and despite its misleading associations there is no better word. Whatever we think about the details of what he has proposed, we must be grateful to him for the clearest presentation of that whole subject which is yet available in short compass to the busy public. *New Worlds for Old* is a masterpiece of exposition. It is no crude resharing of property that is commended to us. That, says Mr. Wells, would be the teeth and claws of Socialism without the eyes and brain. What we are asked to accept is, abstractly, the doctrine of a collective purpose, and, concretely, a bold collective

interference over a vast area of conduct that has so far been looked upon as a strictly private concern. We asserted the principle when, in spite of the individualists, we passed the Factory Acts. We assert it in every city where the butcher is forced to submit his meat to inspection, and a public abattoir testifies to our distrust in "the adequacy of the private conscience." We assert it again when the state monopolises the delivery of mail, and forbids any private person to compete with the post-office. Why stop short with a few such reforms? Why talk nonsense about sacred domestic rights, when we already infringe these by establishing compulsory schools, and it would be just as much for the public interest to segregate the unfit, to endow successful motherhood, and to withdraw the care of children from parents who are obviously unfit for the task? Why refuse to nationalise land in order to do away with the slum, turn to public uses a vast area that is being "held for a rise," and cheapen products that are kept artificially dear to fill the pockets of those who acquired by lucky chance the land that is essential for manufactures, when we have already defied doctrinaire individualism by expropriation for a railroad or a mine? Why hesitate to set up a state medical service for all, like our state department of public health, and thus do away with the hardships of medicine as a private adventure? Why not reduce the wasteful competition of small traders by maintaining a municipal store with cheaper and more reliable goods? It is not a question of Socialism or no Socialism. In a very real sense we are all Socialists now. It is a question of less or more, and more rather than less is plainly indicated.

But Mr. Wells would see collective mind go far further than a mere rearranging within the community. He once pointed out that people are often allowed to die of starvation in India while unsalable wheat is being burned in the United States.<sup>1</sup> "And there is no statesmanship to avert it." Such international statesmanship is what he now wants to create, and he would avail himself of the unique

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<sup>1</sup> *In the Days of the Comet*, p. 20.

world enthusiasm that has been roused by the war. He would have a democratic League of Nations, charged above all with the task of international hygiene in preventing the deadliest world disease, the disease of war. Its symptoms and its causes are well known, if we would have but the courage and the faith to use the remedy. The analogue to unrestricted competition among traders is rival nationality among peoples, but the beaten in the one case are only bankrupt, while the beaten in the other are blown to pieces. In both alike the hindrance to a sane settlement is the exploded myth of individualism and inviolable independence. Mr. Wells has scant respect for the notion of exclusive nationality. In the world he longs to see no state would permitted to keep out the international officers, any more than a citizen can so make his home his castle as to bang the door upon the sanitary inspector. He is particularly incensed with those European *diplomats* who have so far left the Balkans to rapine and murder, because, forsooth, each kingdom has to be protected in the sovereign right to misgovern itself, to express what it calls its racial character in its own way, and, as an incident, to keep all its neighbours on the verge of quarrel. "There is no one," exclaims Benham, "no one with the sense to override all these squalid bodies. All those fools away there in London and Vienna and St. Petersburg and Rome take sides, as though these beastly tribes and leagues and superstitions meant anything but black damnable ignorance. . . . There isn't a religion in the whole Balkan peninsula, there isn't a tribal or national sentiment that deserves a moment's respect from a sane man. . . . Yet there is no one who will preach the only possible peace, which is the peace of the world state, the open conspiracy of all the sane men in the world against the things that break us up into wars and futilities."<sup>1</sup> One can see that, when he wrote that, Mr. Wells's idea of a League of Nations was not far off. He defined this explicitly in his later book entitled *In the Fourth Year*. Perhaps some of us see

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<sup>1</sup> *The Research Magnificent*, p. 271.

points in which Mr. Wells's League is even a better thing than the one sanctioned by more august authority.

In politics he is for democratic government, but of the selective, not the delegate type.<sup>1</sup> He would above all destroy the power of the machine politician, so that men who have what Plato called the *λόγος τῆς πόλεως* may come into their own. To discuss his proposals for this, especially his support of that franchise reform broached a short time ago in the British Parliament and known as "proportional voting," would take us too far afield. What we have to acknowledge in Mr. Wells is the immense service of propounding the real problem to the man in the street as perhaps no other living writer could have propounded it, and of arresting attention for the things at stake as certainly no other has of late arrested it. The ideas of *In the Fourth Year*—whether they are right or wrong—bear the invariable imprint of his lucid and far-seeing mind.

The first purpose of science is to unify, and one who has shown us that the world is to be kept in order by the same principle that makes a railroad pay, belongs to the same great succession as he who found the law of the planets in the trickling of a tear. To think out to the end all that is involved in the success of a business, and to apply this in the great arena of international affairs—no matter how the press may scream and the party agent may intrigue and the financier may bribe—this is the Wells message to the time. In volume after volume he has preached it and he has illustrated it. A mere truism, somebody will object! Nay, says our author, it is yet far from being recognised even as a truth. If you don't think so, read *The New Machiavelli*, or *The Passionate Friends*, or *Mr. Brilling*. They will do you more good than many an abstract treatise on political science.

Enough perhaps has been said to show how foolish are those who look upon Mr. Wells as a mere *persifleur*, or a mere novelist for our entertainment. Two defects, how-

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<sup>1</sup> *In the Fourth Year*, p. 128. Cf. *The New Machiavelli*, III, ii.



ever, must be noticed in him. Of late he has been getting outside the sphere in which he is effective, and he has failed through two of his own best qualities, his passion for simplicity and his turn for wit. He has tried to be a philosophic theologian, and, truth to tell, he seems to have little head for this, for he has far less than the requisite knowledge of speculative development and speculative difficulties. His mind is essentially practical, so that in the higher reaches of inquiry he breaks down. He is always over-simplifying, and his humour is disastrous when humour is the very last thing that is wanted. Mr. Wells cannot help suspecting muddle, and ridiculing muddle, even where the true hindrance has not been the confused thought of those who preceded him but the stubborn and complicated difficulty of what they tried to see through. For him the Sphinx has no real conundrum which man must somehow answer or die, and he laughs at those who cannot answer when he would be better engaged in bowing before the mystery that has been set both to them and to himself.

He has even got out of his depth on a subject that is far more tractable than theology, and, as Dickens truly said, a disputant out of his depth has no resource but to "splash up words." Mr. Wells has undertaken to kill the pædagogic myth about the value of Latin and Greek. English classical teachers, we learn, can read, write, and speak (!) Latin rather worse than a third-rate Babu speaks English. Greek is a "fine, lost language," and if "live" teachers were available a third of the time now used to impart a smattering of it would be enough to convey a complete mastery. The fact that Aristotle's *Politics* should still be prescribed as a text in the Oxford School of History is noted with silent horror. Words fail even Mr. Wells to do justice to such obscurantism. He never wearies of his jest that the utility of Latin prose composition for building up a clear English style has been enforced in scholarly pamphlets whose style is ragged and obscure. A short time ago he gave us in *Joan and Peter* lots of jocose things about English university life. A guardian, home from the illim-

itable veldt, and on the look-out for a school for his two wards, has met an Oxford don whom he hectors tremendously about spending time on the Gracchi and on the statesmanship of Cicero. Does not the purblind man see that a modern statesman—the late Lord Salisbury for instance—was far superior to Cicero, and far more significant?

Now this is “very tragical mirth,” as Peter Quince’s playbill once said. Our author has let loose his rather malicious irony in a province where he is not at home. What nonsense it is to say that English schools are inefficient in teaching ancient classics! It is rather a reasonable complaint that this special field has monopolised their effort, so that if the light that is in them be darkness how great is that darkness. Mr. Wells himself belongs to that small minority, in which John Bright and Hugh Miller used to be quoted, whose excellent style is a proof that classical culture is not quite indispensable for writing good English. But our experience of the vast majority must not be ignored. Political science has, indeed, sometimes been attempted in utter neglect of the great Greek masterpiece from which the political concepts of modern Europe are so largely drawn. The result is not encouraging. It is what one might expect from those who do not know the history of that thinking which they would amend. And how foolish must it look to anyone acquainted with Oxford lectures of to-day upon Roman civilisation when he reads that Cicero’s statecraft is there held up as a model! One of the dangers of a flashing wit is that it wants to flash all the time, and in its eagerness to get into action refuses to be delayed by mere want of knowledge about the subject to be burlesqued. The corruption of the best is the worst, as Mr. Wells has himself reminded us. By the way, strangely enough he seems to ascribe this old dictum to Aristotle.<sup>1</sup> We had supposed that it came to us from Plato, from the sixth book of that very *Republic* which

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *The Soul of a Bishop*, p. 215.

our critic cites so often as to suggest the most intimate acquaintance with all that it contains.<sup>1</sup>

The same weakness is found in his humorous pictures of the early Church, and in the fun he has poked at theological controversies. There too he has been very amusing. He has made us laugh at "little red-haired Athanasius," at the garland of priests marshalled by Constantine's officials, and at "that supreme trimmer, Eusebius," who could change his own view on consubstantiality, convinced that the incidence of damnation would change with him. He can put all kinds of merry riddles to those who believe in providence, riddles about the control of the weather for the behoof of either side in the great war, or about the analogy between a day of national prayer and the ritual of propitiation by a Chinese priest. Mr. Wells is not more profound when he speaks of Church Councils than when he speaks of classical learning, as an expert reviewer in the *Hibbert* was at pains to point out. As to his tone, of course tastes differ, and the present critic is no Puritan in the reverences with which he would hedge about a theological argument. But flippancy can become indecent, and in *God the Invisible King* all limits have been utterly despised.

Perhaps the most effective way of emphasising this point is to suggest a corresponding caricature of that marvellous medley which Mr. Wells would substitute for the current faith of the Church. Far be it from any of us to speak without respect of his earnest effort at construction. We would say of it nothing like what its author said of that group of serious and able and learned men who published the volume called *The Faith and the War*. Dr. Foakes-Jackson and his associates are, we read, "all lying like over-laden camels, panting under this load of obsolete theological responsibility, groaning great articles, outside the needle's eye that leads to God."<sup>2</sup> If one were so disposed, by what similitude would he describe Mr. Wells, declaring in defiance of all modern science that the uni-

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Republic*, 419 D sq.

<sup>2</sup> *God the Invisible King*, p. 20.

verse is not the product of one Power but of two Powers, that there is a Veiled Being who made things, and of whom we can know nothing, however much we learn of the things he made, balanced by a "God of the Heart" whose character is shown in conscience and whose main task is to defeat what the Veiled Being has tried to do? In a writer so contemptuous of old metaphysic what a weird metaphysical conception is this of a God whose true personality is not for a moment to be denied, a God who is Youth, and who responds to prayer, who is Leader and Captain of Mankind, and who yet turns out to be in the end a synthesis of human wills, related to individual men as a temple is to its particular stones, and as England is to the fragments of her own soil! Aptly indeed did Mr. Frederic Harrison call *God the Invisible King* the drawing of "a very invisible God." And so far as crazy metaphysic is concerned I would take refuge in the relative simplicity of the Athanasian creed. But Mr. Wells believes in this odd construction, and sustains his spirit therefrom. If he would only accept the same lesson himself, most of us would try in dealing with his worship to avoid the mood which Carlyle censured in Voltaire, the mood which makes one enter the Temple and continue in it "with a levity which in any Temple where men worship can beseem no brother man."

An old Hebrew reformer once complained of those who would heal lightly the hurt of the daughter of the people. Our new theologian is in fearful haste, and very keen for short-cuts. Theological structures, like others that are put up too fast and to suit an immediate demand, are apt to be jerry built. But it is a great thing to be so full of courage, to assail mysteries anew with confidence so unabashed, to be so sure that now at length "the veil of the Temple is rent to rags and tatters." The pugilist in *Etienne Gerard* complimented the gallant brigadier who had come to grief in the boxing bout because "he came for me like a bantam." Such intrepidity in matters philosophic has at least been shown by Mr. Wells. Like a bantam he has gone for the perplexities of faith, and those of us whom

repeated disappointment has left a little jaded may take heart of grace from his example. But he must try again. "It is all perfectly plain," declares Dr. Scrope in *The Soul of a Bishop*, "quite easy for anyone to understand, who isn't misled, and chattered at, and poisoned by evil priests and teachers." It is when we hear this that our hopefulness is damped once more. For this is not the authentic voice of the twentieth century; it is the cocksureness of the eighteenth, from which we thought we had escaped. Alas, this so baffling universe has had its riddle read so often, and of all the doubtful readings none is more suspicious than that which would make a clean sweep of all the readings that have preceded, and which affects to anticipate all that can be true in the readings yet to come.

Much more would have to be said of Mr. Wells in any estimate pretending to completeness. He is much given, for example, to discussing problems about marriage, and, while in his best vein he has often serious points to make, in his worst his chief appeal is to those giggling triflers who love to hear that the middle class is "smug" and that "conventional morality" is mid-Victorian. Too often his characters are like those of whom Macaulay once spoke as delighting to shock their maiden aunts. Why, one may ask, should the high merit of *Mr. Britling* be spoiled by that tiresome stuff about the hero's infidelity to his wife, which interrupts to no purpose the course of the tale? And why should a writer who has in him the power to produce *Kipps* condescend to tickle the ears of the groundlings with *Ann Veronica*? But one might as well ask why Anatole France, who could give us *L'Ile des Pengouins*, should have soiled his pen with *Le Lys Rouge*. Such are the ways of some novelists, and the critic can but heave a sigh. Our present prophet has no need of such expedient to win an audience for his graver work, and to have recourse to it is unworthy of him.

Yet we must not quarrel with the good gifts of that providence to which Mr. Wells has been so disrespectful because we have not found in the same person a winsome

literary artist, a wise monitor in high politics, a social reformer of great fecundity in suggestion, a weaver of fantastic tales that are at once the joy of childhood and the stimulant of thought in the mature, and a faultless teacher on the deep things of life and destiny. Not until we reach one of his own Utopias, and have given time for the full development of our Samurai, can such concentrated genius be looked for. We must be content and in great measure thankful to take our Mr. Wells as we find him. He has seasonably disconcerted us all, as Matthew Arnold would have said, and we had much need of the disturbance. When we are tempted to put *The Seven Seas* in an utterly different class from *Deutschland über Alles* it is good to have someone at our elbow who will say provoking things about "Teutonic Kiplingism."<sup>1</sup> When we hear talk about a tariff as essential to keep the British Empire together, it is good to be asked whether we are really out on a project of "international sharpening," and whether we mean by Empire only a "combination in restraint of trade."<sup>2</sup> Even an Oxford man, filled with ideas about Plato and Aristotle as the initiators of all true philosophy, may benefit by the jibe that he is being not so much introduced to modern problems as inoculated against them, for "there is no such effective serum against philosophy as the scholarly decoction of a dead philosopher."<sup>3</sup> Mr. Wells will never let us alone, so long as we lull ourselves to sleep with words. Even when he makes us angry, *especially* when he makes us angry, he forces us to think. What higher service can a man of letters perform?

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<sup>1</sup> *The War that will End War*, p. 14. Cf. *The New Machiavelli*, p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> *The Passionate Friends*, pp. 129 and 149.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

## LIGHT FROM TOLSTOY ON RUSSIA

DURANT DRAKE

I AM one of many Americans who have been asking themselves, these past two years, this question: Are the Russian masses longing to be delivered from their Bolshevik masters? Or, on the contrary, do the ideals embodied in the constitution of the Soviet Republic and the decrees of the Bolshevik Government represent fairly the wishes of a majority of the people?

Certainly from the American point of view those ideals and decrees are extremely radical. The dispossession of the landowners and capitalists, the inauguration of a sort of communism and of "proletarian" rule—which means that only those who *earn* their living may vote, or for that matter, *get* a living at all—such a phenomenon is startling, not only to the wealthy in our Western democracies, but to all who add to their comfort by the income from inheritance, investments, and rents, and to all who believe in our Western ideal of an almost unrestricted individualism as the mainspring of progress.

Nevertheless, *if* this new order in Russia does really embody the ideals and aspirations of a large block of the Russian people, we are committed to a *laissez-faire* policy with regard to it by our accepted principle of the self-determination of nations. So that the question is not whether we agree with, or disapprove, or fear the Soviet ideals, but whether they are, or are not, the ideals of a considerable number of Russians. If they are, the further fact that the success of their experiment in socialism might endanger our institutions does not warrant our undertaking to make their experiment fail. They have a right to make their own mistakes, to try out their own ideals. The more we seek to interfere, the more passionately they will cling to their ideals. They will lay the blame for their failures upon us, and an estrangement and bitterness will be en-

gendered between the Russian people and the Western peoples that will go far to jeopardize the success of our first precarious attempts at supernational organization.

It is then a question of fact. But, unhappily, it seems impossible for us to make out, from travelers and correspondents, from diplomats, or from the press, what the real truth of the matter is. Witnesses flatly disagree. In our present darkness, then, any source of light, however meager, deserves attention. And to those of us who have long loved, and to some extent sympathized with, that greatest of Russians, Leo Tolstoy, it seems probable that a good deal of light upon this riddle can be got from a consideration of his ideals and of the extent to which they represent the inarticulate aspirations of his ignorant, long-oppressed, but kind-hearted and idealistic countrymen.

A recent writer in the *New York Times* (whose anti-Bolshevist bias is well known) has said that every Russian has within him a little Tolstoy. Not, of course, in literary gifts or power of personality, but in attitude toward life. It has been generally accepted that Tolstoy was the mouthpiece for the *Zeitgeist* in his great, dumb, restless, fettered native land. Through him spoke the soul of Russia.

He took, indeed, no part in the revolutionary activities which were seething in subterranean channels about him, because he was radically opposed to the use of force for any end. "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you," he reminded men; our business is to make our own lives right and leave the rest to God. But in spite of this ultra-pacifism, his influence in spreading the ideals that were bound to lead to social revolution was enormous. He was a goal of pilgrimage, his words were passed from mouth to mouth, reaching millions of peasants and workmen; his very presence there in their midst, with his outspoken scorn of the existing government, church, and social order, was an unceasing stimulus to radicalism. He loved and lived with the peasants, shared their outlook, expressing for them what they could not express, and thus made himself a sort of concentrated essence of the Slavic spirit.



This spirit seems to us Westerners naive, unsophisticated, childlike. Tolstoy, of course, in his early days, before he tuned his soul to the vibrating heart of Russia, had run through the gamut of worldly pleasures and sophistication. But through long observation and inward struggle he had come to believe that it is necessary for us all to become as little children to find the Kingdom of Heaven. The way of simple justice and brotherhood is the true way of life. Liberty, equality, fraternity—these words are to be taken sincerely, to the utmost extreme of their implications, without fear of consequences.

There can be no doubt of the seriousness, the idealism, thus naively and simply expressed by Tolstoy, and inarticulately living in the hearts of millions of his fellow-peasants. There is no lighthearted gaiety in Tolstoy, little or no sense of humor, to relieve the devotion to spiritual values. Nor is this simple piety of feeling balanced by an interest in science, or art, or politics, or industrial organization. Tolstoy was, indeed, an artist, loved literature and painting, wept over beautiful music. But he came to subordinate his artistic self wholly to his spiritual self. He had never been a scholar, and the Biblical commentaries of his later years have no critical value. He neither knew nor wanted to know economics, sociology, political theory. There was no need. The principles laid down in the Gospels are sufficient for the guidance of life.

What do those principles require? To Tolstoy's mind they obviously require that the rich renounce their wealth and all privileges that are denied the poor, that they "get down off the backs of the poor," and consume only what they produce. Any indulgence in luxury, while others are suffering for the lack of what money could buy, is sin. There must be no more idle rich, no social parasites, no drones in the hive. Only those should eat who earn their food by the sweat of their brows. There will then be no social classes; for if a man's income is restricted to what he really earns by his daily labor, there can be no very wide divergences in wealth and standard of living.

Much else, likewise, he believed to be implied by the serious adoption of the Gospel principles—as, for example, the refusal to fight or to serve as police, the sin of imposing by force the will, even of a majority, upon other men. But it is his espousal of the ideal of economic equality that is particularly worthy of our consideration, the doctrine that capital and land really belong to those who use them, that rent and inheritance and interest upon capital are unjust, and that no man should have anything but what he earns by actual labor. We need not discuss whether this really is an implication of Christianity, or a rational ideal, or practicable at the present stage of human development. It is enough to point out that it was a passionate conviction of Tolstoy's, which permeated his later writings. Moreover, since such a doctrine naturally appeals to the dispossessed classes, who in the Russia of the Czars formed the great bulk of the population, since it is in close harmony with the serious, naive idealism of the Russian masses, and since Tolstoy, more than any other man, is their idol and the spokesman of their aspirations, one can be sure *a priori* that this doctrine is very widespread in Russia to-day.

If so, one cannot but suspect that the Bolshevist Government is not so alien to the real Russian will as our military intervention implies. For its decrees, and the constitution which it has drawn up for the Soviet Republic, clearly center about just this principle of economic equality. To be sure, the Bolsheviki have resorted to force (reluctantly, they say) to maintain what they declare is really the popular will against its enemies. To be sure, they are mostly rather naive and ignorant men, more naive and ignorant than we who live in a land of universal education can easily imagine. They are desperately afraid of intervention from without and reaction, or chaos, within. They are bound, in such a situation, experimenting as they are with a tremendous alteration of their economic life, to make all sorts of blunders. The industrial life of Russia was wrecked, anyway, by the war; the people have long been at the point of starvation. Even if the other nations

helped instead of hindered, their attempt at realizing their ideal would be attended by enormous, perhaps insuperable, difficulties. But if their government does represent a genuine ideal, the ideal of millions of Russians, and is not merely the tyranny of a clique of blackguards over unwilling but helpless masses, are we justified in hindering? Is not "hands off," at the very least, our duty? If the experiment fails, at least its failure will not be upon our conscience.

Can we then, it will be said, sit by and countenance the wholesale confiscation of property, the annulling of so many vested privileges? The dispossessed upper classes, who have suffered much, are frantically appealing to us for aid. But we must remember that the upper class in Russia was a very small fraction of the population. "Proletarian rule" in Russia means the rule of nine-tenths or more of the people. If this is class rule, well and good; but it is well to remember that the small dispossessed class was to a large extent an idle class, honeycombed with vice, supporting the tyrannical rule of the Czar, and living in luxury on the labor of the peasants and workingmen. Moreover, all they have to do to join the "proletariat," and have their vote, is to work.

That there has been much graft and looting in the process of transition, is, in view of the chaotic condition of the country after the war, inevitable. Passions were let loose by the war and by the revolution. Much has happened that no one would condone. But to attempt to suppress the radical movement is precisely to fan the flames of passion and to increase the resentments and sense of injustice that are largely responsible therefor. We must not forget that the old order was based upon oppression and an almost incredible inhumanity. The wonder is that the dawn of liberty for Russia has not been a bloodier dawn.

Many of us will feel that the radicalism of the Russian revolution is due to its long suppression. The craving for liberty and equality, released at last, has gone to extremes which the experience of time will temper. It is an example, on a nation-wide scale, of a Freudian suppressed impulse.

Others, of more radical outlook, will feel that this social revolution is nothing but an application of Christianity to the economic sphere, and that if it could be given a fair trial, it would prove one of the most hopeful experiments in the world to-day.

In either case, since the Bolsheviks propose to allow the ultimate decision to rest with the voters, *i.e.*, with all men and women of age who will work, is it not their right to make whatever experiments, prohibitions, confiscations, they will? Our contemporary decision in America to enforce prohibition of alcoholic liquors, against the wishes and convictions of a very large proportion of our population, and to the financial loss of the class whose business is practically confiscated, should make us hesitate in condemning the right of another people to enforce *their* ideal, even if it be against the wishes and convictions of a large section of their population, and involve confiscation of the property of a class who, *they* feel, deserve no more consideration than we have accorded the brewers.

This much, at least, is clear to the student of Tolstoy. The ideal of the Bolsheviks is a genuine ideal, not a mere mask for cupidity and love of power. To the degree in which it follows the ideal of Tolstoy, it undoubtedly has a deep hold upon the Russian soul. Not only, then, should we in consistency refrain from reprobating in Lenin what we admire in Tolstoy, but even if we repudiate utterly the Tolstoyan ideal, we should treat it with the deference due to the genius of so great a man, and not speak of the attempt to realize it in the bitter terms which are usually employed, outside of a small group of liberal journals, in the press discussions of the Western nations.

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## HAVING RIGHT AND BEING RIGHT.

JULIET EVERTS ROBB.

**I**S it obliquity of moral vision or is it only clumsiness of tongue that leads us to confound two so different concepts as those which lie behind our expressions "*having a right*" and "*being right?*" The Frenchman, with his more delicate and accurate linguistic instrument, feels a strong distinction between "*J'ai le droit*" and "*J'ai raison*," and knows how infinitely more important is "*raison*" than "*droit*." A large and growing contingent of English-speaking men and women are eliminating the higher moral meaning from the word "*right*" and using it only to denote privilege or defiance. Defense of the right of the individual to do with his life what he will, scorn of the idea that conduct is bound up with the past and with the future, or correlated with anything distinguishable from self, is widely prevalent. Especially is there demand for the repeal of all sex restrictions. "I have the right even to bear a child,—and no questions asked," says the unmarried woman. "I have the right to be childless for any reason that may seem good to me, or for no reason but that I choose it so," says the married egoist, male or female. Always the statement, "*I have a right*"—never the question, "*Am I right?*" Modern fiction and drama are seething with this septic ferment; and one has only to be a bit of a sensitive to register its coursing through the veins of society:

The trained nurse attending a friend of my sister was asked by a young lady for instruction in some method of birth-control. Quite frankly she said, "I have as much right to sex-enjoyment as any married woman, but, of course, I must not have children."

A maiden confided to a friend of mine that she longed intensely for a child and thought she had every right to bear one. My friend, who is too sympathetic to deny anything greatly wished for, agreed with her and advised

carrying out the idea. She saw no wrong in the principle of the thing.

Among my more or less near acquaintances are two men who have, each, after marrying and begetting children by one woman, become enamoured of another. In each case the wife has been forced to divorce the husband in order that he might—respectably—marry her successor. His children were left with their mother. These men are unconscious of offense: they do not know that mothers should not be required or allowed to rear their children alone: to them children are a mere incident—a sort of imposition which their wives put upon them and of which a grant of money clearly rids them.

Not long ago, after heated discourse to the effect that all social ills were due to legal marriage and marriage customs, a woman of better than average intelligence said to me, "The oftener the marriage law is flouted the sooner it will be done away with." (As who should say, "If enough people got roaring drunk at once there would be no more liquor regulation and everything would be thoroughly joyful.")

Of the many childless wives whom I know one has refused motherhood because of unwillingness to endure physical pain; another, a star in the theatrical firmament when I was young, because of the superior claim of her career. Once, in her early wedded life, this woman, by accident, became pregnant. The infant was still-born. I never heard her mention it, but her actor husband bewailed the loss of two weeks and a sum of money.

Curious persons who inquire in certain circles who and what Sylvia is are told that she is this or that by occupation and that she "lives with" Urban, or that she used to "live with" Urban but is now "living with" Astro. It is never said that she is the mistress of Urban or of Astro—that would imply that she had sold herself for money. Of this Sylvia is incapable. The people who "live together" form a pact of equals on a basis of mutual passion or congenial tastes. Either is free to leave it at the first moment of dislike.

And now comes a professor of philosophy to say, on the pages of *THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*<sup>1</sup>, that "marriage is an end in itself." Here is another equivocation. What the professor really says is that sex intercourse, purified and perfumed by fastidiousness, is an end in itself. He treats it very gracefully as "a personal intimacy of a unique and precious kind" "replete with significance" and "making a rich contribution to the content of life," which having been "found desirable" should be "cultivated and extended." This in a paper on birth-control which is what the physicians in the hospitals for insane call the "exciting cause" of the present article. The advocate of the further cultivation and extension of the sex-relation would undoubtedly accord it the honor which a public avowal of intention implies, but his context shows that it is not marriage which he holds to be an end in itself. Marriage, in its universally accepted sense, is nothing if not a means. It is a safeguard to wife and child and has no other significance. To say that marriage—meaning the sex-relation—is an end in itself is to join hands with Urban and Sylvia.

Each of the individuals cited is the type of a group and these groups, differing somewhat in ultimate objects and in details of procedure, have in common the belief that in all that has to do with sex every human is a law unto himself. In a way one must agree with them. Every man *has* a right, in the sense in which they claim right, to be a criminal or a fool, or anything else that appeals to him—but *are* they right?

To be right is to be in harmony with that force, not ourselves yet inseparable from ourselves, by which we live even while we dispute its dictates. Human speech about this power must, necessarily, be figurative. Let it be clearly understood that the use of a name for it, printed with lower case or capital, is solely for purposes of easier diction. The superstitious ancients called the unknown power fate; the devout endow it with infallibility, but with human

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<sup>1</sup> Birth-Control, by Warren Fite. This paper appeared in October, 1916, but rankles still in my memory. J. E. R.

partiality, and call it God; the skeptical treat it with an assumption of patronage and call it nature. Since we must have a name, this seems the best to me, because it suggests neither a senseless automatism nor a blinding halo; but Nature, even thus personified, does not present to my mind a person, but a force, indefinable but integrally a part of consciousness. Commenting on the use of the word Nature as a philosophic term Dr. Tufts says, "The point is that you can prove almost anything from 'nature' and it is the distinctive characteristic of moral conduct not to accept standards from nature or from any other source but to weigh and measure and finally set up standards on the basis of intelligent choice." But if you can prove anything by nature you can also justify anything by choice. And what is the criterion of the intelligence of a choice? We can neither weigh nor measure without a previously fixed standard. To what can the choices of men be referred for judgment as to their intelligence if not to this something that is not themselves? Nature may not be synonymous with right, but what we know of Nature's ideals is certainly all that we know of right. Many things, indeed, may be proved—or seem to be proved—from Nature, but not the one thing that would put an end to this discussion. It cannot be proved that the universe is dead. There is, incontrovertibly, an incessantly functioning force to which opposition and hindrance and delay are as atmospheric friction to the meteor, imparting brilliance,—a force which, like the hope of Prometheus, "creates out of its own wreck the thing it contemplates." To aid this contemplated thing—so far as possible to prevent wreckage—this is, surely, the part of wisdom. Permit me then, as the easiest way of expressing my thought, to say that to be right is to be in harmony with Nature.

Be it admitted that the ways of Nature are mysterious, that she seems, oftentimes, a devious and a stumbling guide. She has, in the past, insistently impelled her humans to promiscuity; at this hour she is leading them just a little beyond polygamy—simultaneous polygamy, that is; con-

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secutive polygamy is still *quite* "good form"—but through the ages of ages she has held to *one* unmistakable and unchanging purpose: to bring forth a man able to balance justly and to choose wisely among her permissions—for Nature has no decalogue, only conditioned possibilities—and so to perfect himself. Why she should wish to do this, why she follows her incomprehensible methods, we may not and we need not know. The answer to all our whys is simply, "It is so." When humanity shall have reached more nearly that perfection, perhaps—but that is another matter. Here and now we are occupied with what we can clearly see of Nature's design.

For this purpose sex was evolved and the potency of its spell is not a generous contribution to the jocundity of life but the measure of the determination not to be thwarted. There must be new being and ever new being. *Save as they affect her aims* Nature cares not at all for Sylvia's attachment to Urban or to Astro, or whether their preferences in cigarettes or interior decoration or even in the higher forms of literature and art agree, or whether he supplies her or denies her the sensations she "cannot live without," or for her intensity of "temperament," or for his "wonderful talent" for something or other. None of these things is an object in itself. The revelations and creations of the fine arts, the discoveries and achievements of science, the assiduous cultivation of body and mind, everything that enhances the healthy zest of life, is, of course, valuably contributive to the desired consummation: but this goal must never be lost from view. What Nature requires of Urban and Sylvia, of Jonathan and Maria, is children.

The regulation of productivity in accordance with other natural tendencies, physical and social, is unquestionably advisable—the prolificacy of earlier periods being no longer necessary—but this must be done in consultation, as it were, with Nature; as we prune and clip and feed and train our garden plants in order to obtain the finest, rather than the fullest, bloom. This is not rebellion against but

alliance with Nature. Entirely to circumvent her design is to defeat our own most selfish ends, to fall short of fulfilment, to reduce our garden to colorless, perfumeless, fruitless failure. We are at liberty to do this. We may choose among various lines of conduct, in ignorance or in despite of Nature's conditions, or in awareness and in harmony with them: and we experience the inevitable consequences. The conditions are unappealable.

Dr. Fite says, in his interesting but very depressing paper (depression may be an "exciting cause"), "But I hold that the ways of Nature are authoritative for men only so far as they commend themselves to human intelligence in the satisfaction of humanly appreciable needs. . . . So far as the ways of Nature can be comprehended by us, it is both our right and our duty, as intelligent beings, to control them for our own uses."

But if our own uses be not also Nature's uses they are futile. Man has, indeed, outgrown the estate of a mere biological specimen; he has been admitted to confidence and to partnership with Nature. It is within his power to increase or to squander the firm's capital. If he waste his share he will be cast out and the business will go on without him. Nature must carry on: If we leave her only the Hun and the Bolshevik as material, why, so much the worse for us.

There is a test for all social theories and propositions: "Is this in line with Nature's effort; will it bring weal to the future generations?" Everything else is relative and transitory. Nothing else, though it may cover, for the moment, the visible earth and sky, is of any intrinsic or permanent importance. Dr. Fite says, again, "The social argument for fruitfulness and multiplication rests, in the last analysis, not upon the needs of a self-conscious humanity, but upon the external demands of a personified Nature:" to which it must be replied that only to a very superficially conscious humanity can the demands of Nature seem external.

What answer to these demands is made by those, for

instance, who would abolish marriage? The free-unions are, almost always, intentionally childless. A child requires thought and care that might be spent in the pursuit of some dazzling will-o'-the-wisp. A child makes it more difficult to shift companionship with changing mood. The "liberated" ones, who claim obedience to the natural while contemning the social law, follow Nature while she beckons with alluring gesture and honeyed smile, but when she takes them by the hand to lead them over a bit of rugged road they draw back. They are by no means all gross voluptuaries, but they are all frank egoists. "I must live my own life" is their motto, and "my own life" means, in their mouths, unqualified self-indulgence. Their ideals are sensuous dreams. They see with the eyes of the body, not of the mind. Clear vision does not derive from dreams, but from active exercise in waking realities—as the creative brain is nourished not by alcohol but by bread.

What answer is being made by the woman who asserts that motherhood is honorable under any circumstances, who desires maternity but protests against the imposition of a ceremony—a "patter of words"—and the fetters of wifedom as the *sine qua non* of respectability? Society, she declares, is mistaken in supposing that a woman who gives birth to an unauthorized child is, necessarily, of coarse appetites and loose morality—ignoring the wide distance between the mother by unwelcome accident and the mother by her own volition. These women might seem to balance, were they given their way, the shirkers of maternity: but consider, for a moment, this latter-day proclamation of "woman's rights." Unmarried maternity involves, always, secrecy as to the child's father. Men do not willingly acknowledge illegitimate children. Their fierce sense of private ownership drives them to exact that their acknowledged offspring be mothered by their legal wives. A man can not be sure that the child of his paramour is also his. Speeches are being made, short stories and long novels are being written, to sustain the doctrine

that a woman's will to maternity is authority enough and that the name of her infant's father concerns no one, not even the child. Mothers by their own election, it is said, are good mothers. So they may be, within the limits of their feminine capacities, but they are only partially conforming with Nature, since they are blind to the interest of the child whom they, not being wives, bring into the world unfathered.

A boy who does not know his father intimately, who does not feel that he is a precious care and a fond hope to his father, is injured, no matter how devoted a mother he may have. The girl who is exclusively mother-bred loses something essential—close acquaintance with a masculine mind, love and respect for mental maleness with no tincture of the sexual. There prevails a crippling lack of appreciation of the extent to which the absence of paternal influence is deleterious to children. Even in homes where they are more or less warmly welcomed they are, usually, 99 per cent the mother's. They are reared, from the cradle to the college, by women, and the girls are, for the most part, woman-taught in college. This is a double mistake: it deprives the fathers and defrauds the children.

If such a condition is found, even in the family, what of the progenitor of the half-orphan whose mother is unmarried? When I asked my friend who was carried away by the idea that motherhood needs no official sanction, but is self-justified, if she were willing to lend her husband for the project, she cried out, "O, no!" But the father of the little one would be some one's man—or he would be a free man who should stand, unless he were a contemptible coward, openly and gladly and sustainingly, beside the mother of his child.

And what of the child? We are always left, by the story-tellers, with these chance-conceived infants, who are to exalt unwedded maternity, in their rosy, dimpling babyhood: we are not allowed to follow them to adolescence and then to look into their tormented minds. When the son of the unringed mother begins to question, will she tell him

the truth? Will she say, "I wanted a baby for my enjoyment: that should be enough for you: your father had his pleasure of me and we parted; you may look forward to the same privilege: so to deal with women is the meaning of manhood?" They do not so express themselves in the stories: they put on rings and call themselves widows.

Yet the defense by the unmarried woman of the right to bear is, in a way, a hopeful thing. It is the half-smothered protest of Nature against the "civilization" that threatens to neutralize even her magic of love. It is enheartening because it shows a savable vitality; it is pathetic because its demands are so short-sighted.

Indisputably there must be marriage—public, purposeful, legal. That stage of evolution is not yet in sight when the future of the race can be trusted to instinct or to enlightened principle. The element of chance is far too preponderant in our reproduction, as it is.

But why should I, who am of the present, trouble myself about the future of the race? Did the preceeding generations take thought for me? No. Yet behold the great and glorious creature that I am! Dr. Fite is not satisfied with any answer he can give himself to this kind of questioning. He says, "If the civilization of the future is to be merely a repetition of what it has come to now—and some wise persons tell us that it will never be different—then it seems to me clearly better that the race should not go on. . . . In any case it should be clear that a life process which consists only in a series of sacrifices—the present generation sacrificing itself for the next, and so on *ad infinitum*—is an absurd conclusion for a race of supposedly rational beings." So it is; but the absurdity lies not in the relation of one generation to the next—essential, unavoidable, not subject to human criticism—but in the use of the word "sacrifice." The situation calls for a stirring word like "realization." "Manhood begins when we have in any way made truce with Necessity: begins, even, when we have surrendered to Necessity, as the most part only do: but begins joyfully and hopefully

only when we have reconciled ourselves to Necessity and thus, in reality, triumphed over it and felt that in Necessity we are free."<sup>1</sup> To deny the authority of Nature is not rational: as well seek to annul the motherhood of the woman who bore us: and Nature's decree, written in long pages of physical and social history, is Many more and always better children from the fit, fewer and much better children from the less fit—none at all only from the obviously unfit.

To remain, voluntarily, childless, to renounce the privilege and to refuse the responsibility of parenthood, for any reason but the altruistic one of unfitness, is to be not a quickening stream but a stagnant pool. No man, no woman, can reach full spiritual stature without mating and natural fruition. No life that was ever lived was worth while for the mere living of it. It is safe to say that no man arrives at sixty years, crowded though his days may have been with activities and successes and pleasures, who does not realize, perhaps with astonishment, that there has crept into his heart the knowledge that nothing is really worth living for but the children—his own, if he be so blessed; those of his neighbors in the palaces and in the slums, if he have been denied. I have heard it said by an old physician of national reputation, the father of a large family. I have heard a childless man whose books are known in all the schools of America declare, "I would give any success I am capable of winning to have had a daughter." I have heard a worn out harlot, who had sold her potential motherhood to the devil, first for pleasure then for money, lament in her age, "If only I had a child!" I have heard a well-beloved actress say to one of her company who marvelled at her enthusiasm, which never failed, even before a thin and unintelligent audience, "The public long ago lost all meaning to me. I play, always, for my children." Dr. Fite gives a half-hearted assent to this thought. He holds children to be "a source of intelligent

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<sup>1</sup> Carlyle.

satisfaction and an enrichment of personal life." No more than only this? With such a statement, save that I should greatly enlarge and intensify it, and with his advocacy of birth-control, but from a different view-point, I am in agreement. Most of what he says in great primer, as it were, I should say, if I said it at all, in nonpareil, and the thoughts which he accords a pale bourgeois I should utter in great primer. The idea that race-improvement is a distant thing with which we, in this present life, have no concern has surely been put to silence in these last four years. It has taken the rest of the world merely to check the one civilized nation which breeds conscientiously.

There is, however, more than a grain of justice in the indictment of our marriage customs by the feminists. Does any known ceremony denote the real object of marriage and bind to its promotive conditions? No and no. It is not enough to make the best of marriage—we should make our marriage the best. Legal marriage means exclusive sex-rights conferred by the woman in exchange for certain immunities. The man places himself under obligation to furnish her with shelter, food, clothing, amusement; to protect her reputation; to be responsible for her in every way; to value, moreover, her flesh so highly that he shall be forever satisfied therewith, no matter how greatly its charm may vary or diminish. She promises to be always responsive to him and cold to every other male. These crudities are overlaid with religious sentiment and romantic illusion, but, since the earliest record, this has been the intent of the contract, and the law, in this latest year of our Lord, still treats marriage as paid-for sex-monopoly. The one unfailing ground for divorce—in New York the only ground—is "infidelity," and everywhere the husband must support his wife whatever she may be or become—a spendthrift, a slattern, a shrew, a maniac. So long as he cannot prove that she is guilty of adultery he is liable for all her expenses. If she divorce him he must still pay, even if she marry a second husband, unless she

waive her claim. He pays her for being his wife and for having been his wife, sometimes for having merely promised to be his wife, or for having thought that he meant to make her his wife. This is placing too high a premium on the carnal in woman.

Our civil and religious ceremonies, alike, bind the contracting parties for life and exact a promise to love each other so long as they both shall live. Instead of any inquiry into motives or qualifications the man and woman, who may have been brought together by animal appetite or by ambition or greed, or even by despair, are bidden to promise that they will love each other forever. How can any human being, even in the ecstasy of a first passion—perhaps especially such a one—promise to love? The verb “to love” is defective: it has but two tenses—the present and the past. “I shall love?” Impossible! Still more so, “I *will* love.” To swear it is perjury. One could as reliably promise that all the fruits of the union should be green-eyed girls. Love does last through long lives, but not because it was promised.

As to the religious aspect of marriage: the end held before the bride and groom by the episcopal rite, which is typical, is the attainment of eternal life for themselves, not the creation of new life; and they promise to serve each other, not to give the best that is theirs by inheritance and the best that may become theirs by earnest endeavor to the bearing and rearing of a family. Now personal immortality concerns the individual as an individual—it has nothing to do with marriage, nor has marriage with it.

If personal gratification and “cherishing” were, as is so generally believed, the object of marriage, there would be, truly, no call for public vows. Save for the well-being of their children and, under present conditions, the financial support of the wife, why should society care whether two were together or apart? Inherent in every legal enactment is the protection of the child—most especially in all sex legislation. Why not do, consciously and deliberately, and therefore much more thoroughly and expeditiously,



that which we are really doing, under natural compulsion, but blindly and imperfectly and, often, painfully?

In the nuptial vows should be embodied the intention of parenthood, which involves the determination to remain together, in spite of whatever disappointment or dissatisfaction, with mutual willingness to adjust and compromise, until the children attain self-dependence. It may be said, with some reason, that the covenant to "live together after God's holy ordinance" implies the bearing of children; but the words are not definitive enough. They are understood as a recommendation to sex-fidelity, not to procreation. For some unfathomable reason the first is thought to be a proper exhortation while the second would offend a bride of to-day—let us hope not one of to-morrow.

Mothers and sisters and friends consult, endlessly and rapturously, with the prospective bride as to her trousseau, but how often is there premarital consideration of the girl's equipment for motherhood? We have, happily, passed the day when the very idea of sex lay, even between mother and daughter, as a kind of shameful secret: the young woman who consents to marriage knows what she is going to, but the natural result is comparatively unimportant. When her choice of a husband is announced to her parents they do not ask, "Is he sound and sane and magnanimous? Is it probable that his children will be worthy members of the human family?" Their questions are, instead, "Do you love him? Will he make you happy? Can he support you?" The prospective groom is more than likely to receive only felicitations on the prettiness and charm of his fiancée. The word "eugenics" floats about in the air from time to time, but it has never taken hold of people's minds. It excites ridicule rather than respect—and yet in it lies salvation. Our professor of philosophy says, "We call it prostitution to sacrifice the personal choice for pecuniary gain; from the personal standpoint, biology aside, it seems not less prostitution when the end is the propagation of the species. Certainly a proposal of marriage in these disinterested terms would seem horrible and grotesque." But

biology cannot be set aside; call it what we will, the end is the propagation of the species; and with the added consideration of children personal choice, so far from being eliminated, becomes infinitely more precious and honorable. In any woman worthy to be chosen "I love and trust you—Will you be my wife and the mother of my sons and daughters?—I am sure that you will be a joy to me and a blessing to them" would certainly waken as glad response as the pleadings of hungry passion and the protestations of impossible devotion which have become conventional. To Isaac and Rebekah marriage meant a long line of inheritors of qualities and faiths and principles; to Reginald and Millicent it means only—each other.

This is the logical outcome of our purblind worship of "love." The apotheosis of sex-love is one of humanity's gravest errors. Sex-love is a tricky sprite, a conjuror, not a deity. There is a god named Love at whose altar he who serves may gain supernal wisdom and boundless joy, but the best of us have wasted the time gathering posies and playing together outside instead of entering his temple; if we have passed within the doors we have mistaken the vestibule for the holy of holies: the worst of us have never even approached the sacred grove, but, in the stolen and dishonored name of love, have built altars to our senses and tended them with ill-omened rites.

Passion for passion's sake has always figured predominantly in poetry, drama and fiction. Formerly a thin veil of sweetness and delicacy was thrown about it: now that speech has violated the old prohibitions and found itself unrebuked the baseness of the common concept of love is daily revealed. The present tendency in literature, if not yet in conversation, is to glorify nakedness and abandoned sensuality. In a measure this is prophetic of health—like the draining of a sore—but literature has gone far too far in the development of its favorite theme. "Love is enough" is a pernicious falsehood. That he or she has "loved much" is not sufficient excuse for any and every dereliction, as it has been, in the code of the scribbler, for

so long. Nothing more alarmingly betrays mental and moral disorder than the renunciation of self-control which the modernists are at pains to depict as a splendid movement toward liberty.

It is time that mankind should *begin to try* to grow above sexuality—to rule and use it, instead of being driven by it. For one who follows the novelists and dramatists and the reports in the daily press of idiotic and sinful marriages and foolish or scandalous divorces, it is hard to hope that human creatures will ever be able to restrain themselves within the bonds of reason and health—but it is only a matter of conviction. Man has disciplined other natural impulses. He no longer attacks the stranger who approaches him; he no longer eats whenever his eye lights upon food—because he has discovered that personal happiness is enhanced by fraternal relations with his fellows and by temperance in diet. In this other matter we are not only individually self-indulgent to an unsafe degree, we are a generation of panders; if not through deliberate action at least through toleration. By every public and shameless means, by licentiousness pictured on bill-boards and “movie” screens and enacted in theaters, by over-emphasized passion in the greater number of stories, by our dress, by an almost universal sympathy—ranging from jocose to sentimental—with any excess that calls itself “love,” we keep the consciousness of sex poignantly alive in our young people—often to the exclusion of everything else.

And we do next to nothing to counteract these influences. In the schools the young are trained to mechanical efficiency, something of patriotism and something of civic spirit is recommended: on the subject of parenthood the faculties are mute. Mere prohibition is never effective, warning is wasted breath: unless we cultivate the sentiment of fatherhood and motherhood, unless we make the better thing seem the more delightful thing, we labor in vain. We must make the greater need “humanly appreciable”; there is no urgency about the “cultivation and extension” of the lesser. The profitable use and enjoyment of love is a mat-

ter of slow education and, therefore, the immediate affair of all teachers, public and private; very particularly of authors, editors, playwrights and preachers—and, with them, of each one of us who compose the public which they address.

We must open the eyes of our young people, not to pathological horrors—that is not helpful teaching—but to the true and beautiful significance of love as the means to a noble and joyous end. Under good conditions love is a fragrant blossom, the precursor of delectable fruit: we are letting it degenerate into a noxious weed. There is a strong movement toward what is termed “enlightenment” of the young, but so far as I have observed it is followed by increase of darkness. Such light is too lurid to reveal truth. Can we not make youth to know—rightly? It is most apt in learning so much of the subject as is profitless—or worse. We must bind the young to life by strong realities, instead of letting them drift and blunder about in the mists of imagination, goaded by pangs which we take pains to sharpen for them. We should help them to think and to act as human beings—not merely as possible “lovers”—foster in them not the sickly, emotional self-consciousness that drools, “I live for love, I live for love, I live for love, for love I die”—but the spirit that sings, “And when Italy’s made, for what end is it done if we have not a son?”

When only the generations so reared survive there will be a different marriage vow and better conditions of wedded life. Not all will be parents, perhaps, but those who are not will think of childlessness as a misfortune. Women will realize anew the old truth, which the daughters of to-day, preoccupied with their extraordinary achievements in hitherto untried fields, appear to have forgotten: that there is nothing in this world braver or finer or more romantic than motherhood. There will be no unmarried mothers because all women will know that, while every woman has, theoretically, the right to motherhood, no woman is right who bears a child under any but the best auspices for the

child, and that these include the support and personal influence of a father: because, moreover, all men will know that he who is not the agent of progress becomes a cause of retrogression—that he who avoids fatherhood for the sake of his own ease and pleasure is like a track athlete whom conceit of his excellent body has made mad and whose silly feet lift him up and down, up and down, but never carry him forward, and who finally falls, to become dust under the feet of more faithful runners.

There is no danger of killing glamour and making life a sandy desert. Nature will see to it that her witchery does not go stale. Being right does not imply a neutral submission to sodden duty and the death of personal ambition—a cold, gray selflessness. On the contrary, it means an irresistible reason for the utmost possible acquirement of knowledge and power and the most assiduous cultivation of gifts. It means an infinite, elastic expansion instead of a hard and brittle intensification of happiness; not the “sacrifice” of each generation to the next and so on forevermore, but the possession by each generation not only of its own experience but of all the eternities.

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NEW YORK.

## THE UTILITY OF PAIN.

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**T**HE word pain has an ugly sound—ugly not because of its onomatopoeic effect, but because of its associations,—sickness, disease, death and suffering. It is used synonymously with misery and unhappiness. Mediæval Christianity and Stoicism were inclined to over-rate its value. Perhaps sometimes the prevailing Hedonic attitude to life makes us under-rate it. The war is teaching many people that it has its value, but there is no doubt that the lesson, though consoling, is in many instances false. The proverbial fox comforts himself by the reflection that the grapes are sour, but if he reached the grapes and found them really rather sour, he would be sure to say they were better for him so. Similarly the Christian comforts himself by reflecting (in Nietzsche's cutting phraseology) that the "best whipped dogs are the best loved." Others find consolation in the Leibnizian hypothesis of evil as necessary in the scheme of things, they don't quite see how. From a scientific point of view, this hypothesis has not a leg to stand upon. All Nature is against the puny creature we call man, and it is by combination and co-operation that he can to a certain extent claim to be conqueror. Let a fire, a flood, an earthquake come and she asserts her old supremacy, and "red in tooth and claw," destroys where she cannot tame.

It is however in this very struggle for existence that values are evolved. That is good which is conducive to the well-being of the subject; that is evil which is hurtful or harmful. The world is divided into two great classes, good and bad, which from a biological point of view mean pleasurable or painful. This classification thus forms not only the basis of the biological law—"struggle for existence" and survival of the fittest—but of morality (in creation of values) and of those widely divergent types of emotion

which may be reduced to two primary ones, positive and negative self-feeling. These two primal experiences, the out-come of biological needs, are the foundation of all psychology. Touch and specialized touch of the other senses developed according to these experiences in the primitive organism and because of them. The movements away-from and to-towards, (the outward and visible signs of these experiences) were the foundation of instincts and on instincts is built intelligence. Thus everything rests back on feeling. It is the beginning of all mental life, and the foundation upon which it rests. In human consciousness it is the background out of which the different types of mental experiences step to the fore and to which they finally return. Our attention may be fixed on the fore-ground and the back-ground be unnoticed, but it exists all the same and any outside influence, which changes the rhythmic and habitual way in which different processes step in and out, projects the back-ground forward like an avalanche, disturbing completely the actors in the fore-ground and smashing their scenery to smithereens. Then we say we experience an emotion. Metaphors apart, however, the emotion is only an increase in bodily experiences (so-called organic and kinæsthetic sensations) which as a rule are unnoticed. The two classes are always able to be distinguished. Under negative self-feeling come fear, disgust, aversion, etc., and under positive self-feeling come curiosity, desire to seek food, desire to seek a mate, pugnacity, etc. Speaking broadly, it seems as if positive self-feeling, the useful, the happy, the good were one, "the life preserving tendency;" and negative self-feeling, the harmful, the unhappy, the bad were one, "the life destroying tendency." But if the survival of the fittest be a true conception of the natural world and of the primal needs of man's nature, why should negative self-feeling exist in us at all? The only answer is that the negative side has a certain amount of biological value too. The deer exists as well as the lion because negative self-feeling (in this case fear) made it fleet-footed in running away from the more muscular

animals. Man exists partly because of his negative self-feeling. In his ape-like ancestors this was exhibited largely in quickness of movement in climbing away from an adversary-in fear, in fact. It was this very fear that made them herd themselves together. Under this new influence of the group-stimulus negative self-feeling became more than fear from an outside foe. It became fear of the leader, gradually turning to respect. Respect is a complex largely consisting of fear, with a slight admixture of positive self-feeling increasing in awe, admiration, and worship. Thus it comes about that the anti-social tendencies are those that arise from positive self-feeling, happiness, and aggressive instincts. "Make people happy and you make them good" cry the Hedonists and this is true to a certain extent. Nature demands also that positive self-feeling shall be predominant otherwise the "Will to live" would die utterly and the race end, but Society demands also that negative self-feeling shall be present. It is the basis of authority and law. Why do the new-comers at the door of a pit march cheerfully down to the end of the queue, although no punishment would follow if they stood near the door ready to rush in when it opened? No punishment, did I say? Nothing but the disapproval of the group already assembled, symbol of the social pressure upon individuals. Yet after all is not this the greatest punishment? Suppose some uninitiated person comes along and stands at the door, looks and whispered comments will soon make him uncomfortable enough to beat a hasty retreat. The shrinking, run-away, negative feeling certainly has its uses in Society. In the case of children and criminals, who are supposed to lack these finer feelings of what the group is thinking of them, recourse is had to more physical forms of punishment, actual inflictions of bodily pain, or the restraining of ordinary bodily activities in a prison.

Punishment, says Hegel, is a compliment to a man. It shows him he is a creature Society thinks worth while trying to save for itself. It is a doubtful compliment, even were it true that punishment is looked upon as reformatory.



Too often it is the revenge of Society upon hapless individuals. It is no doubt true, that if humans are to be peaceable social animals, they must be prepared to give way a little. Their relations must be partly positive and partly negative, based partly on self-realization and partly on self-sacrifice. Society can therefore do nothing else than morally disapprove of aggression in any shape or form whether of nations, classes, or individuals.

To the psychologists and biologists who believe that positive self-feeling is only another name for happiness or pleasure, and negative self-feeling, for pain or unhappiness, it does not seem to have occurred that the doctrine has wide-spread moral significance from the Stoic as well as from the Hedonic point of view. Introspection and observation of the behavior of individuals show it clearly enough. What more ecstatic feeling than to be at the height of contentment with self, the conviction "I am just it and all the world knows it." Yet what is this but a joyous expansion of the self, a spreading out and round, a triumphant paeon of all the Me's in unison, a "Glory Song" and a "Hallelujah Chorus" rolled into one. Does society grudge such an individual its one moment of happiness? Why of course it does. It is even anti-social to acknowledge such feelings. After we have had such an experience of pleasure, Fate grimly stands behind, waiting her chance, and, at the most ecstatic moment descends with dreadful force upon the luckless individual. Pride comes before a fall. It is the turn of the social wheel. Another insect is crushed—not enough to die, but enough to feel and suffer. The metaphor expresses the shrinkage of the self to small proportions. Yet if the individual retains the "crushed-insect" form and attempts to crawl through life as such, Society has lost its use for him. To be a person is to have self-respect, *i.e.*, to possess a preponderance of positive as against negative self-feeling or at any rate enough balance between the two to provide for itself mentally and physically, and not to be a drag on society. After all vice is only quantitatively different from virtue. Take "virtuous

feelings" for instance. What difference is there between the consciousness of right-doing approved by the Shorter Catechism and the Pharisaical glow of positive self-feeling which expresses itself in the words "Thank God I am not as other men?" Only a difference in quantity, that is all, there is no qualitative difference.

Some emotional states are complexes in which both negative and positive self-feeling are present. This is so in the pugnacious emotion. It is a reaction to thwarting of some kind, and thwarting means repression by some external stimulus, and repression is the result of negative self-feeling. As a rebound against this however, the aggressive feelings spring to life. Pain then, in small doses is often the means of rousing latent energies which otherwise would be undisplayed. It is this mental pain or fear of the unknown that lends the thrill to adventure and sport. If bodily or mental pain is present the individual bears it as best he can; if it is not (and he is a virile personality) he seeks it out in adventure and sport. Yet on the other hand, it is often the people to whom pain is no stranger, that seek adventure more eagerly in the creative spheres of literature, poetry, art and philosophy than the healthy individuals who know no pain. It is difficult to determine from introspection and observation just how far pleasurable and painful stimuli affect the efficiency of the organism. It seems to me, now, that the very hardest tasks I have tackled and managed to finish somehow were those undertaken under the influence of painful stimuli. But it may be that the memory of these remains with me as the hardest just because they *were* painful and that I might have done as effective or more effective work under pleasurable stimuli. Once I learnt a language under the impetus of wounded pride; I learnt another during the period of great physical pain. After all physical pain is very little different from mental pain (unpleasant emotions) except that the former is more localized. Thus it has not the wide spread effects of the latter. It has the power (like the latter when extreme) to pass over into the tiny muscles and nerves all over the body

which thrills with the intensest agony. This is effected perhaps by some method of internal stimulation of nerve endings in skin and elsewhere.

Of the intense bodily pain and mental pain, the second affords perhaps the best stimulus to action. The pain of a bodily disability makes one feel inclined to take vigorous action, but, if the impulse is carried into effect, greater suffering follows. But in the case of mental pain the body responds to the new effect that is being put forth and at times the task, hateful though it be, becomes almost pleasant. Almost but not quite, almost because of its negative character. There is no real positive pleasure in it, but relatively it seems to approach it by affording for the moment a freedom from the old pain.

This experience alternates in periods in which aversion, anger and disgust at the self-imposed task play a prominent part. Only fear of worse emotions provides enough force to "stick it out" under these circumstances. Pain, chiefly mental, is a stimulus to perform tasks otherwise distasteful, because it affords a change of pain, from a greater to a lesser. Greater or lesser as regards pains is measured not in quantity alone. Pain is always diminished if it can find some outlet for action. The worst types of pain are those which afford no outlet for action-crushing, oppressing pains, like grief and misery. Pains such as these dull actions. It might be said that a small amount of pain stimulates action, in excessive amount dulls action. But here again it is not mere increase that counts. It depends somewhat on the character of the emotion. If it contains an admixture of positive self-feeling it more easily turns to action, than if it contains nothing but negative self-feeling. In anger, wounded pride, thwarted ambition or thwarted desires of any kind in fact, there is a certain amount of positive self-feeling, which provides a ready storage for active aggressive tendencies. In grief and misery there is no such storage. Grief passes out to the muscles as in physical pain and paralyses them. It paralyses also the mental functions. It is a veritable Slough of Despond

into which the victim having once fallen, struggles in vain to escape. Under these circumstances is it any wonder that sensitive people, suffering perhaps under some fancied slight, grow ill-tempered and suspicious of their fellow men? Anger is so much more pleasurable than misery. Therefore it is the natural tendency of the grieved person to be angry with something or someone than just merely to be grieved and crushed to the earth. Similarly love, if rejected, turns easily to hate. It is the Will to live, and Will to power asserting themselves. To be really crushed is to lose one's self-respect.

Pain, then, in spite of its disutility, has its value in life. The flowers plucked from the top of a precipice are always the sweetest just because of the thrill of danger experienced in the plucking. The happiest hours are those snatched from life at the risk of—and in spite of—many bitter hours. They serve by contrast to illuminate the happy ones into seventh heavens of delight. In spite of the gloom in the warp and woof of life it is shot through with crimson streaks which we poor mortals grasp at greedily, living for the hour, and forgetting the thick darkness before and behind. After all, if ugly things do happen, they are adventures on life's way. They give something to reflect on, to introspect, to probe into, something with problems to solve, something to be lived and felt, and suffered perhaps, still possessing an indefinable (and only vaguely felt at rare moments) fascination which is the stir of the vital force within us, the Spirit of Youth itself.

CATHARINE C. BRADDOCK.

NEW ZEALAND.

## BOOK REVIEWS.

**AUTHORITY IN THE MODERN STATE.** By Harold J. Laski. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919. Pp. x, 398. Price, \$3.50.

Like the author's *Problems of Sovereignty*, this volume consists of one introductory essay on systematic political theory, followed by several others on the history of political ideas. In this case the historical portion of the volume covers Bonald, Lamennais, Royer-Collard, with a concluding chapter on administrative syndicalism in France. Of the historical essays the most valuable is that which discusses the interesting evolution of the ideas of Lamennais. The syndicalist movement contains much that is of value to American students of administration and democracy. Both Bonald and Royer-Collard were parts of broad general movements, and could perhaps have been more effectively discussed in relation to the other thinkers who made up the schools of which they were parts, as well as with reference to the social and political forces which they were interpreting. Bonald is naturally associated with De Maistre whom Mr. Laski has already discussed, with Ludwig von Haller and the whole group of religious reactionaries of their day. Royer-Collard can very profitably be considered along with the compromising Cousin, with Guizot, with the famous Benjamin Constant and others of the mediating and moderating group struggling to find solid ground between the absolutism of the ancient régime and that of the Revolution.

The introductory chapter from which this volume takes its name is the prolegomena to a fuller discussion of the general theory of politics in a later volume. Naturally detailed comment upon this must await the mature development of the author's ideas. As thus far tentatively expounded, Mr. Laski's thesis is that "The fundamental problem of politics is not the description of the organs of authority, but the inquiry into their legitimacy." He urges the importance of the study of the somewhat neglected bills of rights, of natural rights, the principles of political obligation, the ethics—social ethics, perhaps—of politics.

Every political theorist has broken a lance with sovereignty. A notable early effort of the century was made by the French

philosophers, who preferred to substitute "justice" or "reason." Dr. Hugo Preuss, better known as draftsman of the new German constitution, made a redoubtable assault in his *Gemeinde, Staat, Reich als Gebietskörperschaften* in 1889. Dr. Preuss' substitute for the troublesome concept was *Herrschaft*. Mr. Laski is vehement in his attacks on what he sets up as the Austinian doctrine of absolute and unlimited sovereignty. The Austinian theory he holds is either a mere play upon words, or it has no vital relation to the actual forces that condition state action. Sovereignty, says Laski, depends "upon the consent of the members of the state for its effectiveness." Yet Austin's theory was that sovereignty was conditioned on the general habit of obedience by the bulk of the community, while Bentham held sovereignty to be *indefinite* but not *infinite*.

The specific limitations on sovereignty suggested by Mr. Laski are freedom of thought and conscience, which should not be liable to invasion by the sovereign state. Furthermore, no state can deny to its subjects the right of an elementary education without injustice. He also asserts that the most essential human needs must be put beyond reach of government (p. 101). But in the last analysis the individual is sovereign over himself and in general we must deny the validity of any sovereign power save that of "right" (p. 122).

But with sovereignty must go the unitary state, and for it must be substituted the multiple type—the multicellular. This is necessitated by the doctrine of "political pluralism" which the author defines as "The belief that while the state is responsible to itself, is a moral being from which self-judgment is expected, the nature of power demands also the retention of the safeguard that we, too, as beings with personality, are compelled not merely to passive reaction to its decisions, but to active registration of our dissent therefrom" (p. 308). The multiple state will break the shock of sovereignty by various forms and types of decentralization. Territorial decentralization will not be sufficient for this purpose. Industries organized in syndicalist form, separate branches of public administration, various ecclesiastical organizations—all must be linked together in a new form of federalistic union—a new type of state which the author does not discuss at this time. As Mr. Laski says of Bonald, detailed criticism of his ideas would be a useless task:—"What he represents is not a system, but an attitude."

On the whole, the volume, although unfortunately organized, is learnedly written with many a happily turned phrase and many a penetrating insight into the depths of politics. All students of government will be interested in the author's exploration of French political ideas, and in the fragmentary forecast of a fuller discussion of systematic political theory, grateful to the historical critic, more reserved as to the dogmatic philosopher.

CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM.

University of Chicago.

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**FAITH JUSTIFIED BY PROGRESS.** By Henry Wilkes Wright. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916. Pp. 287.

This book comprises the lectures delivered before Lake Forest College on the foundation of the late William Bross and was published as Volume VIII of the Bross Library.

The author characterizes his view in the Introduction as the new humanism, "a synthesis of critical idealism and pragmatism." In reading the book one may easily have the feeling that in the synthesis pragmatism is more in evidence in the account of the will and of the "Primitive" and "Natural" life, while idealism is employed more in describing the "Supernatural" and the "Universal" life and "The Future of Religion."

An interesting discussion of the will presents it in two phases. In one the will directs the movements of the physical organism it inhabits, fashioning tools and machines for the ends of personal satisfaction. In the other it chooses between different objects in accordance with their value as end. In the manifestation of will, even in a young child, thought, feeling, and action are present. The will is ever striving for a larger world and fuller life. Faith is the subjective experience of this outreaching impulse with the assurance of the possibility of its fulfillment.

In primitive life the range of the will was slight and feeling was dominant. In the succeeding stage, the "natural" life, the will was expressed in toil in field and shop, in the subjugation of animals and the construction of tools. But machines and social organization make possible more terrible and destructive wars, and other evils. "In this emergency, also, it is religious faith which gives man the courage to continue, the hardihood to endure."

This breakdown of the natural life did not destroy nor silence the will, but drove it to a new form of faith—faith in the super-

natural, and in otherworldliness. Christianity was welcomed by a world in which both Greek and Hebrew life despaired of the natural and took refuge in the thought of a celestial realm of pure Ideas and holy Angels. Medieval Christianity represented a developed system for the salvation of the depraved soul of man by supernatural grace according to a divine plan of redemption. Natural evils, like disease and famine, were only dealt with by an attempt to ignore them. There was no effort to understand them in any scientific way. The consequence was a heavy penalty of suffering and degradation. In the social sphere it was unable to establish justice and in reality became "the apologist for social injustice" by admonishing subject classes to be content with their lot.

Modern civilization may at first seem to be a relapse into naturalism but the author here invokes his Idealism, not without evidence of effort, to prove that it is quite beyond naturalism. The good which the will now seeks by faith is not merely an international society and its welfare but a universal ideal which demands "sacrifice of natural interest and individual ambition." Only religious faith can give the modern man courage to realize this universal life. The fundamental principles of Christianity constitute a religion such as is the only means of making the human will equal to its task. These principles concern the character of God, the belief in immortality, and the realization of a Spiritual Community.

The author makes an impressive statement of the function of natural religion in sustaining the faith of man in the enterprises projected and carried on by the will. He recognizes the extension of the same principle as a feature in modern religion, for example, in the triumphs of science over disease and famine and in the widening sphere of democracy and internationalism. From this standpoint he makes sound criticisms of medieval otherworldliness and mysticism. He recognizes that, "man's gods have been constructions of his imaginative intelligence, given objectivity by an effort of his own will." Immortality is conditioned by devotion to social ends, and the spiritual community is made up of all the saints who are living, together with those who are remembered or whose influence is felt.

Beyond this, the attempt to give further metaphysical reality or authority to modern religious faith does not seem entirely convincing. The author is not, therefore, quite able to conclude



that a religion of science and democracy is the final form of religion because it is consciously open to growth and to fuller spiritual values. Perhaps a firmer faith in the spiritual values of our growing social order would also have prevented even the suggestion in the last pages of a new development through communications from the other world as claimed by Sir Oliver Lodge.

The book is a clear, comprehensive, scholarly work, involving much labor and thought, and presented to the reader without the scaffolding and by-products of footnotes and references.

E. S. AMES.

University of Chicago.

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PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAMES EDWIN CREIGHTON.

By former Students. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917. \$2.00.

This volume consists of twenty-two essays in the fields of psychology, epistemology, religion, ethics, and the history of philosophy. Unlike "Personal Idealism," "The New Realism," and "Creative Intelligence," it is not a carefully planned effort in co-operative thinking, but the essays are separate and independent, held together mainly by the tie of personal allegiance to Professor Creighton as teacher. In spite, however, of certain discrepancies in principle as well as in detail, there is a thread of philosophical unity which runs through the greater part of the book. Most of the essayists adopt the general standpoint of the Critical Philosophy, and are critical rather than constructive. Along with an explicit appreciation of the work of other philosophical schools, there goes a fairly general agreement that Absolute Idealism is too transcendental, that Neo-Realism is without inner light and serves only to emancipate from the premises of traditional British dualism, and especially that Pragmatism and Instrumentalism are excessively biological, even excessively mechanical, in their viewpoint, and cannot consistently do justice to ethical and social values, or to the intellectual life in its higher reaches. On the constructive side, emphasis is laid upon the necessity of a new synthesis of voluntarism and intellectualism, and upon the importance of social, as well as of biological categories.

Considered as a whole, the importance of the book for the student of ethics is slight. Most of the essayists are interested chiefly in other fields of investigation, and come in contact with

ethics mainly in the form of polemical statements to the effect that writers who belong to other schools cannot do justice to ethical and social life. There are, however, two papers which deal more directly with subjects which call for the attention of the ethical student.

In "The Relation of Punishment to Disapprobation," Professor Th. de Laguna points out (1) that many important classes of adverse moral judgments seldom issue in punishment, *e.g.*, cowardice, intemperance, folly, and selfishness, and, to a lesser extent, lying, inhospitality, and neglect of parental duties. In the second place (2), when punishment is inflicted, it is not as a rule for the moral offense as such, but for insubordination of some sort, as when a soldier sleeps on his post, or when drunkenness leads to disorderliness. From this and similar evidence, the writer argues that punishment is not (as Westermarck believes) essentially an expression of moral disapprobation, but is a natural and inevitable concomitant of the principle of authority in social life, which again is bound up with the principle of social co-operation. He proceeds to apply this conclusion (1) to the origin and growth of the institution of punishment, and (2) to present-day ethics, maintaining that the primitive function of supporting authority is the only legitimate function of punishment, and that, while it is sometimes indispensable to this end, it is not always the best means, and is sometimes entirely useless. He finally indicates that a similar application of his conclusions to moral approbation can be made.

The paper is highly original, and, as a contribution to our understanding of the origin and growth of the moral sentiments, important. But the contention that punishment at the present day should be restricted to maintaining authority, *i.e.*, to supporting the principle of social co-operation—while interesting and suggestive, is not logically compelling. Surely, the proper uses of punishment, as of other social institutions, can be established only by actual experiment, and not by reference to a history of origins.

In "Freedom as an Ethical Postulate" by Professor R. A. Tsanoff, Kant's tendency to treat "freedom" from a non-empirical viewpoint is regarded as a relic of theological dogmatism, and the Kantian issue is declared to be an anachronism. The real task of ethical science is stated to be, to analyze the concepts of praise and blame, responsibility and the implications of conduct-

evaluation, in whatever fields these are actually applied, without forcing issues which are in no sense ethical.

The greater part of this essay is taken up with the criticism of Kant—a criticism in the main correct, but, in view of all that has already been written upon the subject, somewhat indeterminate. The constructive portion is a mere sketch, the outlines of which, though doubtless sound enough, are, in the essay, matters of unsupported assertion.

The remaining papers, as already stated, only touch incidentally upon subjects of direct ethical significance.

R. C. LODGE.

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**STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS.** By Members of the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University. New York: Columbia University Press, 1918. Pp. 272.

The authors of these studies say that the volume expresses their desire to encourage research and the exercise of historical imagination and to contribute something to the work being done in this department of human interest.

The table of contents shows thirteen essays. In traditional terminology four of the essays would be called 'metaphysical,' three 'logical,' and three 'politico-ethical.' A note on "Dr. Thomas Brown's contribution to Aesthetics" "by Mr. Jones, a paper on "Francis Bacon and the History of Philosophy" by Mr. Coss, and a discriminating study by Mr. Balz of "The Psychology of Ideas in Hobbes" complete the list.

As the space of this review has very definite limits and as most of the readers of this JOURNAL are presumably more interested in the politico-ethical discussions, the other essays will have to be noticed 'by title.' The metaphysical papers include a suggestive interpretation of "Spinoza's Pantheistic Argument" by Mr. Cooley, a discussion of the meaning of *physis* in early Greek philosophy by Mr. Veazie, and an essay on "Appearance and Reality in Greek Philosophy" by Mr. McClure, who shows very clearly the difference in meaning and function of these categories as they are employed in the different interests of science, of religious mysticism and of ethics and politics. The last of the metaphysical essays is on "Berkeley's Realism." This is by Mr. Woodbridge whose thesis is that Berkeley's Realism is the controlling motive in his philosophy and that this has been obscured by interpreting Berkeley through Locke. Needless to say the thesis is ably defended.

"Truth and Error" in Descartes by Mr. Owen, "The Antimony and Its Implications" by Mr. Montague and "Old Problems with New Faces in Recent Logic" by Mr. Costello constitute the contributions to logical theory and are among the most stimulating essays of the volume. I hope to discuss them elsewhere.

Passing now to the Ethical and political studies, in "The Attempt of Hobbes to Base Ethics on Psychology" Mr. Lord points out that Hobbes is the founder of modern social psychology, and that in basing his ethics on this type of psychology, his procedure was sound. His limitation lay in his inadequate conception of the factors involved in human motivation and in the artificial results of his geometrical method.

The interpretative canon, which Mr. Bush effectively uses in his discussion of "Greek Political Philosophy" is that philosophy celebrates, not what a period or a group possesses, but what it needs. The political philosopher that takes his business seriously is likely to be impressed not so much with the achievements as with the shortcomings of his time. And if he writes in the form of universal propositions it is because that is often the most economical way of writing in the imperative mood. The ethical and political ideals of Plato and Aristotle represent not actual accomplishment, but the weapons with which they combatted the disintegrating survivals of tribalism in Greek society. The array of historical material and neglected considerations, which Mr. Bush marshals in support of his interpretation, is impressive and persuasive.

The purpose of Mr. Dewey's study in Hobbes' *Political Philosophy* is to correct the 'illusion of perspective,' which attends more or less all history of thought, but has been especially prominent in interpretations of Hobbes'. This displacement is due to the tendency to read earlier thought in terms of the problems of a later period, especially of those of our own day. The main problem of social philosophy, for over a century, has centered in the conflict between individual freedom and public control. The prominence of the theory of sovereignty in Hobbes' has made it easy to translate his political philosophy into terms of this conflict. But the real issues of Hobbes' day which furnished the chief motivations of his political doctrine, were the divided sovereignty of church and state, and the conflict between the authority of traditional law, the law of custom and precedent—

lawyers' law, and the reconstructive influence of science and reason, expressed through legislation and equity. Whatever the limitations in Hobbes' conceptions of human nature and of scientific method, his primary motive was to identify morals with politics and to place both on a scientific basis. This meant rescuing morals and politics, on the one hand, from the domination of supernaturalism represented by the Church, and on the other, from the irrational naturalism of custom and precedent. There doubtless remains in Hobbes the paradox of the sovereign's arbitrary authority in matters of right and wrong, and the doctrine of the scientific character of morals and politics; but it is Mr. Dewey's contention that it is the latter that is fundamental in Hobbes. The former is the accident of Hobbes' inability to work out the requirements of this fundamental interest, an inability due to the inadequacy of his psychology and of his mathematical logic.

I think many, if not most readers will agree that Mr. Dewey's study has succeeded in shifting the emphasis in Hobbes' political philosophy, and that future historians of philosophy must take account of this essay in evaluating Hobbes' contribution to the development of modern thought.

The authors express the hope that the volume will be received as a manifestation of the wish to co-operate with similar enterprises elsewhere in the endeavor to increase America's contribution to the history of culture,—a wish which should, and doubtless will meet with a cordial response.

A. W. MOORE.

The University of Chicago.

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#### SHORTER NOTICES.

**THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.** By George A. Coe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916. Pp. 365.

**A SOCIAL THEORY OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.** By George A. Coe. New York: Charles Scribner Sons, 1917. Pp. 361.

In the first of these books Professor Coe has outlined a comprehensive presentation of the work which has been done in the psychology of religion during the past two decades and has added important material from his own researches. The attempt to condense so much material into a work of this size has resulted in a rather formal and schematic treatment of some topics. It is noticeable that the scope of this department of psychology has been so much extended since Professor Coe's first book, *The Spiritual Life*, that the subject of conversion, one phase of

which occupied that whole work, is now treated in one of nineteen chapters. Religion is here presented as a natural growth from instinctive bases in human nature. It is presented both in terms of group conduct and of individual conduct. Importance is attached to the innovating creative influence of religion. This is particularly stressed in the chapters on the Religious Revaluation of Values, and Religion as Discovery. A suggestive passage treats the church as a deliberative assembly. "Here we have a group that achieves unity by means of the very thing that might be expected to prevent united action, namely, the free variation of thought and desire among its members." There are suggestive discussions in separate chapters of mysticism, immortality, and prayer. An extensive, well classified bibliography both alphabetical and topical adds greatly to the utility of this very valuable work.

In *A Social Theory of Religious Education* Professor Coe has applied his view of the social nature of religion in a most fruitful and even revolutionary manner. Regarding the ends of religion as identical with the moralizing and democratizing of society he views the process of education as the training of the individual in the active support of these social processes. Education in religion cannot, therefore, content itself with the impartation of doctrines or beliefs but must be primarily the formation of right social habits. The Learning Process Considered as the Achieving of Character is the title of an illuminating chapter. "In morals it is open-eyed, forward-looking, and in this sense self-conscious, practice that counts most for the formation of a democratic character." It is shown by many illustrations that the child by this process is trained to an adaptability which is not merely routine or imitative but productive, inventive, creative.

A socialized religious education requires for the development of this kind of character a reorganization of the family toward greater democracy, changes in the church school, reconsideration of the relation between the church and the state, and the freeing of instruction from narrow denominational control. The fifth and last part of the book describes various existing types of Christian education such as the Roman Catholic, the Dogmatic Protestant, the Ritualistic Protestant, the Evangelical and the Liberal.

E. S. AMES.

**JUSTICE AND THE POOR.** By Reginald Heber Smith. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1919. Pp. 271.

As stated by Mr. Elihu Root in his foreword, this book began in a study of legal aid societies and "has grown into a systematic treatise and practical handbook upon the administration of justice in the United States in the direction which is at this time of the most critical importance." The three parts deal respectively with "The existing denial of justice to the poor," "Agencies securing a more equal administration of the laws," and "Legal Aid Work in the United States." Quoting further from Mr. Root, "no one doubts that it is the proper function of government to secure justice . . . nor can anyone question that the highest obligation of government is to secure justice for those who, because they are poor and weak and friendless, find it hard to maintain their own rights. This book shows that we have not been performing that duty very satisfactorily, and that we ought to bestir ourselves to do better." More extended notice will follow.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

- ARENT, LEONORA. *Electric Franchises in New York City*. Columbia University Studies. No. 201. New York: Columbia Univ. Pp. 181.
- BILLINGS, THOMAS H. *The Platonism of Philo Judæus*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1919. Pp. 105. Price, \$1.00 net; \$1.10 postpaid.
- CRAWFORD, ALEXANDER W. *Germany's Moral Downfall: The tragedy of academic materialism*. New York, Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press, 1919. Pp. 217. Price, \$1.00.
- GEIGER, JOSEPH ROY. *Some Religious Implications of Pragmatism*. The University of Chicago Press, 1919. Pp. 54. Price, \$ .50 net; postpaid, \$ .53.
- GRAVES, FRANK PIERREPONT. *What Did Jesus Teach?* New York: The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. 195. Price, \$1.75.
- HARTMAN, HENRY G. *Aesthetics: A Critical Theory of Art*. Columbus: R. G. Adams & Co., 1919. Pp. 250. Price, \$1.25.
- LEIGHTON, JOSEPH ALEXANDER. *The Field of Philosophy: an introduction to the study of philosophy*. Second and enlarged edition. Columbus: R. G. Adams & Co., 1919. Pp. xii, 485. Price, \$2.00.
- MORGENSTERN, JULIAN. *The Book of Genesis: A Jewish Interpretation*. Cincinnati: Department of Synagog and School Extension, 1919. Pp. viii, 335. Price, \$1.50.
- NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD. *Wartime Changes in Wages, September 1914-March 1919*. Research Report Number 20, September, 1919. Pp. xiii, 128. *Work Councils in the United States, Research Report Number 21, October, 1919*. Pp. vii, 135. Boston: National Industrial Conference Board, 1919.
- RAVÀ, ADOLFO. *Introduzione alla Filosofia del Diritto*. Rome: Athenæum.
- SEE, CHONG SU. *The Foreign Trade of China*. Columbia University Studies No. 199. New York: Columbia Univ. 1919. Pp. 451.
- SMITH, REGINALD HEBER. *Justice and the Poor*. Bulletin No. 13, Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1919.
- REESE, ALBERT M. *Wanderings in the Orient*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1919. Pp. 81. Price, \$1.00.
- SINGER, IGNATIUS. *Rival Philosophies of Jesus and Paul*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1919. Pp. 347. Price, \$2.00.
- TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. American Association for International Conciliation, 1919.

## PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN

Word has just been received of the death of Philip E. B. Jourdain, M. A., who has been the English editor of the JOURNAL since October, 1916.

# THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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APRIL, 1920

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## THE GENESIS OF FREEDOM OF WILL AND ACTION.

J. E. TURNER.

**T**HE central problem of ethical theory still remains that of free will and self-determined action, although in spheres beyond ethics itself the general direction of recent thought has on the whole added to its difficulties; no longer is it possible almost indisputably to appeal to a vital force in biology, or in psychology to the soul; here, as in phenomena purely physical, science has not ceased its revelation of necessary and invariant law. The result is the maintenance, if anything with greater emphasis, of the familiar antithesis in all its absoluteness; and just as Kant postulated a moral freedom which was noumenal and ideal, so Bergson, *e.g.*, turns to an "indetermination" wholly opposed to the mechanicalism of intellect.

But in adhering to these methods philosophical ethics is in truth but stultifying itself; for, consciously or unconsciously, it is thereby committed to an irreconcilable dualism, and must surrender once for all any ideal of a *universe*, thus becoming a cult of mere miracle or even magic;—the ultimate activity which is Reality is regarded as manifesting itself in ways not merely different, but fundamentally contradictory, and the only relevant Philosophy becomes then some type of mysticism.

Such a development, however, is by no means inevitable; for, just as the material universe contains within its dynamic mechanism all the conditions necessary to processes truly vital and organic, exactly so does the further stage—the evolution of consciousness—itsself provide the basis—

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the necessary basis, if the paradox be permitted—of true freedom. If we compare, that is, the essential characteristics of the preconscious material world with those of the universe in which consciousness is operative, we shall find that there is nothing whatever in spiritual freedom that is mysterious or unintelligible, but that on the contrary it is simply the rational outcome of all the known precedent conditions, and that no other result is possible or conceivable.

We are compelled, it is true, to postulate here the *origin* of consciousness, which itself still eludes explanation; but the question of its origin is after all irrelevant, and we have but to consider the fundamental differences which its advent created—the essentials of the contrast between the two worlds of unconscious objects and of conscious beings. This contrast can be properly comprehended, however, only when these are regarded dynamically, not statically—in terms that is of the stimuli received from the environment, and the responses thereto, in each of these two categories respectively. The presence of consciousness certainly connotes an immense advance in physical organisation; but consciousness and its correlative organic basis must be apprehended in their only true relation, in which bodily organisation is subservient to mind; in this respect we are too apt to be unduly impressed by the marvellous complexity of living matter when compared with the apparently simple nature of primal psychological processes; but this is to put cart before horse, for nervous systems are but means, while consciousness is the true end.

I. In order then to compare the reactions of the purely material environment, before the advent of consciousness, with the conditions which followed its development, the world of matter and its phenomena must be dichotomised into the subdivisions of physical and physiological;<sup>1</sup> in each

<sup>1</sup> I by no means intend, however, to distinguish these absolutely from each other; on the contrary I hold them to be essentially continuous; roughly then, and excluding consciousness, the distinction is between living and non-living, "physical" being used in its widest sense to include chemical and electrical changes, etc.

of which every individual is (first) a systematic structure, and (secondly) a contributory element within a system wider than itself, whence it incessantly receives stimuli to which it must in some way respond;<sup>2</sup> the principal difference between the physical and physiological realms then being the greater complexity of both the individuals and (as a result) the response to stimuli in the latter.

But as compared with the physical, this higher complexity of the physiological subdivision is connected with a far smaller number of individuals having a much more restricted distribution both in time and in space. In purely physical phenomena again, the limits of diversity are relatively narrow, so that the processes, while universal in their distribution, are simple in character; physiological changes, on the other hand, though more complex, are relatively very limited in their extent and duration. The result is that in both divisions alike, although from quite different causes, the range of action taken as a whole attains but narrow limits of variation—in the physical world because their universality is counterbalanced by simplicity of organisation, and in the physiological because complexity is compensated by restricted distribution in time and space; and thus, unless some wholly new factor intervenes which can combine universality with a high complexity, any further development becomes impossible.

II. Exactly the same conclusion follows if the phenomena are considered from a somewhat different standpoint: If we now take into account not the relative complexity of the two subdivisions but the character of the stimuli to which the constitutive individuals respond. The simple physical object in the first place is susceptible to very many physical stimuli;<sup>3</sup> but every advance in complexity necessitates a heightened selectiveness of response—the fewer, therefore, become the external influences which can affect the character of the system, *as a system*. The result is the higher degree

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<sup>2</sup> It may be pointed out that conditions of stable equilibrium form no exception, for this is maintained only while the requisite stimuli continue to act.

<sup>3</sup> But as already noted all states of stable equilibrium must be included here.

of specialisation characteristic of all complex organisations, which are excellently adapted each to its own special environment, but unresponsive (so far as its specific character is concerned) to all influences beyond that; perhaps a sufficient illustration is the narrow groove into which every expert of necessity falls; and thus once more it is obvious that development must reach an early climax which cannot be transcended apart from the operation of some entirely new agency capable of combining further complexity with an *increase* in the number and frequency of stimuli.

Still another characteristic of the preconscious world must be noted. When several stimuli, all in the same category or of one order,<sup>4</sup> influence a system simultaneously, they become compounded into a resultant, to which, and not to the several stimuli as separate, the individual responds. There is here no possibility whatever of isolating the several stimuli (of any one order) from each other; no possibility, therefore, of any discrimination between them on the part of the system affected, which can respond only to the complex influence of all the stimuli acting together; there is thus what may be called a concentration or summation of stimuli, instead of their multiplication and differentiation.

III. Having thus determined the distinctive characteristics of the mechanical universe from which consciousness was absent, it becomes possible to comprehend the fundamental change which the development of an advanced intelligence brought about. The origin of consciousness (to repeat) remains unintelligible; its earlier stages also, prior, *i.e.*, to the evolution of perception and idealisation, concern us but indirectly; so that we may take up our problem at that stage when a developed practical intellect has begun to function, but apart from the appearance of any moral faculty, and therefore of moral freedom in the proper sense of the word. At this point, however, it becomes necessary to determine very definitely our general

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<sup>4</sup> Light, heat, gravity, electric and chemical action, etc., are here regarded as different categories or orders of physical phenomena.

position; for it is as a matter of fact quite impossible thus to draw any *absolute* line of distinction, before which the moral sense is completely absent, and after which it becomes plainly distinguishable. On the contrary, the dawn of the moral judgment coincides, as in all other evolution, with the later stages of earlier functions lower than itself in importance and value; there is no point therefore where we can say with absolute definiteness—Here morality begins, and there it is totally absent. Indeed, it is the principal aim of my treatment of the question to show the inconceivability of any such hard and fast distinction, and to trace the path by which developed rationality comes to necessitate ethical freedom. But at the same time it is perfectly legitimate, if only we bear this principle in mind, to make an abstraction here, in order to consider the functions of the practical intelligence alone and apart from any connexion with morality.

The first difference then that a developed intelligence makes is that the environment now acts in its individuality, instead of merely (as in the unconscious realm) as a totality; which means that the different constituents of the environment affect the intelligent being *as individuals*, instead of merely through the resultant compounded from their several stimuli; which (as has been seen) was the only possible method in the material world. For to perceive is essentially to individualise—to isolate an element from the surrounding totality and to apprehend it in its relations to that totality; and thus (further) to enable it to act in its own nature apart from every other individual—to exercise its special influence independently therefore, instead of being subsumed in a mere resultant.

Perception, in other words, implies that there are as many potential stimuli as there are different objects<sup>5</sup> within any one sphere of consciousness; indeed, every aspect and property which can be separately perceived becomes a stim-

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<sup>5</sup> "Object" here may be taken either (1) in its ordinary meaning of "thing," or, preferably, (2) in its wider meaning to denote every object of knowledge or thought, i.e., in its epistemological significance.

ulus on due occasion.\* Under these circumstances then, instead of the increased complexity involving a more restricted specialisation (as was the case in the preconscious world), intelligence, while associated with individuals much more highly differentiated both physiologically and mentally, at the same time brings to its maximum the number of stimuli capable of affecting them; and thus the first result of this higher complexity is a vast *increase* in the number of separate stimuli: not, as in the material world, a reduction and concentration of stimuli.

But still further, the presentation of objects to consciousness, either in their entirety or as differentiated into their diverse attributes and properties, is usually but transient; one and the same object, *i.e.*, may enter repeatedly into a percipient consciousness, and present now one aspect and again another; so that not only is the number of different stimuli increased, but the *frequency* of each also.

But it will be recalled that in the material world, from which consciousness was absent, the developmental process taken as a whole reached an early limit because of the inherent impossibility of combining more complex organisation with a greater number and a higher frequency of stimuli. This fatal obstacle is, however, removed entirely by the evolution of consciousness; the possibilities of development are thus widened enormously by the activity of simple perception alone; and when, from this as a basis, there arises the still higher world of ideas and imagination the limits which restrict advance are removed to the remotest bounds. For when it is fully perceived an object acquires a meaning, and it then acts not only in its own being but also through what it implies; so that a thing may be very trivial in its simple physical existence and yet may become highly effective because of what it signifies; one may instance the warning and protective colours of organisms; there arises as it were a true psychical *actio in distans*; objects become more important in their intrinsic nature

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\* In this respect natural selection would obviously play a most important rôle during the evolution of consciousness.

than in their extrinsic relations—*what* they are is of much more significance than *where* they are.

IV. It is obvious, however, that these changed conditions do not in themselves constitute any explanation of the nature and genesis of freedom; to heighten complexity and increase the number and frequency of stimuli does not necessarily transform the determinism of the material world into spiritual freedom; for even an infinite number of stimuli may still act purely mechanically. Still another factor, therefore, must now be taken into consideration—a factor which is an additional consequence of that separate activity of the environmental elements which results from the rise of consciousness.

It is usual for psychology to consider perception principally with reference to the conscious subject; but when it is interpreted in terms of the environment—*i.e.*, of the psychological “object” taken *in toto*—perception means analysis—individualisation. The physical world, instead of affecting the perceiving subject as one whole whose many stimuli are concentrated into a few resultant forces, is now grasped in its true diversity, each element revealing itself and operating within the conscious sphere in its own specific nature.<sup>7</sup> Thus instead of being absorbed, each constituent exists and acts separately; and if now we combine this condition with our previous result of the vastly increased frequency and number of stimuli, and consider the character of the reactions of the conscious subject, it will become obvious that these must more and more take on the nature of free, instead of mechanically determined, action.

For every increase in the total number of stimuli thus attained must cause the inequalities of their effects to tend gradually towards a vanishing point, while stimuli which are repeated would still further tend to equality; but where so large a number of influences thus nearly or absolutely

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<sup>7</sup> I may anticipate criticism by saying that this is absolutely true only as an ideal condition which is never more than partially realised, though it is more and more nearly attained with the advance of consciousness.

equal act simultaneously and separately, as they do in perception, any decisive and well marked response on the part of the conscious subject must be obviously extremely difficult, if not indeed impossible; exactly as in the physical world such a set of conditions tends of itself to produce stable equilibrium, which plainly means the absence of any responsive activity; and though such a result is easily attainable under purely material conditions, it is wholly impossible for the conscious individual; urged on as he always is by the desires and fears of his own inner nature, action of some kind is an imperative necessity. To which, therefore, of the innumerable stimuli seeking to affect him he will respond must now depend not on themselves alone but primarily on his reflective selection of some, and rejection of others—in other words on his own deliberate choice from the existent total. Thus the conscious choice of selected stimuli gradually comes to replace their previous mechanical mass action, and the influences which are rendered ineffective are now inhibited, not only as in the physical world by others like themselves external, but mainly by the very individual upon which they seek to act.

The activity of the conscious subject then has thus acquired freedom from external determination; but what is the nature of this new attribute? It is most emphatically not freedom *from* stimuli, but freedom *within* stimuli; not an escape from *all* determination, but the selection of *its own* determinants; not, therefore, action wholly without cause, but action sequent upon one cause rather than another which *prima facie*—apart, *i.e.*, from the subject's own choice—equals it in energy.

It is this which gives us our mystifying sense of inner freedom combined with outer restraint; for instinctively and unthinkingly we constantly seek an impossible freedom from all external influences when all that we can ever secure is freedom within them; we demand an absolute dominance over the external world instead of being content with submission to inner ideals. Hence, too, the difficulty of ascertaining by mere uncritical introspection whether action is

really free or not; for our simple unanalysed feeling is inextricably compounded of the consciousness of being passively influenced by stimuli, together with the absolute necessity, if we are to act at all, of choosing between them; we forget that in such a delicately balanced complex as is the conscious subject, incessantly assaulted by countless stimuli all so nearly equal as almost to neutralise one another, decisive action must be impossible until we freely choose and determine its direction; and in those weak natures which have but little power of choice, action at once reverts to what it was in the physical world—the vacillating and inconstant resultant of stimuli acting apart from any selection and consequent reinforcement from within the person himself;\* he becomes a log drifting with the current, instead of swimming strongly against it.

V. It may still be argued, however, that this view of the function of consciousness does not after all affect the essential principle of the question, because the responsive voluntary act remains still a resultant, and cannot, therefore, be wholly and completely free; and in so far as it insists on the existence of a resultant, and, therefore, of some measure at least of determination, this objection is valid. But the whole issue depends, not on the resultant as such, but rather on the factors producing it; and not on the mere presence or absence of determination in itself, so much as on the *nature* of the determination, whose existence is not denied. And from the dawn of perception to the highest spiritual level, the responsive subject itself becomes continuously a more and more important agent in determining the resultant action, which further implies that the determination, which always exists and is, indeed, positively necessary, gradually acquires a totally new character and basis; it becomes less and less determination from without, more and more determination from within, the active individual himself. There occurs, *i.e.*, a slow but radical transposition of the contributions to the final result made by the environment and by the conscious

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\* The constant tremor of a compass is a good physical example.



subject respectively; at first the latter is little more than a passive element in a mechanically acting whole—a small cog in a great machine; but at the end of the process the active individual has become predominantly directive of itself, and the environment, though still an indispensable factor, of but secondary importance and value.

Finally, it is essential to recognise that the freedom whose generation out of mechanism has here been traced is of a perfectly general character, and lacks as yet those special attributes which distinguish aesthetic, rational, and moral freedom respectively. But to restrict freedom to the moral world is a serious error in principle, and hampers our apprehension of its problems; for just as organic evolution proceeds simultaneously, though independently, in both plant and animal kingdoms, so spiritual development takes place on the rational, aesthetic and moral planes together; but the connexion and distinction between these its diverse manifestations constitutes a problem separate from the evolution of freedom in itself.

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## THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM.

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**T**HE term internationalism is commonly employed to designate a set of interdependent beliefs which center around the postulate that the interests of mankind can no longer be served by activities, customs and institutions which tend toward the eventual ascendancy of one homogeneous racial type. The remote ideal of the movement is, briefly stated, a world in which each of many diverse races shall function in its own specific manner and develop according to the secondary purposes that the character of its people prescribe, and yet exist wholly for and by the general life of the whole. Formally, the structure of a society so organized would resemble that of the present United States of America; essentially, it would be marked by these fundamental differences: that the constituent units would be heterogeneous in character, and that the values embodied in its institutions would be antagonistic to the qualified nationalistic values to which America in common with all great countries, now adheres.

Formulated in these general terms, the creed of internationalism seems, if visionary, at least altogether innocent and harmless; and it is, in fact, only when the revolutionary attitude of mind, as revealed in these major articles, grapples directly with the realities of social life and seeks ways and means of bending them to its purposes, that it excites the reckless criticism to which it has been subjected. The reason for this is not obscure. One of the main contentions of internationalism is that world peace can be secured only at the price of a full and unqualified acceptance by dominant nations of the values which it defends, and such a statement undeniably becomes a veritable instrument of torture when employed against those who fondly hope to eliminate organized warfare from human affairs, and at

the same time retain unmodified the intra-racial activities which have invariably forced nations into a condition of armed antagonism. It is not to the ideals of the movement that the world objects; but only to the claimed conditions of their realization.

At the present time, for instance, a world, shocked by the tragic spectacle of the late war, has formally adopted the general aims of internationalism. The right of small nations to determine their own destiny within wide limits is universally conceded; the principle that the policies of large races should be subordinated to the common welfare of the entire human race is vigorously upheld, and most minds are agreed that a definite central tribunal, powerful enough to coerce refractory social units into obedience to its decrees, should be set up, in order that the interests of society may be defined and maintained by some impartial body, instead of being settled, as they now are, by the moves of partisan diplomats and, ultimately, by the employment of force. Yet side by side with such phenomena there is going on a significant intensification of nationalistic values and a correlative acceleration of those processes which inevitably bring nations face to face with the tragic necessity of choosing between dishonor and war. And it is his insistence upon this indwelling contradiction between our formally professed ideals and our practical activities which has brought the internationalist under the fire of all other sections of thought. Because of his indifference to the mechanical contrivances by which men hope to avert wars, and because of his assertion that, since international relations are determined by intra-national activities, the one cannot be perceptibly modified without the other, he has incurred the enmity of those who hope to harmonize, in some unknown way, the ends of war with those of peace; while, on the other hand, his direct assault upon the policies which invariably terminate in war, has earned for him the antagonism of their defenders. If he sides with the latter in their opposition to a league of nations, it is merely to take up the conflict on more fundamental grounds; if he

takes issue with the former, it is only because he feels that all social forces are interdependent, and that, consequently, the problem of securing peace is much larger than they care to assume. And it is this attitude which has engendered the storm of abuse recently heaped upon those who have identified themselves with the internationalistic movement; this insinuation of insincerity, unconscious but none the less real, on the part of those who advocate a league of nations predoomed to impotence; this charge of a contradiction between our professed aims and our determining actions. Yet what could demonstrate more clearly the superficial character of our present striving for permanent peace than the almost universal unwillingness to discuss rationally and calmly the necessary price of it? Impassioned supporters of a central tribunal, defenders of its abstract conditions, we have in plenty; but scarcely more than one or two have dared to assert that the effectiveness of any agency established must depend upon our consent to submit to it all differences arising between nations, even when they bear upon such questions as tariff, immigration and foreign trade policies, and even when they directly affect the line of internal industrial expansion. To the evolutionist the point is so obvious that any elaborate proof would be thought superfluous. Believing that there is sufficient power in forces now operating to dash into pieces any mechanical device set up to dam them, the problem, as he sees it, is not one of finding the means of interposing an armed and impartial barrier between conflicting groups of peoples, but of turning men's wills and minds to the practical acceptance of values which will create no deep seated antagonisms; and the progressive solution of this problem will, he perceives, carry the race to sacrifices which few men are now willing to make.

Such a contention, however, does not pin us down to a policy of optimistic fatalism, or to an impotent waiting for the dawn of the millennium. Writers who, like Roland G. Usher, declare that "the trouble lies in selfishness, wickedness, ignorance, and a lack of morality and Chris-

tianity in mankind," and that "nothing short of the slow process of education and growth, by which the bad will be made good and the covetous and greedy will be reformed, seems capable of creating universal peace" fail to understand that our hopes may center about that very selfishness which they deplore as fatal to the reign of peace. They make the question needlessly large, and commit us to the impossible task of converting human beings into angels by a vague preaching of morality; whereas, as we shall see later, the difficulty is not to extirpate selfishness from the heart of man and so turn him into an idealistic altruist, but to direct his selfish motives into other channels. Is it not, for that matter, even now apparent that our rebellion against the horrors of war is selfish, individualistic, and substantially equivalent to a revolt against the sacrifices which the masses are called upon to make for the welfare of the race? And do not the most brutally direct advocates of war—writers such as the late Professor Cramb and the German Bernhardi—make their appeal to the sentiment of duty, and found their arguments on the presumption that the individual should be made to give his all in order that the ideals of his nation may sway the world? If it be true that international peace can be honorably bought only at the price of a voluntary surrender of much that man holds dear, it is decidedly not true that the sacrifices called for are of the nature of a deliverance of our personalities into the hands of altruistic formulæ. Were that the case, the discussion of the possibility of world peace would never have passed out of the works of poets and dreamers into the pages of popular magazines and newspapers. It is the uttermost folly to say that war can never be abolished until the Christianity of Tolstoy is established on earth, and particularly so at a time when internationalists are called upon to face the charge that their creed demands a subordination of national aspirations to the personal desires of existent generations. The selfish aggressions of individuals may, as Mr. Usher contends, be the basic cause of all inter-racial conflicts, but it is also

individuals who suffer when the inevitable conflict begins. And in their suffering we come upon the real reason for the present demand for an international tribunal of peace; not in any sudden flowering of Christian ethics or second springtime of Comtism. As we shall see later, the spring of our present development toward the ideal of the internationalist is essentially the very opposite of altruistic; and when we speak of sacrifices involved in this evolution we do not mean unrecompensed ones, but merely sacrifices of one set of desires to another. It is precisely because of this that the charge that pacifists are attempting to wreck their states out of a sentimental love of the masses has obtained widespread credence; it is precisely because of this that those who hold nations to be sovereign units, which must realize themselves no matter what be the cost in terms of human suffering, have accused internationalists of rebellion against duty and its synonyms—God and religion. Obviously we cannot, even to please our opponents, be both white and black, preachers of thin ethical generalities and rebels against our obligations. One charge or the other may be true; both cannot be; and since the two cancel one another, in all probability neither is wholly true nor wholly false, but both no doubt represent instinctive reactions of the non-centered mind to diverse aspects of a single complex evolution. This much, at least, may be said at once, by way of clearing a breathing space amid the heaped up mass of argumentative rubbish with which the field of discussion has been littered.

A line of reasoning, directly contradictory to that indulged in by those who reduce the problem to moral terms, is the one elaborated by Norman Angell in "The Great Illusion." Far from believing that we must wait upon a moral renaissance, Mr. Angell holds that the interests of the human race lie clearly and unmistakably in the direction of international peace, and that this fact has only to be recognized in order that war may become the name for an historic condition. War, he claims, is no longer economically profitable, and it is only our fatuous simplicity which leads

us to believe that any struggle can show a credit balance either for victor or for loser. In perspicuous language he has pointed out that conquered territory belongs, not to the conqueror, but to the inhabitants of it, and that the people of a nation are not enriched one penny by the annexations paid for in blood and treasure. War, in short, is a losing proposition for both parties engaged in it, and once this fact is understood, Mr. Angell believes that the imperative will of civilized nations will put a stop to it.

The solution, fascinatingly simple though it is, seems to me to ignore the most elementary factors in the situation and to implicitly deny the necessity for any mental and emotional groundwork of peace. Even though we unreservedly admit Mr. Angell's first assumption, that all wars between civilized races involve irreparable economic losses, is it demonstrably true that there are no other values concerned for which men, coerced by the pressure of circumstance, will not gladly lay down their lives? Is it even true that the economic interests of *races* lie directly in the path leading to international peace, and that, in seeking the one, they shall come upon the other? Supposing that the four or five great nations of the world can come to some joint agreement with regard to the exploitation—or development—of outlying countries, and the peaceful extermination, by industrial penetration, of inferior races, unable to stand up under the relentless discipline of modern life; supposing, further, that some agreement, mutually satisfactory, can be arrived at, by which periods of international misproduction, which now terminate in a few years of fierce competition, national uneasiness, hate and eventually war, can be safely traversed by means of a central equilibrating influence, and the necessary readjustment of industrial agencies be thus peacefully effected; these are large concessions, but supposing the conditions realizable, is it at all certain that the highest ends of society shall be best served by them? Not at all; and the truth is that Mr. Angell has confused the immediate economic interests

of *individuals* with far-distant social and racial interests, and has failed to perceive that war is the product of forces, inherent in the organism, which are possibly directing its development toward ends whose meaning far transcends any question of temporary loss and gain. There are, in short, more values on the world's balance sheet than Mr. Angell has taken into account, and his argument becomes valid only when it is considered as an integral part of the organic scheme of thought which internationalism defends. Let it once be admitted that the expansion of a type rich in organizing ability and practical intelligence—such as the American, for instance—will be marked by recurrent conflicts, and it will be seen that war, instead of imperilling the economic interests of the human race, is the faithful servant of them. This will become clearer as we proceed.

The apparent conclusiveness of the arguments elaborated in "The Great Illusion" is the result of a bold, though unconscious, assumption at the outset of the only point that can be open to rational discussion between nationalists and internationalists. "Let us assume," writes Mr. Angell, "that at the cost of a great sacrifice . . . Belgium and Holland and Germany, Switzerland and Austria, have all become part of the great German hegemony; is there *one ordinary German citizen* (the italics are my own) who would be able to say that his well-being had been increased by such a change? Germany would then 'own' Holland. But would a single German citizen be the richer for the ownership? The Hollander, from having been the citizen of a small and insignificant State, would become the citizen of a very great one. Would the *individual* Hollander be any the richer or better?"

To all of which the nationalist may, and does, answer,—Very well; but have you not deliberately ignored the only debatable point and thereby invalidated your entire argument? You think in terms of individuals, whereas we assert that the only unit of which the evolutionist can legitimately talk is the race. And the interests of a race are, as Benjamin Kidd has shown, often divergent from those



of any one generation of its members. Has it not been the universal experience of history that the population of annexed territories sooner or later falls into a subordinate position and eventually disappears? True, with the stabilization of racial types, the time required for this change becomes longer, but the final result is not, therefore, the less uncertain. And if the conquest of Holland by Germany, South Africa by Britain, or Mexico by the United States, be the necessary preliminary to the peaceful, economic penetration of those countries, is it at all certain that the ultimate product, measured even in dollars and cents, measured more adequately in terms of large and prosperous cities, stable and progressive civilizations, and natural forces subjugated to man's ends, would not vastly outweigh any transient sacrifices called for?

The same assumption that the interests of the present coincide with those of the future is still more apparent in another famous passage of Mr. Angell's work.

"During the Jubilee procession," states the author, "an English beggar was heard to say:

'I own Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, Burmah, and the islands of the Far Pacific; and I am starving for a crust of bread. I am a citizen of the greatest Power of the modern world, and all the people bow to my greatness; and yesterday I cringed for alms to a negro savage, who repulsed me with disgust.' "

"What is the meaning of this?" asks Mr. Angell, and he answers that "international politics are still dominated by terms applicable to conditions which the processes of modern life have altogether abolished." The statement is true only if racial expansion is absolutely and forever prohibited by the conditions of which Mr. Angell speaks, or if the instinctive attempts of races to extend their ideals and civilizations do not inevitably engender war. Should the former assumption be justified by the facts, then our instincts and the language to which they give rise admittedly have no rational meaning; should it be untrue, and the latter true, the movement toward international

peace necessarily takes on a significance which cannot be exhausted by any statement in purely economic terms.

Unfortunately Mr. Angell has not given to this phase of the question the attention its importance merits. Having examined the relations which subsist between Great Britain and her colonies, and having shown that the internal policies of all but India and a few other Oriental settlements are determined by their respective inhabitants, he triumphantly concludes that the "nations are too firmly set" to permit of any further extension of racial types. "Even when the British, the greatest colonizers of the world," he states, "conquer a territory like the Transvaal or the Orange Free State, they have no resort, having conquered it, but to allow its own law, its own literature, its own language to have free play, just as though the conquest had never taken place. This was even the case with Quebec more than one hundred years ago. . . ."

Let us first see what the conquest of the Transvaal really did establish, or whether the facts warrant the belief that the war with the natives was a monstrous fallacy. One thing at least is certain; that out of British ascendancy in that territory has come the right of Englishmen to emigrate into South Africa in whatever numbers they wish, without fear of being discriminated against by the laws of the land. Could this have been secured without the preliminary subjugation? Hardly; for one of the immediate causes of the conflict was the discriminatory laws passed by the natives, and behind these laws, again, was the justifiable fear of the Boers that, once Englishmen were admitted to their land on terms of equality, their race, as a distinct unit, functioning in world affairs, must begin to die away. And this, despite the permission extended them to legislate as they wish on internal matters, and to retain their language, literature, religion, etc., is exactly what will happen in the course of time. The interval may be long or short; but the instincts which move men to secure the continued existence of their specific type have their proper terminus only in far distant ages, and it was to the

operation of these that the war was due. In order to deal frankly with the premises of the nationalists, we must look to the remote future, and not to immediate and transient phenomena, and with our vision so fixed, it becomes translucently clear that our changed policies with regard to colonies are not less fatal to the race of their first inhabitants than were the cruder policies of the Hebrews and Canaanites. It matters not that we do not exterminate them, man, woman and child, by the sword; that our results are accomplished by the peaceful and less painful instrument of commercial penetration. Once grant that the race is the only legitimate unit in society, once admit that our instincts would be valid, could they be effective, and the entire argument against war on Mr. Angell's grounds breaks down.

Looking into the future we see in the Transvaal a tract of territory in which the Anglo-Saxon can, and will, establish his institutions, his customs, laws, literature, language, and every thing else he holds valuable; a land, moreover, which will at crucial moments assist in the further extension of the Anglo-Saxon race, until the time comes when the race may be so powerful that it can spread itself unopposed even into those nations which, like France and Germany, seem so fixed in their places. This is the real meaning of the fight for "a place in the sun"; of Germany's desperate attempt to force the hand of destiny; of England's magnificent schemes of colonization; of America's dawning realization of the part she may be called upon to play in the world; of the war advocate's insistence upon the legitimacy of his own race's will to realize itself *to the utmost limit of its possibility*. If it does not put forth its greatest efforts now, the time will come, he sees, when his race must submit impotently to the peaceful penetration of a more powerful type, to the later use of its governmental agencies against itself, to the final disappearance of his state from the earth.

The present conquests of large nations are, understood in this sense, an insurance against future eventualities;

reserved spots which they can slowly and gradually, but none the less surely, reclaim for themselves, from which they can keep out large numbers of other peoples that they may be unable to absorb, and which may possibly be the determining factor in the final gigantic struggle which will decide, once for all, what race shall rule the world. It may be said that no nation, having annexed a territory, passes any restrictive laws against other peoples; that the land is free and open to all, and is, in this sense, still a common field for development. This is untrue. The only reason why no laws now appear on the statute books against such an immigration is, that the necessity for them has never arisen, because nations tacitly understand that any attempt on their part to assist in the work of peaceful subjugation, if carried out on a scale sufficiently large to endanger the possessor race, would be defeated by legislation, behind which would stand the menace of armed force. Colonies are no more open to all peoples than is the United States to the Japanese. Nothing could show the operation of racial instincts more clearly than our own recently imposed restrictions on immigration, because of the fear that distinctively American qualities might be lost through the influx of other types faster than they could be absorbed.

The case of Quebec is unique, and Mr. Angell has seized upon it as an illustration of his theory with the instinct of an advocate, rather than that of a philosopher. Yet who to-day doubts that, despite the apparent fixity of French customs and language in that province, they must finally give way before the slow pressure of Anglo-Saxon thought? Certainly not the very inhabitants themselves, who, warned by those instincts which often read more truly than the most enlightened reason, are already bitterly protesting against the fast accumulating evidences of their eventual fate as a race, and who are desperately striving to stave off the inevitable consummation. Possibly the issue cannot be definitively decided without a civil war, but in any case, it is as certain that Quebec shall one day be indistinguishable from Ottawa, as it is that the sun shall rise

to-morrow. And what shall happen to Quebec in the next few generations *may* happen to France, or England, or Germany, or Holland, five centuries after that. It is this possibility that the war advocate takes as the premise of his argument, and against it all reasoning on economic grounds is futile. For it is not true, he affirms, that if present processes continue, racial expansion is forever and absolutely prohibited by the conditions of modern life; and because we find in that expansion the germ of all conflicts, because there will be wars so long as races aim to enlarge themselves, and also because, in his opinion, the real ends of society are served, as our instincts tell us, by such racial activities, he concludes that war, howsoever deplorable in its effects, is defensible as a regrettable, but necessary, issue of forces which are tending to create the only conditions under which peace will ever be possible; the dominance upon earth of one homogeneous type, united by identical language, ideals, customs, manners of speaking and acting, economic interests, mutual trust, and vital interdependence of classes.

We may now glance, though necessarily in a very summary way, at the manner in which the international values, so defended, connect up with national schemes of values, and show how the two mutually create and intensify one another. What is called the instinct toward racial expansion is, of course, nothing more mysterious than the manifestation on a racial scale of the sexual instincts, plus a perfectly natural desire on the part of the people to continue to live under the laws and institutions to which they are by nature adapted. If these impulses, and the values which they create—national and international—have a significance which stretches far into the future, it is not because they are the flame tips of some great central intelligence, but merely because instincts are better able to move among the realities they rear than our faltering, and still unsocial, reasons. True though it be that oftentimes the most patient research is unable to lay bare the deeper meaning of such prejudices as those which are expressed in racial aversions,

in sharply drawn color lines, in the identification of one's self with a nation and its abstract future, in religious systems, moral codes unsanctioned by legal formulæ, and in the pride of belonging to a big country or city, we are not, therefore, bound to discuss them as things sacredly mysterious, nor to hold to them when the processes they set in motion are seen to tend toward ends from which our intellect dissents. Reason is a manifestation of what we agree to call Nature just as legitimate as are our instincts, and if it be seen that the two are more often contestants than allies, then there can be no *a priori* presumption in favor of either.

This being understood, we may deal more directly with the concrete problem before us. Pressure of population upon the national agencies of production and exchange, plus the desire upon the part of all individuals to retain their identity as members of a specific race, with particular ideals, laws and institutions, is, as we have seen, the fundamental fact in our present scheme of international relations. Now, not only is this same fact which creates inter-racial jealousies and war also intensified by the fear of war—as witness the present wide-spread propaganda against directive control of the birth rate and the charge brought against the inhabitants of France, that in looking to their own selfish interests, they almost fatally weakened their race!—but it is also the force which creates that set of values popularly termed capitalistic. This is readily apparent when we consider that capitalism is really nothing more than a plan of industrial organization, under which the larger fraction of the people are coerced by their instincts into the surrender of the means of present enjoyment, in order that the necessities created by an ever enlarging population may be effectively dealt with through rapid expansion of the agencies of production and exchange. Furthermore, as both capitalism and unregulated sexual impulses foster the quickest racial development, and thus rapidly put a race in a position where it can maintain itself against aggression and at the same time extend its own

territories, they are intensified by the very fears they themselves create, and thus are organically tied up with one another and with all other values. The same is true of orthodox religious systems, the function of which is, as Benjamin Kidd has shown, to sanction the individual's sacrifice of himself to the interests of the future; and from some obscure perception of this fact flows, we may be sure, the antagonism of many internationalists to orthodox creeds.

Mark, moreover, how vital is the inter-connection between all our instinctive reactions to social phenomena, and how the destruction or modification of one of them involves the destruction or modification of all. War and the fear of war create, as we have said, the capitalistically organized state, and this state in turn gives birth to the very conditions by which it was created. But both of these phenomena, again, are the products of unregulated sexual instincts, which also are acted upon and intensified by the forces to which they give rise; and into the scheme of things, so constituted, orthodox religious creeds enter to set the seal of their approval upon all prejudices, traditions and institutions, while all these phenomena, fused into an organic whole, engender and justify those minor reactions of the individual consciousness, which lead it to claim its race as part of its very self, and which compel it to sacrifice itself to the race's future, as it would to the objects of its dearest regard, not only on the battlefields, but also in the peaceful pursuits of life. And behind all is the dominating thought that the ends to which a race is driven by its instincts are the only ones which the processes of evolution legitimize, and that to these ends the individual is and should be subordinated.

Now, when we critically review the controversial literature devoted to the defence of the nationalistic set of values, we find that this defence invariably consists in a reiteration of the fact that the values in question are so organically united that no single one of them can be attacked without menacing the whole, and that the inevitable result of a

successful assault would be the collapse of the civilization built upon them. Let one say, for instance, with Norman Angell, that war and the language of war are meaningless monstrosities in the world as it now exists, and he is met by the retort that, howsoever desirable the ideal of international peace may be, the dominant activities of nations render it impracticable, and the teachings of pacifism dangerous. This, in fact, is precisely the stand taken by Roland G. Usher in his *Pan Americanism*, and obvious though it may appear to be at first sight, when the empty outline is filled in with the wealth of detail at Mr. Usher's command, the conclusion appears almost irresistible to the pacifist who would abolish war and, at the same time, retain unchanged the ideals of which it is the issue. The Socialists, tacitly admitting the force of such objections, have thus been driven to the other extreme, equally vicious, and have insisted that the destruction of capitalism must antecede the death of war. This position is, however, not less vulnerable than the one taken up by those who consider the problem of securing peace as a special and exclusive one; even when it is formulated in proper language, and states, not that the capitalist class promotes wars for its own interest, but that social processes directed by "capitalistic" values inevitably terminate in inter-racial conflicts. For true though this may be, and even admitted by the nationalist, he quickly points out that Socialism is impossible in the present state of affairs, for the evident reason that the embodiment of its ideals in the institutions of any race would necessarily weaken it to such an extent as to leave it practically defenceless in a world armed against its welfare. And likewise with all attacks upon the unregulated operation of religious, sexual and other instincts! To the defence of these other prejudices quickly rush, and point out the essential dependence of the race upon them.

Decisive as these objections appear to be, they are, however, disconcerting only to him who fails to grasp the true and revolutionary significance of the movement against



which they are advanced. Let it once be comprehended that this movement represents an *internationalistic* attack upon all the institutions reared by instinct, and it will be clearly seen that these special defences of nationalism fall to the ground, except in so far as they bear upon the point of immediate practicability. For thus interpreted, all these apparently isolated movements toward world peace, economic independence, new creeds and ethical systems, a modified nationalism, accentuation of esthetic and intellectual values, and toward rational control of the birth rate, are seen to be vitally connected, and the strength of internationalism is perceived to lie in elements quite different than those commonly considered. Taken in this sense, effectively to dispose of the movement, it is not sufficient to point out the inherent weaknesses of its special manifestations, and to prove that its immediate conquest of our minds would result in untold disaster. We may grant this much unqualifiedly, and still keep our central defences intact, just as the nationalist may agree to the major premise of Norman Angell, and still insist that his argument leaves the really important issues undisturbed.

Naturally this involves that we should view internationalism in its true historical position; that we should, so to speak, consider it, not as the name for a set of values which can at once be incorporated into our social life, but as marking a comprehensive evolution of thought and feeling towards ends antagonistic to those currently accepted. Rising above all the practical details in which this development is immersed, we must let our minds dwell upon the fact that these related movements, of which I have spoken, are really only the various aspects of one great central attitude toward man and his activities, and that it is this attitude which is the basically important thing, and not the practicability or impracticability of the isolated, concrete demands to which it gives rise. Grant that this be true, grant, that is, that the ends which this spirit constructs into ideals are socially desirable and within the reach of human endeavor, and though we may still differ from the

avowed internationalist upon minor questions of fact, our concession nevertheless amounts to a practical surrender of the adverse position. We are then no longer opponents of the movement, but only of its more particular demands.

What, then, is this central viewpoint, or habit of thought, which is the spring of activities so significant? Lecky has very aptly termed it "rationalistic," and in one of the concluding chapters of the work devoted to the history of its origin and first manifestations he has made the pregnant observation that its transforming influence would, in the course of time, play upon and modify every established institution of society. The statement has now passed into a truism, and we tread upon well worn ground when we point out the essential connection between the attitude which decisively triumphed over the theocratic ideals of the Middle Ages and the political absolutism of the later centuries, and that which now challenges on an international scale, and more fundamentally than ever before, every end toward which a society moved by unregulated instincts would carry us. But when we attempt to reduce this spirit to a dead formula, we find that it eludes our most persistent efforts, and that a definition can no more exhaust its real essence than can an epigram exhaust a living personality. The difficulty is an insuperable one; recast our formulæ as we may, they leave one cold and unconvinced, and with a feeling of the utter inability of intellect to deal directly with life. Take for example Taine's famous reduction of Goethe's message to the phrase, Learn to know yourself and things in general. How trivial and commonplace it seems to a mind which has not drunk of the great secrets hidden in Faust and Wilhelm Meister! How pregnant and suggestive to one who is able to fill the empty outline with the meanings with which Goethe has enriched his heart and mind! And in the same way, though on a larger scale, one who has become acquainted with that habit of thought which now dominates the internationalistic movement, through the works of Lecky, Bentham, the Mills, Paine, Stephen, Rousseau, and in fact every writer

of genius for the past few generations, feels how vague and unimpressive must all his formulæ be when placed beside the living fact. It was Eliot, I believe, who in her review of Lecky's history of the origin and first phases of rationalism, complained that the author had constantly made use of the phrase "the spirit of the age" without giving it any precise significance. This was unjust. For Lecky's whole attempt was to fill the concept with meaning, and one might as well have asked him to define it as to define an autumn sunset, a poetic thought or a rhapsody of Liszt's. Before such a request the keenest mind stands helpless as a child.

Notwithstanding such obstacles, some attempt must be hazarded, in order that the real meaning of the movement which we have called internationalism may be fixed, however imperfectly, in the reader's thought. In one way we have a decided advantage over the first great historian of the development. The generation in which he wrote furnished to the world by far the ablest interpreters and defenders of reason's values since the Renaissance; and since that time, the aims and purposes of the creed's adherents have become translucently clear. We have seen, for instance, tentative steps taken toward the formation of an international labor union, whose avowed function would be to regulate the policies of nations in conformity with the interests, economic, moral and intellectual, of the *present generation*; we have witnessed a world-wide struggle engendered by the failure of a group of nations to move away from the old ideals *pari passu* with others, and have seen, as the direct issue of this conflict, the formal adoption by representatives of many large powers of aims directly antagonistic to those advocated by imperialists; and we have also perceived the first two transient ends of the movement, the separation of church and state and the recognition of the right of all individuals to participate on equal terms in the conduct of the government, definitively established in countries, which, united, are able to direct the activities of the entire world. Nor have other signifi-

cant signs been wanting. The entrance of organized labor into politics; the recent manifestation on the part of our industrial leaders of a readiness to abandon old ideas in favor of the new; the spiritual awakening of religious institutions to the need of broader ethics and less rigid dogmas; the startling drop in the birth rate in France and England; the universal feeling that all races make distinctive contributions to the world's progress, and that their integrity must be preserved against the destructive influence of more powerful types; the renunciation of the principle of *laissez faire* and the qualified adoption of the principle that the true function of government is to act as a directive, regulative power in the body social; all these phenomena point unmistakably to a world-wide growth away from the values reared by unregulated instincts, and show that the influence of rationalism is steadily transforming every institution once regarded as final. And enriched by such experiences, we can undertake, without effrontery, to trace the essential points of difference between the purposes of nationalism and those of its rival. The exposition, however, must necessarily be diagrammatic in the extreme.

It has frequently been remarked that reason is essentially individualistic; that it relates everything to concrete, living men, and boldly postulates that evolutionary processes are meaningless unless their accomplished ends include the promotion of human happiness. The observation is abundantly illustrated in modern literature. J. S. Mill assumes it as a self-evident truth; Bentham transforms it into a Greatest Happiness Principle; Locke asserts that the end of government is the good of mankind; Paine, in his "Rights of Man," finds incomprehensible Burke's faltering defence of man's duty to his race. The belief in this theory drives Rousseau to a mad revolt against civilization; Spencer accepts it as unquestionable, and takes as his ideal a state of society in which the interests of the individual will coincide with the interests of all; it is formally enshrined in our own Declaration of Independence,

and has just recently been restated by President Wilson as a truth from which no one can dissent.

Furthermore, our modern reading of the meaning of the Reformation leads us to the same conclusion. In this, as in the political and religious rationalism into which it quickly developed, we can now discern the fundamental assumption to be that the individual is the only legitimate social unit, and that his reason, corrected and confirmed by the reasonings of others, and thus, so to speak, built up into a social intellect, is competent to direct society to its highest ends. This was the premise which Paine maintained against Burke in their beautifully developed debate on the French Revolution, and Burke, instinctively seizing upon it as the ultimate ground of the antagonism, frankly and finely declared that "instead of casting away our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them *because they are prejudices* (the italics are my own); and the longer they have lasted and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherished them." Contrast this with the penetrating observation of Hugo, probably the greatest of all radicals: "It is a peculiarity of instinct that it can be troubled, thrown out, and routed. If not, it would be superior to intelligence, and the brute would have a better light than man." The issue could not be more sharply drawn; both statements touch rock-bottom, and in them we have potentially all the difference between a Hugo and a Burke, a Rousseau and a Carlyle, or, to bring the antagonism nearer to our own times, between Professor Cramb and Norman Angell, Chesterton and H. G. Wells.

Now, if we examine in this light the major values which sway the minds of internationalists, we shall find that they, too, are sharply distinguished from all others by their imperative insistence upon the supreme importance of the individual and his happiness, as well as by the fact that they all implicitly affirm the superiority of reason's to instinct's ends. When one's mind passes over the bound-

ary lines of races, it does not come to rest in some vague idea of a universal humanity; on the contrary it recoils back upon its object, disintegrates races into concrete persons, and frames a concept of duty which includes the future only so far as its welfare can be harmonized with the happiness of the present. Those who have read Norman Angell's work "The Great Illusion" with care must have been impressed by the fact that it revolves almost entirely around this central conception. At no time does he ask whether the English race, or the German race, or the human race, is enriched by the results of conquest? Would a single German or a single Englishman be richer or more happy? is his persistent inquiry, and his answer, the only answer that can be rationally given, is, of course, the negative. The same individualistic viewpoint pervades and informs Barbusse's "Under Fire"; a work from which no one can rise without a sickening feeling that man is helplessly floundering on stormy seas, at odds with destiny. What, he asks indignantly, is the meaning of the phrase "national aspirations" in this world where nations consist of an artificial amalgam of races residing within the map made lines of a frontier? Do not lines of social cleavage, deeper and more impassable than any others, cut across all nations? Has not the workingman of America more in common with the workingman of France than he has with the American philosopher or financier? And what earthly difference can it make to an existing individual whether the race which inhabits his country ten thousand years from to-day be his own, or French, or Anglo-Saxon, or Slavic?

Commonplace as such inquiries seem to be, they are so only to one who has not measured the chasm by which they are separated from the thoughts which now sway the world. And yet surely it must be evident that a line of reasoning which starts from the premise that the individual is the ultimate social unit is bound to develop important differences from one which assumes the race to be transcendent. Given the latter, and though we may qualify the

legitimacy of our national activities by the assertion that they should be subordinated to the welfare of the world, our final conclusion, the one which reigns over our conduct, will always be that, when a conflict arises between our national ideals and the impartial thought of mankind, the only arbiter of the dispute can be the sword. Given the former, admitted to its fullest implications, and the only logical conclusion can be that any racial differences are trivial and subordinate when placed beside the fact of our common humanity. The antagonism is ultimate, and any compromise between the two viewpoints must be based upon expediency, and, therefore, be transient.

Nevertheless, it is not right to say with Benjamin Kidd that this movement, which we may now call "international individualism," seeks to place all the meaning of evolutionary processes in the present. Rather, it is attempting to reconcile the interests of the present with those of the future; it asks where social forces, engendered by unregulated instincts, are driving us, and is not content with the vague answer that, because past progress has been the resultant of certain factors, future progress must also depend upon the same. That is the crux of the question, and no apotheosis of evolution can furnish us with a satisfactory answer. Adherents of the movement admit that we owe a duty to the future, but they also claim that this duty should not rob the present of its rights to life and happiness. And they seriously question whether the fortune we are now engaged in building up for our descendants is the very best we could bequeath to them. They believe, indeed, that in asserting our own rights, in refusing to allow our personalities to be totally absorbed by an abstract race, we are bringing about the only rational reconciliation of our interests as individuals, as Americans or Frenchmen, and as members of the human race, with the interests of the future. In proof of this they point, first of all, to Socialism.

This inner significance of this latter movement has been so obscured by its avowed defenders that it is impossible

to do more than throw out a few suggestions. They talk at one time of a society moved forward by a bitter class struggle, and at another of the generally accepted theory that society is an evolving organism; they speak of forces which are tending to submerge the individual consciousness in the social, and defend a platform so intensely individualistic that it might have been written by Paine or Rousseau; their ideals are at once a super-state and a sort of abstract essence of humanity. Purposes and aims absolutely irreconcilable abound in the shape of party dogmas to such an extent that the real meaning of the socialistic movement has almost been lost sight of. It is impossible to rescue it from this confusion in a few words.

Taken in its vaguer sense, Socialism is a fast-moving evolution of thought and feeling away from the values created by the instincts we have previously examined toward those created by reason. Its real purpose is, thus, not to create a leaderless society, but to put in the foreground ethical and intellectual values which have been lost sight of; that is, to organize the race around the idea that the production of full and rich personalities constitutes the only intelligible end of evolution. The economic consequence of this would be a retardation of the rate of industrial progress, not only because of the operation of psychological restraints on the birth rate, but also because the freeing of a people from the tyranny of exclusively pursued economic ends would necessarily put a stop to the reckless expenditure of energy which has characterized the past. This is the admitted result when such a change of values takes place in the life of an individual; it cannot be otherwise when the same phenomenon occurs on a racial scale.

A state organized around this purpose could not, however, defend itself for more than two or three generations against more prolific types, pursuing contrary ideals. Consequently, the socialistic movement becomes an integral part of the world development toward universal peace; not only because its complete success is conditioned by the



international acceptance of its values, but also because world peace in turn depends upon the formal embodiment of those values in the institutions of all great nations. This does not involve, as some Socialists have presumed, that we must discard the nation as an active unit in society; only that it shall manifest itself in such a way that it will at all times function for the good of mankind, as generally recognized, by making its prime aim the production of complete and rounded personalities. Thus understood, evolution becomes a process by which individuals pass from primitive anarchy and communism, through societies so highly organized that they practically crush all personality, into a fuller freedom. If orthodox Socialism seems many times to deny this truth, it is merely because its aims are still obscure to most of its adherents. Maturity will bring a clearer vision.

We may now define the issue between nationalism and internationalism more sharply. All these collateral movements of which we have spoken—toward peace, toward the accentuation of intellectual and moral values, toward fewer and better babies, toward a new concept of duty—have this in common; that they are the result of the application of an individualistic viewpoint to the various aspects of social life. They have for their chief end the rescuing of personality from the crush of social forces by the bringing about of some reconciliation between the claims made upon man as a member of a particular race, as a member of the human race, and as an individual entitled to happiness and a certain degree of self-realization; and it is the two latter claims that are emphasized against the former. This, let us frankly admit, is a purely selfish end; to a sordid mind it may even become a sordid end, but noble minds transfigure it into a noble one. The same statement holds, it need hardly be said, with regard to the nationalistic set of values; so that the controversies which have been waged around this point are totally irrelevant to the real issue. What ends society shall pursue depend, of course, upon the manner in which the individual sees his self-interest, and

Lecky has laid bare the real distinction between the motives behind the antagonistic movements we are discussing when he made use of the phrase "enlightened self-interest." Naturally this does not commit one to a belief in the theory that man has been pursuing false ends through countless centuries; a Rousseau or Paine was defensible only before Darwin and Spencer. And we can to-day clearly understand that the purposes of Rationalism have been legitimized only by the international character of the development toward them.

Nevertheless, it remains strictly true that the magnificent sacrifices which marked the evolution of races in the past have been mostly involuntary, the results of the coercion of conditions engendered by the play of individual aims. Man, therefore, need be neither more nor less selfish in order to accept the aims of internationalism; he need only be more enlightened as to his own interests and thus more amenable to the influence of remoter considerations. We might as well speak of the altruistic qualities which led the primitive savages to organize, as to talk of a higher Christianity, manifested in conduct, being necessary for the success of internationalism. Obviously all that is required is the evolution of mental structures that are able to perceive the sacrifices involved in a society driven onwards by unregulated instincts and to modify their conduct accordingly. And if the inevitable consequence of this would be the taking of some of the meaning of evolutionary processes out of the future and placing it in the present, that is only what must be expected of a highly self-conscious society. In the past our instincts rightly made us the unwitting servants of the future; modern conditions make it possible for us to reshape our purposes, without proving traitor to our duty. That, concretely, is the ultimate justification of internationalism, considered in all its manifold and varying aspects.

The great defender of British Imperialism, in what is probably the most magnificent defence of war ever written, has finely stated:

Thus the great part which war has played in human history, in art, in poetry, is not, as Rousseau maintains, an arraignment of the human heart, not necessarily the blason of human depravity, but a testimony to man's limitless capacity for devotion to other ends than existence for existence's sake—his pursuit of an ideal perpetually.

This is inexpressibly beautiful; the interpretation by a noble mind of a past which has too often been given over to the sordid and superficial! Yet, after all, it leaves unanswered the two penetrating questions of internationalism: Are the aims of war any longer defensible? Will man submit to the conscious sacrifices which a state organized around an affirmative answer demands of him, not only on the battlefield but also in the peaceful pursuits of life, when the interests of the present are seen to lie clearly in another direction? One is inclined to think that the history of the past two hundred years furnishes a decisive answer. Above all, the ideals for which four great civilizations recently fought have been formally declared by their representatives to be those of world peace; and while I do not believe that we can now safely accept those ideals in their fullest implications, the goal is visible on the horizon. No single generation has ever made such large strides toward it as we have, for we have proved our right to travel on the road which leads to it by a devotion which has never been surpassed.

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## BOLSHEVISM: ITS RISE, DECLINE, AND—FALL?

VICTOR S. YARROS.

**"PRUSSIANISM** has been overthrown, discredited and destroyed," many liberal-minded people have been saying, but the democratic forces of the world are, or soon will be, confronted by another formidable and dangerous enemy—Bolshevism. We must, therefore, intelligently begin preparations for the next world war—war on this new foe, war for the defence of democracy and civil liberty.

It is true that Bolshevism is the bitter foe of democracy and liberty, but it is not true that it is a "new" foe, or that any special preparations are, or will be, necessary in order to oppose and defeat it. Bolshevism is merely one of the forms of Prussianism. If Prussianism is really crushed, then Bolshevism also is crushed, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. If, on the other hand, Bolshevism is a foe to reckon with, then Prussianism is still alive and full of vigor.

Prussianism has not yet been crushed, but the liberal and democratic forces in the world have the opportunity and the power to destroy it. It is being destroyed, but only as fast and as surely as genuine democracy, liberty and justice are being established and made secure. Bolshevism is being undermined and destroyed by the same means and the same operations. We are not called upon to carry on two wars, or to fight on two fronts; the war on Prussianism is also a war on Bolshevism.

It is the purpose of this paper to justify the foregoing affirmations. This involves an inquiry into the rise, decline and fall—yes, the absolutely certain fall—of Russian Bolshevism. Whatever superficial and ill-informed parlor or other "reds" may say, or think they think, about Bolshevism, the fact is that it is already an absolute failure, and that its days, in any scientific, fundamental sense, are known to be numbered, notwithstanding the

military and political successes of the Soviet government. Incidentally we shall distinguish between Bolshevism and what is loosely called, especially by hostile critics, "Sovietism," which is not synonymous with the former term at all. We shall distinguish between the essential and the non-essential or accidental features of Bolshevism, and perhaps remove certain misconceptions which account for the recent panic among some American officials which led to indiscriminating attacks on "radicals" of various types and which treated all Russian revolutionists in this country as dangerous "reds."

The future historian of revolutionary movements will have little difficulty in accounting for the rise and fall of Russian Bolshevism. The Bolshevik leaders themselves have furnished ample material whereon to base a firm, balanced judgment. Bolshevism is condemned out of its own mouth. It is condemned, further, by the very authority which it has falsely claimed to follow—that of Marx and his school of economics. It is condemned by the teachings of living Socialists of reputation and ability. It is condemned by the pre-war and pre-revolutionary writings of Mr. Lenin himself, the schoolmaster and intellectual leader of Bolshevism. Bolshevism, scientifically speaking, never had a leg to stand on, and the thoughtful, cultivated Socialists should have been among the first to disavow it. Only amazing ignorance of Russian history, Russian literature, Russian economic, social and educational conditions, accounts for the foolish sympathy which certain American radicals and Socialists have expressed for the insensate Bolshevik experiment in the primitive, backward, illiterate, divided and disorganized Slav hinterland of western Europe.

Nothing is more ludicrous and puerile than the notion that, while Bolshevism is impossible and undesirable in England, Germany, Belgium, France and America, it may, nevertheless, be "good for Russia." The real student of Socialist or radical economics and philosophy knows that exactly the reverse statement would be consonant with

such economics and philosophy. Bolshevism, if possible at all, may be deemed possible in highly developed industrial countries, where labor is organized, disciplined, conscious of its responsibilities as well as of its opportunities and interests, and where the consolidation and concentration of industrial power has proceeded far enough to render "socialization" of at least the basic, important industries a comparatively simple matter. That Russia, with her predominantly rural, peasant population, her crude and slight industrial development, her ignorant urban workmen, her dependence on foreign brains, technique and capital, and her small, ineffective "intelligencia"—that Russia could hope to lead the West in establishing Marxian Socialism, or Lenin Communism, is so fantastic and irrational an idea that a few years ago no Socialist organ or teacher of any pretension to weight or authority would have stopped even to discuss it. It would have been dismissed as an absurd idea conceived in complete ignorance of the elements of Socialist economics and Socialist interpretation of social evolution.

Let us quote a few sentences from the Socialist Bible, Marx's "Capital":

Along with the constantly diminishing number of magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all the advantages of this transformation [the application of science to industry, the socialization of the form of production through indirect co-operation, the internationalization of exchange and trade, etc.] grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery and exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalistic production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which has sprung up and flourished along with and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they *become incompatible with the capitalist integument*. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds.

Capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of nature, its own negation.—Vol. 1, pp. 836-837.

*Whenever a certain maturity is reached*, one definite social form is discarded and displaced by another. The time for the coming of this crisis is announced by the depth and breadth of the contradictions and antago-

nisms, which separate the conditions of distribution, and with them the definite historical form of the corresponding conditions of production, from the productive forces, their productivity and the development of their agencies. A conflict then arises between the material development of production and its social form.—Vol. 3, last page.

Here is a quotation from the Manifesto of the Communist party, written by Marx and F. Engels:

The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the laborers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to socialism. . . .

And here is a quotation from "A Summary of the Principles of Socialism," written by H. M. Hyndman and William Morris, and signed by all the members of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Federation of Great Britain:

We in England have arrived at the completest economic development. Our example, therefore, will guide and encourage the world. . . .

Only by collective superintendence of production and exchange, only by *the scientific organisation of labor at home and supply of markets abroad*, can our present anarchy be put an end to and a better system be allowed to grow up. . . . The very increase of companies, the very development of state management now going on, point out clearly the lines of necessary progress. (*Italics mine in all the quotations.*)

The foregoing quotations, which, of course, could be multiplied indefinitely from standard Socialist literature, classical and contemporary, sufficiently demonstrate the essential unsoundness and folly of Russian Bolshevism, which never was anything else than perverted, misapplied Marxian Socialism "in a hurry,"—Socialism prematurely and ruthlessly forced by fanatics and doctrinaires on a totally unprepared country, under conditions that, to sane minds, made any measure of success utterly impossible.

#### THE EVOLUTION OF BOLSHEVISM.

Let us next trace the history of Russian Bolshevism and attempt to account for the tragic episode.

It is, perhaps, not generally understood in the West that in Russia, since the era of reform under Alexander II,

practically every progressive or radical, and certainly every revolutionist, called himself a Socialist. Russia has had neither an individualist, anarchist, nor liberal movement of any importance. The exceptional personalities—like Bakounin, the anarchist, or Kropotkin, the anarchist-communist, or Professor Gradowsky, the liberal—only emphasized the prevailing tendencies to which they were in opposition. For several decades in Russia to say, “I am a radical” was to say, “I am a Socialist.” Why? To explain this fact, one must have considerable knowledge of Russian history. Suffice it to say that the Russian Village Mir and the Russian Artiel (co-operative wage workers’ society) have long been regarded as institutions socialistic in character, institutions that readily lent themselves to the changes necessary to convert them to complete Socialist uses. For decades many Russian thinkers and revolutionists maintained that their country could be spared many of the bitter struggles and sanguinary collisions which capitalist Western Europe was apparently destined to undergo in the process of transition to Socialism. While Russia could not exactly “skip,” or fully avoid, the stage of capitalism, in the opinion of these thinkers, she could reasonably expect to shorten it considerably, to profit by Europe’s experience and build on her own broad, national and democratic foundations. That the whole civilized world was marching fast toward Socialism, the Russian radicals assumed as a fact and never thought of questioning.

In the course of political development the Russian Socialists split. The Social-Democratic party was formed, and its tenets and methods diverged more and more from those of the Socialist-Revolutionists. The principal differences between these two parties were these:

The Socialist-Revolutionists’ platform was simple—“Land and Liberty.” This meant land for the peasants and city workers, with or without compensation to private owners—though *without* compensation to the Church and the Crown for the lands they possessed—and civil, religious and other liberty, in the Western sense, for the whole



population of Russia. The nationalization or socialization of the land was not to be forced, but in every way encouraged, the semi-Socialist Mir being used and developed gradually along Socialistic lines. The peasant landowners were not to be expropriated in obedience to any dogma, but they were to be educated to appreciate the Mir and its possibilities. Concern for the peasants, indeed, led to the Socialist-Revolutionists being called "Peasantists." The party made steady headway among the rural population of Central Russia and by some was incorrectly described as a peasant party. Constitutional liberty was highly prized and always emphasized by this party as the condition precedent to any other solid, lasting reform. It was willing to use terror as a means of forcing the blind, reactionary autocracy and bureaucracy to grant a constitution with all the basic political rights and immunities that implied. Liberty, or free institutions generally, were, however, to be utilized as the means of establishing socialism in industry by legislation, education and all other constitutional methods.

The Social-Democrats called themselves scientific and practical. They claimed to be the true disciples of Marx. They made their appeal to the city proletariat, as well as to the poorest elements of the peasantry who had so little land that they were forced to eke out of a living by seeking employment in factories during the winter season. The richer peasants, the professional classes and the intellectuals were severally regarded by the Social-Democrats as enemies of the social revolution.

The idea that Russia, by reason of her Mir, her Artiel, her semi-socialist traditions, could hope largely to escape the capitalist phase of evolution, or to shorten it, was definitely abandoned by the Social-Democrats as Utopian, sentimental and non-evolutional. Lenin, the leader of the Social-Democrats, vigorously assailed this old notion and insisted that capitalism was the necessary preliminary to Socialism in Russia, as elsewhere, and that the part of wisdom for the true Socialist was to co-operate with evolution

by accelerating the trend toward capitalism. The Russian Mir, with the communal ownership of land, was, according to Lenin, a nuisance, an obstacle to progress. Let the tendencies to peasant proprietorship, as well as to big landed estates, be encouraged rather than resisted. Capitalism contains the seed of its own destruction, and the enlightened, "objective" Socialist has no quarrel with capitalism *per se*, so long as it unconsciously paves the way to Socialism by creating, educating and organizing the proletariat, as well as by consolidating industry and making it ripe for ultimate socialization on Marxian lines.

For a decade or more the Social-Democratic party fought the Socialist-Revolutionists vigorously on these issues. But during this period differences of opinion developed within the Social-Democratic party itself. These differences finally caused a split. The majority faction called itself Bolsheviki—this being Russian for "the majority"—and the minority faction became known as Mensheviki—again, this being Russian for "the minority element." The principal issue between these two wings of the same party related to the treatment of the richer peasant and the "intellectuals." The Mensheviki had, and have now, more in common with the Socialist-Revolutionists than with the Bolsheviki.

While the autocratic régime, but slightly tempered by the reforms of the disturbed period that followed the crushing defeat of Russia's military and naval forces in the war with Japan, continued to suppress and stifle free discussion of Russia's needs and problems, the indicated differences of radical opinion could not be explained to the uneducated Russians in popular language. Scientific works for and against Marxian, or Bolshevik, economics were produced, published and read even in Russia; but they were intended for a very small minority. It was a criminal offence even to belong to the Social-Democratic or the Socialist-Revolutionist party, and the adherents of either of these parties that managed to get themselves elected to the Duma enjoyed few and limited opportunities of ex-

pounding their views. Many of them were arrested and tried for treason. Their addresses in the Duma could not be printed in any newspaper outside of Petrograd—and the addresses could not always appear in the newspapers of the capital, the very seat of the Duma.

The world war came, the autocracy and bureaucracy of Russia once more revealed their miserable inefficiency and their corruption and infamy. The revolution of 1917 was inevitable. It was not the result of underground plots or activities. It was a mass movement. The peasants were as ready for it as were the city workers. Autocracy was hopelessly discredited. If any of the conservative or moderate or liberal statesmen, or members of the Duma, indulged, at the time of the "political" revolution of March, 1917, the hope of saving the Autocracy, or the economic system on which it in part rested, they were gravely mistaken, strangely blind. Under no circumstances would it have been possible by any combination of groups, or by any stratagems, to prevent the political revolution from gradually assuming the character and complexion of a *social* revolution. All apologies for the blunders and excesses of Bolshevism that are based on the distinction between the "political revolution" that the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals contemplated and favored, and the social revolution that the interests of the peasants and wage workers demanded, and which the Bolsheviki alone, forsooth, were determined to bring about, are simply untrue and unsound. They may deceive the ignorant foreign radicals who "are not Bolshevik, but"—they have not deceived intelligent Russians or foreign students of Russian history and Russian conditions.

To quote at this point from a letter of Prince P. Kropotkin, the Russian savant and revolutionist, to George Brandes:

. . . You know how criminal toward all social progress in Europe was, in my opinion, the attitude of those who worked to disorganize the Russian power of resistance—which prolonged the war by a year, gave us a German invasion under cover of a treaty, and cost seas of blood to prevent victorious Germany from crushing Europe under its imperial boot.

If Kropotkin had thought that the revolution of March, 1917, would remain merely political—that is, superficial and limited to forms of government and slight attempts at ameliorating the lot of the masses—he would not condemn the Bolshevik attitude toward the Allies and the war as “criminal toward all social progress.” It was in truth criminal because it retarded social progress instead of accelerating it.

But to resume the narrative. The first revolutionary or provisional government of Russia was not sufficiently radical or representative. It did not last and could not have lasted. The Lvov cabinet, although it planned and even undertook many important reforms, did not command the confidence of the militant radical elements or of the suspicious and expectant peasantry whose one thought was—*Land at last*. This fact necessitated the reorganization of the ministry and the appointment of a Socialist, Kerensky, as premier. The Kerensky cabinet was not strong in personnel, but it was sufficiently radical and representative. The Bolshevik indictments of it, when closely examined by persons entitled to express opinions on the subjects, lack substance or foundation of fact. The Kerensky cabinet would have wrestled earnestly with the land problem, the factory problem and the other economic problems of Russia. Weak ministers would have made way for bold and courageous ones. But the alliance with the Entente would have been continued, and Russia would have stayed in the war, doing little, perhaps, in the field, but furnishing invaluable moral support to the Allied cause and helping to undermine Prussianism.

The Bolshevik campaign against the Kerensky government was a campaign of doctrinaires and fanatics, of self-styled internationalists, ruthless enemies of capitalism, of “bourgeois” policies and half-way measures. The Bolshevik leaders believed that the great social revolution, that was to overthrow all bourgeois and capitalistic systems, including what they called the sham democracy of America, was at hand, and that it was their bounden duty and un-

precedented privilege to give the old order the *coup de grace* and usher in the Marxian Socialist system. What they themselves had said and written concerning Russia's backwardness and unpreparedness for Socialism was forgotten or dismissed as irrelevant and inapplicable to the unforeseen situation. Russia, the Bolshevik leaders thought, happened to find herself at the head of an international procession. Leadership had been thrust upon her; she was not to remain long in a dangerous, though splendid, isolation. The revolution would spread with amazing rapidity. Italy, France, Germany, Austria, Hungary were on the eve of tremendous upheavals. The prospects were glorious; to hesitate, then, would be criminal.

Only as regards Britain and the United States did the Bolshevik doctrinaires admit some anxious doubts. Lenin himself, the schoolmaster of Bolshevism, was frank enough to recognize the strength and stability of capitalism in these two countries. They might resist the inevitable for some time and cause certain complications. But, of course, Russia would not be the only victim of such complications. At any rate, the anticipated resistance of England and America, the last strongholds of capitalism and plutocracy, should not deter Russia from crossing the Rubicon and sounding the trumpet to rally those nations that were ready for the final contest with the bankrupt social order!

We know what the course of developments has been. Hungary—or, rather, Budapest and its immediate hinterland—tried Bolshevism for a short time. A triple crisis, and particularly the fierce opposition of the peasant population and the middle classes, put an end to that experiment. Germany and Austria had short-lived revolutions, but Bolshevism hardly ventured to show its head in either country. Lenin and his associates now frankly admit that the social revolution in western Europe has somehow been checked and postponed. The German Social-Democrats, instead of holding out hope and encouragement to Bolshevism, are disavowing even the purpose of undertaking limited experiments in Marxian Socialism. All they

are contemplating is the enforcement of some legislation giving the wage-workers a voice in the management of industry. The fear of militarist and monarchical reaction is profound and widespread in Germany. The republican and democratic régime is frail and insecure. Advanced as German industry is, the German workmen, organized and unorganized, are not ready to take over the industries and manage them efficiently. The middle class has not disappeared, nor has it been reduced to negligible proportions. To attempt too much, under the circumstances facing the Socialist minority, is to court complete failure and triumphant counter-revolution.

Even in Italy, where for many months the unrest in the army and the disaffection among the wage workers appeared to threaten revolution, the sympathy with Bolshevism is purely platonic. The Italian Socialists, judging by the tactics and attitude of the 156 Socialist deputies in the national parliament, are aware that the country will not support extreme measures. The Catholics, the liberals, the independents and the minor groups, though weak when divided, would, if driven to unite by the menace of expropriation and communism, find sufficient strength to make a successful defence of private property and civil liberty. The solid Socialist delegation in the Italian parliament is not pressing any radical measures, being content to await the logic of events, meantime accepting small concessions from the bourgeois and nationalist government.

Since, then, there is to be no world social revolution in the immediate or near future, and since the Lenin-Trotsky summons is to fall on deaf ears, what are the prospects of Bolshevism in Russia?

Let one of the Bolshevik leaders, Max Litvinoff, who has been negotiating with the small Baltic states as well as with diplomatic agents of England and Scandinavian governments, answer this crucial question. In a statement published by him at Stockholm, Litvinoff said:

At present we are compelled to take a temporary transitory middle course between capitalism and communism. Full communism is possible

only if other countries accept the same economic basis. *They will either follow our example, or if Russia is before her time she will have to revert to capitalism.*

The Bolshevik leaders know full well *now* that "Russia is before her time" and that "she will have to revert to capitalism." There is not a single intelligent, sober-minded observer who, after a study of the economic, social and moral conditions in Russia, has not reached this conclusion. Thus the able correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, a faithful and consistent organ of genuine English liberalism, wrote recently in summing up his personal impressions of Russia: "The Bolsheviks set out to establish communism; in this they have failed." They have failed utterly in the villages, for the peasants would fight like tigers against state ownership and control of the land. *The Bolshevik land policy collapsed at the first touch of reality, of peasant psychology.* Land is private property in Russia, and will remain such for decades, at least. To what extent the Bolshevik doctrines have already been modified in the banks, factories, mines and stores which were confiscated after the coup of November, 1917, the outside world is not fully informed. But that compromises and concessions have been made to the bourgeois intellectuals, to the unregenerate captains of industry whose services were indispensable, is denied by no one. That more concessions are expected, and indeed promised, is also generally known.

Russia's natural resources have scarcely been touched, and she has no capital with which to develop them. American and British capital is openly sought by Bolshevik chiefs, and all manner of franchises and grants are as openly promised. Foreign capitalists and entrepreneurs are to be allowed to carry on business in the "capitalistic" way—to issue securities, pay interest and dividends, and hire workers in the open market, subject only to such restrictions as national labor laws may impose.

It is hardly necessary to labor the point that the bids now being made for a reasonable peace with capitalistic

countries and for loans and credits by capitalistic syndicates involve the recognition of the impossibility of adhering to communism—or to Marxian Socialism modified by the Slav temperament. The Bolshevik leaders know that they have failed, and that their “social revolution” was as premature as it was disastrous to Russia.

In the letter of Prince Kropotkin already quoted from, there occurs this sentence: “The Bolsheviks strive to introduce by the dictatorship of a fraction of the Social-Democratic party the socialization of the soil, of industry and of commerce. Unhappily, the method by which they seek to impose in a strongly centralized state a communism resembling that of Babeuf—thereby paralyzing the constructive work of the people—that method makes success absolutely impossible, and is paving the way to a furious and vicious reaction.”

This is what thousands of Russian intellectuals, including Socialists of several schools, have been saying for two years past. This is what the informed and mature European and American radicals have been saying. The misdirected, hysterical sympathy of certain American self-styled radicals and democrats for Bolshevism is a puzzling phenomenon. It argues inability to think and to understand. It argues profound ignorance of the elements of revolutionary philosophy and also a certain insincerity and intellectual dishonesty.

Bolshevism is Prussianism, and it must fail exactly as Prussianism failed, and for the same reason. Its method was fatal, its philosophy anti-democratic, anti-humanitarian, illiberal.

The future of civilization does not depend on any “ism,” and the ruthless attempt of a handful of doctrinaires to impose Marxian Socialism on Russia was particularly fatuous. But there can be little doubt of the fact that the world-wide Socialist movement, which has undergone many changes and is likely to undergo further changes, will furnish many hints and ideas to the solution of our social-economic problems. There is but little doubt that capi-



talism will ultimately be superseded and replaced by a co-operative system of production and distribution, and that the wage relation will be replaced by a relation of copartnership—a relation that reduces friction to a minimum and stimulates effort for the common good. If the civilized and advanced countries exhibit a disposition to adopt co-operation, or what may perhaps be called voluntary Socialism, Russia, with her Mir and Artel, may confidently be expected to make rapid progress in that same direction. The Bolshevik error was in supposing that Russia, under the lash of a dictatorship for the proletariat but not of it, could be forced to swallow Marxian Socialism, successfully operate its machinery and institutions and thus give the world a convincing object lesson.

Russia will revert to capitalism, but only to renew her slow, gradual, evolutionary advance toward co-operative industry. She will march with, if somewhat behind, western Europe and America, but not necessarily very far behind. Those of her thinkers were right who have maintained that she might shorten the process of transformation by utilizing her peculiar institutions, on the one hand, and, on the other, by studying the developments and readjustments of more advanced nations.

#### THE SOVIET SYSTEM.

But will Bolshevism contrive to save the so-called Soviet form of government, which manifestly has no close connection with communism? The interest in and the admiration for the Soviet system are not unnatural. The essence of that system is "functional representation," or, as the Guild Socialists of England would put it, "functional democracy." To the Soviets, local, provincial and central, men and women are sent, not because they profess certain opinions, or because they belong to certain parties, but because they pursue certain vocations or work in certain useful industries. This system is supposed to yield a better quality of representation, to keep mere politicians, windbags and trimmers out of public life, and to make

the legislative bodies responsible, efficient, dignified and independent.

We know that the question of improving representative government—which at times has broken down even with us Americans—has been under discussion for decades; that functional representation is not a Bolshevik idea; that Anglo-Saxon writers have suggested again and again that at least one of the legislative chambers—the Senate, with us, for example—should be composed of direct representatives of industries, trades, professions and recognized interests, instead of, as now, of lawyers and professional politicians that are supposed to represent the population at large. We know that functional representation has been studied with sympathy along with such other means of improving governmental machinery as the referendum, the recall, proportional representation, and the like.

There is no reason why Russia should not lead the West in experiments with functional representation. True, she needs this system less than we do, for her population is industrially more homogeneous, and under any plan of democratic government her peasants would dominate her provincial and national legislative bodies. Still, this feature of the Soviet system is not unsound and is fairly attractive. It is certain to develop evils and weaknesses of its own under normal conditions and severe tests, and the present writer is disposed to think that proportional representation, plus the referendum and recall, is preferable to the strict plan of functional representation. This, however, is not the place to argue this point.

To sum up: Everything characteristic of Bolshevism is wrong, unscientific and impossible. Bolshevism is Prussianism in another form. It is equally opposed to democracy, to liberty, to evolution. It is merely the substitution of the tyranny of the Agnostic and Socialist Lenin for that of the monarchist and orthodox Nicholas Romanoff. Lenin is sincere—so was Romanoff.

The world will not be saved by benevolent tyrants—of

any school. It will be saved by trial and error under forms of government that permit the fullest discussion, the greatest freedom for social and economic adventures, for individual and minority departures, and the amplest scope for experiments compatible with reasonable stability of the social structure. Revolutions, so-called, are incidents and accidents. A momentous change—the establishment of co-operative industry—comparable only with the transition from feudalism to capitalism, is not to be effected by explosions of bad temper and anger, though such explosions may occur. Just as all ways led to Rome, so in our time all ways lead, and will for decades and perhaps centuries continue to lead, to co-operative industry and industrial democracy. A hundred forces and factors will contribute to the great social revolution. The tragic chapter written by Bolshevism into the annals of modern society has but served to emphasize the futility and absurdity of reform under a rigid formula by catastrophic and violent leaps at the command of stern and unbending autocrats.

The Allies, including America, have not known how to combat Bolshevism. They have not understood this singular phenomenon. They have charged the Bolshevik leaders with pro-Germanism, and have adopted measures—the blockade, the “sanitary cordon” of small, anti-Bolshevik principalities, aid to various military dictators and counter-revolutionists—that, instead of weakening Bolshevism, have brought it strength and prolonged its life. Some of the blunders of the Allied governments may be explicable and even natural. But the fact remains that Allied policy has not had the effects that were intended. Bolshevism cannot be destroyed by bayonets or by blockades. It can be destroyed only by free discussion, by free intercourse with the West, by the release of the industrial and moral forces within Russia herself that are opposed to tyranny and violence. Russia is not Bolshevik and under normal conditions Bolshevism would long since have been overthrown there. Give Russia goods, capital and vital contact with the West, and the whole Bolshevik fabric must collapse.

Meantime the anti-Bolshevik movement in the United States is assuming the character of a panic. Anti-sedition laws of the vaguest and most dangerous sort are demanded; deportations of ignorant aliens whose foolish talk is unworthy of attention are making martyrs and "refugees" by the hundred. Free speech is menaced, and the post-office is being used to create a peace-time censorship of the most stupid and intolerable kind. In short, Prussian methods are adopted or proposed in democratic America to fight Prussianism. Where is our faith in liberty, in discussion, in common sense and in the virtue of historically developed institutions that on the whole fit our conditions and our needs and that, despite all crude, silly agitation, will be modified only so far and so fast as our conditions and needs change?

Democracy has but one enemy—to repeat—and to fight this enemy with anti-democratic weapons is to surrender to him. The most searching criticisms of democracy will do it infinitely less harm than a single act of injustice toward its critics. The advocacy of violence and crime cannot be permitted, and the physical-force revolutionists who attack officials or individual capitalists may properly be restrained or punished. But to suppress the books or the organs of radical groups because they *advocate* communism, anarchy, syndicalism, or guild socialism as systems preferable to ours is to evince distrust of genuine democracy and to violate its basic principles.

We want and need the opinions of the "reds," nay of the reddest of the reds—provided the expression of opinions does not degenerate into the direct encouragement and propaganda of crime.

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## COMMERCIALIZATION—INCREASING OR DECREASING?

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS.

**C**OMMERCIALIZATION is the increasing subjection of any calling or function to the profits motive. Normally this motive has a large and legitimate part to play in society. To it we appeal in order to call into being the myriad forms of industry and commerce necessary to provide for the wants of the public. Even here, however, it may govern only in a general way. In each particular transaction it should find counterpoise in the desire to keep faith with the patron by supplying only honest goods and loyal services. In a bearer of responsibility, however, such as clergyman, teacher, judge, official, artist and journalist, it is expected that lust of gain will be quite subordinated to the obligation to render a vital service or discharge an essential function.

Into the production of a good or a service may enter various motives which hold the profits motive in check, viz., 1. Pleasure in creative activity; 2. Pride in the perfection of one's product; 3. Accepted standards of technical excellence which forbid the putting forth of a ware or a service which falls below a certain degree of merit; 4. Abhorrence of sham or humbug in one's work. Desire to render loyal service, to market genuine goods; 5. Solicitude for the welfare of the customer or patron prompting one to refuse to supply him with that which will disappoint, defraud or harm him; 6. Doing one's work as a service to society.<sup>1</sup>

There is commercialization when the profits motive gains the upper hand of these nobler motives. In case the rela-

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<sup>1</sup> i.e., acting on the principle of Comte: "Every person who lives by any useful work should be habituated to regard himself not as an individual working for his own private benefit, but as a public functionary working for the benefit of society; and to regard his wages of whatever sort as the provision made by society to enable him to carry on his labor."

tions between producer and consumer, or between server and served, continue in the same intimacy, the profits motive will not play a greater rôle unless the motives which limit it are weakened. In such a case commercialization would be the result and proof of moral decay.

Now, in contemporary society there is no general moral decay. Using the ancient test relations as a dial face, the onward movement in humanity, sympathy and charity is most cheering. In the treatment of children, of women, of the aged, of dependents, of convicts, of aliens, of underlings, of the weaker race or class by the stronger race or class, the improvement in our times is beyond all question. Nor are we in doubt as to the causes of this rapid humanization. With the vanishing of personal encounter, the passing of judicial torture, branding, stocks, pillory, whipping post and cart's tail, the renouncing of flogging and keel-hauling in the navy, the vanishing of public executions, the abandonment of cock-fighting and bear-baiting, the outlawry of prize fighting, the restraining of brutal teamsters, the substitution of electricity for the horse, the removal of the diseased, maimed and misshapen from the streets to public institutions, the feelings are no longer calloused as of yore and human good will is able to assert itself with its original native force.

The encroachment of the profits motive in our time is, therefore, not chargeable to moral decay. It is a consequence of certain transformations which have occurred in our economic relations:

#### I.

(1) Greater social distance between producer and consumer: Less and less often nowadays is the user of one's ware a concrete known person to whom one feels a sense of responsibility. One's product passes out into that vague mass, the "public," and there is lost to view. Hence, the baker who kneads "chalk and alum and plaster" into his loaf may be no miscreant, after all, for he cannot know just who will eat that loaf or what gripe it will give him. Only a villain would fit out an unsuspecting customer with a life pre-

server filled with sawdust instead of cork; but the manufacturers who a few years ago were found to be equipping excursion steamers with these spurious "life preservers" may have been far from moral monsters. They were supplying their treacherous wares not to men and women, but to "the market."

The corporate form of business organization thrusts apart producers and consumers. The stockholders on whose behalf iniquity is done do not consciously will it. It is not their wish that children should be worn out for them, or workmen maimed in avoidable industrial accidents, or consumers defrauded, or the public taste corrupted. They instigate such wickedness only because they know not what they do when they clamor for dividends and blindly support the management which has increased dividends. Their avarice is reflected in the conduct of the business, but not their good will.

Not only does incorporation take personal responsibility out of business relations, but every year sees more savings banks, trust companies and insurance companies come between industrial concerns and those who provide the money. This makes it still more difficult for the conscience of the latter to influence the management.

Nevertheless, when a corporation becomes so large that it fills a place in the public eye, it develops a sense of responsibility of its own. Its volume of output is so great that its products must be well spoken of everywhere. Hence, it strives for excellence and sincerity in its goods and acts on the maxim, "the satisfied customer is the best advertisement." Owing to its conspicuousness it is sensitive to public opinion. It feels obliged to maintain a reputation so good that it can draw into its service men of the highest character. Its treatment of labor is so well-known among workingmen that if it acquires a bad name it will be unable to attract labor of the best quality. Therefore, the great corporations take the lead not only in square-dealing with the customer, but in looking after the safety, health and welfare of their employees.

(2) The growing differentiation between principals and subordinates: In large concerns the men at the top may adopt with impunity greedy policies which they well know cannot be carried out without deceit or corruption. They would not do such dirty work themselves, but they require others to do it. Upon their subordinates they impose the obligation to get "results," but are very careful not to learn of the crooked means by which alone the "results" they insist on may be obtained. The veins of business like the veins of the body have valves, their purpose being to check the return flow to the principals of knowledge of the odious practices and the blistering tirades to which the policies they insist on give rise. Safe behind their cordon of underlings they instigate crimes which they lack the nerve to commit in the open.

(3) The increasing prominence of capital in the practice of an art or profession tends to subordinate artistic or professional conscience to profit: This is illustrated in the commercialization of the stage. As the theater-going public becomes accustomed to more sumptuous and costly stage effects, the actor-manager gives way to the capitalist-manager. The actor-manager is dominated by the idea of "elevating the stage," of making the drama a great and uplifting social force. His master-dream is to present Shakespere and "Shakespere spells ruin." Great actors like Booth and Irving pass their lives either as "stars" accumulating a fortune, or as managers squandering it in giving the public drama finer than it is willing to pay for. But with the greater costliness of theatrical production the capitalist-manager comes to the fore, while the successful actor, even the greatest, remains throughout his career an employee. Generally this type of producer tries to see not how high one dare go, but how low one dare go. Ideals and social aims are contemptuously kicked out of the theatrical business. The only question is "What will the Public like?" and this is answered frequently by a vulgar avaricious man who has no comprehension of what the public will like *in the long run* and no idea that the taste



of the public admits of being educated upward as well as downward.

(4) The profits motive and the newspaper: In newspaper publishing the capital factor gains constantly on the service factor, with the result that less and less is the editor-owner able to hire the capital he needs, while more and more the owner is a capitalist who hires the editors he needs. The capitalist owner is likely to run the newspaper as a pure "business proposition," i.e., as he would run a theater or a hotel, and less often than the editor-owner does he see it as a great social instrumentality. Furthermore, the newspaper is a peculiar undertaking in that it unites two services altogether different,—the purveyance of news and opinions and the sale of publicity in the form of advertising. The former is a responsible public service, the latter the marketing of a ware. Now, constantly the share of the newspaper's receipts from advertising grows while the receipts from readers and subscribers dwindle. Speaking broadly, advertisers yield the newspapers three times as much financial support as their readers. There are numerous indications that the advertisers are waking up to the fact that they hold the whip hand and are exercising an increasing censorship over the newspapers—a censorship which is secret, of course, for a journal known to be controlled loses its readers and therewith its value to the advertiser. Most significant is the way in which during the war the newspapers, in order to please their advertisers, preached "Business as usual," when, for the sake of the Liberty loans, they should have preached "Nothing as usual."

Thus it happens that, although the social mission of the newspaper was never so widely recognized as now, although nearly forty schools and courses for journalism have been established within fifteen years, the clandestine prostitution of the newspaper to the business interests has never been so general. With the proportion of receipts from advertising creeping up each year, the newspaper is coming to be an advertising circular carrying reading matter,

rather than a news medium carrying advertising. The situation will get worse until society treats the newspaper as a public utility in need of regulation and restricts its rôle as seller of publicity. If newspapers were not allowed to derive more than a modest proportion of their total income from advertising, they would cost us more but they would tell more truth.

(5) The "corporation collar": When a lawyer sits in his office and causes are brought to him, he can choose which to undertake. But a large business finds itself in need of a continuous supply of legal services and therefore retains a lawyer to look after its interests in all cases which may involve it. Such a relation saps his moral independence for, even if his client's cause is unjust, he is obliged to stand for it under penalty of losing his employment. Against his conscience he may be required to defend all suits brought by injured workmen or for violation of the anti-child labor laws and to prosecute malicious eviction suits against striking tenants of company houses. Thus the practice of law becomes a mere tool of business and the lawyer's work is cut out for him by the business man. As the proportion of lawyers who accept corporation service grows, the chances are poorer for the independent attorneys who take only the cases they believe in.

(6) The profits motive in art: It is said that half or more of the statuary made in the United States is not carved by the man who signs it. Sculptors of reputation sign the product of young unknown men reaping for themselves the proceeds and the honor. "Monument associations" interpose themselves between sculptor and public. They have agents in the field soliciting contributions for the erection of a statue for some famous man or event. An open competition will be announced, with a prize for the best model submitted, but the association sees to it that the prize goes to the model submitted by some young sculptor in its employ.

(7) The commercialization of amusement and recreation: Formerly young folks' fun was not catered, but was

self-made, home-made, church-made, or school-made. In the home there was the inevitable chaperonage of the old folks amiably looking on. Entertainments held in the school-house ordinarily were supervised by the teacher and, in any case, the school trustees were in the background as board of censors. Other social gatherings were sponsored by the church or by some daughter organization. Now, the habit of contenting one's self with amateur amusement is dying out. Thanks to good roads and automobiles the country young people are turning from their home-bred fun to the professional amusement makers to be enjoyed in the town. Since the art of entertainment has become specialized, the church no longer exercises in matters of recreation the initiative and supervision she once had. Less and less is she able to compete with the regular places of amusement, while her ban on dancing and theater-going has become a dead-letter.

In a word, as never before, recreation is being supplied for money. The danger of this is that commercial recreation tends to become a means for the economic and moral exploitation of the young. It is in the nature of play and amusement to tend upward or tend downward. In case they are catered and without regulation, they tend downward, because more money can be extracted from young people by offering them the high-flavored, the *risqué*, the sensational, than by offering them the pure and elevating. The conscience of the individual amusement-caterer is well-nigh a negligible factor, for if he is restrained by scruples he will be forced out of business by a less scrupulous rival. In this field the man without conscience is "fittest."

Some benefit, no doubt, is to be had from the regulation of commercial amusements, *e.g.*, the censoring of shows and motion films and the supervision of public dance halls. The only policy, however, which holds much promise is the communal provision of recreation. This is why in the last twenty years there has been a wonderful expansion of the facilities provided by institutional churches, the Young Men's Christian Association, the Young Women's Chris-

tian Association, the social settlements, the social centers, the recreation centers, the public playgrounds and the public libraries. Society has resolved not to abandon this field to Mammon.

Were there space one might go on to show the commercialization of the saloon (which was the real cause of the adoption of national prohibition); of prostitution; of sport and inter-collegiate athletics (save where a strong barrier has been raised); of immigration from Europe by the transport companies; and of war scares and military preparedness by the munition-makers.

## II.

While, however, the profits motive has made these encroachments in our time, let no one suppose that this motive has always had a career of triumphant aggression. The fact is, social history is strewn with discarded commercialisms. One might almost sum up the moral side of social progress as the expulsion of the profits motive from parts of the social order where it has no business to be.

(1) De-commercialized mating: At one time the father without consulting his daughter disposed of her hand to the highest bidder. Sometimes, as among the Tekke Turcomans today, when the daughter's services are very remunerative to the father, he names a bride-price so high that she goes through life without a mate!<sup>1</sup> A century ago in in Servia, what with purchase price and presents to members of the bride's family, a wife became so dear that "many a poor fellow was unable to marry at all." Finally a price-fixing law was passed restricting payment for a bride to one ducat. A common result of wife purchase has been that the rich old men monopolize youth and beauty while the younger and poorer men have only hags. On the other hand, in some societies a "marriage portion" has been expected with the bride, so that the portionless girls go husbandless.

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<sup>1</sup> For the effect of the great demand for "Bokhara" rugs in handicapping Turcoman maids in the matrimonial market see Ross, "Russia in Upheaval," end of Chapter V, "The Rug Market at Merv."

In olden times an approved philanthropy was to provide poor girls with marriage portions. In the folk tales the crowning proof of romantic love was the lover's willingness to take his sweetheart without a portion. It is but a quarter of a century since Westermarck wrote, "In our days a woman without a marriage portion, unless she has some great natural attraction, runs the risk of being a spinster forever." How remote all such huckstering seems! Probably at no stage of civilization has mating been so free from the taint of avarice as in America today.

(2) De-commercialized religion: When the religion of sacrifice prevailed a man won divine favor in proportion to his contributions to the god. The petitioner who offered the richer sacrifice believed that the god would surely be on his side. The unseen powers were supposed to bestir themselves more for the rich man who could offer a hecatomb than for the poor wight who could offer only a dove. This type of religion however was displaced by faiths like those of Jesus and Mahomet which make God's favor depend on the *heart* of the worshipper rather than on his *sacrifice*. Jesus' parable of the widow's mite is a landmark in the humanizing of religion.

With the conviction that the petitioner does well to have his sacrifice and request offered by an expert, a wide door was opened to making money out of religion. Originally the priest was a pray-er. He knew just what formulas, postures, and gestures to use under the given conditions. By such means he could *compel* the god to do his will. Naturally he would not exercise this mystic power on behalf of the worshipper without pay, any more than an attorney will plead his client's cause without fee. So the priest charged a stiff price for his services and grew wealthy. In Homer's time the priests drank the finest dark wine of which he knew. It is a far cry from this to the Christian priest exercising his functions under responsibility and bound to serve the poor without fee,—farther yet to the Protestant and Mohammedan conception of a clergy who are pastors and edifiers, but not intermediaries between the

soul and God. About the close of the second century Tertullian declared that in heathenism the very gods are for sale, that no one is admitted free of charge to the knowledge of the gods. A fee is exacted for room in the temple, for even admittance thereto. Among Christians on the contrary, "no market value is set on anything in our religion. We have indeed boxes for offerings . . . contributions, however, are not compulsory but spontaneous."

(3) De-commercialized government: It was customary for the Roman state to farm out its taxes rather than collect them by the hand of its own servants. Syndicates bid against one another for the right to collect a particular tax in a certain province for a term of years. The contract with the censor fixed the rate at which the publican or tax gatherer could collect, but there was little to restrain the practice of extortion. Only the powerful could profit by the subject's right to appeal to the governor. "Wherever the tax gatherers penetrate," says Livy, "there is no justice or liberty for anyone." "Imagine," writes Cicero, "what is the fate of our allies in the remoter provinces when even in Italy I hear the complaints of Roman citizens." Among the Jews the publicans could not enter a court of law to give testimony, nor fill offices of judicature, nor engage in public prayers. No money was to be changed at their treasury, their contributions to charity were not accepted and they were ranked with thieves and murderers.

About the close of the seventeenth century the French Crown began to sell to sixty "farmers-general" the right to collect the indirect taxes. Adam Smith describes their profits as "exorbitant" and the collection as "wasteful and expensive." Commenting on the fact that their cruel methods often led to bloody conflicts, he remarks: "Those who consider the blood of the people as nothing, in comparison with the revenues of princes, may, perhaps, approve of this method of levying taxes." When the Convention met it prosecuted the farmers-general as enemies of the people and guillotined thirty-five of them. Amidst

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general execration, the system fell after an existence of nearly a century.

Farming out the poor is another instance of handling public responsibility as a business transaction. A hundred years ago a report on the state of the poor in Massachusetts observes that where there is no almshouse the poor are "disposed of by the overseers in several ways":

1. The overseers farm them out at stipulated prices to contractors who are willing to receive and keep them on condition of getting what labor they can out of the paupers.

2. Relief is afforded to the poor at their own habitations.

3. The poor are sold at auction—the meaning of which is that he who will support them for the lowest price becomes their keeper; and it often happens of course, that the keeper is himself almost a pauper before he purchases, and adopts this mode in order not to fall a burden upon the town. Thus he and another miserable human being barely subsist upon what would hardly comfortably maintain himself alone—a species of economy much boasted of by some of the town officers and purchasers of paupers."

This report concludes:

1. That the poor when farmed out or sold were frequently treated with barbarity and neglect.

2. That the education and morals of the children of paupers—except in almshouses—were almost wholly neglected. They grew up in filth, idleness, ignorance and disease, and many became early candidates for the prison or the grave.

Until half a century ago commissions in the British army were private property. The officer bought his commission and when he was done with it he sold it for the highest price he could obtain. The capable, experienced officer could be jumped over in promotion by a mere youth. The high cost of a commission excluded members of the lower and middle classes from desirable places in the army and made the command of her Majesty's troops a prerogative of the aristocracy. This class privilege was

extinguished by paying the owners of commissions \$35,000,-000 in compensation.

The aggressions of the profits motive today are, then, but an eddy in a great current which has borne us farther and farther from the practice of purchase. That in modern society love, salvation, clerical ministrations, protection, justice, education, access to the professions, access to the public service, promotion, and recognition, are generally to be had on a basis of need or desert, instead of price, is owing to numerous triumphs over commercialism by the spirit of good will, justice and democracy.

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## SOME FUTURE ISSUES IN THE SEX PROBLEM.

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**F**OR any organized social movement which, in order to increase its ultimate effectiveness, expects to carry with it the impedimenta of conservative opinion and support, it may in general be wise not to cross bridges until they are reached. Like a modern army, some social movements lay siege to a whole battle front, and no unit can be forced ahead too far without weakening or breaking the line. But aeroplanes are constantly flying far over the terrain to be invaded, to test the range of guns, to watch the enemy's movements, to correlate the armies, to guide strategy. A strategist often has to assume the success of his present campaigns in calculating his objectives and the necessity of future moves.

To apply the metaphor to the task of social hygiene, we have a right and a duty to look ahead—though it may be a generation, or a century,—to the completion of the most active present drives in the sex problem, and to ask, what then? Are we through? Have we got what we want? Are we likely to get it? Would we rather have something else? If so, why? If not, why not? And what is to be done about it?

The classical economist was wont to simplify his economic problems and social prophecies by segregating and combining hypothetically, certain recognized factors; and deducing the results under assumed conditions. For purposes of analysis and for the isolation of tendencies this procedure has real usefulness. Let us, so far as possible, apply the method to the social situation here considered, first naming certain active factors, and then assuming them to be permanently effective, inquiring the result upon other more passive conditions.

The writer will endeavor to show that the net tendency

of many present forces is toward a loosening of orthodox sex morality based on fear of results, and that research is necessary to secure a basis in fact for the positive sanctions which will be necessary for any ultimately effective education in sex morals.

## I.

The most conspicuous and successful efforts of the more conservative social hygiene agencies at present seem to be (1) for the control of venereal disease, and (2) for the suppression of commercialized vice and elimination of professional prostitution.

Thus far outside of the organized social hygiene movement, but almost as obvious and ultimately none the less important, are (3) the so-called "birth-control" movement, (4) the so-called "Mutterschutz" propaganda, (5) the alleged lessons of psychoanalysis, (6) the practical freedom of divorce, (7) the economic independence of women and (8) the endowment of motherhood.

(1) It is claimed that with the means already known it is possible practically to eliminate venereal disease. Let us assume that we have succeeded in doing so.

(2) It is claimed that it is entirely possible to reduce commercialized prostitution to a negligible minimum through law enforcement and reformatory work. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that this is a true and accomplished fact.

Assuming, at this point, that there has been no great change in other social factors, we must recognize that there is a great group of men to whom the supernatural sanctions for conduct and even the accepted code of morality are meaningless; and who, if they were "moral" before, were so purely from fear,—one might almost say cowardice—either of disease or of social stigma. *Ex hypothesi*, they are no longer afraid of disease. They can no longer find public prostitutes, *ex hypothesi*. For we have assumed the practical elimination of disease and of commercialized prostitution as factors in our equation.

The most effective remaining deterrents from extra-

marital intercourse would be pregnancy and public opinion. Neither the fear of giving birth to an unwanted, unsupported, and stigmatized child, nor the stigma of scorn and ostracism supposed to be visited upon those indulging in immoral relationships seems to have proved of universal efficiency in recent years. This is said to be especially true in Europe. As a result of the "social hygiene movement," therefore, we might, in the absence of other deterrents look forward to the bugbear of the segregationists, from de Mandeville to Lecky: namely, the frequent "ruining" of young girls by men, not, to be sure, in the crude form of rape, but through "education," *i.e.*, seduction or bribing. This would hold, even if the elimination of venereal diseases and public prostitution were the only changes under way.

But, as noted above, other movements are simultaneously afoot, busily undermining the inhibitions against freedom of intercourse on the part of the group of men above mentioned—and corresponding groups of women. Consider (3) birth control, and (4) the "Mutterschutz" propaganda involving the elimination of social stigma on "illegitimate" motherhood and childhood.

In a measure these two movements are mutually antagonistic. In another sense they dovetail. At least one sentimental argument for the removal of stigma on illegitimate mating is that the coming of the child "couldn't be helped," short of abortion, and that it is unfair to the child to stigmatize its parents or impair its status. Birth control eliminates this argument. At least one conventional doctrine of illegitimacy was that pregnancy is the logical punishment for immorality, and that immorality would be increased by the elimination of pregnancy through birth control. "Mutterschutz" declares all birth sacred. General knowledge of birth control would seem to obviate the necessity of this phase of the "Mutterschutz" campaign, and vice versa.

On the other hand, both birth control and "Mutterschutz" act together to reduce the motives for abstinence

on the part of persons not married to one another. Whether or not the "Mutterschutz" movement is entirely successful in abolishing the stigma of illegitimacy, knowledge of birth control seems inevitable. The two together will serve to reduce to a minimum any deterrent effect on account of what might be termed biological reasons. Birth control alone will eliminate the economic fear connected with the possibility of conception, and the newer attitude toward illegitimacy will, again *ex hypothesi*, eliminate the fear of conventional ostracism and legal discrimination.

As a mere matter of speculation, then, what have we left when the aforesaid movements, already under way, have attained their objectives? We have noted that there is admittedly a group, perhaps a mass, of people to whom religion and morals mean little. These folks are now, according to our supposition, further released from restraint due to fear of disease, "white slavery," pregnancy, or social conventions. It seems reasonable to suppose that, under these conditions (which are perhaps not so far different from the actual as some of us would like to imagine), there would be an increase of promiscuity or at least of "free relationships" and of private prostitution for cash or support.

Two more factors were mentioned which seem likely further to reduce the buttresses of the "accepted" standards of sex conduct. They are (5) the growing independence of women from any need of marriage on economic grounds, and (6) the spread of opinions based on the so-called "new psychology" of wishes or desires and their thwarting, release, and control.

(5) In so far as the emancipation of woman means the reduction of unwilling prostitution and the abandonment of a double standard of sex ethics based on the woman's ancient status as man's "property," it is pretty generally accepted as a boon. But "feminism" may unify the standard of morality by levelling "down" as well as up, by permitting economically free women who do not desire

or are not desired in marriage, to indulge sexually with or without motherhood. This is, indeed, admitted both by certain opponents and by certain supporters of the "woman's movement"—in other words, both by those who dread this freedom as a "lowering" and by those who look upon it as a gain, or who think it will not menace the existence of the best homes. Incidentally, birth control, "Mutterschutz," and state endowment of motherhood regardless of legal marriage, probably tend to increase the independence of women in respect to marriage.

(6) Sexual excess has always been condemned as injurious, though what constitutes excess is subject to difference of opinion. The theory that sex indulgence is a necessity for mere physical manhood or bodily health has, of course, long been exploded. But the same modern psychology which brands *physical* "sex necessity" as the mere rationalization of a repressed wish, is declaring that the *psychic* sex nature—the "life-urge," or "libido"—embodies instincts and wishes which, if suppressed in certain ways, may express themselves in abnormal ways injurious to the individual and society. The results of psychanalysis in many cases of abnormal psychology seem to point to sex repression as an evil. It is further claimed by some neurologists that prolonged continence may cause nervous impotence. It is probable that many will seize upon these new theories as a new excuse for freely indulging their repressed desires.

It is, indeed, claimed that the risks and evil results of "illicit" sex indulgence are greater than the occasional or relatively slight injury alleged to be due to prolonged continence. Even if no disease or exposure were to ensue, the sense of guilt and the psychic lesions caused by repression of the "double life" and by the necessity for lying and concealment would probably be worse, in most cases, than any nervous results of continence, except where there had been previous sexual excess and loss of shame. But the "suppressed complexes" due to the taboo on sex and to the sense of guilt are themselves dependent upon the existence

of a social stigma upon illicit relations. We have assumed this social stigma to be gradually disappearing because of the possibility of birth control, the "Mutterschutz" movement, and the freedom of women.

While the "new psychology" points out how recreation, art, religion, and social service may serve as "sublimation" of the sex impulses for both the married and the unmarried, the effects of these theories of modern psychology, be they true or false, are likely to be felt in moral standards long before society will be persuaded to provide the adequate recreation, aesthetic, spiritual and social outlets, or opportunity for early marriage for the masses.

To sum up thus far, we have assumed and considered, as the chief determining factors in future sex morality, the control of venereal diseases, the suppression of commercialized vice, the general acceptance of birth control, the abandonment of stigma on illegitimacy, the independence of women, and the "modern" psychology of sex. Their combined effect seems to be that of loosening and breaking down traditional standards, by the elimination of the fear of results.

Let us consider this situation further in relation to the other active factors which have been mentioned.

(7) The breaking down of the barriers to divorce, religious, legal and social, may be considered practically inevitable if not already in large part accomplished. Let us, therefore, suppose divorce free except for necessary public proceedings regarding property and children.

(8) The tendency toward and propaganda for the subsidy of parenthood is evident in the "mothers' pensions" movement and may increase with the demand for human conservation due to the war. The old Malthusian fear of overpopulation has largely disappeared with the spread of birth control and rising planes of living, and has given place rather to a fear, probably equally unjustified, of underpopulation. The latter fear may, however, lead to encouragement of childbearing until the pendulum shall swing again in a rhythmic readjustment to the costs and standards of living.

Free divorce and endowment of motherhood will, apparently, reduce fear of legal marriage. If, therefore, legal marriage be considered an indispensable element of the home, and *ipso facto* a justifiable goal of morality, it may be claimed that free divorce and "paid motherhood," so deplored by some moralists, may counteract the alleged "demoralizing" effects of social hygiene, birth control, "Mutterschutz," feminism, and psychoanalysis.

However, free divorce in and of itself might conceivably decrease the conventional prestige and sanctions of marriage as a legal institution; and the "Mutterschutz" movement includes the equal endowment of unmarried mothers. Non-support and desertion laws are more and more being brought to bear with practically equal weight upon married or unmarried fathers. Such laws may stimulate birth control but they probably do not greatly affect the marriage rate. The modern tendency is against the "forced marriage," as a tragic farce, adding evil to evil. If the desirability of traditional sex morality as a goal has been undermined, so has the fear of marriage as a threat to the sex delinquent. Apparently, then, free divorce and support laws may have comparatively little effect on future morality one way or the other.

If, however, the accepted code of moral prohibitions and inhibitions has no other basis in conduct than fear of results which are preventable by other means than abstinence, and no other basis in results than conditions which are otherwise avoidable, it seems to have no other justifications in the future we imagined, beside those of taste and religion, which are largely subjective except as they affect others through tradition and convention.

Cowardice is hardly a virtue. If there were no longer any ill results, physical, social, economic, or legal, from which a party to or possible child of irregular intercourse should be protected, it is questionable how "moral" so-called right conduct, due only to fear, would be. *A positive morality should be based on positive rewards.* What, under the assumed conditions, can the moralist offer?

## II.

In short, the logical net result of the present set of tendencies, simplified for the sake of clearness in argument, seems to be the gradual abandonment of the traditional or Christian code of sex morality by a goodly fraction of the population. This will be due to the absence of fear of penalty from any supernatural source, and the removal of fear of disease, misery, disgrace or poverty.

Has any group, with the possible exception of some extremists, faced this issue squarely? More particularly, are conservative and cautious social hygiene agencies prepared to face frankly the possibilities of the results indicated, or even the consequences of their own success, with or without the other factors mentioned?

Three courses seem to be open: (1) To combat the prospect sketched above by attempting to give "moral" education at least enough force to offset the combined effect of the probable control of venereal diseases, reduction of commercialized vice, and acceptance of birth control; (2) to acquiesce in the popular verdict as inevitable or as *vox dei*; or (3) to guide and formulate the new state of affairs into a new code of "morals" which will not in our opinion be anti-social. What facts are there to influence our choice of policy?

(1) It will be claimed that the sex hygiene movement has throughout its history stressed morals and education. This is true. But let us analyze the statement. How much of this so-called moral education has been based on the supposed wish of God which is often only the projection of our own or our ancestors' wishes? How much of it has grown up simply to conform sex and marriage to the interests of some dominant class or to an inherited code of law and custom? How much has been based on the ethics of exposure to and transmission of disease? How much has been based on the risk and horrors of professional prostitution or "white slavery"? How much has been based on fear of pregnancy and the stigma of illegitimacy? And



how much "moral education" is there left after these factors are eliminated?

It may not be denied that under present conditions all these are valid moral arguments: because exposure, infection, social disgrace, all have moral aspects which may still legitimately be used to strengthen the campaign for sex hygiene. But the morality involved in these matters is not the same, and its issues should not be confused with the morality or immorality of extra-marital intercourse in and of itself. If the latter be stripped of all bolsters and buttresses based on the conditions we have assumed to be eliminated, we find, as apparently the only remaining moral sanctions of continence outside of marriage, (a) the pressure of habitual folkways or conventions, (b) the maintenance, in its present state, of the monogamic family, and (c) the alleged benefits of continence, in and of itself, upon the mind and body.

(a) The pressure of social conventions or "mores" may be said to be relatively weak, and certainly is variable according to time, place, and social class, under modern complex conditions. Moreover, public opinion is like a glacier. Though it budges too slowly for the reformer's individual efforts, it is irresistibly governed by the economic, social, and physical environment. We have already assumed that the conventional morals of birth control and illegitimacy are to change. It is reasonable to admit that, given the conditions named, any moral stigma on incontinence not based upon demonstrable effects on society or the individual would also melt away in time in the face of the new conditions, as it already has among certain groups.

(b) This mention of the effects of incontinence upon society and the individual leads to the second remaining sanction for extra-marital continence—namely the maintenance, in its present form or forms, of the monogamic family.

It behooves one to pause at the threshold of that holy of holies. The aesthetic and ethical ideals, the struggles

and sacrifices, and, apparently, race survival and that thing called Christian civilization, have been largely based upon some form of the monogamic home. Yet the same thing was once said of the Church; and sociological research tells us how rapid (in historical perspective) have been the changes in the spiritual and institutional character of ecclesiastical institutions.

The modern family is, after all, a very recent and multi-form institution, and it is changing under our very eyes. We do not see the unfolding of a bud or the growth of a seed, because our sense time-span is too short; nor do we often observe social changes until they are history.

We must admit, then, that the family, even the monogamic family, may change without necessarily destroying the home, and we may assume in that case that change may be to forms either better or less well adapted to organic welfare. The question now arises whether further change in the recognized type or code of marriage is desirable. Later we may ask if such changes can be controlled or influenced to any appreciable extent through conscious propaganda.

In asking whether change in or from the monogamic family is desirable, however, we cannot depend upon any criterion so subjective as the wishes (whether frank or expressed in theories) of individuals whose personal experience may bias their judgment. You and I perhaps prefer permanent monogamy, and our wishes may easily be projected into theories that monogamy is identified with and indispensable to human progress. It is "human nature" for folks to try to force their standards on others. Our personal tastes, however, furnish in this case no valid reason for so doing, for monogamy will, in all probability, always be possible for the many who spontaneously like it.

The data of historical sociology and ethnology should afford a more solid basis for judgment as to the social worth of a monogamic family form, as well as of extra-marital continence. cursory examination of this material reveals many plausible warrants for the assumption that

some form of monogamy has survival value on other than economic and crude protective grounds. Further research is desirable, however, to prove whether family happiness and home life, and especially the quality and care of children, can be secured in fullest measure only from that permanent exclusive monogamy and extra-marital continence which are the orthodox standard. But even into the conclusions of history and ethnology subjective elements almost inevitably enter, through the nature of the source material, if not through the investigator's own subconscious bias.

Whether a change in the family code is desirable, therefore, must eventually be determined through social research of a kind for which even the methodology is hardly developed—a case by case study of the sex experiences of all classes, correlated in a valid statistical way with some index of family and child welfare. Only in this way may be developed sufficiently objective social sanctions for present standards of monogamy.

When we hunt, however, for the elements of personal conduct which affect domestic harmony and hence the rearing of children, we at once enter the realm of social psychology. Is the primary function of sex mere physical reproduction, or communion for mutual joy and benefit? Can either sex have physical relations with more than one mate, simultaneously or successively, without tarnishing the nature of the marriage relation actual or potential? Such questions can be answered only by establishing such facts as the essential psychological nature of romantic love, of attraction, of sexual jealousy, and of the sense of guilt or "sin," all of them age-long mysteries. Are they created by social imitation or are they instinctive reactions? If jealousy be an instinct, can it be controlled or suppressed entirely by social pressure? If so, will it create troublesome "suppressed complexes"? How far is jealousy merely fear of disease, of pregnancy, and of stigma, all of which fears are, as we have seen, possibly to disappear?

Similar questions arise regarding filial relations as

affected by the morals of marriage; though were it found that families composed of children from mixed or doubtful parentage are (independent of social stigma) likely to be unsuccessful, the universal knowledge of birth-control, presupposed in our argument, would largely take care of any such difficulty. If it were shown that the number of folks spontaneously desiring children were sufficient to maintain social welfare, it is quite conceivable that society might sanction any form of marriage or free relationship in which birth control was successfully practiced, but demand monogamy, permanent or for a term of years, for any unions resulting in children.

There would remain, however, questions of the effect of polygamy, successive or simultaneous, upon the sub-conscious, upon the aesthetic nature, upon emotional harmony, mental integrity and efficiency—all of these being questions of social psychology, subject only to inductive research for their final answer.

(c) The last named questions, however, are closely related to the question of the individual effects of extra-marital continence. This question should be settled for the present purposes on grounds of physical and mental hygiene in their broadest sense, but independent of disease and independent of the mental effects of social stigma and the sense of guilt; though both of these, under present conditions, are still doubtless valid arguments against incontinence.<sup>1</sup>

In the analysis of cases involving any of the above problems, it may be difficult to segregate the social from the purely physio-psychological elements. But the challenge to psychologists is worth their acceptance, for upon the results of such research depend in large part the soundness of the present program of sex morality, its ultimate effects, and its relation to and influence upon the morality of the future.

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<sup>1</sup> The psychic and physical results of masturbation should similarly be studied, if possible, independently of the mental effects of shame, which is largely conditioned by moral preconceptions.

If those results negative our present ideals or wishes, whether we like it or not, we must face the facts frankly. Aesthetics will then be the only kind of education for sex morality which is not bolstered up artificially (and, therefore, probably temporarily) by the present existence of disease, theology, prostitution, poverty, ignorance and prejudice. And who knows but what psychologists may claim that even aesthetics are merely a matter of personal taste, socially changeable with time and environment?

If, therefore, we are to try the first alternative course of strengthening "moral" education to the point of offsetting the removal of all motives of fear from "immoral relationships," we must base that moral education on facts independent of disease and tradition, facts which are available so far only in the haziest form. And this practically implies changes in the "morals" to be taught, and the impossibility of our first alternative course, of combating the inevitable. Only those ethical teachings which are based on scientific facts of body and soul can hope to influence beneficially the actual moral standards and behavior of coming generations.

(2) The materialist or the anarchist might declare all this to-do useless. He or she may prefer to take things as they come, to hasten the result as desirable or to deny that the outcome may be influenced either for "good" or for "evil." To this, the writer can only oppose the active interests, or the human nature, of another group whose scale of values and lines of thought based thereon are increasingly dominant over *laissez faire*, even as the occident dominates the orient. In other words, the writer appeals frankly to his readers' prejudices in favor of the third possible course. We gain little and may lose much by letting our own wishes for society drift, or be anaesthetized, while others are pushing and steering independently (whether consciously or unconsciously) amid the new currents toward dimly perceived goals.

(3) If research should definitely foreshadow the partial or complete abandonment of old sanctions of sex conduct,

it will certainly be wiser to foresee, formulate, interpret, and thereby recognize and absorb and socialize the new state of affairs, than to play the ostrich, to acquiesce supinely, or to stand across the path of the inevitable changes. To attempt unintelligently to thwart such changes is apt to make them rebellious, covert, and dangerous, both in individuals and in society. If, on the other hand, the efforts of social and physical psychologists produce convincing evidence of the independent social and individual value of continence and of some form of monogamy, then there is every reason for full speed ahead in moral education upon this solid ground of self-supporting facts, to counterpoise the other factors actively at work, and to prevent their acting anti-socially upon the existing sex standards.

Until the many issues raised above can be faced and searched out, social hygiene agencies, however conservative and well-supported, will necessarily be dodging logical issues of psychology and public education which, like the issues of legal control of prostitution, medical prophylaxis of venereal disease, birth control, and the economics of marriage, have in the past been dodged and are now accepted or are imminent. In so doing, these agencies may diminish their opportunity of social leadership in the sex and home life of the future.

The extent and rapidity with which public opinion on such issues can actually be changed by convincing knowledge of the facts is witnessed by the epoch-making work of Mr. Flexner for the Bureau of Social Hygiene in the field of law-enforcement and by the effect of the war on the public's attitude toward prevention of venereal infections by "early treatment." But until we learn through inductive study to what extent we still have (or ever had) extra-marital continence, monogamy and a stigma on illegitimate relations or children; and to what extent we already have birth control, free unions, and free divorce or separations, we cannot even approach a satisfactory

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answer to some of the fundamental future issues, let alone launch an adequate forward-looking propaganda.

"A long look ahead, and hardly practical" is the possible verdict of the reader upon the speculations of this article. But in times such as the present, all things are in the melting pot, in flux so mingled as to be obscured. Many incredible reconstructive developments have already startled us, and it behooves no one to prophesy how short or long a time may produce apparently revolutionary changes in that "human nature" so frequently alleged to be immutable.

The strategy of social hygiene calls for "observers" and an "intelligence corps" as well as for a general staff.

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## THE THEORY OF PROPERTY, LAW, AND SOCIAL ORDER IN HINDU POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR.

### I. THE DOCTRINE OF MAMATVA (PROPERTY).

ACCORDING to the *Mahabharata*, *Manu Samhita*, *Shookra-neeti* and other texts of Hindu political theory, government is by nature coercive because man is by nature vicious. The state can thus be born only in and through *danda*, i.e., punishment or sanction. It is out of a condition of the "logic of the fish" (*mātsya-nyāya*) or the Hobbesian and Spinozistic "state of nature," that *danda* brings into existence a well-regulated civil society, called the state. In Aristotelian terminology *danda* would be the "efficient cause" of the state.

What, now, are the marks of the state? How does it declare its existence? What are its functions? In what manner does it make itself felt among the people? In Hindu theory the state, as soon as it crystallizes itself into shape, conjures up *mamatva* ("mine"-ness, *Eigentum*, *proprium*) or *svatva* (*suum*), i.e., property, and *dharma* (law, justice and duty) out of primitive chaos or socioplasmic anarchy. Both these institutions are creations of the state. The state functions itself by generating them, and people recognize it in its activities fostering their nurture. *Mamatva* and *dharma* are, therefore, two fundamental categories in the political speculation of the Hindus.

Property does not exist in the non-state<sup>1</sup> (*mātsya-nyāya*), i.e., in the condition of men left to the pursuit of their "own sweet will." In the non-state, of course, men can possess or enjoy, but they do not "own." Property, however, is not mere *bhoga*, i.e., enjoying or possessing, its essence con-

<sup>1</sup> *Manu*, VII, 20; Kautilya's *Artha-shastra*, I, 4 (ed. and trans. by R. Shamasastri). For a brief account of Sanskrit literature on politics see the author's article on "Hindu Political Philosophy," in the *Political Science Quarterly* for December, 1918, pp. 488-491.

<sup>2</sup> *Mahabharata*, *Shanti Parva*, LXVII, 12-14.



sists in *mamatva* or *svatva*, i.e., ownership.<sup>3</sup> It is "one's own"-ness that underlies the "magic of property." To be able to say *mamedam*<sup>4</sup> (This is mine) about something constitutes the very soul of owning or appropriation.

This proprietary consciousness is created in men for the first time by the state through its sanction, the *danda*. For it enjoins<sup>5</sup> that vehicles, apparel, ornaments, and jewels must be "enjoyed by those to whom they belong," and that one's wives, children,—and food must "not be encroached upon by others." And it is only through *bhaya*<sup>6</sup> or fear of the state that the people observe these injunctions, and the sanctity of property is kept entire.

A distinction is here brought out between mere *bhoga* and *mamatva* as the basis of the difference between the non-state and the state. In Europe the identical discrimination has been made by Rousseau in his *Social Contract*. "In the state of nature," says he, "there is but possession which is only the effect of the force or right of the first occupant"; whereas "ownership which is founded only upon a positive title" is an incident of "civil society."

Property (*bhoga* plus *mamatva*), then, is a *differentium* between the non-state and the state. And juridically speaking, the property taken cognizance of by the state is *laukika*, i.e., worldly, material, or secular, as the *Mitakshara*, the *Sarasvati-vilasa*, and other law-books<sup>7</sup> make it clear. Thus considered, it is necessarily also a *differentium* between the state and the extra-state, e.g., a *Sookhâvati*,<sup>8</sup> the transcendental Land of Bliss in Buddhist metaphysical lore. For in that super-sensual region "beings are not

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVIII, 19.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVIII, 15.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVIII, 16.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVIII, 8. For *mâtsya-nyâya* and *danda* see the author's "Hindu Theory of International Relations," in the *American Political Science Review* (Aug. 1919), p. 307.

<sup>7</sup> Cited in Jolly's *Recht und Sitte*, p. 91; *Svatvam laukikam (das Eigentum ist weltlich)*; *Sarasvativilas* "geht vielleicht am weitesten in dieser Richtung," "in dem es die Entstehung des Eigentums aus rein weltlichen Akten betont."

<sup>8</sup> *Buddhist Mahayana Texts*, Part II, pp. 13, 43, 55, in the Sacred Books of the East Series.

born with any idea of property even with regard to their own body." Besides, according to the *Geeta*, property is not to be acquired by ascetics and monks who desire to live, like the Senecan "wise man" or the Catholic Capuchin, an extra-statal or super-political life, in which, as the proverb goes, man is either a beast or a god.

We are not concerned here, however, with property, *laukika* as it is, in its bearings as a legal institution. The Hindu analysis of the distinction between real and personal property or discussion of the rights to use, destroy, transfer, bequeath and sell each species of property, need not, therefore, detain us. We are interested for the present in the concept of property as a political category only, *i.e.*, as influencing the theory of the state. But it may be remarked, in passing, that it is the state backed by *danda* that gives validity to the "seven modes"<sup>9</sup> of acquiring property and to its "three titles"<sup>10</sup> as well as to other legal incidents.<sup>11</sup>

Nor does it fall within our scope to discuss the concept of property as an economic entity. Obviously, of course, the property generated by the state is Aristotelian in its exclusiveness, as the phrase *mamedam* signifies. It does not contemplate the communism of Plato or of More. "A field," says Manu,<sup>12</sup> "belongs to him who cleared away the forests, and a deer to him who first wounded it." This is individualistic tenure and jurisdiction in their primitive form.<sup>13</sup> But no matter whether held in common or private, it is pertinent to observe that the sacredness of property can be established only by the state through its *danda*.

Two miraculous changes are effected in social life, once private property is thus ushered into existence. First, people can sleep at night without anxiety "with doors

<sup>9</sup> *Manu*, X, 115.

<sup>10</sup> *Vashishtha*, XVI, 10 (S. B. E. Series).

<sup>11</sup> Jolly, 90-92.

<sup>12</sup> IX, 44.

<sup>13</sup> Letourneau's *Property: Its Origin and Development*, p. 72.

open.”<sup>14</sup> And secondly, women decked with ornaments may walk without fear though “unattended by men.”<sup>15</sup>

This sense of security as regards property is, therefore, the first great achievement in the humanization of Caliban. This is the first item in the civilizing of man by *danda* out of the *mâtsya-nyâya* or “law of beasts and birds.”

## II. THE DOCTRINE OF DHARMA (LAW, JUSTICE, AND DUTY).

Property is the first acquisition of man through the state. His second acquisition is *dharma*. The doctrine of *dharma* is like the doctrine of *mamatva*, an essential factor in the theory of the state, and both have their foundations in the doctrine of *danda*.

There is no *dharma* in the non-state,<sup>16</sup> i.e., in the condition of men left to themselves.<sup>17</sup> It comes into existence with the state. *Dharma* is created by the state or rather by its sanction, *danda*.<sup>18</sup> No state, no *dharma*. *Dharma* does not flourish where “politics” is not; it flourishes only as long as there is the state. In other words, *dharma* appears as *mâtsya-nyâya* disappears, and *dharma* ceases to exist with the extinction of the state. Logically, therefore, a people can have no *dharma* when its statal life is abolished, e.g., through loss of freedom, revolution or anarchy.

We shall now proceed to analyze this *dharma*. What is that category in Hindu thought, which, besides property, serves to differentiate the state from the non-state? What is that characteristic, shorn of which, as shorn of *mamatva*, the state would revert to the condition of *mâtsya-nyâya*? The answer to these questions lies in the doctrine of *dharma*.

*Dharma* is a very elastic term. Like *jus*, *Recht* and *droit* it has more than one meaning. It really admits of almost all the ambiguities associated with the term “law”

<sup>14</sup> *Maha, Shanti*, LXVIII, 30.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVIII, 32.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVII, 1.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVIII, 22.

<sup>18</sup> *Manu*, VII, 14, 15, 18.

as analyzed by Holland in his *Jurisprudence*. Thus there are at least five senses in which *dharma* is used in scientific treatises as well as in common parlance; viz.,

1. Religion, a category of theology, *e.g.*, Confucian *dharma*, Mohammedan *dharma*, Christian *dharma*, Hindu *dharma*, etc.
2. Virtue, as opposed to vice or sin, a category of ethics.
3. Law, as a category of jurisprudence.
4. Justice.
5. Duty.

For purposes of political theory we have to neglect 1 and 2 and confine ourselves to the import of *dharma* as law, justice, and duty. The doctrine of *dharma* then enunciates three propositions: First, that the state differs from the non-state as a law-giving institution; secondly, that the state differs from the non-state as a justice-dispensing institution; and thirdly, that the state differs from the non-state as a duty-enforcing institution.

In the *mātsya-nyāya* there is no law, no justice, no duty. The state is the originator of law, justice and duty.

#### A. *Dharma as Law.*

*Dharma* (law) is the creation of the state, and the state, as such, has the sanction of *danda*. Theoretically, therefore, every *dharma*, if it is nothing but *dharma*, is *ipso facto* what should be called "positive" in the Austinian sense. *Dharma* is obeyed as *dharma* only because of the coercive might of the state. All *Dharma-shastras*, *i.e.*, the legal text books, *e.g.*, those of Manu, Yajñavalkya, Narada, Brihaspati, and others, would thus automatically acquire the character of "statute"-books simply because their validity, provided they have any validity, depends on the authority of the state. The Yajñavalkyas and Manus would obviously have no "sanction" in a condition of *mātsya-nyāya*.

But probably, so far as actual practice is concerned, the *dharma-shastras* of India had no greater sanctity than as treatises embodying the "positive morality" of the dif-

ferent ages. Let us, therefore, examine how the nature of *dharma* (as law) was understood by the theorists themselves. As is well known, law as a category of jurisprudence, has passed through two stages in European thought. The same two concepts we notice in Hindu political philosophy also.

In ancient European theory law is the embodiment of eternal justice. Thus, according to Demosthenes (fourth century B. C.), laws are the gifts of the gods and the discovery of the sages. In Aristotle's conception law is the rule of god and reason. Stoics, like Cicero and Seneca, believed that law lies in the hearts of all men.

This doctrine of "natural law," of law as the "king of all things," was maintained by the jurists such as Gaius and others whose views are codified in the *Digest* of Justinian. It was the theory also of Celsus and other Church Fathers. In medieval European (Teutonic)<sup>19</sup> theory, so far as there was any theory independent of the tradition of Roman jurisprudence, law was not something "made" or created at all, but something which existed as a part of the national, or local or tribal life.

The modern theory of law in Europe may be said to have originated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with Bodin and Hobbes in their analysis of sovereignty. It has since become classical, however, as the handiwork of Austin,<sup>20</sup> the father of analytical jurisprudence. According to this view, law is the command of the sovereign enforced by a sanction.

Thus there are two theories of law,—first, law as uncreated or original, existing either as a part of the universal human conscience, taught by "natural reason," or as a custom among the people; and secondly, law as created by the fiat of a law-maker, as something which is to be obeyed not because it is just, good or eternal, but because it has been enacted by the state. Both these conceptions are to be

<sup>19</sup> Carlyle's *Medieval Political Theory in the West*, Vol. I, p. 235; Mackenzie's *Studies in Roman Law*; Gomme's *Folklore as an Historical Science*, 84-100.

<sup>20</sup> *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, VI.

found among the speculations of Hindu political philosophers. The distinction between positive law and ethics is clearly set forth by Vijnaneshvara (eleventh century) in his notes on the text of Yajñavalkya<sup>21</sup> in regard to the judicial duties of the king.

The ethical conception of law as the dictate of conscience, *i.e.*, as *jus naturale* has a long tradition in Hindu thought. In the *Bṛihadaranyak-opanishat*<sup>22</sup> law is identical with truth and is as powerful as king. It is of course the creation of God. Brahman (God), we are told, "was not strong enough." So he "created still further the most excellent *dharma*. . . . There is nothing higher than law. Thenceforth even a weak man rules a stronger with the help of the law, as with the help of a king. Thus the law is what is called the true. And if a man declares what is truth, they say he declares the law; and if he declares the law, they say he declares what is true. Thus both are the same." According to Apastamba,<sup>23</sup> law is what is "unanimously approved in all countries by men of the Aryan society, who have been properly obedient to their teachers, who are aged, of subdued senses, neither given to avarice, nor hypocrites." In *Manu-Samhita*,<sup>24</sup> again, law is whatever is practised and cherished at heart by the virtuous and the learned, who are devoid of prejudices and passions. Vashishtha<sup>25</sup> and Baudhayana<sup>26</sup> also hold the view that law is the practice of the *shishtas*, *i.e.*, those whose hearts are free from desire. The *shishtas*, *rishis*, passionless and unavaricious persons of India are obviously the "sages" of Demosthenes. And in Yajñavalkya's Code<sup>27</sup> according to which law is *sadāchāra*, *i.e.*, the "practice or conduct of good men," what "seems pleasant or good

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<sup>21</sup> T. N. Mitra's *Tagore Law Lectures*, pp. 32-33; Kishori Lal Sarkar's *Rules of Interpretation in Hindu Law*, Lect. IX, p. 116.

<sup>22</sup> 1, 4, 14, *The Upanishads*, Vol. II, p. 89, in the S. B. E. Series.

<sup>23</sup> 1, 7, 20, 8, in the S. B. E. Series.

<sup>24</sup> II, 1.

<sup>25</sup> I, 5-6.

<sup>26</sup> I, 1, 1, 4-6.

<sup>27</sup> I, i, Introduction, 7.

to one's self," and the "desire that springs from mature consideration," as well as in the *Vyavahara Darpana*, where law is described as something "eternal and self-existent, the king of kings," far "more powerful and right" than they, we have once more the Oriental counterpart of the Greek, Stoic, Roman and Patristic conceptions of law as morality.

In Hindu analysis *dharma* came to be defined as positive law also. The conception of law as *râjnâm âjnâ* in Kautilya's language, *i.e.*, as command enforced by sanction, finds clear expression in the writings of Narada, Shookra, Jaimini and his commentator Shabara Swami. In Narada's *Smṛiti*<sup>28</sup> we are informed that the performance of duty having fallen into disuse, positive law (*vyavahara*) has been introduced, and that the king as superintending the law is known as *danda-dhara* or wielder of *danda* (the power to punish). The sanction is definitely mentioned in the *Shookra-neeti*,<sup>29</sup> according to which the sovereign should categorically state in his commands that he would "surely destroy by severe punishment those offenders who after having heard these his decrees would act contrary to them." In order that the law may be seriously recognized as command Shookra stipulates that the greatest amount of publicity should be given to it. For instance, it is the duty of the sovereign to have the laws announced by the state drum<sup>30</sup> or have them inscribed in esplanades as written notices. The documents embodying these commands (*shâsana-patra*)<sup>31</sup> are to bear the king's signature, date, etc. Laws thus being the promulgations of the state, we read further in the *Shookra-neeti*<sup>32</sup> that the king is the "maker of the age," the "cause of time" and of the good and evil practices, and that since the ruler is the dictator of virtues and vices, people make it a point to practise that by which

<sup>28</sup> Introduction, I, 2.

<sup>29</sup> I, lines 623-624.

<sup>30</sup> *Shookra-neeti*, I, 625-626 (B. K. Sarkar's trans. in the Panini Office Series, Allahabad).

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 607-608.

<sup>32</sup> IV, i, lines 116-119.

he is satisfied. Besides, as law is upheld by sanction we can easily understand why Shookra advises the sovereign to make use of his terrible weapon<sup>33</sup> in order to maintain the people each in his proper sphere.

The same idea of positive law is expressed by Jaimini in the very definition of *dharma*. As we find in his *Mimamsa-Sootra*, *chodanālakshanartho dharmah*.<sup>34</sup> *Dharma* is that desired-for object (*artha*) which is characterized by command (*chodanā*). Jaimini has also examined the reason as to why that which is determined by a command should be obligatory. He analyzes the reason as lying in the fact that "the relation between the word of command and the purpose to which it is directed is eternally efficacious."<sup>35</sup>

The doctrine of *dharma* as law introduces into the theory of the state the cardinal element of sovereignty. Whether *dharma* be taken as equivalent to the dictates of a moral sense, or as the observance of a tribal or some other established usage or as the deliberate order issued by an authority with threat of punishment in case of violation, it is clear enough that *dharma* is like *danda* the most awe-inspiring fact in the state's life. *Danda* and *dharma* are, indeed, the two faces of the political Janus, so to speak, the one looking to the failures, the other to the triumphs. Or, to express the same thing in a different way, *danda* is the root of a tree which flowers in *dharma*. The state can be recognized positively by *dharma* which is in evidence, while *danda* maintains its vitality from behind.

### B. *Dharma as Justice.*

We have now to understand the doctrine of *dharma* as justice in its bearing on the theory of the state. Justice does not exist in the *mātsya-nyāya*; if, therefore, a reversion to *mātsya-nyāya* is to be avoided, i.e., if the state is to be maintained, justice must not be tampered with. Justice

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 120.

<sup>34</sup> Ganganath Jha's *Shabara Swami's Commentary on Jaimini's Mimamsa in the Indian Thought* for 1910 (Allahabad).

<sup>35</sup> K. L. Sarkar, *Lect. I*, pp. 23-24.



is necessarily as integral a branch of sovereignty in Hindu conception as law.

The dignity of justice has been declared by Manu<sup>36</sup> in the following terms: "If justice is violated, it destroys the state, if preserved, it maintains the state. Therefore justice must not be destroyed." Such sentiments in the *Manu Samhita* could be bodily incorporated in the writings of a Jonas or an Alcuin of the ninth century and other medieval European theorists<sup>37</sup> with whom the maintenance of justice is the *sine qua non* of the state and kingship.

But what is justice? It is a most practical or pragmatic definition that the Hindu theorists offer. According to Manu<sup>38</sup> justice consists in the application of law to the cases arising between the members of the state. And that law is to be known from the customs and from the *Institutes*, e.g., those of Gautama, Yajnavalkya, and others. Justice, as interpreted by Shookra,<sup>39</sup> consists of two elements: First, it consists in a discrimination of the good from the bad (of course, according to the laws). Secondly, it has a utilitarian basis, in as much as it is calculated to minister to the virtues of the rulers and the ruled and promote the common weal.

The doctrine of *dharma* as justice is thus organically connected with the theory of the state as contrasted with the non-state.

### C. *Dharma as Duty.*

*Mâtsya-nyâya* is a condition in which duties are nil. Men left to themselves tend even to persecute<sup>40</sup> their mothers, fathers, the aged, the teachers, the guests and the preceptors. It is the fear of *danda* that brings about an order among men, each man minding his own duty (*sva-dharma*).<sup>41</sup> The doctrine of *dharma* as duty is thus

<sup>36</sup> VIII, 15.

<sup>37</sup> Carlyle, Vol. III, 109.

<sup>38</sup> VIII, 3.

<sup>39</sup> IV, v, lines 7-11.

<sup>40</sup> *Maha, Shanti*, LXVIII, 16.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVIII, 8; *Manu*, VII, 21, 22, 24; *Shookra*, I, lines 45-51.

like that of *dharma* as justice, naturally a doctrine of the conservation of the state. It is only from this standpoint that the theory of duties has a bearing on the theory of the state.

The doctrine of duty as stated in the *Geeta*<sup>42</sup> runs thus: "One's own duty, though defective, is better than another's duty well performed. Death in performing one's own duty is preferable; the performance of the duties of others is dangerous." The passage here has no mere metaphysical significance. This theory of *sva-dharma* (one's own duty) has a political significance as well. It has the sanction of the state behind it; for, says Manu,<sup>43</sup> "neither a father, nor a teacher, nor a friend, nor a mother, nor a wife, nor a son, nor a domestic priest must be left unpunished if they do not keep within their duty." According to Shookra<sup>44</sup> also the people should be kept each in his proper sphere by a "terrible use" of the weapon of sovereignty.

Duties are thus enforced by *danda*, which also backs the laws. Indeed, from the angle of the *prajā* or *prakṛiti* (the people in the state), *dharma* as duty is but the obverse of *dharma* as law. What the state calls "laws" are recognized as "duties" by its members as a matter of course. The doctrine of duty is thus identical with that of law, turned inside out.

Altogether, then, the doctrine of *dharma* in its entirety imparts to the state the character of an institution for the advancement of "culture." The state elevates man out of the law of beasts by instituting legislation, adjudication, and enforcement of duties. The functions of the state are thus in keeping with the ideas involved in the doctrine of *danda*. The state as a pedagogic or purgatorial or moral training institution is not merely a *mamatva*-insuring instrument, *i.e.*, a property-securing agency, but a *dharma*-promoting *Samooka* or public association, *i.e.*, a

<sup>42</sup> *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. VIII, ch. III, pp. 56, 127.

<sup>43</sup> VIII, 335.

<sup>44</sup> I, line 120; IV, iii, 15.

*Kultur-staat* or the "virtue"-state of Plato. And herein the Hindu theory meets Aristotle's conception of the state as the means to the furtherance of the "highest good" of man.

### III. THE DOCTRINE OF VARNÂSHRAMA (CLASSES AND STAGES).

Out of *mâtsya-nyâya* evolves *dharma* through the fiat of *danda*. Now *dharma* has need to be embodied, i.e., the *Kultur-staat* must have to materialize itself in space and time. This is accomplished in the *rashtra*, which provides sovereignty with "a local habitation and a name." It is in and for the *rashtra* that the state institutes *mamatva* and *dharma*. Property, law, justice and duty are concretely realized through this medium. The doctrine of *rashtra* thus furnishes the crowning arch in the Hindu theory of the state.

What is this *rashtra*? It signifies "the country." Both "movable and immovable things" are indicated by the term.<sup>45</sup> It is a territorial concept comprehending an aggregate of human beings and material possessions and thus constitutes the "physical basis" of the state. It may be taken almost as equivalent to *res publica*. The doctrine of *rashtra* would, therefore, naturally consist of two parts: (1) the doctrine of property, and (2) the doctrine of *prajā prakṛiti* or population. The doctrine of property has already been investigated. Let us now examine the doctrine of population in its bearing on the theory of the state.

In the *mâtsya-nyâya* condition there is the people, but no state, because there is no *danda* to enforce *dharma*. If the *prajā* is not to remain *ad infinitum* an amorphous mass of *selbständig* atoms, it must have to follow *sva-dharma*, i.e., the members of the society must perform their respective "duties," which, as we have seen, are really "laws" turned inside out. The observance of these duties would necessarily imply the organization of the people into a unified state, a *samooḥa* or a *polis*.

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<sup>45</sup> IV, iii, line 2.

Now, communally speaking, the *prajā* or members of a society naturally fall into economic and professional groups, classes or orders, the so-called castes of India. The alleged classification of a society into four occupational groups, *e.g.*, Brahmana, Kshatriya, etc., is, however, a conventional myth, at best a legal fiction. Students of *Realpolitik* like Shookra<sup>46</sup> are aware that the actual number of these orders or castes is "unlimited." The reason, as may be guessed, is stated in the *Shookra-neeti* to be the "intermixture of blood through marriages." These orders of *prajā* or classes of members of the state are known as *varnas*,<sup>47</sup> *i.e.*, colors, probably designated after some typical (or hypothetical?) ethnic complexion. Further, from the standpoint of the individual, we have to notice that people pass through well-marked physiological stages, *e.g.*, infancy, adolescence, etc. These stages or periods of life in every person are called the *āshramas*.<sup>48</sup> They are arbitrarily known to be four in the span of human existence.

The total population with all its interests and problems of all the different periods of life is then comprehended by the two categories, *varnas* (classes) and *āshramas* (stages). If, therefore, the people is to constitute a state, all members of each of the *varnas* (no matter what their number and what their occupations) must have to perform the duties (*svadharma*) at each of the four *āshramas* or periods of life. Thus, the soldier at the front must "do or die," the young man while at school must not marry, the king must keep to the coronation oath, and so forth. This is the doctrine of *varnāshrama*,<sup>49</sup> the counterpart of the Platonic correlation of "virtue" and status.

As soon, therefore, as the *prajā* is organized into a state, be it in any part of the world or in any epoch of history, a *varnāshrama* spontaneously emerges into being as a matter

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<sup>46</sup> IV, iii, lines 22-23.

<sup>47</sup> Kamandaka, II, 18-21 (Text in the *Bibliotheca Indica* Series, Trans. by M. N. Dutt).

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 22-31.

<sup>49</sup> Kamandaka, II, 35.

of course. It is inconceivable, in this theory, that there should be a state and yet no *varnāshrama*. To say that the state has been born and yet the various orders or classes of the people do not follow *dharma* would, indeed, be a contradiction in terms, a logical absurdity. *Sva-dharma* leads inevitably to *varnāshrama*, the two are "relative" terms. They indicate coexistent phenomena in the social world. In other words, the doctrine of *varnāshrama* is a corollary to that of *dharma* as duty, *varnāshrama* is but *sva-dharma* "writ large."

The non-existence of *varnāshrama* is possible only under conditions of non-performance of duty. Suppose the *varnas* do not follow *dharma*, e.g., the soldier flies from the enemy in a cowardly manner, the husband does not maintain the wife, the judge encourages the fabrication of false evidence, the king violates the *samaya* or compact with the *prajā*, and so forth. According to Shookra<sup>50</sup> the offenders are to be rectified by the *danda* of the state. This is the supreme moment for the exercise of sovereignty. Why, even the king is not immune from penalty. Rather, as Manu<sup>51</sup> declares, "the settled rule," where "a common man would be fined one *karshapana*, the king shall be fined one thousand." Really, a state is no state unless it can enforce as duty the *dharma* that it has enacted as law. This should be postulated in the irreducible minimum of the state's functions. One can, therefore, easily understand with Kamandaka<sup>52</sup> why if *dharma* is violated by the members of the state there is bound to be a *pralaya* or dissolution of the world. Verily, with the extinction of *varnāshrama*, there is a reversion to *mātsya-nyāya*. The violation of *sva-dharma* and of *varnāshrama* brings back the "state of nature," and the state automatically ceases to exist.

*Varnāshrama*, though obviously a socio-pedagogic and ethnico-economic term, is thus fundamentally a political concept. It is an indispensable category in an organic

<sup>50</sup> IV, iv, 6, 82-83.

<sup>51</sup> VIII, 336.

<sup>52</sup> II, 34.

theory of the state. It is identical with *rashtra* from the demographic (*prajā* or population) aspect. The doctrine of *varnāshrama* is, therefore, the doctrine of *rashtra* minus the doctrine of property; and further, the doctrine of *dharma* (as law and duty) applied to the total *prakriti* (or members of the state) coincides with the doctrine of classes and stages. The doctrine of *varnāshrama* then is clearly an integral part in a consistent philosophy of politics.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR.

NEW YORK.

## THE COMMUNITY CENTER MOVEMENT AS A MORAL FORCE.

C. J. BUSHNELL.

**T**HE motto of the United States—*E Pluribus Unum*—is to-day becoming the motto of the world,—not, perhaps, so much by the will of the diplomats as by the will of the people. Humanity is sick of disunion, and is more and more deliberately endeavoring to “form a more perfect union.” What this ideal of union means in concrete detail we as yet, of course, only vaguely understand; but we are progressively achieving it. This achievement we are learning to call democracy. Of the innumerable concerted efforts to this end at the present time, next to the League of Nations, perhaps the most significant is the community center movement. And it is so precisely because it is a concerted, intelligent effort for the solution of the central problem of morality,—the promotion of social union.

In America we are inclined to flatter ourselves unduly on our efficiency and general welfare. The war has opened our eyes to some of the facts of serious social waste among us. For example, recent surveys have shown that one third of our men of military age are unfit for military service; 3,000,000 of our children in the United States are continuously undernourished; 10,000,000 persons of the country are in chronic poverty; one half of our men do not receive incomes sufficient to support an average-sized workingman's family (about five) in physical efficiency; the income of the average wage-earner is hardly one half the market value he adds to the product on which he works; one half of our business firms go to the wall every thirty years; and a person dies from unnecessary cause in the United States every minute. The following disorders have for some time been increasing,—apparently faster than the population: strikes, child labor (?), child delin-

quency, murders, suicides, lynchings, robberies, divorces, and insanity. We are beginning to feel that these are unnecessary and irrational conditions of disunion, causing billions of dollars of waste every year.<sup>1</sup>

During the last decades a growing public consciousness of these conditions and of their meaning has been a strong influence in producing the modern community center movement. This started partly as an instinctive impulse toward further social solidarity, and partly as a deliberate effort to bridge the widening chasm between social classes,—particularly through the social settlements,—in Jane Addams words, “To add the social (fellowship) function to democracy,”—to help all classes to overcome invidious and abnormal class distinctions, and participate freely and effectively in all of society’s elementary social functions: those of maintenance, learning, control and play. To be sure, not all the efforts for community union were as democratic, conscious and impartial as this. The number, variety and persistence of them, however, is an impressive evidence of the growing strength of the movement. Even earlier, the Grange movement in the rural communities and the labor unions in the cities were “get-together” efforts, broadening out in recent years into a tremendous, voluntary, unco-ordinated development of industrial co-operation, industrial welfare work, organized charities, institutional churches, public playgrounds, public libraries, public forums, civic associations, neighborhood clubs, social centers, school and home gardens, parent-teachers’ associations, the Christian associations, Boy Scouts, Campfire Girls, art associations, music organizations, and public, municipal enterprises of a hundred different kinds for assisting communities to more conscious, co-operative life.

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<sup>1</sup> For full and careful statistical discussions on these points consult: King, *Wealth and Income of the People of the United States*; Hunter, *Poverty*; Parmelee, *Poverty and Social Progress*; Lauk and Sydenstricker, *Conditions of Labor in American Industries*; Koester, *The Price of Inefficiency*, especially pp. v-xxiv of the last.



In the last four or five years both students of this movement and intelligent citizens generally have begun to feel keenly not only its extreme importance, but also its wastefulness of effort, through duplications, disorganization, haphazard finance and unscientific methods.

Perception of this situation, and at the same time the pressure of the war for more effective union, have produced recently several very significant agencies for introducing comprehension, order and science into the movement. Consider a few of these in the United States.

Before the war,—in October, 1911,—at Madison, Wisconsin, was held the first national conference on social centers, promoting the development of the American Social Center Association, of which the late Josiah Strong was elected president. This meeting emphasized the wider community use of the public schools, and was addressed by Woodrow Wilson in a speech heartily commending the idea.

With our entrance into the war, the Playground and Recreation Association of America, which had for some ten years been doing a notable service for community welfare through the promotion of play centers, was asked by the Federal War and Navy Departments to help in organizing entertainment for the soldiers in the communities near their camps. This War Camp Community Service, consisting of home hospitality, dances, athletic meets, community sings, concerts, church socials, automobile rides and many other forms of good fellowship, not only awakened remarkable public spirit in many communities, but also revealed new possibilities and methods of community organization.

In this connection it is worthy of note that we are now spending on organized, uncommercialized public playgrounds and other recreation centers in the United States in the neighborhood of \$10,000,000 a year; about 1,000,000 persons are in daily attendance, in over 500 cities, at nearly 5,000 playgrounds, more than 200 public bathing beaches and 300 swimming pools,—nearly all with trained attendants and play leaders. It is significant that over 300 cities

have now wholly or in part assumed municipal control and support of these public recreational facilities, and the tendency in this direction is rapidly increasing. Nearly 100 cities maintain training classes for recreation workers, with probably more than 3,000 students; and in many of these cities recreation positions are now filled by civil service examinations.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps even more significant is the fact that, since the close of war, a nation-wide movement has arisen for the construction of community center buildings as memorials for the soldiers and for the cause of human freedom. At the present writing this movement is enlisting the guidance and support of artists and social workers everywhere.

On April 16, 1916, a national conference on community centers was held in New York, with the late Luther H. Gulick presiding, and John Collier as secretary. A national annual conference organization has been effected, with headquarters in New York,—also a Training School for Community Workers, with Mr. Collier as director, in connection with the People's Institute. The Training School, now in its fifth year, educates its students for the new profession of the "community secretary" and assists in the publication of *The Community Center*, the organ of the National Community Center Conference, to help local groups of the United States and Canada "To organize the people in order that they may use government; to place social science and experts at the disposal of the people."

The underlying principles and methods of the movement are perhaps most clearly exemplified by the Social Unit Plan, developed during the last six or eight years, by experiments in New York, Milwaukee and Cincinnati, chiefly under the leadership of Wilber C. Phillips and Elsie Phillips. Beginning in a community health service, especially for the children, its purpose is "To hasten the coming of a democracy, both genuine and efficient, by

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. Recreation in the First Year of the War, in the *Survey*, Vol. XL, No. 7, p. 196.

building up, on a basis of population units, an organization through which the people can get a clear idea of their common needs, and can utilize the technical knowledge of skilled groups in formulating and carrying out programs to meet those needs." The central principle of the Unit Plan,—as that of the community center movement as a whole,—is to enable every individual clearly to perceive and feel himself to be a factor in the life of the community, and to work intelligently for the whole community at the same time that he is working for himself. This is obviously the highest ideal of morality, the prime condition of peace, and the foundation of democracy. The work has developed out of the growing perception of students and social agents that, with the increasing complexity of our civilization, a closer and more vital relationship must be established between the masses and the experts, between the consumers and the producers, between the people as human beings and the people as vocational workers.

This idea in the winter of 1915, brought together a group in the city of Washington, D. C., and a committee of organization was formed. Realizing that the Unit Plan was "essentially an experiment in democracy, with preventive health work as the point of attack," the committee decided to secure three things: (1) Endorsement of leading social and medical workers; (2) Money support which would go as a gift to the community in which it might be undertaken; (3) the services of national experts as advisers and aids to its execution. In February, 1916, with a considerable fund raised, the National Social Unit Organization was formed, with Gifford Pinchot as its first president; and in November of the same year, at the invitation of the Council of Social Agencies of Cincinnati, that city was selected as the field for the first unit experiment. After the people of Cincinnati had been thoroughly informed of the Plan and a city-wide organization had been developed for counsel and support, \$135,000 were appropriated (two thirds from the national organization and one third from local contributions), and the

Mohawk-Brighton district of the city was chosen in June of 1917, as the special region for the experiment,—“to bring the neighborly advantages of the small town to the city community.”

For this purpose the essential features of the local organization consist of a citizens' council and an occupational council. The former is made up of one representative from each block, elected by a block council which is elected by the people of the block,—each person above 18 having a vote. These block representatives of the citizens' council are the paid general social agents of the district. Their duties are to report the needs of the people to the proper authorities and experts and see that those needs are fulfilled,—whether they be along the lines of health or employment or business or recreation or education, etc. In other words the citizens' council is a continuous census and intelligence system. One worker compares it to the sensory nervous system of the human body. “In the community there is no complete nervous system, so one part of it may be hungry and the rest not feel that there is any need. One part may be diseased and the rest not feel the results until it is too late. One part may be evil and the rest not realize the evil until the lives of its own children have been touched by it. The citizens' council will be the nervous system of the district, knowing whenever there is a need and making that need felt until it is satisfied.” The occupational council, on the other hand, is made up of at least one representative elected from each important vocational group of the community,—as the physicians, the nurses, the teachers, the lawyers, the ministers, the charity agents, the musicians and artists, the business men, the manual workers, etc. The occupational council serves as the motor nervous system of the community to bring its various functional groups into action to meet the needs of all its individuals, as reported and advised by the citizens' council. These two councils meeting regularly in some central building and co-operating through an executive, which they jointly elect, constitute

the local government of the community in all strictly local concerns and help the central authorities of the city on the one hand, and citizens, on the other, to eliminate the present numerous oversights, duplications and conflicts of effort,—and to transform the present hostile class distinctions of special privilege into friendly vocational distinctions of social service. A thorough report by Dr. Devine upon the working of the experiment thus far has recently appeared in the *Survey*.

While the Cincinnati experiment seems to be the most scientifically detailed plan now in operation in the United States for the development of genuine community democracy, there are still other numerous and promising experiments, among which is the Community Clearing House in New York. It has been privately instituted as “a radical experiment in the democratization of all public services, and in the work of training citizens to become parents and brothers of the city. Thirteen city departments co-operate in serving the people within a forty-block area. Through this clearing house, a public agent—a parole officer, or tenement inspector, or visiting nurse—can summon the aid of other public agents or any private charity, can invite the people to confer about needs, can enroll lay citizens for neighborhood social service.”

For all these important community enterprises the public school buildings constitute the most natural and useful material equipment; and in many parts of the country the new buildings are being constructed with these purposes in mind. A typical instance of this use of the schools is that of school 40 in New York. In February, 1917, wageworkers from 700 different garment shops began to use the school as a center. They held their shop meetings in the school rooms, danced in the play grounds, dined together in the corridors every night, and instituted forum work in the auditorium, meeting the expenses out of their own union treasury. This work has rapidly grown into many industrial evening centers in other schools, with a central educational institute at the

Washington Irving High School. In many other parts of the country similar use of the public school is developing.

The recent definite entry of the United States government into the movement, through the Bureau of Education, in part as a wartime necessity, has greatly emphasized the wider use of the public schools as community centers. The slogan of the Bureau in this work, as stated by Henry E. Jackson, special agent in Community Organization, is "Every schoolhouse a community capitol and every community a little democracy." Commissioner P. P. Claxton says, "For this purpose the schoolhouse is specially fitted; it is non-sectarian and non-partisan; the property of no individual, group or clique, but the common property of all; the one place in every community in which all have equal rights and all are equally at home. . . . Here all members of the community may appropriately send themselves to school to each other and learn from each other the things pertaining to the life of the local community, the state, the nation, and the world."<sup>3</sup> In commending the movement, President Wilson says, "The creation of community councils is in my opinion making an advance of vital significance. It will, I believe, result when thoroughly carried out in welding the nation together as no nation of any great size has ever been welded before. It will build up from the bottom an understanding and sympathy and unity of purpose and effort. You will find it, I think, not so much a new task as a unification of existing efforts, a fusion of energies now too much scattered and at times somewhat confused into one harmonious and effective power."

In his Ten Commandments for a Community Center, Mr. Jackson says:

- (1) It must guarantee freedom of thought and freedom of its expression.
- (2) It must aim at unity, not uniformity, and accentuate resemblances, not differences.

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<sup>3</sup> Letter of Transmittal in the book, *A Community Center*, by Henry E. Jackson.

(3) It must be organized democratically, with the right to learn by making mistakes.

(4) It must be free from the domination of money, giving the right of way to character and intelligence.

(5) It must be nonpartisan, nonsectarian, and nonexclusive both in purpose and practice.<sup>4</sup>

These are the key notes of the movement.

The practical lines along which these ideas are now being carried out by the government include within the community center:

(1) A People's University, with classes, lectures, athletics for all.

(2) A Community Capitol, with the public polling place.

(3) A Community Forum, for the courteous and orderly discussion of all questions concerning the common welfare.

(4) A Neighborhood Club, with the passing of the saloon an increasingly important means of healthy, democratic fellowship. To this are being added organizations for music, dramatics and other forms of art, such as the exhibitions of pictures by the American Federation of Arts.

(5) A Home and School League, which is a parent-teachers' association for improving both home and school conditions.

(6) A Community Bank, primarily a co-operative savings bank for both children and adults, but also a loan society.

(7) A Co-operative Exchange, a collective buying and distribution organization for which there is a growing public demand. North Carolina has already passed a law authorizing communities to form such exchanges in the schoolhouses.

(8) "A Red Cross Unit ought to exist as a department of the community center in every school district of the United States."

The organization for carrying forward these plans as suggested by the government consists of three essential parts:

(1) A Community Secretary, elected publicly by the community concerned, as its executive, especially trained for such work.

(2) A Board of Directors, similarly elected, to have both legislative and executive duties, as an occupational council, each member of which is committee chairman or director of one of the special community services of the center.

(3) A Citizens' Committee, or "trouble committee," corresponding somewhat to the citizens' council of the Social Unit Plan,—not to make

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<sup>4</sup> loc. cit. p. 65.

trouble but to remove it by finding out the things that most need to be done and developing wise, constructive programs of action, big enough to merit the interest and support of the people.

The movement is thus coming to furnish a simplified machinery for sound social reconstruction, eliminating disturbing class distinctions and enabling layman and expert, consumer and producer, operative and manager effectively to "get together." It is an important, a necessary, means at this time for realizing social union, allaying unrest,—achieving the moral ideals of democracy.

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**MATTHEW WALKER ROBIESON**

Readers of this JOURNAL will be able in some measure to appreciate the loss to ethical thinking and to philosophy in the sudden and early death, on July 16th, of Matthew Walker Robieson. For almost six years he had taught moral philosophy and history of philosophy in the Queen's University of Belfast, having previously shown eminent distinction as student and then junior teacher of philosophy at Glasgow. Colleagues and pupils have attested the attractiveness of his teaching and the value of his administrative work. His personal example is one that went to show that while universality of interest may not be for the moment a predominant feature of the work of philosophers, the tradition is still one that can be maintained without detriment to thoroughness and real knowledge. What he had published was principally in the region of social and political theory. It was his conviction that it is knowledge above all that is requisite in the current treatment of social questions, whether of class or of sex, but he further realised that knowledge in these matters has still to be well-founded through those methods of discussion of first principles and examination of assumptions which are characteristic of philosophy. This point of view is well shown in his more systematic published work: the articles "German Socialist Theory and War" (*Hibbert Journal*, 1915) and "The Theory of Morals on a Class Basis" (this JOURNAL, April, 1919). Like many young students he had been attracted by, and had later reacted upon, the current political propaganda of socialism, but reaction in his case took the form of recognising that here was an ultimate conflict of social theories, with definite philosophical affiliations, and calling for that philosophical discussion and genuine scholarship which he was so well able to provide by a powerful memory, acuteness of intellect and a maturity of performance which was noticeable in his earliest work. So it is that that in these writings there is to be found, practically for the first time in Britain, a discussion of socialist theory which can be compared with those of Sorel, Croce, Labriola or Sombart. Recognising in the contemporary advocacy of the scheme of National Guilds some definite apprehension of the problems in which he was interested, he contributed largely, from the same theoretical point of view, to the more thorough discussion of the subject in the "New Age." There also he dealt with the recent developments of psycho-therapy in their ethical and educational bearings.

He took a large share in the establishment and administration of the School of Social Study in Belfast, as in the activities of the Workers'

Educational Association and kindred organisations, and was the joint-author of a scheme for the systematic training of teachers in the province of his University, which is inspired by those ideas of social structure he had helped to work out. And it was acknowledged by Irishmen that his appreciation of the Irish point of view was, for a stranger, well-nigh unique.

At the time of his death he was engaged on a more comprehensive philosophical work on the development of socialist theory, of which it is hoped that some portion, at least, may be published with other writings.

W. A.

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## BOOK REVIEWS.

**IDEALISM AND THE MODERN AGE.** By George Plimpton Adams.  
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1919. Pp. ix, 253.

Professor Adams vivifies the age-old problem of objective idealism, namely, the rationalization of the mystic sentiment that man participates in some intrinsically good and noble thing. New life is injected into the exposition by the attempt to place it upon the level of concrete human events, rather than confining it to problems of sin and evil. In brilliant fashion Professor Adams exposes some of the shortcomings of our present machine industry ideals, the escape from which appears to him to be the embracing of idealism, the philosophical framework of religion. In particular, the author contrasts the current attitude that man must create the structures amidst which he must live, an attitude which underlies the economic struggles of the modern age, and which compels man to consume practically his whole time in material pursuits, with the religious view according to which man feels his way into "significant structures" which he neither makes nor controls. He stands upon the ground that the difficulties of our age are traceable to our clinging to the wrong sort of idea system. In this connection he condemns the knowledge which leads to behavior and control, in order to make room for the knowledge of "possession and contemplation." His point is, that man must seek for "significant truths," eternal values, and naturally enough for an idealist he argues that science cannot attain them.

A critical reader may be at a loss to see how the argument of the book holds together. On the one hand, Mr. Adams seems to be advocating a means of escape from the difficulties of the modern age, an unmistakably concrete problem, while on the other, the argument seems to carry us out to a realm beyond the possibility of connection with the facts of the present age. This dichotomy in the argument comes about of course, because its foundation is the belief that true and significant knowledge means thorough penetration by the mind through mystic insight into an utterly objective "other."

Illustrative of the defects of transcendent philosophy is the discussion concerning autonomous values. For moral conduct

and genuine knowledge it is presumed there must be a basis in autonomous values; that is, absolute ideals of an objective sort which can be demonstrated but not developed. The burden of the demonstration of these autonomous values is the assertion that unless there were final and real things known to the mind without learning, there could not be knowledge at all nor moral conduct.

J. K. KANTOR.

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**THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM.** By W. B. Pillsbury. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1919. Pp. 314. Price \$2.50 net.

In this book the well known authority in the field of individual and experimental psychology presents an essay in the field of social psychology. It grew out of the observations of the author while observing in Greece the American Greeks who had come back home to fight in the Balkan wars. First hand observations are used to good effect in the chapter on The Process of Naturalization in which the steps are traced through which the immigrant passes on the way to citizenship. The general standpoint is stated by the author to be a compromise between MacDougall and Trotter with obligations to Graham Wallas, but the concepts and presuppositions are largely those of the individual psychology where the author is so well at home. The reviewer found the most interesting chapter the one on Hate as a Social Force in which the thesis of conflict and opposition is worked out with concrete and interesting examples. Jennings' paramecia which stayed together because they could not endure the alkali in the water outside, is taken as the type which we follow when hate of the enemy drives us together. Reference to Jennings has no citation and, indeed, there are many instances of similar omissions, apparently a sign of haste. The story of the negro who referred to the effect on the Gerinans of "us Angry-saxums" illustrates the thesis that nationality is a psychological and not a hereditary phenomenon.

The main interest for ethics is the last chapter which is devoted to a discussion of the League of Nations and to the question of the psychological arguments for war. Human nature is plastic and the instincts are modified by the ideals making it possible to substitute other objects for the instincts to act upon. "In

no single respect does the psychology of nationality offer any reasonable objection to the formation of an international society or League of Nations. It is an obvious next step in the development of a social organization, and the social instincts and the social ideals and habits offer sufficient basis for its development and for its proper functioning when it has been developed."

ELLSWORTH FARIS.

#### SHORTER NOTICES.

**SELF-GOVERNMENT IN INDUSTRY.** By G. D. H. Cole. London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1919 (Fourth edition, revised). Pp. xii, 283. Price, 5s. net.

The first chapter of this new edition of Mr. Cole's book indicates a considerable change of view as regards political theory, though the bulk of this important book still stands. But everyone should read the new first chapter where he admits that "many things are here (i.e., in previous editions) stated far too dogmatically for truth or likelihood." The changing political scene, the emergence of the soviet idea and the action of widespread public discussion has modified Mr. Cole's doctrine, so that his attack on the "sovereignty" idea of the state is toned down, and he is no longer satisfied with his position that the state is merely a neighbourhood association, the final representative of the consumers; his past insistence on the state as the typical neighbourhood association is now "to say the least of it misleading" (p. 7). The sharpness and precision of Mr. Cole in his statement and retraction is very attractive, and his book is only another example of the fluidity of the present attitude of thinkers towards the state.

J.

**SHOP COMMITTEES AND INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS, Parts I and II. STATE RESEARCH.** Section "New Jersey." Section 2, Vol. VI, No. 10, July, 1919. New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce, Newark. Pp. 63.

This is a very useful publication for those who are trying to understand the new movement in industry which concerns itself not solely with wages, but with a voice in the working conditions and a variable number of additional phases ranging from adjustment of grievances to co-operation in the more responsible problems in which the worker is concerned. Part I contains a general statement of the objects and functions of shop committees. Part II contains a study of thirteen shop committee systems which are classified into five types. The tabular views presented are highly convenient for reference. The conclusions, so far as applicable to the present condition of unrest, "and in no way forming a theory that would be right at all times and for all conditions," are:

"1. Shop committees operated as a substitute for unionism tend to increase industrial unrest.

"2. Shop committees which are planned to be neutral on the union question are beneficial especially in the industries where labor is little or not at all organized, but they are unstable in that they eventually become either anti or pro-union.

"3. Shop committees combined with unionism present an effective instrument for the protection of the interests of all parties participating in industrial production as well as the public."

**WORKS COUNCILS IN THE UNITED STATES.** Research Report Number 21, October, 1919. Boston: National Industrial Conference Board, 1919. Pp. vii, 135.

This study is more comprehensive than the State Research Report in that it is based upon a survey of two hundred and twenty-five works councils. It gives useful data as to the technique and plan of administration of various types. It does not give so intensive a comparison of particular methods as is found in the preceding research, nor is the material so conveniently arranged for ready reference; but it makes a useful companion study. Its conclusion as to the value of the movement follows:

"In view of the conflict of experience, it is as yet too early to measure definitely the permanent value of the Works Councils movement. Approximately three-fourths of the employers having Works Councils from whom an expression of opinion was secured declared themselves in favor of this form of industrial organization or that their experience had been favorable. Although further experience may lead to a revision of judgment in some cases, the results thus far obtained with Works Councils indicate that they are worthy of unprejudiced consideration on the part of American industry."

**SOME RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF PRAGMATISM.** By Joseph Roy Geiger. University of Chicago Press, 1919. Pp. 54, price \$.50 net; post-paid, \$.53.

The author believes that the origin of religion is to be sought in the origin of the social consciousness, and that the problems and values of present-day religion are not only social and ethical but spiritual. From the pragmatic point of view, religious realities, like other realities, are empirical, dynamic, and practical. Specifically, they must be capable of scientific control on the one hand; they represent social and ethical demands, but religion "is not a short-cut method for settling, once for all, the problems of life. It is an attitude of faith, a moral venturesomeness, a working hypothesis by which the religionist means to have a share in the solution of these problems. Religion expresses man's deepest needs and highest aspirations; at the same time it strives to objectify these aspirations, to impose these needs upon an environment and make it answer to them."

**THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT.** By Hugh Taylor. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1919. Pp. viii, 259. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

Mr. Taylor, as if he were a survival of the Darwinian generation, argues that the evolution of government is the result of a species of natural selection and criticises the Spencerian theory of society. There is much that is otiose and questionable in the book. A chapter is devoted to a depreciation of liberty, in which quibbling as to the word (p. 130) in its various senses is introduced. Government, according to Mr. Taylor, is the "essential precondition of rudimentary civilization" and originated in the struggle for supremacy of the strong man in his group; owing to his effective leadership the group was armed for more effective struggle. It is difficult to square Mr. Taylor's claim for originality of treatment of this theory with the work of other writers.

Mr. Taylor has an exaggerated respect for war as a formative influence which he does not justify. According to him "peaceful biological growth does not occur in society; society grows by war."

In the synopsis of Chapter II, the views of "Mr. D. E. Fraser" and the priestly origin of government are criticised, and on page 61 onwards the views of "Mr. J. G. Fraser" are considered. For both names "Sir J. Fraser" should be substituted.

E. F.

**THE MENACE OF SOCIALISM.** By Sir Leon Levison. Edinburgh: W. Bishop, 1919. Pp. iv, 159. Price, 2s.

Sir Leon Levison's book is the expression of opinion by a disciple of Mill, out of patience with modern Socialism, which derives chiefly from Karl Marx. Such Socialism is to him a menace, and "threatens the foundations of our social as well as our manufacturing and commercial life." The book would be more compact without the excursion, natural in Sir Leon Levison, into the Jewish constitution (Chapter X). There is a curious kind of wrong-headedness about some of the statements, ranging from the supposed effect of the Boy Scout movement "in which the youthful mind, impregnated with militarism, loses its individuality and becomes an easy prey to Imperialist ideals," to that of the relation of Ricardo's theory of value to Marx's theory. The book, which is well put together, is, however, extremely readable. Intended as it is for popular reading, no references are given to the many quotations, and there is no index.

M. J.

**THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE.** By V. Branford and P. Geddes. London: Williams & Norgate, 1919. Pp. xxv, 381. Price, 6s. net.

This is one of a series of optimistic and suggestive books, edited and partly written by Professor Geddes. The regionalism of France is both his inspiration and hobbyhorse. Civic life, the crown and fulfilment of regional life, is the corrective of predatory imperialism and extreme worship of the state, a thing too abstract and too big for human interest, a Leviathan, in Hobbes's term. There is, to the writers of this book, something wrong in the whole theory and practice of modern organisation into great centralized states with their "megalopolitan rivalry." In place of the abstract monster set concrete cities, Louvain, Milan, Aberdeen. It is from the study and comparison of such cities' origins that the authors' views have crystallized, and they look to the cities of Hellas as model for an Amphictyony, a federation of splendid cities, which was the Greek ideal.

The book falls into three divisions, the first treating of the Industrial Revolution and its legacy, the second, purely descriptive of a walk through Westminster, an excursion into a historic culture city, while the third opens the question of the finer use of universities, which are warned to awaken to their resources and opportunities. It cannot be said that these three diverse threads are closely woven together into one strand, and this with the writers' love of their own verbiage (which leads them to speak of the refashioning of cities "from pretechnic or palæotechnic to etho-politic and eutechnic forms" (p. 374) is a stumbling block.

N. C.

**CRIME AND CRIMINALS.** By Charles Mercier. Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1919. Pp. xvii, 290.

Dr. Mercier's book contributes much valuable data for thought concerning ethical problems of crime. The author's thoroughly scientific attitude leads him to consider crime as merely a specific kind of social

conduct. As social acts, criminal conduct is owing to two factors, namely, the internal, which consists of instincts and reason, in short, the *mental constitution*, and the external factor, which is opportunity and temptation. This analysis of Dr. Mercier's and the conclusion following it puts the problems of crime upon a reasonable basis, and avoids the hopeless attitudes toward criminals which dominate legal theory and practice. In a brief summary Dr. Mercier sharply distinguishes his viewpoint from the obviously fallacious doctrines such as those of Bentham and Lombroso.

J. R. K.

ON BECOMING AN AMERICAN. By Horace J. Bridges. Marshall Jones Company, Boston, 1919. Pp. xiv, 186.

Unfortunately rare it is that an immigrant approaches the problem of naturalization with a full recognition of what is implied in the conception of citizenship. It is interesting to observe, therefore, Mr. Bridges' treatment of such questions as what America means to him, the privileges of naturalization and the obligations of the citizen to his country. In such chapters as *The National-Group Idea*, and *Cultural Cross-Fertilization* the way is indicated to the mutual penetration and fusion of the many cultures present in America and the final emergence of a distinct American civilization.

J. R. K.

THE MEANING OF THE WORLD REVOLUTION. By H. Hamilton Fyfe. London: Cecil Palmer & Hayward, 1919. Pp. 242. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

Mr. Hamilton Fyfe's book, which is a condemnation of civilisation as it has been made, though popularly and emotionally written, deserves serious consideration from its real depth of feeling. It is as striking as the rhymes of John Ball. The Revolution is the process through which the world has been passing, and its goal must be the end of the divine right of kings and castes, of systematic Christianity and pretensions, and when that Revolution is come full circle, the axiom will have been established that the "happiness and the well-being of each individual creature, the health, contentment and gladness of man, woman and child, are of more value than anything else." The worst feature of the book is the tenuity of its historical background; and the, perhaps, exaggerated optimism of its outlook; its redeeming features, freshness and sincerity. His solution is "mystical religion." Though there is nothing new in Mr. Fyfe's gospel, he may be ranked among the prophets.

DOCUMENTS AND STATEMENTS RELATING TO PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS (DECEMBER, 1916-NOVEMBER, 1918). With an introduction by G. Lowes Dickinson. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1919. Pp. xxxii, 259. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

The object of this publication is stated to be the preservation of the record of "the aims of the belligerent governments, as set forth by them during the Great War." The choice of this limited period is, of course, arbitrary; it is the period of "peace-feelers," and it does not attempt to include any account of the expressed aims of the same countries on entering the war. Within the limit the selection is compact and admirable; documents such as Count Czernin's great speech of the 11th of December,



1918, are brought into deserved prominence; as are regrettable incidents such as the secret treaties made by the allied governments and published by the Russian revolutionary government during the winter of 1917-18, treaties which bear the worst stamp of the old diplomatic tradition.

Of course the materials are still incomplete, and the time is not yet ripe for final comment. Mr. Lowes Dickinson contents himself with hinting faults and indicating awkward questions. His opinion appears to be that the Allies needlessly protracted the war, though this is not directly stated. The crucial point is the closure of all discussion by the statement made by the War Council at Versailles (No. XLIV). It is, of course, quite possible, as Mr. Dickinson states, that no peace was at that time attainable which the allied governments would or ought to have accepted but "it is difficult to defend the action of the War Council in banging the door at that stage of the discussion." It is always a hard task to stop a war and Mr. Dickinson's selection of documents will be invaluable for ready reference to the student.

J. E.

**THE FOURTEENTH POINT: A STUDY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.** By C. E. Fayle. London: John Murray, 1919. Pp. xii, 140. Price, 5s. net.

Mr. Fayle adds another stone to the very considerable building that is rising about the idea of the League of Nations in his essay for the Garton foundation. Its difference from other works on the same subject lies in his emphasis of the "dangerous pitfall" of attempting to establish a full-grown, fully developed League on the basis of existing national institutions, whereas, in his view, a more rudimentary organism would better meet the case. "Our task is not so much to legislate for the world community, as to call it into conscious existence." The present chaotic condition of international relationship represents a state of primitive anarchy which the people of Europe have long ago left behind in their internal development, and Mr. Fayle looks to the primitive stage in the history of individual races for a parallel for the powers of his rudimentary League. In such a state, the injured man waiving his right to revenge, threw himself on the protection of the community. The community replied by bringing to bear the pressure, of which the ultimate sanction was outlawry, and Iceland during the Saga period exemplifies this stage very completely. Imperfect as the system was, "it was an advance on the heroic anarchy which it superseded," and the application to our international relations would be an equally great advance. This is the limit, Mr. Fayle believes, of what is at present possible, and he therefore rejects as Utopian the paper schemes of a complete world-state, with its appropriate legislature, judicial and executive machinery. If we overleap the intermediate stages between our final goal and the existing state of things, we may run the risk of creating an organisation with no vital principle, because it does not represent the world's conscious needs. As an essential minimum he suggests a League of Nations, which must provide some simple machinery for receiving the co-operation of these nations in the pursuit of their common interest, and judicial practice will develop by practice, as in early Iceland. The appropriate offensive weapon of the League will be outlawry, which could be enforced by the economic pressure of a boycott or a blockade, or, in the last resort, by the armed forces of the League.

M. J.

**THE QUESTION: IF A MAN DIE, SHALL HE LIVE AGAIN?** By Edward Clodd. London: Grant Richards, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 314. Price 10s. 6d. net.

Mr. Clodd devotes himself to a critical examination of the evidence brought forward by Sir Oliver Lodge in favour of spiritualism. Unlike a recent anonymous critic of *Raymond*, he has little belief in the respectability of the professional medium and bases much of his criticism of spiritualism upon the fact that many well-known mediums have been convicted of fraud. That is the common sense attack; but much space is devoted to showing that "Spiritualism is the old animism writ large," and that it repeats experiences that have happened a thousand years ago.

Criticisms such as that (on page 24) of the messages purporting to come from the late Mr. Frederick Myers: ("surely wife and children would be the first to have messages from their beloved one") are of less value. Mr. Clodd's conclusion is: "To Job's question, If a man die, shall he live again, science can answer neither 'yes' nor 'no'; all that can be said is that the evidence supplied by comparative psychology does not support the belief in a future life, it leaves it unsolved."

M. S.

**SOME REVELATIONS AS TO "RAYMOND": AN AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT.** By a Plain Citizen. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. 245. Price 3s. 6d. net.

This is a curious book. The critical examination of "Raymond" from the common sense point of view is distinctly effective and damaging. Although the writer, unlike Mr. Clodd, believes that "spiritualistic mediums will bear comparison for trustworthiness, honesty, and good conduct with the members of any other profession" (p. 95), he is persuaded that Sir Oliver Lodge was exploited in their interest, and believes that the sittings with professional mediums were "not wholly genuine in character." Yet in the summary the amazing conclusion is reached that there exist in the world intelligent personalities who in some cases assert themselves to be the discarnate spirits of deceased human beings, and that "*probably* reincarnations take place."

M. S.

**QVADERNS D'ESTVDI**, Any IV.

This monthly journal, published under the direction of the Department of Pedagogy of Catalufia at Barcelona, has among its recent contents articles on the philosophy of Bertrand Russell, on F. C. S. Schiller, on the concept of the comic, and on democracy *vs.* the dictation of the proletariat.

**EUROPE IN THE MELTING-POT.** By R. W. Seton-Watson, D.Litt. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1919. Pp. xvi, 400. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

Mr. Seton-Watson, who is Professor of East European history at London University, has collected various essays bearing on his special province written during the past few years. They have a distinct continuity of thought which connects them both with each other and with his earlier work, *The War and Democracy*. Besides treating of racial and national questions that agitate Central Europe, Mr. Watson advocates the League of Nations as the only practical alternative to universal bankruptcy and social upheaval; diplomatic, consular and foreign office reform, and the establishment of parliamentary control over foreign policy. It was not

only in the Ballplatz that good faith and serious intentions were lacking; there was vacillation and dim-sightedness nearer home. Therefore, his main hope for the future is that the working classes will take an increasingly active and intelligent interest in foreign politics, and that the abysmal ignorance of our responsible members will be a thing of the past. The book is the work of a historian at grips with reality, and has the stamp of the best qualities of political writing.

N. C.

**THE ENGLISH PUBLIC SCHOOL: A SYMPOSIUM.** Edited by J. H. Whitehouse. London: Grant Richards, Ltd., 1919. Pp. 155. Price, 5s. net.

This book owes its origin to the much-discussed *Loom of Youth*. This novel, a serious indictment of the public school, led to confirmation and a critical examination, and the whole system which dominates a great part of English educational life appeared to be in the melting-pot. The main points raised were the inadequacy of the curriculum—the often lifeless teaching of two dead languages—the tyranny of athletics. Certain defects, such as those above indicated, might well be removed, but both the novel and correspondents drew attention to the inherent dangers of boarding school life, and the social danger (p. 50). Sir Sydney Oliver suggests breaking down the boarding house system, by providing first class advanced education for everybody within a bicycle ride of his home, and insisting that he receive it—but this is a counsel of perfection. It is to be hoped that the ventilation of the public-school question will lead to definite action on the part of those in authority.

E. F.

**THE MINISTRY OF WOMEN: A REPORT BY A COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY.** With appendices and 15 colotype illustrations. London: The Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1919. Pp. xvi, 320. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

It was remarked by feminists on taking up this valuable historical survey of the ministry of women that they had asked for bread and had been given an archaeological report. Were the sexes to be equalised? When in doubt, as in the case of other official bodies, a committee was appointed, that in due time produced a leisurely and adequate report, which deals not with "questions bearing upon sex in comparative or speculative theology or with the reasons why woman has never been ordained to the priesthood. The application of the results of our researches to the solution of modern problems has not been before us"; it was in fact outside the terms of reference. The committee states and does not criticise the "apostolic conception" of the relation between the sexes. It is plain the sacerdotal and teaching functions have been denied to women by the church; and as Dr. Mason says, "she (woman) was not to be regarded as the accredited and responsible custodian and exponent of the Faith." To whatever cause the restriction of the priesthood to the male sex may have been due, the committee contents itself with simply recording the fact, and also that this restriction "originated in a generation which was guided by the special gifts of the Holy Spirit." The issue, therefore, lies between those who emphasise the fallibility of the early church and those to whom it is an organism divinely inspired and assisted. The Report shows that the order of deaconesses (exhaustively treated here) has been allowed to lapse, and that women do not now enjoy the privileges that were theirs in early times.

LONDON.

N. C.

**THE OPEN LIGHT.** By Nathaniel Micklem, M.A., with a foreword by Rev. H. A. Thomas. London: Headley Bros., Ltd., 1919. Pp. 166. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

*The Open Light* is a book of tactful and supple apologetic, written for the student mind by a man in close touch with their desires and susceptibilities. By emphasising the mystery of matter, Mr. Micklem leads on to the necessity for a directing mind, and later chapters deal with the problem of evil. The case is put attractively, the argument is pleasantly tricked out with illustration showing Mr. Micklem's wide reading and sympathetic insight; the treatment is neither too optimistic nor superficial, and a great deal can no doubt be accomplished by *manner*, by the sympathetic subtlety of Mr. Micklem's exposition, preaching, as he does here, to those half-converted. *Glissez, n'appuyez pas* is his note; on the question (p. 88) whether prayer is a waste of breath for man when caught in a storm at sea, he tells us it would be "foolish to dogmatise."

E. F.

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# THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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JULY, 1920

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## THE ATTACK ON THE STATE.<sup>1</sup>

NORMAN WILDE.

**T**HAT there is at present a radical criticism of the state that may properly be called an attack, needs no proof. Both from the side of practice and of theory the state is under fire: sometimes in the interests of lawlessness and sometimes in the name of law. But to all its defamers alike it represents a dangerous and irresponsible power needing to be brought low and rendered harmless by the exposure of its pretensions.

Distrust of the state is not a new thing, however, its rise is almost coincident with the rise of the state itself, witness the theories of the Sophists. But the earlier distrust was not so much distrust of the institution itself, as of the particular form it had actually assumed and of the special persons in whom its powers were lodged. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was the royal and aristocratic state that was feared by the members of the less fortunate classes and it was to effect a transfer of power from the top to at least nearer the bottom that the successive revolutions were undertaken. But so far as the nature and powers of the state were concerned, the revolutions were merely revolutions, rather than progressions and the resultant democratic state was only an "inverted monarchy" with undiminished or even increased powers. It was only as the nineteenth century came to realize again, as the Greeks had learned long before, that democracy

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<sup>1</sup> Read as the president's address at the annual meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, held at the University of Wisconsin, April 16-17, 1920.

might mean only a change of masters rather than true liberty, that individualism began to question the beneficence of its new master and to plan defenses against its power in the interest of man *v.* the state.

But the present attack does not represent the old individualism with its atomic psychology and *laissez faire* economics and politics, it proceeds rather from the opposite camp as a modification of socialism, representing from the scientific side the new social psychology in its application to politics and law. Practically, the ultimate origin of the tendency is to be found in the emergence of groups in the industrial and social life of modern times and in the necessity of determining their relation to the state. The individual has in some cases lost his isolation and in other cases lost merely his unconsciousness of the absence of isolation and come to recognize himself as essentially a member, not of one group, but of many. Associational life, long discouraged in the interest of the unitary state, has grown to marvelous complexity; individual competition has everywhere given way to combination; and combinations have become self-conscious and able to assert their claims against the state in a way not possible for the uncombined individual. It is the emergence of these new self-conscious groups, offering new centres for individual life, forming independent units within society, able to treat with government upon apparently equal terms, that has raised in its most acute form the problem of the nature and value of the state. In particular, it is the concept of sovereignty upon which the attacks have converged, its nature, its limits, its location, and it is the possession of this by the state, or at least, its exclusive and essential possession that the critics are concerned to deny.

To appreciate the value of these new theories it is necessary to remind ourselves of the difference in the points of view occupied by the pluralists and the absolutists. The pluralistic doctrines are explicitly and designedly analyses of the actual structure and function of states as these are presented in history and in the life of today.

They refuse to recognize the validity of a political science which deduces the attributes and prerogatives of the state from its idea as determined from non-empirical sources. Their object is not "the real state of the perfect future" but "the real state of the past, the present and the imperfect future."<sup>2</sup> If they admit with Hobhouse, the legitimacy of a social philosophy which examines the meaning and ideal value of institutions, they yet insist that these questions of ideals must be clearly distinguished from those of facts. "The foundation, therefore, of true social method is to hold the ideal and the actual distinct and use our knowledge of the one as a means to realizing the other. We may pursue the two investigations, if we will, side by side . . . but every question that we ask and every statement that we make ought to be quite clearly a statement as to fact or an assertion of what ought to be, and never a hybrid of the two."<sup>3</sup> And it is their general charge against idealism "that it starts with and never corrects the fundamental confusion of the ideal and the actual."<sup>4</sup> Claims which might be valid for the ideal state are, by Hegel and his followers, transferred without notice to the actual state of experience, and governments, far from perfect, are given the prestige and authority of agents of the absolute. It is to strip the actual state of this idealistic splendor and to show it in its realistic rags that the pluralists have undertaken their analysis.

For the sake of concreteness in the discussion it will be convenient to centre attention upon the work of two men who may fairly be considered as representative of the movement, Leon Duguit<sup>5</sup> and Harold J. Laski.<sup>6</sup> Duguit repre-

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<sup>2</sup> Burgess, *Pol. Science and Const. Law*, I, p. 50.

<sup>3</sup> Hobhouse, *Meta. Theory of the State*, p. 17.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>5</sup> *L'État: Le Droit Objectif et la Loi Positive*, 1901. *Les Transformations du Droit Public*, 1913. Translated by Laski under the title of *Law in the Modern State*, 1919. *Law and State*. *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 31.

<sup>6</sup> *Problem of Sovereignty*, 1917. *Authority in the Modern State*, 1919. *Corporate Personality*. *Harvard Law Review*, 29. *The Pluralistic State*, *Phil. Rev.*, Vol. 28.



sents the reaction from the doctrines of Rousseau as these found embodiment in the French constitutional law of the Revolution, for, as Janet says, "*Il n'y a pas à proprement dire d'école de J. J. Rousseau, cette école, c'est la révolution entière.*"<sup>7</sup> It is especially against the idea of law as having its basis in the will of a sovereign state, that he protests. The state is not such a collective person and, therefore, the law cannot rest upon its sovereign rights, but is objective and prior to the state.

Duguit is a thorough nominalist, the only real will is the individual will and the only real person is the individual person. The collective person of legal theory is a fiction and one not needed by the facts. Legal relations, the old argument runs, are based on subjective rights and, therefore, that there may be a public law there must be a public person as the subject of public rights. But this whole idea of law as based on rights and involving subjects of rights, Duguit rejects, and with it the idea that the state must be conceived as a public person or a real will. The existence of a collective purpose is no evidence of the existence of a collective will, for it is always the individual who wills this purpose. "We can be sure that an individual thinks and acts; we can be sure of nothing else."<sup>8</sup> And not only is this idea of a collective person an unnecessary fiction, it is a dangerous fiction for it perpetuates the opposition between the individual and the collective interest, giving rise to the idea of a dominant interest other than that of the collective individual interests.

The state, as Duguit sees it, is simply "a body of men dwelling on a determined territory, of whom the stronger impose their will on the weaker . . . this power of the stronger over the weaker is termed political sovereignty."<sup>9</sup> The strength at one time may be military, at another, economic, but in all cases the state is a group in which there is this distinction of rulers and subjects and in which both

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<sup>7</sup> *Histoire de la Science Politique*. Tome II.

<sup>8</sup> *L'Etat*, § 177.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, § 178.

rulers and subjects are individuals with individual interests and individual wills. "The idea of a material power legitimate by reason of unanimity is a fiction,"<sup>10</sup> for if all wanted the same thing there would be no reason for commanding it.

But if the political power is not legitimate by virtue of its representing a general will, what is the condition of its legitimacy? Briefly, its conformity to law. "The state is material force, whatever be its origin; this force is and remains a simple fact, but it becomes legitimate if those who control it use it to accomplish the negative and positive obligations which the legal rule imposes on them,—that is to say, use it in the realization of legal right. Law is not, following Jhering's expression, the policy of force, it is the limitation of force."<sup>11</sup> These stronger men who always constitute the rulers and possess the sovereignty, are not to be conceived as above law or as themselves the authors of law, they "are men whose duty it is to employ their material force in perfecting social organization by protecting the individual and in protecting the individual by perfecting social organization."<sup>11</sup> This law in no sense is the product of a sovereign will, but is objective. Duguit's second thesis is "that there is a rule of law above the individual and the state, above the rulers and the ruled; a rule which is compulsory on one and on the other; and we hold that if there is such a thing as sovereignty of the state, it is juridically limited by this rule of law."<sup>11</sup> The state is nothing but force put at the service of law, it is a means and not an end.

In his conception of this sovereign law which sets the end and limit for the state, Duguit is largely influenced by the sociology of Durkheim. The key term is solidarity. Men form by nature a unitary group in which the interests of the individual are bound up with those of his fellows, he is *solidaire* with them. "Individuality grows in proportion to the growth of sociability, sociability develops with individuality. The opposition between the individual and the

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, § 180.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, § 178.

collective, so often brought forward, does not conform to the real nature of things."<sup>12</sup> The law which expresses this social unity is not a law of causation, but of social purpose; it appears, not as a relation, but as an imperative in human consciousness. The rule of conduct founded upon this fact of social purpose, is, in brief, *co-operate in the realization of social solidarity*.<sup>13</sup> We have here a rule based, not on any metaphysical considerations, but solely on the facts of human psychology, and, as based on human interests, it is a rule valid for all men of whatever rank and power, holding for the strong equally with the weak, for the rulers as well as for the ruled. And since the state is only a collection of individuals, essentially the group of stronger individuals, this rule is binding on, and limitative of, the state. The social purpose, shared in by all individuals, is the determining principle of the state and it is this purpose that can alone justify the actions of the governing group.

The rule of conduct based upon this purpose, Duguit prefers to call a rule of law rather than of morals, though he recognizes no real difference between the conceptions, but, as commonly understood, a moral rule is based upon intrinsic and absolute values, whereas, this rule of purpose is based solely upon social values. Co-operation is not a duty, but it has value since it conduces to the realization of the actual purposes of society. It is a hypothetical imperative based upon the fact of solidarity. Such co-operation is neither egoistic nor altruistic in principle since both these conceptions set the individual over against the other and imply a diversity of interests. The true conception is of the individual in his act realizing a good which is necessarily both individual and social at once. The egoistic acts are done because of ignorance of this true relation, hence, as the ancients saw, all vice is ignorance.

These rules may properly be called laws irrespective of their formulation and enforcement by the state since they have what is characteristic of laws, a sanction. This

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, § 186.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, § 187.

sanction exists either in the attitude of society toward the act or in the feeling of the individual himself toward it as reflecting that social attitude. When the state passes a law it does not create the rule, nor even the sanction of it, it only formulates the former and organizes the latter. The real basis of the law is not the political coercion but the public opinion and Duguit agrees with Jellinek that "the rules of law are not so much rules of coercion as guaranteed norms."<sup>14</sup>

The value of such an analysis of the nature of law consists primarily in the fact "that it makes it possible to limit positively and negatively the powers of the governing body or of the state."<sup>14</sup> Duguit believes that no theory of law based upon the subjective right of a sovereign state can explain, or afford ground for, any limitation of its power. The idea of the self-limitation of the sovereign he finds unmeaning. Only in the reign of objective law is there security against absolutism in the state.

In his recently translated book, *Les Transformations du Droit Public*, this theory of limited sovereignty is illustrated in illuminating detail. He there points out that the development of public law is all in the direction of recognizing the responsibility of the state, not only for the misdeeds of its agents, but also for its own acts when these inflict unequal damage upon individuals. Statutes may be declared unconstitutional, if not even annulled. So, too, the recognition of the rights of associations and of local self-government points to the same end. The rules and statutes of these smaller groups do not originate in the state, yet are recognized by it as binding upon the members and enforceable by law. Everywhere there is implied the idea of the state as only the enforcing agent for the ends set by the social purpose. As he summarizes his theory: "Individual consciousness and individual wills solidary with one another; a rule based on this solidarity, which is a mandate for individual consciousness and wills; individuals stronger than others, who in consequence of this rule are

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, § 191.

under a duty to put their strength at the service of solidarity; a statement of this rule by the rulers and an organization of means of sanction,—this is the state, objective law and positive formal law. The notions of the personality of the state, of sovereignty, of subjects of law, do not correspond to reality and should be definitely banished.”<sup>15</sup>

It is perhaps not quite fair, nor wholly safe, to discuss the doctrine of Mr. Laski before it has received final expression in his promised work on political theory, and yet the main outlines of his position seem now clear enough to warrant comment. Agreeing in objective with Duguit, his point of departure and method are somewhat different, as is also to some extent his terminology. In the former, the theoretical motive appears dominant in the desire to find the concept that will explain and justify the newer developments of law; in the latter, while the legal interest is evidently strong, still stronger appears the practical interest of the social reformer, looking toward industrial and economic change. It is its interference with industrial and ecclesiastical rights that rouses Mr. Laski to his attack on the sovereign state.

The state, he defines as “a territorial society in which there is a distinction between government and subjects.”<sup>16</sup> It is not identifiable with society as a whole because there are “social relationships which cannot be expressed through the state.” It is, therefore, one organization among many. The authority of the government rests upon the idea that its acts are for the interests of its subjects, that it is actually a dividend-paying concern. Whether it is such or not is not to be determined by its professions or by its concept, but only by its results and the test of these is in the actual obedience of the people. A government act that gets accepted is, by virtue of its actual effect, the expression of a legitimate sovereignty. Sovereignty is actual ability to secure assent by ministering to the needs of the people. “The state as a whole may repudiate, as in 1688, the acts

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, § 199.

<sup>16</sup> *Authority in the Modern State*, p. 26.

of its representatives for reasons that it deems good,"<sup>17</sup> and the government is thereby proved to be illegitimate because not actually effective. The *de jure* sovereign is the *de facto* sovereign since only the latter expresses the real will of the people.

The question of the sovereignty of the state, therefore, resolves itself into the problem of whether, and how far, it is able to secure assent to its acts. And here Mr. Laski develops a doctrine of natural rights as limitative of state sovereignty. The modern doctrine differs from the old as being not metaphysical, but social and historical. These natural rights are the fundamental opinions of any age as to what are the essentials of social welfare and these vaguely formulated norms constitute rights which every government must respect if it is to maintain its authority over its subjects. Such rights are not fixed and definable once for all as eternal possessions of abstract human nature, but vary with time and circumstance and social need. It is these principles of social welfare that get written into constitutions and bills of rights, but, whether politically formulated or not, they express a solid public opinion of which government must take account and thus constitute internal limitations upon the authority of the state. It is these natural rights that Duguit in his theory calls laws and regards as the basis of the state, imposing, as they do, upon the rulers the obligation to secure their recognition and enforcement as constitutive of social welfare. His denial that sovereignty rests upon rights is a denial that it rests upon the subjective right of a sovereign will and not a denial of the existence of historic rights in the social body.

In addition to this internal limitation of governmental authority, Mr. Laski recognizes an external check in the existence of delegated powers exercised by organizations within the state, such as industrial and religious bodies. The principle involved in this distribution of governmental functions is that power should be lodged where it can best be exercised and that this means usually that it should be

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<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

lodged in the hands of those directly concerned with any particular activity. This gives us the principle of the functionally organized society, with its many co-ordinate groups, each expressive of a unifying interest, and autonomous within its own sphere. Of these, the state would be only one group and limited by its relation to its fellows, *primus*, perhaps, *inter pares*, but certainly only *inter pares*.

Besides these two limitations upon its sovereignty, the internal, due to the existence of natural rights and the external, due to the presence of functionally distinct, self-governing bodies, Mr. Laski also recognizes a moral limitation resting upon the state. Granted that a governmental act might in rare cases secure universal consent, this could at best merely justify it politically, not morally. The *vox populi* cannot be identified with the *vox dei*. Truth cannot be determined by counting votes. The general will is not necessarily good, this is the testimony of all history, hence the individual must "pass judgment upon its validity by examining its substance. That, it is clear enough, makes an end of the sovereignty of the state in its classical conception. It puts the state's acts—practically, as I have pointed out, the acts of its primary organ, government—on a moral parity with the acts of any other association. It gives to the judgments of the state exactly the power they inherently possess by virtue of their moral content, and no other."<sup>18</sup> Not only, therefore, does the state not always register the real will of the people, but even if it did, it could not on that account alone command the conscience of the individual.

The aim in both these attacks upon the state is to secure and to justify the rights of individuals, and of groups of individuals, as against the Great Leviathan. To this end, Duguit insists upon the state as only a means for the carrying out of social purpose and hence as responsible before the law, while Laski emphasizes the actual limitations of its power and urges administrative decentralization and the organization of a federal system. In both, the state is

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<sup>18</sup> *Phil. Rev.*, 28, 571-572.

displaced from its traditional place as supreme and either subordinated to law or co-ordinated with other social groups.

With the practical motive involved in these theories no one who is intelligently interested in social progress can fail to sympathize. The liberation of personality and its education through self-government is the ideal of a democratic society and in so far as the contemporary attempt to humanize and socialize political theory and law looks to this end it deserves nothing but praise. The state ought to realize social purpose, the rights of society ought to be taken into account, a larger number of locally autonomous administrative areas ought to be organized, industry and the church ought to be self-governing and yet one may be forced to raise the question whether the fundamental notions in terms of which the theoretical interpretation of these political movements is being worked out are not to a certain extent confused and misleading.

Naturally, the basic notion is that of the state itself and it is in their treatment of this conception that the pluralists exhibit that tendency to abstraction that forms the root of most of their difficulties. With their formal statements no one need quarrel; the state is "a territorial society in which there is a distinction between government and subjects," it is society territorially grouped and organized for government. By this definition the state consists not merely of the ruling group, but of the ruled as well, it embraces all the members of the given society united in an organization for the attainment of certain ends. The action of the state would, therefore, be the action of this comprehensive body and its power would be that lodged in this whole politically organized group. Having paid formal deference to this concrete conception, however, emphasis is laid forever after upon the fact that for all practical purposes the will and power of the state is only that of the effective and dominant class or group, usually the majority, but often enough only a strong minority. The state is thus only the group within the given territory able to impose its



will upon its weaker fellows. And this will, if our political theory is to be realistic, so we are told, is always a will directed toward the interests of itself and not toward the good of the whole community—always a special, and not a true general, will. The real state is thus a class state, no matter how seriously our idealistic theories may strive to disguise the truth for us.

But, as Mr. Laski himself recognizes, though apparently ignoring its implications, one cannot separate a people into two sharply distinct bodies, the rulers and the ruled, and ascribe all power and responsibility to the former. The power of the so-called rulers rests ultimately upon the sufferance of the ruled so that every people gets virtually the government it deserves. No class state is purely a class state and no majority, or strong minority, acts solely in its own interests or expresses unmodified its own will. Consciously or unconsciously, the wills of all affect the political result even though that political result be far from expressing the will of any taken in its isolation. Even in our newspaper-ridden democracies, public opinion is not merely the product of editorial specialists dictated to by interests, for the newspaper itself is in no small part the product of its creative readers.

That there is a relative division in every state between rulers and ruled, and that some get their wills more perfectly realized than others, is, of course, obvious enough. It is, in fact, implied in the very existence of the state, since if there were perfect community there would be no need for the political organization with its coercive powers. But because we are limited both in our understanding and our sympathy we are compelled to fall back upon some external bond of unity and invoke the police. The state is only a makeshift necessitated by our imperfect moral development. To make this inevitable fact of subjection *within* the state, however, a ground for the exclusion of the subject group from the notion of the state itself, is strangely to misread the facts. For the subject group of one age may be the ruling group of another and, indeed, endure the

thwarting of their wills largely because they believe in the possibility of converting their minority into a majority. The state is this whole body of inter-related and interacting wills in which now one group is dominant and now another, but in which no one carries out its exclusive will in isolation from the others. There is a constant, though more or less effective, diffusion and interpenetration of social life, by virtue of which different elements at different times receive more adequate satisfaction and seem to be the center of the public life. Beneath all difference and variation, however, there remains the common life and the interest in a public good. As Hobbes, in his crudely vivid way, insists, men recognize that the evils of anarchy are worse than any of the evils of society, and, therefore, accept the state with all its implied restrictions.

No one has more clearly expressed the real meaning of the classic doctrine of the general will than Prof. McIver in his work on *Community*. He there distinguishes<sup>19</sup> between the will to organize and maintain the state and the will within the state determining its policy; the former is a general will, the latter always special, being the will of the dominant majority at any given time. The general will to have an association conditions absolutely its existence, the dominant will directing its policy gives it its specific character as this individual association. It is this policy-directing will that he thinks should be identified with the will of the state and it is this that finds expression in its laws and administrative acts, but back of it, and underlying all the political antagonisms out of which issue the laws, is the prior will to have a state at all. No matter how violent may be these political conflicts, nor how oppressive may be the will of the dominant party, so long as there persists the general will to unity, the state endures. This will to have a state is thus a common real will in all citizens, understanding by citizens only those who are the real constituents of the state. As McIver puts it, "it is those citizens who will the maintenance of the state who both

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<sup>19</sup> P. 137.

make and *are* the state, the rest are merely its subjects."<sup>20</sup>

To identify the will of the state, however, only with the policy-directing will, as he does, is to separate too sharply between the joints and the marrow. The real fact is the territorial group of individual wills struggling to maintain a peaceful community life in various specific ways. Some of these individual wills, with their specific means for attaining the public good, become dominant, but to say that the only state will consists of these willings of specific means and that the underlying willings of the common end are not the state will is an unjustifiable abstraction, since it is only as these specific wills are accepted and reinforced by the general will that they can form the will of the state. Without such reinforcement the political policy would be without effective power and constitute no will at all, being only the policy of a contending party. While the conception of the state as an organism is, in many respects misleading, it is none the less true that its existence and strength depends upon that harmony between rulers and ruled which Plato in the Republic identifies with temperance.

So much of truth, then, there seems to be in the doctrine of the general will, that there is underlying the various, and often opposing, purposes in a community a will to unity that finds expression in the state. To the extent that all individuals have an interest in an external order, their wills may be said to be realized in the will of the state—but, it may be, *only* to that extent. The external order may be so bad that it may be only a shade better than anarchy. Under such conditions it becomes unmeaning to speak of the will of the individual as finding its complete expression in the state as actually constituted, or to attribute to that body the ideal qualities it is assumed in the absolutist philosophy to possess. A state in which there is incipient or actual rebellion is far from the unity of the perfect community, in this fact lies the strength of the realistic con-

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<sup>20</sup> P. 135.

tention. To exaggerate this discord, however, to the extent of identifying the state with the government and denying altogether the presence of a general will is to overshoot the mark. Even such a discord as revolution is not pure anarchy for the will to have a state manifests itself inevitably in a new political organization—the overthrow of the government is not the complete destruction of the state. In Mr. Laski's words already quoted, "The state as a whole may repudiate, as in 1688, the acts of its representatives for reasons that it deems good."

Granted, then, that the state is this whole territorial group of individuals associating themselves together for the realization of a common good, though through policies only varyingly satisfactory to the constituent members but acquiesced in and supported as adequate enough to justify the association, what is to be said of the authority of this group? Is such an association rightly to be called sovereign over its members? And, if so, in what sense?

According to Duguit, the state is only a means to an end, that end being the social welfare or the realization of the social purpose. It is force in the service of law. This conception is asserted as implying the subordination of the state and its responsibility before the law. If we ask, however, what the real relation is between the state and its end we shall find that this end is not external to the state taken in its concreteness, but is immanent in it, is, in fact, just the well-being of the state itself. It is only when we make the abstract division between the machinery of the state and its living unity, identifying the state with the former, that we can speak of it as a mere means. Then it is obviously true that the institutional forms and the persons chosen to administer them are merely means for the realization of the ends sought by those who in their association form the state, but those ends are by no means external to the association itself for they constitute just its common good. The action of the state will be determined by the ends sought by its citizens and, in so far as any particular measure is thought by them not to realize the goal sought, it is

condemned and changed, but this change is not forced upon the state from outside, it is the result of the state's own changed mind and will. That this change of mind is not itself due to political action but may be the result of social and moral changes only remotely connected with political life, does not imply the externality of these ends to the state, or its subordination to them, any more than in the case of the individual the fact that his ideals may owe much of their character to the nature of his environment implies that the determination of his life by them is the subordination of himself as means to the uses of an external end. However he may get them, the organization of his life for their realization is at the same time a process of self-realization and it is essentially the same in the life of the state. The fact that it organizes itself for the sake of ends does not prevent those ends from being its own ends even though they may not be the creation of any system of legislation or political education and its recognition of them does not reduce it to the position of a mere means.

The reign of objective law, which is the central idea of Duguit's system, is thus not the reign of a sovereign over the state or of a fact external to it, but is the reign of the state itself according to the principles of its own purpose. That the laws of the state are not created in a vacuum, *ex nihilo*, as expressions of the arbitrary will of a sovereign power, unrelated to the social conditions of the time, is obvious. It is a commonplace that an effective law must have its origin and basis in public opinion, of which it is, virtually, only a formulation and enforcement. The function of the state is, therefore, according to the French jurist, only to give the sanction of organized force to laws which already exist as the recognized conditions for the realization of social purpose. But again it would seem that in spite of his nominalistic scorn of abstractions he has been misled by his abstract ideas of both law and state. These laws of social purpose are not objective existences independent of the individuals who cherish the purposes, nor are these individuals themselves outside the state, or

the state independent of them. The laws express the common purposes of individuals who constitute the state and the fact that these same individuals have held these views before they decide to formulate and enforce them does not imply any external limitation upon the action of the state. It is the same group that approves these laws that afterwards enforces them, the same public mind that thinks them that later wills them. The public sentiment which limits the state is the public sentiment of the state itself. It is only as we identify the state with its own machinery or representatives that we can regard social purpose as a limitation upon it.

The same criticisms can be made on the historic interpretation of the doctrine of natural rights. That there is a consensus of opinion as to a body of necessary social rights and that no government can endure which disregards these rights, is evident enough. The action of the state must respect this public opinion, but it is a self respect and not a constraint exercised upon it by a society other than its own members. If the state, to act freely and from its own nature, must act *without* a public sentiment, it must act without a mind and, indeed, without a will. The content of the state mind cannot be other than that which we call public opinion and to set this over against the state as its limiting other is the height of confusing abstraction.

So, too, in the pluralistic doctrine of the place of associations within the state the same tendency to abstraction is present. Each group is regarded as an independent unit with its own separate interests and the state as an additional unit external to the others. The fact that the members of all groups are citizens and that it is impossible to disentangle the special interest from the general interest, though it can scarcely be denied, seems virtually ignored. When the interests of the church seem affected by political action, the struggle is not between churchman and citizen but between the churchman citizen and the citizen of other interest, individuals as members of the state striving to influence its will in various directions. But the state has

no other members than these specific, differently grouped members and it has no separate interest apart from the complete individual interests, that is, apart from the interests of the individuals as members of the associated groups. We have no mere collection of groups acting upon the state from without, nor is the state constituted by its groups. As McIver says, associations are "unities within, but they are not units of community."<sup>21</sup>

The suggested limitation of the state by public opinion, therefore, or by law, is not a real limitation since this public opinion is that which alone constitutes the mind and ultimately, the will of the state. But what public opinion itself approves that it can enforce, which is but another way of saying that what the state wishes done it can do, since the organized power of the group is superior to that of its individual members or lesser groups. With public opinion back of the government, industrial associations are forced to submit. In normal times, we lose our sense of this compelling power, but in times of crisis the iron hand is revealed and the state shows itself that mortal god whom Hobbes worshipped. In such times the ordinary rights of citizens may be abrogated and constitutions disregarded in order that the supreme law, the safety of the people, may be realized. Political habits upon which men had learned to rely are then broken up and the state becomes a single, vitalized, flexible, unrestricted will.

But while under these conditions the state may attain that unity of will which constitutes its supreme power, under less perilous conditions it may exhibit all degrees of disintegration and corresponding powerlessness. Interests may conflict, opinion may be divided and a determined minority may force its will upon the government in disregard of the wishes of a hesitant majority. In so far as this is done by constitutional means, however, and acquiesced in by the people, it is hard to see how the resultant action can be considered other than that of the state, or the situation one in which a body other than the state is sov-

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<sup>21</sup> P. 138.

ereign, since it is not merely the particular group that is involved, but the latent power of the whole acquiescing people gives it backing. Its strength is the strength of the whole. Where opposition of interests goes so far that reconciliation is impossible, the community bond is broken and the state is dissolved into its elements. Sovereignty and the state disappear together, for we have a state only where we have a common will to hold together in spite of differences and, when we have this, we have also an effective control over the whole group, or sovereignty—the loss of the unity is the loss of the power. It becomes then a somewhat verbal matter whether we should speak of a state's losing its sovereignty or of its ceasing to exist, but the latter is more nearly expressive of the truth of the case.

Taking the term sovereignty in the sense of actual power, then, it seems impossible to admit that the state is subordinate to any power external to itself. The pluralists are justified, however, in so far as they mean merely to point out that not every state, at all times, has the inner coherence and unity necessary to constitute an effective will and that, in consequence, a government representing no real will often meets resistance and suffers defeat. Sovereignty as fact thus admits of degree, from the complete power of the unified state to the point where anarchy replaces the cohesive community. It characterizes the state in proportion to its ideality. It is not that the state can't control its members—as in the self-control of the individual, it could if it would, but it won't.

Turning from the positive to the ideal aspect of sovereignty, we have the question whether sovereignty ought to characterize the state. And in the discussion of this problem there is perhaps a more strident note in the pluralistic voice than is strictly necessary, at least in academic circles, for, apart from difference of emphasis, there is more essential agreement than the contestants would have us believe. In principle both parties would admit that so far as the state is the expression of the ideal community it is rightly authoritative. It is only in terms of ideal community that



rights and duties have significance. And that the actual state is not identical with this ideal society and is, therefore, not possessed of absolute authority is also admitted, though with more or less reluctance by the idealist. But the fact that states are many, that their sphere is limited to external action, that they employ force, that their actions rest on decisions by a majority—all these obvious considerations compel the recognition of the distinction between the state and the world of absolute obligation. It is sometimes difficult to separate the concepts of the ideal and the actual as used by the idealists, but there can be no question that both Hegel and Bosanquet admit the existence of bad states, though they refuse to recognize them as strictly real or *wirklich*. "A bad state," says Hegel, "is one that merely exists."<sup>21</sup> And Bosanquet, both in his earlier and his latest writings, claims for the state, not moral absoluteness, but only absoluteness as having "the distinctive function of dictating the final adjustment in matters of external action,"<sup>22</sup> and even as to this, he asserts a duty of rebellion under certain conditions. But differences of opinion are largely differences of interest and emphasis, according as stress is placed upon the fact that it is the will of the state, or that it is the will of an imperfect state, that makes the demand. The individualist, seeing in the state a doubtful and dangerous necessity, has small compunction about resisting its will, while to the idealist with his eyes fixed upon the perfect type, it is a more serious matter, and the burden of proof is upon the individual.

While there is this implicit agreement, however, in regard to sovereignty considered intensively, looked at from the point of view of its extent, the difference is greater. The pluralists hold, not merely that the state is actually limited by the associations within it, but that it ought to be so limited, that it is essentially a co-ordinate group. Their ideal is that of a loose association of autonomous groups, functionally distinct, in which the state is sovereign only

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<sup>21</sup> *Phil. d. Rechts*, p. 339.

<sup>22</sup> *Social and International Ideals*, p. 273.

with respect to special aspects of life, such as education, police power and external defense. Each interest of society is to have its organization, but no organization is to represent the will of society as a whole. In denying, or minimizing, the desirability of such an organization of organizations, however, the pluralists seem to display an optimism which is somewhat at variance with their usual realistic temper, for it implies a very hopeful disposition indeed to look forward to a time when a need for dictating the final adjustment in disputes between associations shall have passed. The interests of social life are distinguishable, but not separable, and so long as an external sphere exists at all, so long will there be need for some such organization as the inclusive state to say the final word.

Turning from the consideration of these special aspects of pluralism and looking at the movement as a whole, I am impressed by a vague sense of misdirected energy. The aim is to safeguard the rights of the individual and of groups as against the state, the means suggested is the reduction of the state to the level of other institutions. In effect, this seems to mean reliance upon new forms of political organization, specifically, upon decentralization. Refuse to organize at all, says the anarchist, and trust to the sound instincts of human nature. Organize loosely, counsels the pluralist, so shall your liberties be conserved. But if the government gets its power for good or evil solely from the people, no mere constitutional changes can give real relief from the potential tyranny of the people. It is like relying for temperance reform upon taking the pledge, or for peace, upon scraps of paper. It is not the pledge, but the will back of it, that gives security; not the contract, but the will to keep it, that lies at the basis of the state.

The problem of liberty in the state, as in the individual, is ultimately a moral problem arising from the opposition of interests and of values. So far as community is imperfect, so far as there exist insistent antagonisms, the individual and the group are at the mercy of the dominant antagonising power. No matter what the paper pledges,

there will be no more liberty for the citizens than there is justice and sympathy in their characters. It is as true of a democracy as of an autocracy that the character of the government depends upon that of the rulers. The vital problem is, therefore, not one of machinery or external organization, but of the unification of personal interests and public opinion, of the realization of a true community life. A transfer of power from one group or association to another is only a superficial remedy so long as the clash of interests remains. A local group can as effectively limit the individual as can the state and it is, indeed, as a protection against group tyranny that the state finds much of its justification. It is in this emphasis upon the need for a real unification of social life that Miss Follett's work is so important. It presents community, not as an actual fact, but as a task to be accomplished, and accomplished not by compromise, but by a real transformation and integration of wills. This integration, however, is but an ideal and as long as it remains so there will always be compromise and partial frustration whatever may be the political organization adopted. It is, indeed, the absence of this perfect integration that gives rise to the state and justifies its existence—it is the evidence of our imperfect nature. The very essence of the state is force. If, then, the state is necessary, it is surely not the part of wisdom to attempt to destroy or dilute its essence and thus render it incapable of performing its function. It is not force that is dangerous but the will embodied in it. The problem, therefore, is not that of limiting sovereignty, but of educating the sovereign.

And this conception of the political problem as ultimately one of education, suggests the final comment on the pluralistic tendency as at present formulated. It has the defects of its virtues. With its eyes fixed upon the discords of historic states it denies the reality of a general will and warns against the danger to liberty of confusing the ideal with the actual and endowing the imperfect state with a prestige and authority not warranted by its charac-

ter. It is this resolute realism that constitutes its strength. But it is one thing to emphasize the particular in life and another thing to deny the presence of the universal. Reality is always a process of the realization of form in matter and materialism and absolutism are equally inadequate to the facts. But political reality tends to be conceived by the pluralists as a mass of particulars in purely external relations to one another. It is true that these particulars are now conceived of as groups rather than as individuals, but this change in the unit marks no advance toward concreteness so long as the group represents an abstract aspect of life and the individual's relation to it remains mechanical. There are the functional groups, appealing to the particular interests and representing the partial man but nowhere do we find the including group appealing to the concrete interest and representing the whole man. The abstract and imperfect personality of the group with its limited interests is substituted for the real personality of the individual, whose interest in the universal, in community, finds no institutional expression. While, therefore, we can be grateful to the pluralists for their insistence that political theory must be realistic, we must also insist that it be *adequately* realistic, recognizing in social life not merely the failures of universality but the equally significant fact of the interest in universality and the need for its organization in the state.

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## THE PROBLEM OF A FAIR WAGE.

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**M**OST persons are agreed that there is such a thing as a fair price, and, therefore, a fair wage. Otherwise such opprobrious epithets as profiteer, and a score of others on men's tongues every day, are mere sound and fury, signifying nothing. If you doubt whether any meaning really lies behind these much-used terms, try the simple experiment of telling a considerable number of persons some variant of that ancient tale, Jacob's bargain with Esau; such a variant as, for example, the following story: During a famine in the seventeenth century, a wealthy nobleman was the only man in a certain district who had food for sale. A peasant who owned a comfortable property went to the nobleman to purchase a supply of food; the latter refused to part with any, except at the price of the man's house and land and an agreement to serve the nobleman one-sixth of his time for the rest of his life without compensation. The peasant had no other course open to him than to accept. On inquiring what your auditors think of this little transaction, you will find that the great majority condemn it as a piece of outrageous oppression; while the few who excuse it do so on the ground that the nobleman was simply carrying out consistently, in an exceptional case, those principles of business dealings which are necessary if the needs of society are to be supplied.

If, in addition, you attempt to discover what, in the opinion of the community about you, constitutes a fair wage, you will discover that the majority of people regard a wage as fair when it represents in some sense the return to the worker of the equivalent of his work. This is also the view of a great number of special students of ethics. This equivalent, some will hold, ought to be measured in terms of the sacrifice of inclination on the part of the server

—what in every-day life would perhaps be called his effort, what in economic theory would be called the “real costs” to him. Other persons, on the contrary, will hold that the equivalent ought to be measured in terms not of effort put forth, but of results attained. Every man, they would claim, ought to receive the fruits of his labor.

Certain writers, without attempting to distinguish clearly between these two very different standards of equivalence, attack this entire view by asserting that it sets a problem which our society is incapable of solving. “The story of modern economics,” writes Professor Overstreet, “is the story of rent, that is, of unearned surplus due to scarcity conditions of one sort or another. . . . So subtle and devious are the ways of unearned surplus that society has as yet not been able to invent means for their complete detection and elimination.” Equally pervasive, as others have shown, is the play of mere chance in contemporary business life. The situation is made still more confused, it is pointed out, by the fact that in the modern world all work is co-operative, while no devices exist for determining in any given instance how great is the share of the individual worker in the completed product.<sup>1</sup>

These arguments seem to me impressive, and the conclusions to which they lead true enough as far as they go. But they do not appear to me to penetrate to the heart of the matter. For if there exists a fundamental obligation to reward every man by returning to him the equivalent of his labor, then there lies upon society a solemn obligation to determine this amount as accurately as possible, and to distribute its goods in accordance with this standard as nearly as practicable. Everyone will, of course, admit

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<sup>1</sup> See in this journal H. A. Overstreet, *The Changing Conception of Property*, Vol. 25, p. 165; and A. K. Rogers, *The Principle of Distributive Justice*, Vol. 28, p. 143. The rôle of chance in the economic world is presented in detail by Adolf Wagner in *Grundlegung der politischen Oekonomie*, Vol. 1, p. 384 (3d ed.). The “classical economists” believed that the share of the worker in the completed product determined his share of the return, so that the latter could be used as an index of the former. This position is now generally abandoned.

that the absolutely impossible is not obligatory. We shall presumably never be bound to send missionaries to Mars, even though some successor of Lowell should one day demonstrate indubitably that the inhabitants of that unfortunate planet are in serious need of our ministrations. But this obvious consideration does not excuse us from realizing the moral ideal to the extent of our ability. Nor, provided our ideal is really entitled to the name of a *moral* ideal, does it justify us in turning our backs upon it as soon as its realization threatens to be inconvenient. You cannot play fast and loose with the authority of a moral standard in this fashion, any more than you can serve God and Mammon. To be sure we permit exceptions to such general rules as those forbidding unverity and breach of contract when they conflict unmistakably with the requirements of social welfare. But such permission can be justified only on the ground that these rules are derivative in the first place, and that since they draw their life from an ideal of social well-being they must accept the limitations of their applicability from the same source. No such position is attributed to the principle of equivalence in the writings before us. It is supposed to be not a corollary drawn from a consideration of the conditions of social welfare, but rather an independent and apparently self-evident maxim. The laws of economic justice, like those of veracity and fidelity to promises, either derive their validity from the demands of social welfare or they do not. If not, then considerations of social harm are irrelevant, and we are bound to cry: "Let justice rule though the heavens fall." If, on the other hand, they derive all their meaning and authority from their relation to social good, let us by all means start from this conception, and, without wandering off into by-paths, follow its lead.

These ideals of equivalence, then, must be examined on their merits. To this task we accordingly turn our attention.

As we have seen, the principle of equivalence has two forms. The first asserts that the amount of sacrifice *A*

makes for *B* should be equaled by the amount of sacrifice *B* makes for *A* in return. In determining this amount we must include not merely the time involved, but also the amount of distaste felt for the work, and with it the amount of effort required to put through the job. The inclusion of the second factor raises many complicated and perplexing questions. Ignoring them, however, for the sake of brevity, the principle in question would work out in a simple case as follows: *A* and *B* have neighboring cherry orchards, the one with fruit that matures early in the season, the other with fruit that matures later. *A*, let us say, is through native endowment very quick in his movements. His mind works automatically in such a manner that, in stripping a tree, he does not make a single unnecessary motion. *B*, on the other hand, is far less efficient than *A* in both respects. With equal effort, therefore, *A* can pick 25 per cent more cherries in a given time than *B*. According to the principle under examination, however, differences in native ability are entirely irrelevant. All that counts is the will to serve. Therefore, if *A* and *B* are to help each other in the cherry harvest and *A* works fifty hours for *B*, *B* ought to work fifty hours for *A* in return. This assumes, of course, that both work with the same diligence.

Where this principle is laid down as self-evident and ultimate, the reason may be that in some way the problem is assimilated to that of the claims of gratitude. It is natural to feel—I do not assert that reflection will justify this feeling—that if you make a given sacrifice for my benefit, I ought sooner or later to make a sacrifice for you similar in amount. Certainly if I refuse to do so I write myself down as your moral inferior—as one unwilling to do for another what he is willing to do for me. But whatever may be said for this method of measuring the claims of justice in the case of a disinterested service, it is only by a confusion of mind that we can suppose it to have anything to do with the economic problem before us. For the essence of the fair-wage problem is that the determination of its amount is independent of any question of motives,



whereas gratitude derives its claim precisely from the disinterestedness of the service. I do not here enter upon the hackneyed theme of the relation of the economic man to the real man. The point with regard to a wage is that it is due when the work has been done, regardless of the motives of the worker. The casuistry of gratitude, therefore, deals with an entirely different problem from that of the fair wage. The attraction which this solution seems to possess for certain minds is thus due to a fundamental misapprehension of the facts of the case.

But perhaps it may be maintained that a return of sacrifice for sacrifice is demanded by the spirit of fairness, whatever the motives of the server. A proper self-respect, it may be claimed, would not permit a person to accept a service from another (at least under ordinary circumstances), except as he, in turn, could repay it with an equal sacrifice. This principle, doubtless, has a very considerable range of application in the extra-economic relations of men, and may have had some significance in the economic relations of farmers a hundred years ago. But it has little or no bearing upon the problems presented by the economic system of to-day. In the first place, according to the view under examination, the return is due because of some sacrifice of inclination which *A* has made in the service of *B*. But suppose *A*, in performing an economic service for *B*, has made no sacrifice of inclination whatever; suppose rather, he has positively enjoyed his work. An expert bookkeeper once said to me: "If it were not for the fact that I have got to have a salary with which to support myself and my family, I would keep books for nothing, provided I could not get any pay for doing it." This type of man is far from rare, outside of factories, or at least was not rare in 1913. And whether rare or not, his case presents the ethical problem of distribution, stripped of all unessentials. If you try to meet it by urging that the employer would be bound to pay such a man because of the value of the services to himself, then you have completely shifted your ground. You are now proposing to administer

the economic system on the basis of value to the served, a system which would involve a man giving up everything he had in the world to one who, with perhaps practically no effort, had saved his child or himself from drowning. Now the essential fact is that the bookkeeper and his family must live. If then, he does his best for society through a good day's work he cannot be charged with swindling his employer by taking a salary, merely because he happens to enjoy the work for which he is paid. Otherwise his only chance to remain an honest man (and support himself at the same time) is to take a position where he hates the work. This entire point of view, then, has no relationship with the problems of modern economic society. We must start with the fact that every man who is willing to do a fair day's work is entitled to live; that to live he must have an income; and that this income cannot be and ought not to be determined primarily by the extent to which, in working, he sacrifices his inclinations, so that where the disinclination is zero, the income also might properly drop to zero.

The second form of the theory of equivalence is the one which, it seems to me, represents for the most part the plain man's view, though upon the moralists of our generation it perhaps exerts less influence than that just examined. According to this second view, the equivalent must be measured in terms of results. The server ought to receive the product, or rather the equivalent of the product, of his labor. For example, the cherry pickers of unequal ability should exchange on the basis of quart picked for quart picked. Every worker ought in fairness to enjoy all the advantages of his own intellectual, volitional, and physical qualities, together with (according to many adherents of this view) the advantages that come to him from the play of chance in economic society.

This phrase, "the equivalent of the results of one's labor," is in most of its applications about as ambiguous and slippery as any that ethics is called upon to analyze. I do not, however, intend to spend time upon any such

enterprise. For there lies at the basis of all the possible interpretations of the principle in which it is incorporated a certain assumption, and if the assumption is false the whole structure collapses. This assumption is that outside of the circle of family relationship, and possibly that of friendship, no human being owes to another any form of service, except perhaps such as call for no serious sacrifice. Locke states the basal conception with admirable clearness. "Every man," he writes, "has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. The labor of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his."<sup>2</sup> The conclusion from these premises can only read: "Every man has an absolute right to the fruits of his labor."

It may be worth while to discover how this principle works out in practice by examining a particular case. Let us in imagination flee to that favorite refuge of the economist, Robinson Crusoe's island. Let us, however, suppose that two sailors, instead of one, have escaped from the wreck, and that in escaping one has been so seriously injured as to be permanently crippled. He can, we will assume, do a certain amount of work; but with his best efforts the fruits of his labor will still be small. What then is the principle of division which Robinson Crusoe ought to employ? According to Locke, Crusoe has no obligations whatever to serve his companion. Each is entitled to the results of the labor of his body and the work of his hands; and a fair division is one made on this basis. If, therefore, they contribute to their common stock of goods in the ratio of ten to one, these goods ought to be divided on a ten to one basis.

Now it is the professed view of most contemporary moralists, as it is the nominal doctrine of the Christian church, that this conception of obligation is through and through false. We have, indeed, the right of self-defense as against the parasites that would suck up like a sponge

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<sup>2</sup> Second Treatise of Government, ch. V.

all that we have to give and would then ask for more. But assuming equal willingness on the part of all others to do their best, my duty is to do my best also for those who are within the range of my actions. This view is, indeed, far from being universally accepted in the society in which we live. Many men, perhaps most men, are—speaking broadly—still in the stage of morality represented by Locke's dictum. "I ought not to injure others, but the world has no claim upon my services," is for them the sum total of the dictates of the moral law.

In view of this situation it seems necessary to show that the distinction between serving others and refraining from injury, upon which the popular conception of the limits of obligation rests, is at bottom an arbitrary one. This can perhaps best be done by studying the problem in the concrete. Macbeth, not satisfied with being second in power and dignity in the state, aspires to the solitary eminence of the kingly office. He, therefore, murders his king and forces a passage to the empty throne. William of Orange (in Dumas' version of the incident as told in *La tulipe noire*) stands by and refuses to intervene while an ignorant mob, drunk with suspicion and rage, kill his chief rivals, the brothers De Witt. A few words from him would calm and disperse the mob. But he coldly watches the tragedy, deaf to the entreaties of his secretary.

If we compare William's inaction with the deed of a murderer such as Macbeth, what real moral difference do we find? In essence, none whatever. Each was determined in his course by the same motive—ambition to be the head of the state. Each was willing to go to the same lengths to attain his ends, to crawl over the dead bodies of those who stood between self and the goal set by ambition. One served himself by means of a dagger; the other allowed himself to be served by a torrent of human ignorance and fury which swept his rivals to destruction. In the court of morality the action of Macbeth and the inaction of William of Orange are on precisely the same level because they are due to precisely the same spirit. This is clearly

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recognized by the Dutch historian, Professor Blok, who, in his *History of the People of the Netherlands*, says that (in contradiction to Dumas' version of the story) "the Prince was absent and therefore not responsible."

This conclusion must not be misunderstood. There are cases where overt action is worse than inaction. One man reduces a helpless family to beggary by theft; the other man knowingly permits this same family to starve. The world rightly judges the first man to be worse than the second. There are at least two reasons why this sentence is justified. In the first place the responsibility of the first man for the situation of the family is undivided and inescapable. The second man, on the other hand, may argue with plausibility that the obligation to help the starving family rests no more upon him than upon any other member of the community. In the second place the thief wrongs two parties, the family who are his immediate victims, and the community as a whole, through his attack upon the institution of property. The second man, on the other hand, wrongs by his inaction, at most, the family itself. Such presumption as his hardness of heart creates, namely, that every one will have to look out for his own economic welfare, while of course not called for in this instance, is nevertheless on the whole salutary rather than otherwise.

No such excuses can be offered for the Prince of Orange in Dumas' novel. He was the only man in Holland who could have dispersed the mob, and he knew it. The indirect, remote effects, if the inner history of these events ever became known, were such as were calculated to kill patriotism at birth. That a man should be perfectly acquainted with the services and sacrifices of these heroic patriots, and then allow them to be done to death by an ignorant mob because he wanted the power they had wielded—the knowledge of such a damning fact would tend to undermine alike love of country and faith in the human race.

If the preceding analysis is correct, positive service is,

in essence, precisely as binding as the refraining from injury. This means that every man owes the world the best services of which he is capable, regardless of what he may expect to get out of them in the way of return. Applied to the economic world this means, in the words of Comte: "Every person who lives by any useful work should be habituated to regard himself not as an individual working for his own private benefit, but as a public functionary working for the benefit of society."

The same obligation that applies to the individual in his relation to society applies to society in its relation to the individual. It therefore defines the standard of distribution which society should employ; it ought to distribute economic goods with an eye single to the best interests of its members. The principle of distribution, in other words, like that of production, must conform to the spirit which obtains in the ideal family. Each loyal member of such a family contributes to its welfare according to his ability, without calculating his chances of receiving in return the "equivalent" of his services. Similarly the family does its best by each of its members, without looking narrowly to the amount which he is able to contribute to the common income. The ideal of economic justice thus becomes, in the often quoted words of Louis Blanc, "The state ought to be regarded as one family, in which all shall work according to their ability and receive according to their needs."

The conception of distribution according to needs, to be sure, is almost as difficult to deal with as is that of equivalence. Fortunately for our theory, however, we do not have to examine it too minutely. For in the world outside of the family it will prove practically impossible to adjust men's incomes according to their needs, because no one can really tell who has more needs than another, and how much greater they are. It is, indeed, true that the child under fourteen years of age has less needs than an adult, reckoning them in terms of the amount of money required to satisfy them. It is also true that where two adults live

together their combined need for money is less than twice as much as where each lives alone, because of the saving in overhead expenses. These are quite manageable facts, relatively easy to calculate in determining the economic needs of a family. When due allowance for them has been made, however, we have gone about as far in this direction as it is practicable to go. Subject to these conditions, accordingly, our ideal will require in practice equality of incomes for all persons as the nearest approach to the perfect standard of distributive justice which the ignorance of man permits.

Economic equality, I am well aware, is anathema to many very excellent people. It certainly has great difficulty in making a place for itself in the "philosophy of the top dog." But the moral point of view is not that of the top dog, but of the impartial observer. Seen from the latter standpoint, inequalities do not appear so beautiful as when looked at from the lofty heights of exceptional success. Inequality of distribution is in the first place very wasteful of the material conditions of human well-being. One thousand dollars added to an income of one thousand dollars may revolutionize a man's mode of living. The same sum added to an income of one hundred thousand will produce no appreciable effect whatever upon any feature of his life. Furthermore, great inequalities of income involve grave dangers to morals, since extremes of wealth and poverty are about equally inimical to health of character. Again, such a system involves serious dangers to the state because the state cannot afford to have subjects more powerful than itself, as the history of every wealthy nation shows only too clearly. The existence of a large class of discontented poor is also likely to be almost as dangerous to the state as the concentration of enormous wealth in a few hands. Finally, it is wasteful from an industrial point of view. The sons of the rich, who are likely in large degree to inherit the father's ability, are tempted to degenerate into mere loafers, or worse. The very poor, on the other hand, do not have sufficient food, clothing, and shel-

ter, to be physically vigorous and thus capable of doing their best work.

Inequality, to be sure, like everything else in the world, has certain advantages of its own. The most important, doubtless, is the zest that is afforded by running for prizes (at least in the case of the twenty per cent that are measurably successful). Undoubtedly, too, as was suggested in a recent editorial in one of our weekly journals, the pleasure of the winners in their possessions is in many instances greatly enhanced by their ability to see all about them people not so well supplied with the good things of life as are they themselves.<sup>3</sup> Precisely as it used to be affirmed that much of the happiness of the saved would consist in looking down from Heaven upon the sizzling miseries of the damned. But whatever may be the advantages of inequality no one need fear its disappearance as one of the facts of life. And as will be seen immediately we do not even claim that it ought to disappear entirely, at least within any period of human history about which it is worth while to speculate.

For obviously the possibility of introducing the ideal of the family into society at large depends upon one very important condition, namely, that "all shall work according to their ability." Where any considerable proportion of the community are unwilling to do so the result of attempting to introduce such a system would simply be to lower the amount to be divided. None, or few, would then be better off, while the majority would be worse off. The very spirit of the family, therefore, requires that where necessary a spur be applied to individuals to induce them to raise their economic efficiency to its maximum. A man has no moral right to be a sponge. Therefore, he may not complain when the world refuses to allow him to play that rôle. All of which has been said once for all in the words: "If a man will not work, neither shall he eat."

What then is a just economic system? I answer, that economic system is just which in its principles of distribu-

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<sup>3</sup> *The Review*, January 3, 1920, p. 4.



tion departs from equality so far and only so far as is necessary to supply the spur required to raise production to the maximum desirable. The inequalities which belong to such a system would, of course, be just also. And those returns, whether for working, for saving, or for taking risks, would be just which came to the individual as the results of the workings of the system. The nature and amount of the excess rewards may well vary from generation to generation according to the character and intelligence of the persons concerned, and also according to the nature of the industrial processes that are being employed. No one system is in its concrete workings eternally just. The most we can say is that that system is just at any given time which most successfully maintains such a ratio between the demands of production and those of distribution as will best serve the economic interests of all concerned, while at the same time sacrificing to economic ends none of the higher elements of human life.<sup>4</sup>

Contemporary society attempts to apply the needed spur chiefly through the principle of competition. It follows from what has been said above that provided, or in so far as competition is, on the whole, the best industrial system at present attainable, that is a fair price to-day which is obtained through fair competition in an open market. "Fair competition" is that form of competition in which success is won on the basis of effective service.

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<sup>4</sup> It must be noted that the equality of treatment here set forth as an ideal may require a larger amount of pay in occupations essentially monotonous and otherwise disagreeable than in those which are intrinsically interesting, or are for whatever reasons contributory to immediate happiness or self-development. In this way the satisfactions which money brings may serve as a plus as against the minus represented by the tedium or other ills with which the task burdens the slowly passing hours. Following this line of thought, and taking into consideration, at the same time, the necessity of paying according to effort in order to apply the necessary spur to action, one may get to demands which *at certain points* are identical with the first form of the standard of equivalence criticised in the earlier part of the paper. But the principles here advocated and the demands of equivalence are, as should be obvious, in spirit utterly different. The coincidence in the field of practice, as far as it exists, has at most the significance of the (also incomplete) coincidence between the requirements of the retributive and deterrent standards of punishment.

An "open market" means one which is not artificially closed by law, agreement, *etc.*, and which is really accessible to a large number of persons prepared and willing to serve and be served.

Competition, like every other instrument of man, has its imperfections, many of which, as everyone conversant with the subject knows, go down to the very foundations of the system. The rewards and penalties which it dispenses are, therefore, far from being the last word in economic justice. The ideal system of distribution, we have maintained, is represented by the nearest approach to equality compatible with the maintenance of a high standard of production. Accordingly, where men are receiving wages higher than the average, society should attempt to reduce these wages as near to the level of the average as is compatible with securing a sufficient amount of service of the desired kind and quality. In the case of those who are getting less than the average, in so far as they are working to the limits of the maximum desirable, society should aim to raise their wages as near to the average level as is compatible with the excess payments to others that are necessary in order to obtain the requisite exceptional service.

The problem of the means to the attainment of these ends is one primarily for the economist, the statesman, and the business man. As we all know, the modern state has in the income and the inheritance tax a powerful instrument for levelling down; and it has begun to use, among other devices, the legal minimum wage as an instrument for levelling up. After what has been said the underlying principle upon which these measures rest needs no defense. With regard to economic minima, however, we must never forget that when the "living wage," as defined, for example, by our industrial commissions, has been established as the minimum permitted by law, and economic society has made the tremendous adjustments which this policy will necessitate, then we must take up anew the problem of eliminating the lower wage levels, if there be

such, which cannot justify themselves by the requirements of a satisfactory system of production, even though they may be sufficient to supply the bare needs of existence.

There are certain fields in which competition can play no direct part whatever in regulating economic rewards, because it has ceased to exist. Indeed, in some cases society has no desire, as well as no power, to revive it, because it cannot be made to function effectively. This is the field of public utilities and other "natural monopolies." What then is a fair price for the managerial labor and skill and for the capital involved in such undertakings? In answering this question we must note that the wages of the managers of these enterprises are ordinarily above the average of the community as a whole. We shall not go far astray if we make the same assertion with regard to the incomes of those who supply the major portion of the capital employed by economic society. Therefore, the fair price for these two forms of service will be, generally speaking, the lowest price that will produce an adequate supply of the particular kind and quality of service required under the given conditions. These conditions are at present determined by what the managerial skill and the capital concerned could obtain, on the average, under circumstances of equal risk, in the open market. Such a price is, therefore, to-day, a fair price.

This is precisely the principle which is being employed by the courts. Typical in this respect is the legal doctrine of a reasonable railroad rate. "The reasonableness of the schedule as a whole," write Beale and Wyman, in *Railroad Rate Regulation*, "depends upon whether it yields a fair return to the carrier. This is largely a mathematical question. The carrier is entitled, first to pay all expenses, which would include both the actual expenses of operation and also certain annual charges that must be paid before any real profit can be realized. He is entitled, furthermore, to gain a fair profit on his capital invested. The determination of the actual amount of the capital invested may be a matter of some difficulty; once determined, the rate of

profit upon that amount of capital is a question which will be determined, generally speaking, by the ordinary business profit of the time and place. A schedule of rates will be reasonable from the point of view of the carrier if it yields him a net profit equal to that which would be realized, as a business question, from any other business where the capital and the risk were the same." In a very able article in a recent number of the *Harvard Law Review*, Mr. H. W. Edgerton has shown that the introduction into the problem of the claims of the shippers leaves the solution here stated unchanged.<sup>5</sup>

The above statement should enable us to answer the question. What is a fair price in those fields where the state or quasi-public organizations like educational endowments determine the wage? What is, for example, a just wage for a state or municipal official, or for a university professor? What is the fair duration of a patent or a copyright? To answer the question in the concrete, the just wage for a university professor is that sum which will attract to the profession in sufficient amount the ability and willingness to work required for meeting the needs which universities exist to supply. And if the university is to get the best real services and not merely nominal ones, this sum must, furthermore, be large enough to enable him to afford those expenditures which are necessary for the most effective performance of his duties.

The community is constantly being called upon to determine, through its arbitration boards, what constitutes a fair wage for great bodies of workers, such as the coal miners or locomotive engineers. As is well known, this method of settling industrial disputes has of late been losing favor because the boards, sometimes by their own confession, have been unable to find any standard of fairness towards which to move. Their findings have, therefore, tended to represent merely a more or less arbitrary compromise between conflicting demands. With all due

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<sup>5</sup> Beale and Wyman, *Railroad Rate Regulation*, second edition, sec. 220. H. W. Edgerton, 32 *Harv. Law Rev.*, 516.

recognition of the enormous difficulties of this class of problems, this outcome does not seem to be a necessary one. For the principles which hold for the professor or the judge hold equally for the coal miner or the locomotive engineer, though the actual working out of the problem in the latter cases happens to involve complications of which the former are quite innocent. The wages of locomotive engineers, like those of professors, ought to be sufficient to fill each grade of the service with the requisite number of men possessed of the necessary ability. They should, furthermore, afford a man with a family of average size sufficient means, reckoned by the year, to keep him permanently in the physical condition necessary for a proper performance of his duties, and of course to maintain the same standards of living for his family. These counts should be a first charge on all transportation. But there is another factor. If the annual income, thus reckoned, is less than the average annual family income of the nation as a whole, the men have a *prima facie* claim to an advance up to this point. It goes without saying that the duty of society to honor these claims may be limited by other conflicting considerations. It must take into account the effects of any proposed advance upon the real wages of the remaining members of the community who must pay the charges. The effects upon the industry as a whole must of course be counted, and much else which it is unnecessary to mention in this place. All that we here attempt is to formulate a first approximation to a standard. And this, notwithstanding the questions it leaves unanswered, should not be a futile method of spending one's time. For without a standard, whether formulated or implicit, the economists and other experts, the "representatives of the public," and all the other members of the arbitration boards are like Huxley's Irish horseman, who was "going at a divil of a pace," but didn't know where he was going.

In this country, before the Civil War, the husband and father was in the great majority of cases the sole wage receiver of the family. This remains true, to a consider-

ble extent at least, to-day. The preceding discussion has failed to state explicitly on what basis such a man ought to be paid. There can, however, be but one answer on the principles for which we have contended. The agents, whoever they are, through whom society distributes its goods ought to be paid in proportion to the number of individuals properly dependent upon them. This may include of course not merely the immediate family, but in certain circumstances the aged parents, the invalid sister, or others more remote. No agencies exist in contemporary society for the effective realization of this claim. Nevertheless, it has worked itself out in a crude way in the competitive system through the determination of the working-man and the clerk to maintain the standard of living for his family as well as for himself. And this determination has been seconded not infrequently by the recognition on the part of the employer of the justice of such a claim. Hence has arisen the phenomenon of unequal pay for equal work as between men and women. This phenomenon is not to be confused with the fact that what appears to be equal work often is not. For it is found where there is in fact no difference in quality or amount of service. And where such differences exist they do not ordinarily account for the differences in wages that actually obtain.

The result is the realization of an ideal of justice for all which is incomplete enough, no doubt, but is infinitely better than nothing. One of the serious dangers which threatens society to-day is the movement to destroy this system by law or any other agency that may come to hand. It is being engineered not with a view to a nearer approximation to the ideal of equality for *all*, but rather for the destruction of such approximations as have been thus far attained. Obviously one who accepts the principles laid down in this paper could have no sympathy with such an object. The average man engaged in business has the financial care of more dependents than the average woman. It is true that there are some men who have no dependents of any kind; it is also true that there are such women,

and that the number of the latter is by far the greater in economic society as a whole. It is true that some women in business are widows with dependent children; it is equally true that besides the widowers with children there are the married men who have both wife and children. It is true that some women are supporting a mother or an invalid sister. As many men will be found who are doing precisely the same thing, and most of these men have a wife and children to care for besides. If the present system of payment through the father is to be destroyed society must move in either one of two directions. It must seek either to adjust incomes in accordance with the number of dependents more perfectly than it does at present or it must treat each worker as an isolated unit. The first alternative, as far as I can see, could be realized only by socialism. The second would mean that the interests of the great majority of the members of society, men, women, and children alike, had been sacrificed to the interests of that comparatively small body of women who will never marry. For him who accepts the general conclusions of this paper, and at the same time is not a socialist, the only possible policy is to stand by the method of distribution at present prevailing. In its union of strength and imperfection this part of the competitive system is neither worse nor better than the rest.

It might at first glance be supposed that the movement to divorce men and women from all family relationships in determining wages would find its support in the "fruits of one's labor" theory. In this case the issue before us would be one more phase of that clash of ideals with which this paper has been occupied from the beginning. A more careful examination, however, will show that while the movement in question undoubtedly owes much of its actual momentum to the widespread acceptance of this principle of distribution, it can at bottom claim as little support from the one rival as from the other. Locke's theory, when translated into the concrete, does, indeed, seem to affirm that in so far as the employees of the A, B, C, Com-

pany do equal work they ought to receive equal pay, and that this holds whether they are men or women. But what Locke's principle really says is this: *All human beings* doing equal work, wherever the work may be done, are entitled to equal pay. According to this view, therefore, we should undoubtedly have to ignore dependents who are doing no work for society that can properly be so called; and should thus have to throw out the children and the invalid sisters. But how about the wife at home? Is she doing no useful work? Is she not on the contrary doing a work as important as and often far more exacting and fatiguing than that of her husband, especially if she be a mother? Should she not be paid for it? And can you cut her husband's salary, in order that a part of it may be given to an unmarried woman, without cutting that of the wife at the same time? Why not solve the problem by raising the women's salaries to the level of the men's, it may be asked. This suggestion is a mere subterfuge. The question is, What is the fairest disposition to make of a given sum of money, whatever its amount? A system that ignores the claims of the married woman as a wage earner simply ignores the claims of one of the greatest of the world's fields of labor—largely, I fancy, because its representatives are not making a noise.

The laboring classes, as is well known, have adopted "Equal pay for equal work" as one of their slogans. The reason is also well known. They are determined to protect their own standard of wages against the competition of woman's wage. Since their standard is based upon the needs of a family we can have nothing but approval for their purpose. But this aiming at one target for the purpose of hitting another is likely in the end to have very awkward consequences. For some day a United States Supreme Court will make the important discovery that the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by the establishment of a minimum wage for men. When that day arrives, on what basis shall this wage be calculated? On the basis of the needs of an average family, our view would declare.



Not so, says the new movement; the number of dependents has nothing to do with the amount of pay to which a man is entitled. If the latter view is correct, the conclusion is inescapable that the minimum wage for men must be calculated upon the needs of the worker alone. On this issue the workingman will find that he must either fish or cut bait, and the sooner he awakens to the real situation the better it will be for him.

A final problem remains for consideration. It is obvious that according to the present paper deliberate lapses from economic equality are permissible, on a large scale, at least, only because of the hardness of the human heart. The question therefore arises, What return for his services ought a man to accept who aims at a higher standard of conduct than that of the ordinary individual who has to be bribed to get him to work. The answer is that, under given conditions, a certain reward is always necessary to secure for society each particular kind of service in the requisite amount and quality; and that every man ought to accept such reward when it is offered him. When Benjamin Franklin invented his famous stove he refused to take out a patent on it, and gave it freely to the world. As almost no one followed his example no harm was done, and the world was just that much better off for the gift. But suppose his generosity had fired the emulation of a third of our American inventors. The result would have been a great calamity. It would soon have become a disgrace to accept the profits from a patent, and as a result, in all probability, the less unselfish geniuses would never have produced their inventions. In certain fields, as in medicine, this statement apparently does not hold. Here, therefore—such is the complexity of ethical phenomena—a different code will be and may be followed by the best men. But under ordinary circumstances the interests of economic order and economic progress alike will be best conserved if the good man accepts the rewards which must be offered to his co-laborers in the same field. On the other hand when there are poured into his lap sums palpably in

excess of this amount he will feel that he has no right to treat them as his own, but will regard them as a trust held by him in behalf of society. Under such circumstances his first care should ordinarily be for his employees. The reason for this statement is not, as some enthusiasts for profit-sharing would have us suppose, because these employees have necessarily "earned" more than the employees of other men who have been less successful. This would be to go back to the "fruits of one's labor" theory in precisely the case where it has least plausibility. The priority of the claims of one's own employees usually has its source rather in the fact that the promptings of humanity ordinarily go out most spontaneously and vigorously, and reach their goal with most economy of effort in the case of those whose lives touch our own. Wherever the level of remuneration is well above that of the "living wage," the claims of the employees should always be balanced against those of the consumers, who may be served through lower prices, of entrepreneurs who may be served with capital through loans, and of the community at large which may receive back its own in the form of what is commonly called donations.

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## RATIONAL SELF-INTEREST AND THE SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT.

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**A**LL discussion of the problem of social adjustment must take its departure, it would appear, from two outstanding and indubitable facts: first, that on the plane of actual existence or common human life the interests of individuals do conflict; and, second, that on a higher plane, that of reason or right as you may choose to call it, the good of all is the good of each. When one considers the pages of controversial writing upon the problem so-called of self-sacrifice, without producing any final agreement as to whether there is any such thing, he is tempted to conclude that this problem has attained no solution because it is at bottom fictitious and unreal. But such hasty inference concerning the problem of social adjustment is forbidden by the fact that social progress is emphasizing its existence and difficulty and showing the urgent necessity for its solution. Those who plan and labor for the realization of democratic social ideals are being held back constantly by the knowledge that the measures they propose, while demonstrably for the good of all, nevertheless presuppose and require a degree of co-operation among individuals which they with their private interests cannot or will not give. Leaders in government and in industry are asking how this apparently incurable individualism can be overcome and men gotten to work together. But those who are practically interested in the problem disagree in the answer they give to the question how secure genuine co-operation among individual members of society. One answer, usually associated with liberalism is "by popular education," meaning thereby general intellectual enlightenment; another, conservative in its antecedents, proposes "moral and religious training" as the solution. A problem like this, of social import and practical urgency sufficient

to cause men to insert their answers into political party programs is far from antiquated or unreal; it is deserving of renewed attention and systematic study from philosophy.

Systematic ethics of comparatively recent date has furnished us with two different theories of the social adjustment, which are significant by virtue of their sharp contrast. I refer to the view of Professor Dewey developed in the Dewey and Tufts' "Ethics," and that of Professor Fite formulated in outspoken opposition to this in his "Individualism." The first theory is based upon the facts of genetic psychology and emphasizes the social nature of goodness, the second builds upon the presuppositions of rational self-consciousness and upholds individualism in ethics. Professor Dewey finds the interests of men to be rooted in their native instincts. These instincts when developed into conscious desires are objective in their reference; they do not aim at subjective satisfactions. In the case of man, however, intelligence comes in to enlighten and liberate instinctive preferences: taking cognizance of the consequences of actions performed and of the changes which social evolution has wrought in the human situation, it projects ends which promise on experiment to yield a fuller satisfaction to human instincts in their totality. Thus, guided by intelligence, the human individual breaks the bonds of early habit which confines his interest to those objects that have a direct bearing upon his private well-being and learns that the fullest satisfaction is to be found in meeting the demands of the associated life. Professor Fite, who essays to find in the nature of self-consciousness a new basis for individualism, holds that every interest of an individual is from the start a self-interest because an expression of an individual and personal point of view. But the consciousness of self-interest logically implies a knowledge of others' interests as well. These interests of other selves, in so far as they intelligently assert themselves, have for the conscious individual an equal justification with his own. By the logic of consciousness the aims of all intelligent individuals are essentially harmonious and the

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individual is bound to identify others' interests with his own. Nothing besides true knowledge, therefore, is needed to account for any aspect of social responsibility.

Both of these views are well-considered and skillfully presented; they are interesting examples of present-day solutions of the problem of social adjustment from the naturalistic and intellectualistic standpoints respectively. Yet neither admits the reality of any suppression of sacrifice of self-interest for the sake of social good: for the one there is suppression, but no self-interest, only natural instincts to be curbed and adjusted; for the other, there are selves but no sacrifice; only intelligent accommodation. Yet the necessity for the individual to sacrifice what appears to be his own interest as a condition of genuine social co-operation is one of the plainest facts of moral experience. The inference is plainly suggested that these two theories fail to account for what is fundamental to social adjustment because each is limited by the implications of a particular philosophic standpoint and does not recognize that man is both a natural being whose evolution is proceeding along social lines, and a self-conscious person subject to the universal requirements of rationality.

It is of course a fact that our instinctive desires do aim originally, and continue to aim frequently, at the possession of objects rather than at the production of conscious states, and this fact is important because it refutes the claims of psychological hedonism. But it is equally an error to overlook the tendency that accompanies the increasing control of intelligence over human conduct to evaluate all objects of natural desire in terms of the subjective satisfaction they promise. The thoroughly selfish person (a part which we all play at times) commonly desires and seeks not simply the choicest food, the most comfortable seat, the most advantageous outlook; he is rather a person increasingly preoccupied with his own comfort, convenience and amusement. Such evaluation of objects in terms of subjective or exclusively individual satisfaction is an inevitable consequence of the fact that self-conscious intelli-

gence enters human life not as an aid or accessory to the gratification of instinct, but as a dominating capacity demanding expression in its own right. The requirement which intelligence as such imposes upon human conduct is that of unity and correlation, and to this requirement it proposes to subject every instinctive desire. Now intelligence in its initial step towards self-organization avails itself of the aid of one strong instinct in gaining control over the rest; it enlists in its service the instinct of self-preservation which prompts the human individual constantly to consult his own comfort and safe-guard his own security. Hence, it may with correctness be said that the various instinctive tendencies of man are integrated through a set of mutually reinforcing habits which adjust the human agent to the principal permanent features of his natural situation. But the complete truth gains expression only when is added the statement that the rational will of man first identifies itself with that system of objects which experience has proved to be interrelated and necessary means to its own continued existence and expression.

Conscious intelligence makes all the difference, therefore, that idealists have claimed that it does in human conduct. The self-conscious individual is indeed an end in himself and for himself; all his acts are expressions of self-interest. It is also true that consciousness of self involves consciousness of others, their aims, their interests. But it by no means follows that the same intelligence which reveals the existence of others and their individual interests establishes a harmony among these interests. If conduct were governed by such abstract rationality as that which affirms that all selves as co-ordinate members of a class are equal and each counts for one, this conclusion might follow. But the intelligence which governs human intercourse works in the concrete; it appears as rational will, an activity striving in the thick of experience and by constant experimentation to enlarge the scope and increase the consistency of human living. To intelligence in this capacity there is a very important practical difference between the

interest of self and the interest of others, a difference which outweighs their abstract equality. This difference springs from the fact that self-interest, representing the requirements of a secure and comfortable livelihood, along with the conditions under which individual aptitudes can be exercised and preferences fulfilled, proposes an end which past experience has found satisfactory. Attention to its demands has consequently become habitual; it has become one with the will itself. The claims of others, for all their rational justification, have not in the normal human experience demonstrated to a like extent their value to the will of the agent. They claim to be equal in value, yes; but how is this equality to be demonstrated conclusively to the will of the agent except through the experience of pursuit and attainment. And it is an undeniable fact, based upon the conditions of physical existence, that the human individual must acquire habits of action which assure fulfillment of his natural needs before he can establish any wide or inclusive social relationships. But in advance of actual realization social relationships must remain somewhat uncertain and wholly experimental; to seek them will be a venture. When, moreover, as frequently happens, merely to engage in a co-operative undertaking involves the abandonment of individual interest which has proved on realization to be satisfactory, an effort of will, an exercise of courage distinctly moral, is required. This painful tearing of the will loose from private concerns and attaching it forcibly to a social end, which offers at best new and promising possibilities, has been not inappropriately named self-sacrifice and, as such, is an inexpugnable factor in the process whereby rational will enlarges the system of objects in which it finds satisfaction.

Without doubt, then, intelligence when exercised does force a progressive reorganization of human activities, in which habits adjusted to existing conditions are suppressed in order to make possible the pursuit of new and ampler goods which are created by these very activities of pursuit and reconstruction. But it is clearly a mistake to confine

this larger good to the possibilities of the particular individual's social situation. The experience of mankind, if it teaches any lesson at all, proves that moral development has been gradually shaping in the minds of all individuals a common social ideal and this is the society of selves, each an end and never a means. The moral will whenever it is conscious of the implications of its choices aims at a good that is *personal*, the development of self-conscious life, and *universal*, the development of all individuals capable of participation in the community of intelligence. The three ends traditionally granted supremacy, Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, contemplate the establishment of such a society whose members are united by perfect mutual understanding, complete co-operation, and thorough-going sympathy. We should commit a fatal error, however, if we limited the scope of that ideal society which it is the aim of the moral will to promote to those selves whose intelligence is developed and articulate. Such a view violates the universality of the moral will, the principle, that is, of moral democracy. The human will in so far as it is conscious of the obligation imposed upon it by its own essential nature aims at the realization of all the possibilities of intelligent life and personal satisfaction resident in human society. The patriot does not limit his beneficent activities to those of his fellow-country men who like himself have attained to an intelligent conception of life's opportunities; instead he desires to lift all individuals, both of present and of future generations to an intelligent understanding of the possibilities of personal fulfillment latent in their own characters.

Let us endeavor now to bring these truths which are forced upon our attention by consideration of two such conflicting theories as those above referred to, more directly to bear upon the problem of social adjustment with the hope of reaching a view that will accord both with the facts of social evolution and with the laws of personal intelligence. Such a view will as a matter of course recognize that man has native instincts which refer originally to ob-



jects, some necessary to self-preservation and others to the permanency of the group or species. It will take cognizance no less of the fact that man's conduct is directed by self-conscious intelligence which affords to each individual his own conspectus of a world of universal meaning which he may expand and enrich by discrimination and adjustment of its constituent elements. Finally, the true view must acknowledge the importance of two determining tendencies in personal development, which in their interplay furnish the only sufficient explanation of social obligation in its relation to self-interest.

The first of these tendencies is individualizing; it works to produce mutually exclusive and antagonistic self-interests. This tendency is a necessary phase of the assumption of control over action by intelligence; it is inevitable that rational will should strive to discover and establish the general conditions in the way of health, property, social relations, etc., which secure to the individual the maximum of satisfaction for his natural desires. Every normal man, if given any chance of personal development, comes speedily to mark off the limits of his own private interest. And the development of individuality does not stop short with the acquisition of the means of a safe and comfortable livelihood which are much the same with all men. It extends perforce to the expression of those tastes and abilities peculiar to each individual. These preferences and capacities, rooted in hereditary endowment, constitute in their combination or pattern the most distinctive mark of individuality; they determine for each individual an original scale of values or hierarchy of ends which is the most intimate and essential expression of himself. Nor should it be forgotten that the rational interest of the individual, as he understands it, ordinarily provides for the satisfaction of the most urgent social cravings such as those for family, companionship, and reputation.

The second tendency of man's will is universalizing: rational will is capable of detaching itself from the individuality it has created and of uniting its interest with the

social whole, national, international, or comprehensively human, of which this individuality is a single item. No feature of man's conscious experience is more striking and significant than this—that the same will which with jealous circumspection defends a narrow private interest against all outside claims whatsoever at times turns its back on these private concerns and acknowledges as its own a social or universal good in whose scope and complexity the private ambitions of individuals reduce to triviality. This most distinctive and decisive capacity of self-conscious intelligence present-day philosophy is in danger of overlooking in its preoccupation with the function of intelligence in reconstructing the natural environment of a living organism. Man's reason, a potential universal, enables him to take the standpoint of the whole and to view his own career as an episode in human history, his life as an event in universal evolution. Nor is the human individual merely permitting his imagination to range beyond ordinary limits when he thus turns spectator of his own life and character from the standpoint of the whole. The whole, the universal system, appeals to the will of man, itself an implicit universal, as an end, the highest end. Doubtless religion and art are effective in heightening this appeal, but they do not manufacture it and foist it upon the will of man. This is proved by the wave of spiritual exaltation that sweeps over individuals who in times of national emergency fling every cherished private aim to the winds and rejoice in the personal expansion which they experience when they identify themselves with an all-inclusive social cause. Notice, however, that the larger social unity to which the patriot devotes his life is not that of a group of individuals like himself to whom intelligence reveals a common interest—it is his country as a spiritual unity with infinite possibilities of personal development on the part of its present citizens and among unborn thousands of future generations.

From the clash of these two tendencies, individualizing and universalizing, which lie at the root of human personal-

ity, springs the necessity for self-sacrifice. Of course, comprehensive social causes appeal to the will of man; if they did not he would be incapable of devoting himself to them. But because they are remote and unreal as compared with private interests of established worth they do not arouse that whole-hearted devotion which must exist if they are willingly to be pursued at the expense of individual ambition. Doubtless the individual is assisted in this crisis by such knowledge as he may have acquired by observation or instruction of the larger return experienced by other men who have chosen to serve a public or social good to the neglect of private interest. Yet he can make such experience of larger satisfaction and fuller life his own only by trying the thing for himself, and at the time of trial it is not the common good but rather his own exclusive interest to which experience and habit point as an assured source of satisfaction. Hence, the social adjustment is a venture and calls for real courage: interests which because established are identified with the agent himself have to be given up as a condition of seeking ends, which, because more or less uncertain and problematic, seem estranged from his own life and will. The act seems to threaten the integrity of the individual's own nature, to violate rather than to express his own will, is necessarily painful and not inappropriately named self-sacrifice. Another consideration remains, furthermore, which demonstrates still more clearly how inevitable is some such experience as self-sacrifice to social adjustment. Even after the individual through his own courageous and self-denying effort has experienced the superior worth of co-operative achievement, the further pursuit of social ends is not made thereby as certain and reliable a good as the extension of self-interest along established lines. For social satisfaction springs from the intercourse and co-operation of free persons whose thoughts and acts cannot with assurance be predicted on the basis of past experience. Hence, not merely do social satisfactions like those that attend upon the preservation of natural existence need to be experienced before they can be def-

initely anticipated, but inasmuch as they are products of genuinely creative activities, which strike out new and original results, their character cannot be fully anticipated even after considerable experience of pursuit and attainment. The scope of the present paper gives no opportunity for further discussion of the last named point. But it supplies the culminating argument against the view that true knowledge of the essential identity of all human interests is all that is needed to eliminate from social duty the supposed necessity of self-sacrifice and proves beyond question that the social adjustment requires from men the courage to risk hard-won and secure sources of personal satisfaction for the sake of ends which though rich in promises are uncertain of achievement and unpredictable in result, the capacity to endure loss and bear disappointment in such social adventure, and the open-minded and alert intelligence which makes him responsive to all the stimulating and fructifying influences of the social life. This, to be sure, is but to assert that the individual must 'die to live,' as the familiar saying is. But it is not to propose the destruction of individuality as those mistakenly assert who confuse the recognition of these facts with mysticism. It is the exclusiveness of individuality which must be destroyed. Its originality, inventiveness, and vigor, must be preserved for the larger service of country and humanity and universal progress.

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## THE EVOLUTION OF MASTERY.

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**T**HE history of human progress from its beginnings in a creature barely maintaining itself in a hostile world to that creature's latest descendant, a navigator of the air, a flyer underseas, is a tale of prolonged warfare upon foes visible and invisible, a tale of successive intrusions upon farther and farther reaches of the environment, —a stupendous series of masteries. To-day, the foes that ringed man round in his first savage den are vanquished, but new ones have taken their places; the conflict by which from the start he prospered, and for the sake of which he developed sinew and cunning, has merely been moved farther afield. With the extension of conquest and the trampling upon ever vaster and more insidious obstacles to his supremacy he has multiplied his aggressions, and crashing through the bonds of ancient superstitions has flung the challenge of his restless spirit even to the citadels of heaven and fastnesses of hell. For it is no longer sufficient to count his triumphs in terms of the substantial universe of earth and sky and water. The subjugated domain of the human will at the present moment of time comprehends indeed the multitudinous forces of that universe, but it comprehends likewise a realm of laws and ideals possessing a range and significance before which the immensities of steller spaces shrivel to a point.

The process of mastery, which among the later generations of men has reached these proportions, began with, not man himself, but his earliest progenitor. Aggression, destined to issue in almost limitless dominion, had its birth in the first vague stirrings of vitalized matter in the welter of primeval slime. What connections there are between such unpurposive stirrings and the finest achievements of civilized man, what the decisive steps in that most splendid of evolutions, it is the purpose of the present inquiry to

consider. We shall attempt in the following pages to take some account not only of the presumable order of the various stages, but also of the occurrences of primitive foreshadowings of the achievements to come in later generations. For it seems probable that the impulse behind the youngest triumphs of the race must be traced far back—even to the original quickenings in colloidal matter. It seems probable that inasmuch as man's inheritance is the gift, not of co-ordinate ancestors, but of generations climbing by steady steps, a full understanding of his more sophisticated grades of power can come only by unearthing the deeper levels of that inheritance. The purpose of the present investigation is to study the evolution of mastery and the experience of it, but it must be clearly comprehended at the outset that no claim is to be made for conscious purposiveness and self-consciousness in the beings initiating that evolution. It is hazardous to attribute to man's savage ancestors any awareness of the import of their self-assertions. Even to attribute to civilized man himself a full sense of the aggressive character of many of his most aggressive activities is hazardous. The only validity that is claimed for these tentative reflections about world-conquest is that of a somewhat fanciful retrospective interpretation of various happenings in terms which appear to lend them connection.

Organic life, then, began with its first movements to encroach upon its environment; and for a certain distance the widening of its conquests was measured by the course of development of the sense-organs. The first instrument for detecting and mastering the physical universe was a sense of touch. Only that with which an organism came into immediate contact could it even apprehend. In the beginning its warfare upon the universe was consequently restricted to aggressions upon what collided with it. Presumably the crude commencements of taste and smell came next, mediating, like touch, only the closely proximate. For the first time with the achievement of hearing and sight did the living creature come into connection with what lay

at a distance from the surface of its body, thus extending prodigiously the circumference of its empire. Eyes and ears may consequently be regarded as tentacles flung out by the militant organism to enable it to grasp after things at far distances. By their means it contrived to bring within its reach the treasures of seas and lands, by their means to gather at length into its kingdom even the unattainable stars.

Arriving at the level of man we recognize that, whereas the later phases of his mastery have involved conquest of the superfluous, the earlier fell in a period of struggle for the painfully imperative. At first the type of conquest was of the simplest—a bare achievement in every case of a material object for the satisfaction of a primitive instinct, his fierce activities being induced by the blind goads of hunger, danger and sex. But though these impulses were more like mechanisms than conscious desires he must have taken delight even then in the manifestation of his strength, must have gloried in the experience of power over his own body and over other bodies, animal and human. The exuberant sense of conquest surely came, then, in all the ways in which it still comes, to the child and the man alike, in the exhilaration of controlling the muscles, in free motions of the limbs, and all the heightened vitality of movement over the ground, with the wind in the nostrils and breathing deepened and heart-beat accelerated. Without reading into the experiences of primitive man improbable anticipations of future developments, we can suppose that physiological manifestations of vitality were always definitely pleasureable. In other words, it is not unreasonable to assume that intensifications of the rhythmic reflexes, accompanying as they did swift motions of the body in warfare or in play, contributed to a vague sense of mastery. It was a far cry to the sort of awareness of mastery comprehended in esthetic experience which we shall later consider; but none the less, between the brute intoxication of physical conflict and the ecstasy and triumph that is the product of man's finest creative activities there is undoubt-

edly a relation of direct ancestry. If, then, intensified bodily rhythms formed an integral part from the first in human self-assertion, the fact will have to be taken into account when we consider the more significant stages of the aggrandizement of man's empire.

As a male in pursuit of his mate, as a carnivorous animal preying upon other animals, as a belligerent, bringing terror and death to his foes, man prospered by subduing the bodies of other living creatures. By sympathetic and imitative magic he next thought to extend still farther his opportunities for successful aggression. The bodies of his fellow-creatures were now, he conceived, under his control not merely when within his grasp, but at far distances. To possess a lock of their hair, a fragment of their skin, a rude image or symbol, was enough to ensure their crippling or disease or even death if so he desired. So obstinate was this assurance that failure to blast his enemy with the impalpable shafts of his magic induced no doubts. In intent at least he shattered from afar many a foe who was still secure only because the time of discoveries in means of distant destruction had not yet come. Armed with his ineffectual instruments of magic he was unconsciously anticipating a day when he should indeed annihilate his brother man without need of becoming visible to him, in insidious ways, by weapons of science.

In a yet further way did he outreach himself. The fate of dead men, no less than that of the living, he conceived to be within his control. Whether they should, as unquiet shadows, haunt the places of their death; whether they should remain in an unredeemed state or progress onward to better regions; whether they should be subjected to insatiable desires or attain peace—all this did man arrogate to himself for decision. By performance or by neglect of rites, by the utterance or the omission of certain prayers he thought to determine the destinies of beings inhabiting the kingdom of the dead. Many a man still retains the ancient superstition, believing naïvely that his powers extend beyond the threshold of the unseen. Incantations



and the muttering of refrains are even yet seriously regarded by multitudes as efficacious ways of interfering with spirits whose earthly forms have perished.

But not his fellow creatures only did man by action direct and indirect attempt to subjugate. Seasons and harvests, the coming and ceasing of the rain, and the rendering the elements propitious,—even the motions of heavenly bodies in their orbits—he claimed to have in his possession. In this case again it was by ineffectual measures that he attempted a conquest which ages later his own descendants were destined to accomplish. To try by motions of the hands and repetitions of charms to bring about vast alterations in the visible universe was a pitiful demonstration of impotence, but it was, too, an unconscious prophecy of future triumphs. After the passing of slow ages of toil the race was to increase the productiveness of the earth; it was to turn rivers out of their course; and to chain the lightning. Not, however, by resort to tricks and charms; nor yet by intercession with divinity, though it was thus that man at first endeavored to eke out his possessions. Not merely to command the physical world directly, but also to issue orders to other Beings who should do it for him—to cajole, threaten, and wheedle them, naturally gave him greater assurance of importance than ever. In making gods, man became himself a god. And so deeply rooted, so primal, so passionate was his egoism that he injected it into the very heart of his submission.

It is customary to charge to man's fears and to his instinct of self-abasement the origination of his religion. It may be true that such were its sources; but only an obstinate prepossession regarding the exclusive claims of the humble virtues could blind one to the truth that, once started, religion thrives upon human arrogance. Man's original motive for seeking the gods may well have been to gain immunity from the consequences of ill-doing; to lessen the terror of death; to secure a powerful ally against pain and grief and fate. But one of the clear consequences of that seeking has been a feeding of his instinct for universal

mastery and an inflation of his already swelling egoism. Such consequences, moreover, are not to be wondered at. To the degree that one can comprehend godhead, one is indeed a god; to the degree that one deliberately aligns oneself upon the side of the supposed controller of one's destiny and offers obeisance, one is no longer the slave but the slave's master. This does not mean that even in his later religious experience man does not still pass through a preliminary state of humiliation in the presence of a power before which he is impotent. No less than his most savage ancestor he may feel terror-stricken, crushed, by a vastness compared with which he is but an atom of dust driven by a whirlwind. The point is that the sense of physical nothingness is immediately replaced by realization of mental and spiritual community with the source of mind and spirit. The very discrepancy between that unlimited and the finite dependent upon it is the measure of the triumph with which man can assimilate to himself the greatness of the infinite. An understanding of the incommensurability of the whole and the part sufficient to induce prostration in awe and wonder is the only possible condition for the final starward leap of a spirit renewed in its confidence of power to grapple with and vanquish the entire creation. What is overlooked in the usual appraisal of religious humbleness is the relative unimportance of that preliminary self-effacement in comparison with the flash of exuberant power which follows it. It is only in its immediate narrower aspect that the ego is at first dazed and humbled. With the breaking down of the barriers between its lesser, empirical self, and the unending hierarchy of potential larger selves, it exults anew in the experience of limitless expansion.

All this takes place, however, only at the stage of evolution where intellectual mastery supplants the purely physical. Partly as a supplement to mere strength of muscle—a feeble enough instrument at best to carve out his empire—partly as the next inevitable consequences of the forward urge of human ambition, it was the mind which

began to develop out of proportion to limbs and sense-organs when man had exhausted the possibilities of these for extending his conquests. Thus he commenced to open for himself still vaster chances of discovery and comprehension. In the new realm of assertion regarding laws and validities these possibilities appeared inexhaustible. He began to be aware of the power of his intellect to render intelligible the space and time which in a physical way he could only partially master. He was now handling things so far beyond himself in magnitude and antiquity as to dwarf to total insignificance his puny body, doomed to early death and chained, temporally and spatially,—a foolish, transient spark flaming for a moment. But the occasion for self-depreciation was turned into a new occasion for arrogance. The ego had transcended now the limits of the physical; it was realizing its ability to pass into the universe that is outside of space and time and peopled with what had no beginnings and can never alter or perish. It beheld principles which underlie the very plan of the world; traced patterns of which the orbits of comets and suns are vanishing copies; tracked to their sources at the core of eternal being numbers, with all their powers and relations. To grapple thus with things out of all proportion greater than himself transferred to man some measure of greatness of that with which he grappled. Accordingly, his intellectual activities, too, were from the outset irradiated with an emotional glow induced by an expansion of the ego without limit. It was an experience, as we have seen, that had its roots back in the tropical stage of his evolution when a physical object, conquerable by brute strength, was the adequate stimulus. It was an experience that in artistic production and appreciation was to attain its final development. That supreme achievement which was to bring together a variety of experiences was in its most fundamental elements prepared for by far earlier occurrences. For in so far as man took satisfaction in the process of attaining as well as in the object attained he was actually anticipating the distant goal of esthetic contem-

plation. Correspondingly, the objective correlates of such experience, whether things perceived, or things conceived, may be entitled the forerunners of esthetic objects proper, in which the perceptual and the conceptual merge, giving birth to something different from either, called beauty.

Purely sensuous stimuli and purely intellectual, alike possessed the function of ministering to the emotion of power, but creations of art proved to be more perfectly adapted than either to stimulate and satisfy that emotion. It is only natural that this should be. The universe of physical things and their laws, though conquerable by force and intelligence and to that degree ministrant to the demand for empire, is not, so to speak, the supremely conquerable. It provides few opportunities for exaggerations of actual triumph—for illusory magnifications. The real universe that constitutes man's bodily and mental environment is, in other words, indifferent to him. It will not stoop to pander to his pride or to gratify his thirst for self-expansion. With the universe of created beauty it is different. That universe is no accidental phenomenon, but the deliberate product of man, the would-be conqueror of the cosmos. The work of art is accordingly fitted, to a degree impossible to natural things, to perform its function of liberating and intensifying the sense of a boundless dominion. By designedly playing upon the peculiarities of the psycho-physical make-up, it consequently engenders a complex, emotional state which is *par excellence* the expression of the human will to mastery. That state itself is nothing less than the exuberant flowering of a growth of long incubation—a thing wrought indeed of highly refined sensibilities and passions, but having at its heart a brutal exaltation such as a beast might feel when it leaps upon its prey; or a half-savage god of ancient fable, wielding his thunderbolts and feeling the immense globe shiver beneath his strength. For though the highest esthetic emotion is a blend of two other emotions, one belonging to sensuous, the other to intellectual, experience, it is built upon a deep foundation of physiological rhythms—rhythms originally

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quicken under the stress of mere bodily combat, and thus associated from the first with triumphant physical aggression. It is by virtue of a shared participation in stimulating those rhythms to which psycho-physical life is conformed, that a thing so debilitated as the lyric mood of poetry or song can be said to possess affinities with the earliest emotional upheavals of the race, and to share its more generic character with such diverse experiences as those of mechanical subjugation of natural forces, of religion, of romantic love, and of philosophic speculation. To what extent, in these various types of experience, it is by reinforcement of natural rhythms that gratification of the will to mastery occurs is not to our present purpose to argue. We must limit our considerations to the general thesis that the intrinsic nature of rhythm is to mediate a sense of power; and thereafter apply our deductions to the materials of esthetic activity.

Rhythm had from the first been present in the living organism both of man and of his brute progenitors. Heart-beat and breathing, motions of fins and wings and limbs had possessed in common a rhythmic structure. These rhythmic activities, moreover, though they were, some of them, subject to voluntary control, were normally reflex, automatic, and not even invariably accompanied by consciousness.

Now, in the course of man's advance toward greater complexity and greater efficiency he successively acquired new reflexes. The achievement of efficiency was indeed conditioned by such acquirement. It is only by becoming automatic—which means progressing toward unconsciousness—that acts take themselves from the arena of voluntary operation, thus leaving room for more important activities. The significant matter about a reflex act—is after the fact that it is or may be totally unconscious—is that it possesses a fluency, accuracy and rapidity foreign to acts still under the control of the will. The extension of the field of the rhythmic has then a bearing of two kinds, diametrically opposed, upon the progress of the will to

mastery. On the one hand, in their character of reflexes, all rhythmic responses possess precisely the qualifications for mediating a conviction of power. What is done with maximum assurance and faultlessness is best adapted to produce such a conviction. Viewed from this aspect, then, rhythmic performances exhibit more promise of inducing an illusion of limitless control over one's own body and all that surrounds it than does any other type of action of which an individual is capable.

But on the other hand, as the price of such potentialities, they contain the seeds of their own annihilation as conscious performances. By virtue of their rhythmic form they acquire a monotony which unbroken rhythm invariably generates, and losing their hold upon sensation and emotion alike they tend to drop to the level of the unconscious. Consequently, from this point of view, they would seem to be of all acts the least likely to favour a conviction of mastery. That conviction surely reaches its fullest development not at a low degree of consciousness, but at a very high one.

Now while reflex motor activities involve at once the advantages and the disadvantages we have noted, activities of the imagination, in exhibiting less capacity for genuinely rhythmic structure, escape the defects of automatism but at the same time forfeit its merits. It is the triumph of art that it succeeds in grafting the symmetry and form of the body's cyclic processes upon the spontaneous elan of creative thought, thereby qualifying the rhythmic by the a-rhythmic, and appropriating the immense resources of each.

Unadulterated rhythm, we have noted, brings in its train unconsciousness; but it is by virtue of those very properties which make it soporific that it is first of all a stimulant. Consisting as it does of repeated identities, spatially or temporally displaced, it provides exactly the conditions for pulses of triumph. Each phase of the rhythm, being itself a recapitulation of past phases, is likewise a prophecy of future ones. It furnishes, that is, the ground not only for

recognition and anticipation, but in every case, also, for an experience of fulfilment. Such alternation of expectancy and perfect fruition is quite enough to induce a conviction of undetermined reaction—of free and voluntary creation. The conviction is of course unfounded; the seeming freedom is illusory. It is one of those strange cases of self-deception suffered by the human spirit agonizing for self-expansion. For in its real essence rhythm is incantation, which is pure autocracy. It is imperious, unanswerable, irresistible. It bows the will, overshadows the mood, lays its command upon the spirit and the body and the blood. It induces accelerations and retardations shaped upon its own mould which, impalpable as dreams, possesses the rigidity of steel bands. And yet, so greedy is the spirit for power, so conformed during its entire history and the history of its antecedents to the dogmatism of its own demand for universal conquest, that it is able to claim and to maintain it in the very act of its most complete subjugation. Out of the stuff of that subjugation it fabricates a stupendous self-assertion. The surges of rhythm that submerge it, that hale it on and trample upon it, become, paradoxically, the instrument for its further exaltation. Accepting without reserve the rhythmic pattern, it is not only chained to the present pulse, with its ghostly re-echoings of an entire ancestry, but compelled to anticipate the succeeding one. Thus a compulsory prevision assumes for it the form of prophecy, and the actualization of what it foresaw it seems to have itself, by a free act of will, accomplished. It appears, that is, to decree the very fetters that are laid upon it.

But expansion of the self dependent upon unadulterated rhythm is, as we have noted, a transient thing. Even such duration as it possesses issues from an illusory experience. Rhythm as employed in art, however, is not of the unadulterated variety. It is rhythm qualified by the a-rhythmic sufficiently to render the recognition of the anticipated phases a genuine recognition: in other words, not a perception of bare identity, but of identity in difference. The work of art is distinguished from all objects in the natural

world by its perfect balance of two antagonistic principles: one, the law of the brute universe, the other, the law of the domain of spirit. It partakes of the rhythmic, which is incantation and which means for consciousness fluency, ease, sureness; but it partakes, also, of that essence of things vitalized—a total unpredictability of variation. We appear, indeed, to find in art examples of repetitions as unvaried as any the natural world offers. Consider regular metre in poetry, regular beat in music; regular duplication of similar elements—arches, columns, curves,—in architecture; regular returns of abstract or conventionalized figures in formal decoration; and of larger span: returns of a refrain; periodic recurrences of a theme or a cadence. A moment's reflection is sufficient, however, for grasping the fact that the imposition of rhythmic form upon any content, however meagre, results unavoidably not in repetitions of identities, but in a profusion of dissimilar modifications. Temporal rhythm woven into the fabric of sound to produce even the simplest of melodies; or imposed upon a stream of sensuous images for the production of the least elaborated verses, cannot but give rise to a blend of the rhythmic and the a-rhythmic. No matter how uniform the bare temporal structure of music or poetry, the effect of it needs must be an effect of identity in difference, since the tones and the words and the images supply endless change and variation. Similarly with spatial rhythms as employed in the visual arts. Even without recourse to devices for varying the rhythms upon which a work of architecture or a painting is fashioned, the artist is assured of a degree of variety within unity in the finished product. To be an imaginative artist at all is to accomplish some measure of modification of the elected rhythms by their mingling with an unrhythmized substance. Such natural variety as is inherent in the materials with which the artist works may moreover be accentuated by proper juxtapositions and sequences. Instead of leaving the matter to chance he may purposely select, for incorporation of any pattern, objects of maximum individuality and most sharply anti-



thetical character and meaning. By emphasizing instead of slurring the intrinsic differences between major and minor key, between the colours of the spectrum and their derivatives, between light and shadow, low and high, motion and rest, and all the gradations that there are of texture and size and quality, the skilful craftsman deliberately increases the element of the a-rhythmic.

He has, however, scantily demonstrated the full power of the principle of variation until he derives his asymmetries from the form as well as from the bare material. It is, in other words, irregularity in the very rhythm, balance, repetition itself, which constitutes the special and peculiar magic of a finely wrought piece of creative imagination. The most mediocre artist can, with practice, learn to keep perfect time, to cause absolute returns of an element, to produce mathematically exact balances and symmetries. Only the great artist knows the secrets of the departures, the irregularities, the asymmetries. The formulated technique of the several arts comprehends some of the laws and methods of such intentional deviations from the norm of absolute rhythm. The master artist practices methods of his own which can never be included in any abstract formulation, and of which presumably not even he himself is ever exactly aware.

For a more specific consideration of such practices, it will be expedient to limit ourselves to the case of poetry, although any one of the other arts would furnish equally illuminating illustrations. Even within the field of poetry we shall be obliged to confine our discussion to a very few of the outstanding instances of our principle. On the formal side, the range of possible types of repetition in verse includes simple recurrences of a single letter or pair of letters for rhyme; alliteration, both initially and within words; and the larger units, consisting of recurrent single lines or grouped lines for refrain, or of entire stanzas, intermittently or but once at the close,—besides the wealth of rhythmic types, consisting of the various unit combinations of stressed and unstressed syllables. Each one of these types offers occasion for exercise of ways of departure,—

of sublimation of the automatic and reinforcement of the free. Let us take, however, as three especially interesting phenomena, imperfect rhyme, irregular metre, and climax developed out of varying refrain.

For merely perfect rhyme there is no need of defence and no call for condemnation. The complete repetition which it involves seems to turn a golden key upon each finished line, locking it up with what had gone before, and storing it away for union with what shall come after. In its completeness it is, like all things recurrent, of the nature of magic, of incantation. It soothes the spirit and wafts the senses toward unconsciousness, and by the old trick of causing anticipation only to yield precisely what the waiting senses anticipated, it persuades the reader that it was he, not the poet, who produced the magic. What then of imperfect rhyme, which should, if our principle is correct, possess a beauty even exceeding that of the normal and regular? The unprejudiced student of the device of imperfect rhyming, as handled by an authority, will have to admit that it does, indeed, endow with a strange, added loveliness verses otherwise beautiful. The delicate surprise caused by failure in complete conformity is aroused in the midst of an echo of what the perfect rhyme, if it had come, would have been. There is at the same time together in consciousness the image of the complete and of the incomplete. The result is a sense of mastery due to the genuine recognition of a return in the midst of a difference. Expectation has been defeated, but only for the fraction of a moment, for the ear immediately reclaims the seemingly lost sound, strange and yet familiar in its new setting. By virtue of the strangeness, the rhyme acquires a kind of iridescence, as of clear light fallen upon mother-of-pearl, and transformed each instant, in tone and tint, by the inconstancy of what it illuminates. Consider as a rhyme:

“ . . . sunlit sea,

This harp still makes my name its voluntary.”

or again,

“Heart let her go, for she'll not be converted,  
She is most fair, though she be marble-hearted.”

To one who has once sensed the seductive imperfection,—the exquisite taint, like no merely human falling from grace,—there can never again be need of apology for the practice of incomplete rhyming. Still less, with extension of one's adventuring among the vagaries of poets' usage, is one inclined to wonder at their indulgence in irregularities of metre—a thing relatively more frequent, relatively more urgent, and correspondingly more notable in its effect. It is more urgent since its absence means the unchecked sway of rhythms, such as are sought for purposes of hypnotic subjugation, with all its emotional power of monotony, but also with its grave defects. To rescue consciousness from the yoke of such mechanizing forces, to give to the senses not an automatic, but a vitalized series of pulsations, it is essential to employ the several devices for departing from the chosen metre, even while remaining subject to its commands. The task and triumph of poetic art on its formal side amounts, one might venture to say, just to the discovery and practice of intricate and varied methods of defying with impunity the laws of accepted rhythms. Those rhythms—an underlying monotone of unvaried alternations—remain as a deep-toned murmur of an orchestral bass; the variations upon it—ever departing but ever returning to it, like the tide to the land—contribute the change, the melody, the unpredictable creation.

The types of variation differ in their emotional effectiveness. There are substitutes of troches for iambs, of iambs for troches, and of anapaests or dactyls for either, and all serve the same office of injecting into the monotone the magic of the unforeseen. Sometimes the check to the onward flow of regular measure occurs at the commencement of a line; sometimes at its close, giving a sudden lilt, an upward turn, or a solemn prolongation. Occasionally, the wayward substitution intrudes itself into the very heart of the verse, spreading faint ripples of unrest backward as well as forward, and even infecting succeeding verses with a fleeting sense of vague disturbance. It is the introduction of spondaic measure, that thing rare in English

verse, that I want especially to mention. For the effect of such metre in the midst of normal iambic or trochaic is one of the most arresting in the entire art of poetry. What one gets is an experience of a thing poised, and, while without sufficient lack of equilibrium in any one direction to determine motion, palpitating with a kind of inward activity. Because movement is undetermined and the possibilities appear infinite,—instead of merely toward the dominant rhythm or its reversal,—the emotion induced is one of restrained but boundless power. Take, for instance, the slowing down, with all its accompanying drowsiness in

“The savour and shade of old-world pine-forests  
Where the wet hill-winds weep.”

or that succession of spondaic fourth lines, coming as they do upon their antecedent triple iambic verses:

“And no birds sing.”  
“And the harvest’s done.”  
“On the cold hill’s side.”

Finally, I would mention the extraordinary cumulative effect of climax, which involves the illusion of a progress toward some unnameable point of expanding emotion, and which is so often mediated by repetition of a refrain qualified by slight variations. The heightening comes, in such cases, in the rich experience of a return, a reincarnation of something known before, yet also exquisitely different. It is, of course, only one variety of climax that we have here to do with—although without doubt every variety depends in the last analysis upon some form of the principle of identity in difference. In this type the intensified feeling with which one is smitten at the close depends upon a steady progress upward from the beginning by the ladder of slowly transformed refrain. The device which such lyrics exemplify is one of the most effective in all the field of poetry. For one thing, its scope is very great. The variation is potentially, at once, a variation of metre, rhyme, meaning, epithet, and it may comprehend not merely one line, but an entire stanza. Moreover, involving a larger unit, it stimu-

lates more significant anticipation, and mediates an ampler recognition in the midst of surprise. The memory of each of us probably treasures especially prized instances of what I am describing, but we may note in passing the well-recognized one of Swinburne's *Itylus*, where through the series

"Hast thou forgotten ere I forget?"  
 "Till thou remember and I forget."  
 "Couldst thou remember and I forget?"  
 "Can I remember if thou forget?"

we reach the climax

"But the world shall end when I forget."

Or take again the refrain of what is perhaps Tennyson's most flawless lyric

"She only said, 'My life is dreary,  
 He cometh not,' she said;  
 She said, 'I am weary, weary,  
 I would that I were dead!'"

which recurs with the just appreciable change:

"She only said, 'The night is dreary,  
 He cometh not,' she said;  
 She said, 'I am weary, weary,  
 I would that I were dead!'"

until we are wrought up to the pitch of the close:

"Then, said she, 'I am very dreary,  
 He will not come,' she said;  
 She wept, 'I am weary, weary,  
 O God, that I were dead!'"

We started with a general formula: that man reacts to all experience in the way of progressively intensified affirmations of himself, of increasingly more arrogant projections of his ego upon what is other than the ego,—and that formula has now been given its final application. If in its less specific character it appeared presumptuous, much more so must it in its attempted extension to account for the motivation of art and for the constitution of art's fundamental technique. To offer an interpretation of art

such as the foregoing, to define esthetic emotion in terms of a higher egoism, calling it a triumphant expansion of a self vivified physically, sensuously, intellectually,—is, moreover, admittedly to run counter to the traditional view of its nature. Not egoism, but completeness of impersonality, not arrogant self-assertion, but self-forgetfulness, is commonly accounted its essence. Now, that traditional view may still be regarded as correct in the emphasis it lays upon the esthetic fusion of the subject and the appreciated object. Where it needs revision is in its calling the resultant fusion all object, instead of recognizing it to be all person. It errs, that is, in its conclusion that in esthetic contemplation the self is obliterated, whereas rather the fact is that the self swallows the universe. The fallacy rests upon a too narrow definition similar to that which discredited hedonism as being a theory of a necessarily base criterion for the regulation of conduct. Just as pleasure may be something far other than a momentary gratification of low and selfish desires,—something many dimensional, involving distant times and places and unborn generations of men, so the self is something of wider circumference than the limits of the body and more enduring than its physical sensations. It is unfair to define consciousness in terms of its lowest denominator of content. Its assimilated universe after vision and hearing are achieved is no longer bounded by the environment with which it is in immediate contact. And after conceptual life has begun that universe is no longer even limited to the physical. The self that experiences esthetic emotion is a self containing the past in memory and the future in anticipation, a self whose outer boundaries lie within the region of the invisible. It is this self that beauty causes to expand, to exult, to assert itself—and that beauty alone can galvanize at every one of its levels.

According to the conception of man and his world which has directed these reflections, art is thus exalted to the very pinnacle of that hierarchy of objects which functions to satisfy the insistent human instinct for self-expansion. It

is the open-sesame to man's entire empire over space and time. More eloquent than earthly possessions, or perishable hopes, or even joyous adventurings into realms of pure thought, it is the persuader to an assured possession of such strength, greatness, beauty, glory, power, as the spirit of man, in its supreme moments, feels unalterably that it is capable of.

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## THE ETHICAL VALUE OF INDIVIDUALITY.

JAMES LINDSAY.

**T**HE distinctive value, the peculiar worth, of man lies in individuality. His moral nature gives him intrinsic value. Every man is, in some sort, an individual, but he is not true individual until he has gotten individuality, of which, indeed, few men are fully possessed. Individuality is that which truly distinguishes a man from every other being of his kind. The individual is the last and irreducible element of reality. Few things defy analysis so completely as individuality, but at least it must comprise the notes of unity, incommunicableness, and, in a certain sense, impenetrability, as constitutive elements. There are those, of course, who object to "impenetrability" in this connection, and who urge that distinction merely, not separateness, is the sign of individuality; but those who are so fearful of "each in his separate star" generally end by doing less than justice to individuality, in any substantive or significant sense. The distinctness of all souls is that of being concrete existents, and cannot be satisfactorily held for anything less. There is a clearly realised individuality of the soul which feels and loves; and an individuality of the mind which thinks and comprehends. But for individuality, as I now take it, there must be a synthesis of these two: their union or fusion is necessary to individuality, in true full sense. For individuality is a true indivisible unity. By how much soever their union or fusion is imperfect, by so much is the individuality impaired. Such individuality is concrete and essential; it imports ethical being; it implies the possession of all our powers, thoughts, qualities, opinions, standards, values, so that we are determined by ourselves, not by society. It is not implied, of course, that such individuality is sufficient unto itself, in the sense that it rejects the inheritance of the ages, or spurns the reciprocities of society.



Personality has been by Bradley and some other philosophers emphasised in its essentially individual or limited character or aspect, but personality is no such exclusive thing, but, though importing a being-for-self, carries the capacity for going beyond the self and entering into relations with others. But what marks such outgoings of personality is just the individuality—the characteristically individual features—of personal life, related, as such, to other persons. For it is essential to personality to recognise the value of other personalities. Not a very satisfactory definition of personality is that which Hegel has given in his “Philosophy of Right,” when he describes it as “the free being in pure self-conscious isolation,” since the “being” is not wholly “free” and the isolation is by no means so “pure” or complete. Individuality does not efface or immolate itself—its moral existence—for society or the state, even if we take these to be logically prior to the individual. In the order of history it may be the reverse, but that is not now the view of historical criticism, at any rate. Individuality, in any case, takes from society and the state what they can give, but it gives to them the best they hold—whatever they may have of savour, strength, reality, value, life. This it does most freely and naturally, for liberty is the vital breath, the native air, of individuality. The solidarity of mankind is without prejudice to this liberty. Man is made for society, for association; but the fact that society is essential to man does not make society greater than he, for society grows out of the individual, his needs and attributes. Its importance, it has been said, is only his importance under another name. He is master of himself—according to individuality, not according to the very different thing named individualism—in order that he may be able to give himself freely to the service of all. Without such individuality there can be neither real morality nor real religion. His consciousness of personal ends and values, and of the power to realise them, makes the individual the original source and constituent of all real value. I say these things in full knowledge, of course, of those current

theories which, contrariwise, make everything of society or the community, and treat the individual as of no inherent value, but dependent for all rights and value upon society—theories which I account ethically indefensible and undesirable. The individuality on which I am insisting involves that the conscious individual find himself an end in and for himself. As such, he has claims to consideration and respect, and not simply as a member of a group. His ends and choices, right and rational, are individually his own, else they lack all ethical value. He is thus no mere product of the social order, as is often absurdly said of a being of ideas and purposes all his own. As a free, self-conscious being, he is no such mechanical product. He is, on the contrary, the corrector and transcender of society, the reviser and raiser of its values, in so far as he has individuality enough. Neither upon society nor the state nor any external authority whatever does he depend for the right to be a free, self-conscious being, capable of realising personal ends and values.

Wundt, of course, has been pleased to speak of organized communities as though they were psychological entities, ascribing to them *Gesammbewusstsein* and *Gesamtwille*; and Royce, in what I cannot but think a too facile manner, seems disposed to accept Wundt's position that such communities are wholes or entities, and have, or are, minds. All the attempts of Royce and others to treat the community as an organism in any way comparable to the real being of the living individual—as possessed of true individuality—remain singularly futile and unconvincing. Individuals are self-conscious and self-determining, not mechanical parts of a quasi-physical organism. Dr. Bosanquet says, in an Aristotelian Society paper, that "the conception of general will" involves the existence of an actual community "of such a nature as to share an identical mind and feeling." If this somewhat loose mode of expression is meant to claim for the community something on the level of the unity of the self-identical mind of the individual, it is to be decisively rejected. The more so, as later in the same paper, he:

speaks of "the community" as "an individual in a far deeper sense than the citizen, being the nearest approach to a true individual that exists upon the earth"—an ethical treatment of human "individuality and value" that appears to be the result of his characteristically imperfect view of the nature of the individual. I hold, as does, I observe, Dr. D'Arcy also, that the self is "the most definite unit which thought is able to conceive." Lévy-Bruhl says that, "in fact, the ethical homogeneity of a human society at any moment is always only apparent." (*Ethics and Moral Science*, p. 217.) It is of little avail for Dr. Bosanquet to speak, at one moment, of man's individuality as a "world," and at another moment—as here—to treat it as a shrunken, dependent, insignificant "part of the communal will." He is far too completely the victim of verbalism and doctrinaire notions of "group-life" and collectivism to be able to do justice to ethical individuality: he never sees the tree for the wood. One may well allow a certain use and interest to the facts and phenomena of the natural history of such collectivism, and yet feel that we should have to hoodwink our critical reason pretty thoroughly before we could ascribe to it any value of the character intended. Moral individuality implies a personal worth and value not found in the members of a physical organism. The attempt to raise the organized community to the level of the real being of the personal entity utterly breaks down before the really individual character of all consciousness. Without such consciousness there is neither meaning nor value.

Of course, our individuality is developed through the contacts of society. But, whatever we may allow to the so-called social consciousness, we cannot admit that it is at all comparable to, or to be confounded with, consciousness in the strict, proper, uniquely individual sense just spoken of. Even Royce has said that experience must be at least individual, and with that one entirely agrees, though whether he has really allowed it to be so is quite another matter. I cannot find that he has done justice either to individuality or to the liberty characteristic of it. Of

course, an individualism, like that of the eighteenth century, which isolates man as though he were sovereign and a law to himself, is untenable and absurd, and liberty is curtailed, or it may be, by the laws of duty. But liberty is, for all that, a distinguishing characteristic of man, and marks him off from the animal kingdom. We have need to be very jealous of the tendencies of some philosophers to biologise human intelligence, liberty, and even the spiritual life itself, for deadly issues lie behind these positions. Fruitfulness in such directions belongs no more to the reasonable order of things than does the expectation of grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles, or roses from the salt, unchanging sea. The procedure is one of the confounding or obliterating of qualitative differences, and shearing off the edge of the distinctively ethical consciousness. "The question of value," Dr. Bosanquet rightly remarks, "is really distinct from that of the nature of the causal connection between mind and body." ("The Psychology of the Moral Self," p. 124.) Elsewhere he says truly, "Individuality will shew itself as inwardness and spirituality, not by emptiness and abstraction, not even by blank intensity of incommunicable feeling, but, in a word, by the characteristics of 'a world'." ("Individuality and Value," p. 77.) Individuality is, to me, unique as the being one's self; it is positive in quality and content. I agree that "its essence lies in the richness and completeness of a self." (*Ibid.*, p. 69.) Nevertheless, the position is unsatisfactory when, later (*Ibid.*, p. 286), individuality is taken by Bosanquet to mean "mind," "a mind," for this is easily capable of being taken, and is, in fact, taken in a too abstract and merely intellectualistic sense, so that the ethical side of individuality is far from having justice done to it. The finite individual is thus left to be a "part" of, or to "participation" in, a logical whole without any proper or adequate account of his union or fusion with the absolute through free, voluntary ethical union. The defect is radical, and inherent in all such abstractly intellectualistic systems or modes of thought. These have no other idea than of self-consciousness con-

ceived in a purely intellectual fashion, but that aspect is far enough removed from true individuality. The single self-consciousnesses are left so much of an equal value that the essential non-substitutional character of individuality is missed. There is more in us than the logical function of reason, though that is important enough; and reason itself craves something higher, more transcendental, than to be a "participant" in an impersonal, non-ethical whole. Individuality is one and indivisible—a living unity. I do not, of course, deny the logical functioning of individuality, but that such logical functioning exhausts it, is the whole of it. Ethical individuality insists on the unity of the mind or soul in its entirety being recognised. There has, however, been no adequate care to preserve in its integrity the character of individuality as "a world" in the ultimate dropping to a "part." But individuality is and remains a fact, whether recognised or resisted.

Individuality had little real place among the Stoics, for they asserted it only to efface or abolish it; Stoic individuality lay in the paradoxical suppression of individual interests and pleasures; there was too little distinctness of being for any real fostering of ethical individuality. But, indeed, "Stoic ethics are not based on the needs of the individual, but on the demands of the supreme law." (E. V. Arnold, "Roman Stoicism," p. 273.) The Neo-Platonic view of individuality, also, was a despairing one, albeit it provided a certain goal for human striving in its theory of mystic contemplation. This, although in the "Enneads" of Plotinus, there is now a basis for individuality as representative of idea in the Divine Mind, and so participant of the Divine universality, and now a treatment of the individual as a mere constituent element of the Universal Soul, with whose unity a certain independence of the individual is compatible. But there is little that can be said, in any real sense, to make for ethical individuality, and what there is makes for the purifying of thought rather than for ethical action. Individuality had no great measure of justice meted out to it in the Middle Ages. Albertus Magnus, for

example, in common with the Arabian philosophers, was inclined to connect individuality with the body or matter, as representing existence in its divided state in the world. A defective view, of course, although I am not at all concerned to deny that the character of individuality is more or less determined by the physical organization. I do not now dwell on the Thomist and Scotist theories of individuality, valuable as they were, since they are of metaphysical rather than ethical interest. Origen, long before, had, on the contrary, derived individuality from the mind itself—from its use of freedom—which, however, is not adequate to account for it. Leibniz treated *de principio individui*, and maintained every being to be individuated in its entirety (*totum ens in se toto individuatur*). Indeed, for Leibniz, individuality was, further, expressive of the place of individual things in a system. Only in a developing system of categories can realities of such an implied relational type be known. Hence the complementary character of Kant's teaching concerning the categories. But Kant and Hegel were too much inclined to regard individuality as only a limitation, and did not appreciate it as the condition of the realisation of the ethical world. Schleiermacher, however, did better, albeit in a manner still too quantitative, rather than qualitative; he thought the soul sustained a peculiar modification through its connection with the body; he saw a reason for individuality in the relation of the ego to the non-ego; each individual had, for him, the psychical peculiarity predetermined or implanted within him so as to constitute him a peculiar soul: his spiritual individuality was seen in a somewhat too sentimental and romanticist—for so it must be said—"marriage in him of the Infinite with the finite"; and he thought the whole of humanity became individualised in each soul in a particular way. Schopenhauer missed the ethical value of individuality very completely when his system allowed the individual to be dissolved in the ceaseless movement of the world-will without goal. He also made the grave mistake of dethroning reason, and reducing it to the level of a mere temporary

organ of the will. Individuality he tended to confound with spatial and temporal individuation. It is not to be overlooked that our individuality, whatever its uniqueness, is set in an infinitely larger whole, which you may call the social order if you will. But that does not keep it from being true that Hegel failed to do justice to ethical individuality—as his modern followers also do—the individual, in his system, being relegated to a secondary place in more aspects than one. The individual is, in a true sense, in and for itself; it cannot be itself save as it is not anything or anyone else; but it is yet not for itself alone, for only in and through its other can it fulfil itself—even for itself. Still, no *alter ego* can keep the individual from being himself: as a self-conscious ego, he remains—after every recognition of the whole in which he is set—the centre of his own universe. I have not meant to suggest that individuality is anything but beginning rather than end; it is for the larger social whole; but it is for it as free, self-posessed individuality, giving itself, dedicating itself, to the service of the whole in voluntary, unconstrained fashion. But in my service to the whole, I do not lose my individuality; it still remains true that I am I. Thus I preserve my freedom, so essential to ethical value. Yet, though I am I, consciously and intensely individual, there is no reason why, as Schleiermacher suggested, the whole of humankind should not, in a sense, pulsate through me. For though my individuality is real, I am not atomic and independent of the race. It is by sympathy individuality manifests itself. I realise myself only in and through the community of men, or the whole. But society, as organised whole, must immanently allow the fulfilment of my free individuality, if the whole is not to fail of its end. Thought, it has been said, “does nothing to annul the fact of individuality as it is given in perception, and it is necessary that it should have no such power; because it is only individual human organisms that manifest the conditions on which universal thought should be possible.” (C. Read, “Natural and Social Morals,” Introduction.) And such thought must, before

all things, be free, free even to rise above the externality of law, if need be. This is not to forget that every free, self-active being is under universal ethical law. There has certainly (however necessarily) been in our time great loss of faith in freedom—a deplorable loss. I am of those who think there has been an unhappy tendency on the part of the modern state—as a political engine or structure—to interfere unduly and harmfully at times with individuality and freedom. Nothing can compensate the loss of freedom and individuality, to conserve which should be primary aims of state control and governance. The words of Mill have lost none of their truth: “The worth of a state, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it”; “a state which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great thing can be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish.” How true of Germany, it will be said; yes, but a not unneeded monition for Britain and America, too. The harmonization of private good with the good of the state is that which the state exists, in ways just and equal, to effect. This without infringing man’s essential liberty or inherent dignity. It is a primary need of the individual to be member of a stable social organism. But the savour of society must be found in true individuality.

There can be no doubt of the need to cultivate what, by a bold metaphor, is called the state conscience. The state should govern, but states do not always do even that; and why then should they so often take upon themselves to crush individual initiative, and induce individual helplessness? To say that the individual has no interests apart from the state, none but what society confers upon him, is a soul-destroying and pernicious doctrine. This tendency to state absolutism is a real danger to-day, and in the absolutism of the state, the soul—wherever it is a soul—cannot



acquiesce. The soul cannot deny itself; that were to deny the God that made it. The soul, conscious of itself—its intrinsic worth or absolute value—can never rank itself below the state. That is its declared ethical position. Does that preclude its sacrifice of itself for the state? By no means. For it is precisely the soul that feels the call of a time wherein—

“ ’Tis man’s perdition to be safe,

When for the truth he ought to die.” (Emerson.)

But that is more than the call of a mere absolutist state. An absolutist state that recognises nothing higher than itself is an atheistic monster, to be loathed not loved. The state, as organ of conservation, is apt to be repressive of individuality, but cannot get rid of it. For the agents of its activity are yet personalities; even an oppressive state needs individuality in its instruments. If society, however, is organic, and everything organic is circular—Hegel said every part of philosophy is a circle—then there are reciprocities wherein State authority and individual independence should be properly guaranteed and adjusted. The state did not make me, nor give me my powers, and it does not merit my first allegiance; the state does not keep my conscience for me; behind all human authority, ultimate sovereignty belongs to God alone, to Whom I am primarily responsible. That is the prerogative of my individuality, which is not inconsistent with society, and does not make otherwise than for social evolution. The state may seek my improvement as a citizen, but it does not belong to the state to fashion me as a personality, or to shape my moral individuality. The inner citadel of my individuality or personal moral being is immune from state interference, and is a matter for God and myself alone. For I am a being whose essential principle is that I am responsible for my own destiny. The state is, however, to be recognised as, in some sort, a divinely ordained institution for certain righteous and specific purposes, but it is bound to recognise, and act under, ethical law. A British philosopher has lately spoken of the state as “the guardian of moral values,”

while an American writer has declared that "government is the highest expression of the social conscience, and as such is a uniquely human institution." Such statements must be regarded largely as ideals to be realised, if they are not to become ironic nebulosities, more or less. The relations of man to God and to all spiritual truth are entirely outside the sphere of state interference or control. The principle of individuality, in its higher forms, is at once advantageous to, and corrective of, society, and is needfully preservative of liberty against the encroachments of all-absorbing power.

Individuality is the spring of all character, the source of all energy for the good, and does not leave us with merely pallid and passive virtues. But theories are by no means infrequent which invest the state—as a political organisation merely, though necessary—with claims to devotion and self-subordination, which are utterly unreserved and indiscriminating, and are a menace to the integrity of the human individuality, from ethical points of view. Fichte argued stoutly that no law or commandment whatsoever was obligatory save only as conscience confirmed it: the obligatoriness of ethical law was, for him, absolutely devoid of exterior foundation. Fichte was absurdly extreme in laying it down that conscience can never deceive us, as historical fanaticisms, self-deceptions, and aberrations of the moral sense abundantly prove. He seems to me, in his assumed infallibility of conscience, to have overlooked the relativity of our moral judgments, I mean, judgments as to duty relative to ourselves, not as to duty in itself, even though it may be true that we have to act with such conscience as we have in the end. Not every conscience is of equal value; every conscience exhibits but a relative degree of perfection, and calls for enlightenment and increasing delicacy. This all the more because conscience or the moral nature is so complex—not the simple thing it was thought in pre-evolutional times to be. Free play for the exercise of spontaneous individuality is of fundamental importance and value, with the freedom therein involved; and there is inherent guarantee in the true nature of individuality, as

have defined its relation to end, that it shall not fail of its service to the whole or humanity. I do not care to dogmatise on concrete matters or cases of ethical reconstruction; I am only concerned with the maintenance of ethical principles, which are often not so carefully preserved in reconstructive proposals as is dogmatically claimed or asserted. The precise application of ethical law in concrete cases does not at all appear to me to be always so easy or certain as some airy dogmatists suppose. At any rate, the abridgment of liberty, the impairment of individuality, are to be shunned to every extent and degree possible, since, so far as they exist, they reduce the man from person to thing. A finer ethical sense would lessen the disregard of this truth to be seen in all public relations, where the ethical worth of the individual always tends—under Dr. Bosanquet's grotesquely overrated "communal" spirit—to be undervalued. It is curious to find a certain modern tendency run back to Fichte—the philosopher of *die Selbständigkeit* and *die Persönlichkeit*—who not very consistently viewed our duties to self as merely mediate or conditional, and our duties to others as immediate and unconditional. An illogical and not particularly ethical procedure, resulting in the treatment of our fellows merely as a means of perfecting ourselves. Not to my own individuality, but to humanity in general, according to his representations, do I owe anything in the way of duty. As if I could give anything to others, being and having nothing in myself! As if I had no duties of self-preservation and self-development, and were not bound to increase my value as a person! What a parasitic absence of all proper self-dependence! If it had been only a question of what he says in "The Destination of Man" concerning the interdependence of souls, it would have been all right,—“The individual finds and understands and loves himself only in another, and every spirit develops itself only in contact with other spirits.” If the one is to be essentially sacrificed, in the manner already indicated, to the many, rational theory of self-sacrifice is destroyed. But a rational judgment of

obligation is required for ethical value. Fichte has, however, meritoriously caught up the idea of development, in advance of Kant, in his resolution of moral action into a striving towards the ideal, so unattained, and in his insistence on the moral fulfilment of destiny. Of course, I realise myself both in and through society, but I, as an individual self, am certainly not the abstraction which certain philosophical writers are pleased to assert in their overweighted stress on the doctrine of community. My self is for me, unique, definite, concrete, and ultimate unit of experience. But this imports nothing of Rousseau's absurd tendency to treat man as a solitary individual; for the individual knows it is for society he is destined, and only claims full possession of himself in order that he may, in conscious voluntary self-dedication, give himself to the service of society or humanity. This means a vastly greater ethical value for his individuality than the mere intellectual recognition of his being, in quasi-naturalistic or mechanical fashion, "part" of an organic self or whole. There seems no need to forget, as is so often completely done, that in the very conception of an individual (*Individuum*), there is implied interconnection or *Zusammenhang*, a whole or wholeness from which, as thought-field, we set bounds, under specific marks, to the individual as a unity, and determine his essence. But the fixation is not a finality, since the individual, in his peculiar relation to the whole, tends to outrun or escape it, in the ethical manner or spirit just described. And thus it comes about that consciousness is not a mere existent in individualised centres, but "is a function that carries the individual beyond the limits of his particular mode of existence, and reveals to him his place as a member of an objective order." (Prof. J. E. Creighton, "The Philosophical Review," March, 1913.) Every person is thus a more or less universalised individual, and his individuality calls for the maximisation of his ethical value. For there is surely no more mischievous conception of individuality than that which regards it as closed, finished, stereotyped once and for all, instead of regarding it as a

mere projection, susceptible of constant enlargement or development in range, rationality, and moral power and interest. This enhancement of experience involves for the individuality an ascending scale of life-values, in which universal interests, standards, and ends, are the lure whereby it is drawn upwards and onwards in this advance. But the individuality retains its uniqueness, has a determinate form exclusively its own, and the issue is a life whose match has not been lived before. It does not find Münsterberg's "impersonal over-experience," "after eliminating all the characteristics of the individuality as such," necessary, justifiable, or inviting. Such an artificial depotentiation of our being "as the selfhood without individuality" suggested in his so-called "overself," may do for a fanciful world of values, but not for the real world of moral values, with which all men—and not merely web-spinning philosophers—have to do. If, as is sometimes (though none too discriminatingly) said, man does not make values any more than he makes reality, why should there be all this artificial construction of values that carry so great sense of unreality? Such a featureless unity as Münsterberg wishes for all souls of men is a very uninspiring residuum. We shall do better to abide by experience, our *Erlebtheit*, and find the ethical value of our individual being, in a more real way, as part of the ordered whole of reality, as spiritual. Of course, there must be no sacrifice of society to the individual, but there is something futile and absurd in the attempts we have been considering to make man attain the ideal by the artificial process of self-diremption just described. The same thing is true when Kant's duty to self is flouted, and the far from new or original remark made that "from the very notion of duty, it is impossible that I could owe myself any thing." ("Mind," July, 1917, p. 294.) We should be easily satisfied if we allowed a mere etymological reference to settle for us a matter of this kind. The feeling of oughtness in respect of duty-ideal is in truth a much wider affair; it is a fact of human consciousness too deep to be so restricted to a purely

social content. An ecclesiastical system may so absorb men as thus to eliminate their individuality, just as a philosophical system with an impersonal whole may effect the like unethical result, but the idea of duty in respect of the individual's own moral perfection and development is not thereby impugned or done away. There is only a failure in respect of these systems to do justice to ethical individuality. For if the ethical individual must treat the person of others as an end in itself, not merely as a means, why must he unethically treat his own person merely as a means? A man is clearly bound to treat his own person, equally with other persons, as an end in itself, and not merely as a means. It is for this reason that Höfding rightly insists that "there must be a thorough-going individualising of the ethical demand." Even his self-preservation and self-development will often outrun duty to self as end, and prove beneficial to others, a fact which constitutes an enhancement of the personal duty, and widens its binding character. If I am to "love my neighbour as myself," and should love my neighbour greatly, I can do so only as I have learned to love myself greatly or worthily. For, as Pascal said, "in a great soul, everything is great." This need not keep the duty and necessity of self-sacrifice from becoming so real to a man that, as Renan remarked, there is "no limit to the horizon which opens before him."

The great metaphysician need not be a great ethical individuality—that we have seen too well demonstrated; equally true it is that the distinguished ethicist may be greatly wanting on the metaphysical side; the great religious personality even may not be a strikingly ethical individuality; but the great ethical individuality may, by happy and fortunate combination, coincide with the great metaphysical thinker and the great religious personality. That is a rare type of greatness. But the great ethical individuality—and that is what now concerns us—has a greatness of his own, a uniqueness, savour, distinctiveness, from every other type or blend of greatness. But an ethical greatness, that should stand alone and unsupported,

is not without danger and peril; the fine gold is apt to become both thin and dim. That must not be, as we are here in the sphere of ethical achievement—of pure and achieved ethical values—which must always have an adequate metaphysical basis or support. There are life-situations which call for conscience, for responsibility, for duty-fulfilment, and in these we must seek the realisation of high and pure moral value—less as a matter of merit, more as a matter of course, because therein lies the fulfilment of our ethical being. But I am not saying that the soul is not conscious of herself in these ethical outgoings and advances, which are due, be it said, to the ethical “ought” within or behind us. In these experiences we have willed not only the particular deeds or doings involved, but in them have willed ourselves in the highest, achieving or realising new and higher values. And the process is carried through only and always under the ideal-positing of reason. We seek to realise them in freedom, with a will which is thus a strictly reasonable will. The true inwardness and unity of this whole ethical will-structure a great ethical individuality will be careful to maintain, for to him it would be intolerable to walk “with a tortured double self.” For he has an inward consciousness that morality is one, so that he may not snatch an ethical fragment, and be indifferent to the rest. To teach him that his ethical value lies thus in the quality of his will has been the abiding service of Kant in his stress on the good will—a stress anticipated, long before, by great schoolmen like Albertus Magnus and Pomponazzi, a fact too greatly overlooked. One of the finest features in Kant’s insistences (in the “Critique of the Practical Reason”) is, that in such a will there must be, as “supreme condition of the *summum bonum*,” nothing less than “the perfect accordance” of the mind with the moral law. He admits this is only an ideal, but rightly demands that there shall be increasing approximation in “practical progress” towards this ideal. In all this one can appreciate the great ethical services of Kant, even if one does not—as I certainly do not—share in all respects his anti-intellectualism.

I can never bring myself to believe that only in one particular way—the way of moral or practical reason—has God revealed Himself, and not also in the superb workings of theoretic reason and speculative insight. The sundering is far too complete, but, despite this divergence, the palm must be assigned to Kant among modern ethicists. The supreme worth of the moral life he has asserted for all time, and nowhere has his own individuality been more marked than here, where he lays on every man the duty to realise his value as an ethical individuality. For it is precisely the personal or individual character of moral life or action that determines ethical value. It is the free, voluntary ethical outgoing of the good will, in scorn of consequence, that commands, and always will command, our homage and admiration. However varied the manifestations of ethical individuality, they all spring from the ideal of duty—an ideal that reigns high above all earthly vicissitudes, and shapes personality and character. It is our consciousness of the ethical value of our ideal and end that constitutes the value of our ethical pursuit. But the quest must be of our sense of absolute duty. For the ethical value of our individuality must be positive in character, and rich in quality. Its primary concern is, as Kant rightly insisted, not with making ourselves happy, but “how we should become worthy of happiness.” Amid much one-eyed altruistic talk, we may still recall the words of Ruskin,—“The real sacrifice of all our strength, or life, or happiness to others (though it may be needed, and though all brave creatures hold their lives in their hand, to be given, when such need comes, as frankly as a soldier gives his life in battle) is yet always a mournful and momentary necessity, not the fulfilment of the continuous law of being.” (“Ethics of the Dust,” Lect. VI.)

The reasonable character of ethical individuality, and its purpose-positing activity or teleological determination, must be clearly kept in view, as, with the consciousness of responsibility, marking it off from being a nature-product or constituting mere nature-life. Intelligence has its part to



play in the culture or upbuilding of ethical individuality, since it is the duty of every man to find out concretely what is his peculiar life task, and what are his responsible purposeful conceptions, which are to issue in his deeds. His world-view must not be allowed—not even if it be a supposedly religious one—to impede or contradict his ethical consciousness. With intelligence—as representing the universal or world-reason in us—must co-operate, in this upbuilding, the moral will, that that unified impulse of the “I” which alone constitutes ethical individuality may be realised. For the world of knowledge and the world of will are not two worlds, but two aspects of the one moral world. But I do not by this mean to deny the senses in which moral attitude may be one of valuing rather than of mere knowledge. What I am here concerned with is the fact that consciousness finds expression in the will. Questions of race, temperament, national and family type, all have place, of course, in determining the individuality of the single person. But these colourings or complexions are not differences of a kind to supersede or dispense with the worth and duty of studying the ethical upbuilding of individual character. The talk of Taine about race, environment, and time, as sufficient to account for individuality, is absurd in its neglect of the personal equation. In his hands, “the frame tends to take the place of the picture.” I have already spoken, both of the unique character, and of the developing character, of ethical individuality. It is in the enlarging consciousness of the ethical self, in the growing power and value of its ethical individuality, that the worth of the ethical spirit is seen and realised. In so treating the ethical type of individuality, we are dealing with something far other than that type of individuality which is all that certain leading philosophers of our time have given us, and which defines the individual merely in terms of its spatial characters and its physical exclusion of other things. It is the selfhood of the moral self with which we are here concerned, a self with freely chosen moral ideal. But it is as by nature social beings, not stark and isolated individuals,

that we possess this moral ideal, for while we preserve our ethical individuality in its integrity, it is yet in the life of organic humanity that we find our true life, and from the power or principle that underlies the whole that we derive our strength and inspiration. The ripeness and fulness of ethical individuality will be drawn from the ideal fulness which supports the whole—the one vast human organism. Social evolution is possible, just because the ethical individual is no abstract and isolated individual, but a *socius*, with capacities for service, sympathy, and fellowship, within the encircling sphere of the organic whole. He is such as under the sway of the moral “ought.” Obligation is imposed by this conscious possession of moral ideal. Royce talks much of the “attentively selected” ideal of the self, and of its “choosing” the ideal, and this is right, for it must be freely chosen. But it must not, for all that, be supposed that the ideal is what it is, simply because it is chosen. The ideal is not simply of the individual, neither is it furnished by society; its ideal source is behind and deeper than either the individual or the system of society. The ethical individual is constitutive of society, and not merely constituted by it; and his moral ideal, however much developed by interactions with society, does not come from society, does not spring from its relationships, but is of his own essence. But that does not keep his ideal from being also social, as he himself is by nature and destination. For the social side of the self is to be regarded as having a place that is fundamental; and not the individual aspect only. Individuality is thus transcended in our relations, but never annulled or abandoned. But to treat the moral ideal as not intrinsic or inherent in man, but mere fruit of development, or result of environment, can never be a satisfactory account of man as man. As we have seen the sense in which the self is social, so must we recognise the sense in which society is essentially individual, and the man not a product, but an original and producing power. Self and society belong to one moral cosmos; and though we have, for the avoidance of what is confused and ill-defined,

differentiated duty to self from duty to others, yet there is, of course, a certain sense in which every duty to self is, at the same time, fulfilment of a duty to others—to the moral whole. Our moral individuality will react beneficially on others, on the community, from direct and intense culture and development of our inmost nature. For no other can fulfil the duty of self-culture in me, any more than I can perform that duty in and for any other. It has already been made apparent, how every duty fulfilled to others makes for my own ethical good. All this play of individuality is necessary, for, if each individual were like every other, the community of individuals would cease to have any interest for us.

It is with conscious individuality we are now concerned, where the ethical individual is himself all the time, and here, as Prof. J. H. Tufts has said, "since the moral self is completely rational, completely social, it has a standard and motive and authority which are universal." (Garman Commem." "Studies in Philosophy and Psychology," p. 19.) The free exercise of reason, the practical reason, is necessary throughout the whole process of the realisation of the ideal—a process of the self, and a process within the self. The "I" in its knowing activity, projects an ideal, which it seeks to realise by the action of the will, reasonable will, rightly understood, being central in our ethical activities. Thus it comes that, in the ethical self-positing of the "I," there is something creative. This "I" has relations to things other and larger than itself; there is no reason why the unity of the moral personality should fail to recognise its own organic and relational character. But relations are, of course, not entities, and it is not admissible, without cause shewn, to suppose relations to be of more significance than the things or beings themselves. It is through real moral action that ethical personality is developed, but such personality is itself the source and spring of moral productiveness. The unified character of ethical personality must be maintained against all tendencies to resolve it into a psycho-physical aggregation or conglomerate of particular willings and

representations. For the essence of ethics is the being, and not merely the doing, of an autonomous self, whose "active energy," says Spencer, "wells up from the depths of consciousness." The final ground of all being, for that matter, is ethical, no less than rational. Eucken has a good deal to say of the "rightful claims" of the state over against the individual with his "threatened isolation" and "growing apathy," but is yet compelled to admit that a system "which places the individual above all else must undoubtedly prove superior to any other system in originality, mobility, and variety." (Art. "Individuality" in Hastings' Ency., Vol. VII.) Nor should it be overlooked how often the "isolation" of the individual has induced, so far from "apathy," the highest spiritual energy and the greatest mental activity, with incalculable benefit and enrichment to the world. We could as little spare the great individuality of a Newman with his "isolation," as we could the powerful individuality of a Johnson with his endless socialities. In any case, the freedom of the individual, in life and thought, cannot be filched away without serious loss. And as for the state, it is founded on the idea or principle of right, and its embodying this principle is a thing of moral value; the state must realise its function as an independent ethical fabric for the administration of public justice. One can well agree with Spinoza that "the end of the state is liberty, that man should in security develop soul and body, and make free use of his reason." But, on the other hand, one must emphatically repudiate Spinoza's denial of individuality or self-determination to finite beings; his dissolution of all real being in the one indivisible substance was no happy affair. The individual does not exist to be treated even by the state only as a means. Ethical individuality stands for the wholeness of our nature, as permeated and suffused with ethical spirit, when fronting humanity in the wholeness of its ethical possibilities. It is as member of the one vast ethical system or body that the ethical individuality is inspired to yield its own peculiar and distinctive ethical contribution to the moral wealth of the whole, so far is it from

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being egoistically arrayed against that totality. This it does under the impulse of the moral ideal which, as a fact within our experience, is yet not a fact derived entirely from our experience. The moral ideal has always stood out to men as an unattained and unfulfilled ideal. Ulrici urges that we must go out beyond experience in forming the ideal concept of the highest possible perfection of the human being or essence; it is not without experience, he says, but certainly not through experience. ("Gott und der Mensch," Vol. II, pp. 84-85.) This accords with what I have already urged as to the moral ideal being deeper than either the individual or society. And one may surely say that the ethical individuality, in seeking fulfilment of the moral ideal, must be under the lead of reason, dynamic and directive. Morality is not made by thought, but is "recognised by reason through a necessity which is antecedent to all subjective activity." But the ethical individual would, as we have seen, be unintelligible without relation to other selves. The true end of ethical individuality must be taken to be the perfection of self and others in the order of human life, as, for it, the thing of intrinsic and abiding value. In this reference to others, one may recall the remark of Wundt that such "altruism always belongs to the ethics of feeling." Green's end for man as the "abiding satisfaction of an abiding self" is, therefore, taken by him to imply man "as living in the successful pursuit of various interests which the order of society, taking the term in its widest sense, has determined for him." It is in such interactions of the self, in its devotement to the ideal, that ethical harmony and adjustment are to be realised. Thus thought is kept from circling too much around the self, a necessary precaution while maintaining the integrity of ethical individuality. A man's best or ideal self—which is to be realised—is his best for others as well as for himself. I agree with Höffding that the best development of the individual may not necessarily so serve society, but I think it will do so if it is an ethical development. But it is a long and toilsome road before some individualities, that of Goethe for example, un-

derstand and realise wherein their own peculiar power and individuality lie. When Goethe did make the discovery, he remained—although he could say, “where I cannot be moral, my power is gone”—predominantly an intellectual individuality, as compared, say, with Carlyle, who was a nearer representative of the categorical imperative individualised, though no perfect one. Ethical individuality neither stands absolutely by itself, nor hangs uncertainly in the air, but is deep-set in the moral order. Of this order it was well said by Trendelenburg, in his “Historical Contributions to Philosophy,” that “an ethical philosophy which would exclude pleasure would be contrary to nature; and one which would make a principle of it would be contrary to spirit.” This realisation of one’s true self in and for others can, of course, only be a gradual affair—implies, as Green says, “a progressive determination of the idea of the end itself.” For the activity of reason is not finished and perfect; moral intelligence is a developing magnitude. The harmonization of all the impulses and forces of life is not soon accomplished. But this progressive aspect must not obscure the duty to make the individuality a rounded affair, to form the personality into a totality. Such a microcosm it should certainly be. To make of itself and its manifold activities a relative whole, is precisely its life-work. And as for the society aspect, there is always the question whether the society realises the conditions that in it one is treated as end, and not merely as a means—a test too often and too easily overlooked. The subservience of the actual to the ideal must be our individual and steadfast aim. The greatest conditioned good that is possible can be actualized in no other way. A great love of the infinite ideal will raise us, and help us realise the ideal self. “*Rarum est enim, ut satis se quisque vereatur.*” It will enlarge the circle and widen the scope of our self-determining freedom, to embrace the ideal so. Endless is the vista of vital and concrete moral progress opened by the possibilities and demands of the ethical ideal. As for the creative office of the ethical individuality, this belongs to him as participant

in the social whole, taken in the largest sense, for he may find his *alter ego* in another continent than his own; the ideal community may, for him, be the community of all mankind. Not, I think, without large horizons and long views can the reciprocities and interdependence of self and the community or social whole be rendered satisfactory to some minds—a fact too rarely recognised. But this must be without the tendency towards sentimental dissolution of real selfhood in the mere idea of humanity. The ethical individual knows he cannot be a morally detached individual, but must create new value for himself as a person, by his life-task within and for the social whole. Ever straitened within himself he must be till this life-task, this ethical warfare, be accomplished. It is the nature, the very genius, of true life—life creative of new value—that it should be so. Such life has its ideal extensions, its moral extensions of the present, which must be kept in view. My ethical individuality is not merely an individual value, but a value that concerns the world; is not merely a present value, but endures through time. Such I take to be the conservation of value in the ethical realm—the realm of ends, where man is legislator as well as subject.

It must be evident what redemption from moral monotony, from ethical sameness and tameness, springs out of the diversities of ethical individuality. But, of course, the fact of individuality cannot be so accentuated as to overlook the elements of sameness or likeness found in different individuals, for no antithetical aspects of sameness and individuality can be allowed to be such as to infringe or imperil the unity of the moral world, or to obscure the mutual and serviceable relations that must exist between these contrastive aspects. The value of my ethical individuality is realised in the ethical ends that stand out for me as individually mine—of supreme and unescapable value for me. For my moral responsibility is involved in this ethical choice of ends; no valuation by any other, or for any other, can for a moment take the place of the determinations of my own moral consciousness. That is my uniqueness as an ethical

individual; it belongs to no other, is indefeasibly my own. The conception of the individual *per se* is doubtless an abstraction; the individuality must be that of the concrete self of consciousness, as *here*, and as *this* and not *that*. I have the power, not only to posit myself as an independent subject over against world objects, but to distinguish different sensations, feelings, impulses, in myself, from myself and from one another. This self-consciousness is the condition and the presupposition of my self-determination. It is also true that the universal is present in the individual, but if you make the universal that which purely constitutes the individual, so that the individual is no longer known save in its universal guise or aspect, you destroy the individual altogether, and merge it in, or confound it with, the generic type of selfhood. It is then no longer true that the individual is the real. But, in less formal modes of speech, it is as self-conscious that the individual is real, with interest as a concrete individual in the whole world of reality. This consciousness of moral personality becomes at length the sovereign fact in experience. In this consciousness of its own intrinsic value, the soul chooses ends and objects that have for it meaning or value. We exaggerate what ethical laws, codes, maxims, can do. Ethical individuality, when finely exemplified, does far more than these, for it takes up into itself, and embodies, the free creative spirit of virtue, whereby it makes for itself ethical discoveries and divinations, and translates them into action or practice in the most diverse circumstances and variegated forms, so that moral splendour, moral beauty, moral fitness, moral sublimity, result. The ethical value of such individualised life and action has immediate significance for others—and that of the finest character. It is because, in moral matters or duties, so much falls to be decided by individual judgment, that ethical individuality has such large scope and free play. Many of the greatest issues in life are thus involved: the pages of biography teem with proofs. Ethical study, so conceived, is far more impelling and inspiring than is ordinarily imagined. It is an unilluminated view which re-



gards ethics as an order of iron rule or leaden uniformity, with no play of inventive genius or faculty. I have not at all, in saying these things, been forgetting that the sphere of ethical individuality is confined to moral obligation, but neither am I forgetting that the domain of moral obligation is always extending, a fact too often neglected or unperceived. The genuine inwardness of the whole moral process must be steadily kept in view, as consisting in the consent of the will to what forms its own good, under a sense of moral obligation which is inward, never imposed from without. All this under the command of, and in conformity with, reason, as mine. The invisible things of ethics—love, honour, justice, goodness, and the rest—are the values which, so far as they are mine, make my ethical individuality what it distinctively is. I do not make (save in the subjective or idealistic sense), nor can I alter, these ethical values; 'tis they that make me. This belongs to their absolute aspect, however relative they must always appear in me. My being is measured by my degree of relative perfection. My individuality is not mere defect, limitation, or hindrance, as it has sometimes been taken to be, but represents the nobility of the force which I am, in that I am so far from any mere congeries of atoms, or any sort of arithmetical sum. My individuality means that I am not a mere part or function of anything, nor a mere determinate appearance of a universal soul, nor a drop in the pantheistic ocean, but a born original, so far at least as to have properties or qualities that differentiate me from every other. This does not keep my individuality from being a developing whole, as various and discordant impulses are controlled and organised into the more coherent and harmonious whole which I become. Nor does it keep me, as an ethical individual, from the needful task of more fully adjusting my individuality to the social system in which I am set. This should be natural, but is often painfully sacrificial; as said George Eliot: "We can have the highest happiness—such as goes along with being a great man—only by having wide thoughts and much feeling for the rest

of the world as well as for ourselves; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we choose before everything else, because our souls see it is good."

The twofold progressive realisation which has just been spoken of moves towards unity and enlargement of the developing self. This unified and developed self finds its self-fulfilment in freely giving itself to the service of the race or the social whole. Such self-fulfilment may remain always more or less an ideal, but it is an ideal which the ethical self can never relinquish. Nor does the individuality become lost, or lose its distinctive colour, in the process; nay, the distinctive quality or colouring remains, taking only richer hues, deeper tints, and finer shades, from the process. It has been said that Herder, for example, made everything he learned, whether as philosopher, historian, or poet, *Herder*. But the developmental and interactive processes do not fix and predetermine me, Spencer-wise, as a mere "resultant," for it belongs to my unique individuality to prove and show what my individual initiative, personal projections, and particular achievement, shall be. This it does only by reaching out to an end beyond itself, even though we have seen it to be an end in itself; for the divine dignity of the individual spirit is unattainable save in the outreachings of sympathy, love, and service. In the nature of the case, the individual must stand in relations, and needs the intercommunion of being, with the expansions, repulsions, and discipline involved therein, for the attainment of the high ethical individuality which is his goal. But, as such an individuality, he will neither lose himself in society, nor merge himself in the state. As Royer-Collard remarked: "Human societies are born, live, and die upon the earth; there they accomplish their destinies. But they contain not the whole man." "We, individuals, each with a separate and distinct existence, with an identical person, we, truly beings endowed with immortality, have a higher destiny than that of states."

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## NIETZSCHE AND THE ARISTOCRATIC IDEAL.

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THAT the quality of human life, and not its mere being, or its quantity, is ethically fundamental, is the undoubted truth lying back of the part which the ideal of aristocracy has played in human development. It is from this demand that life be lived in terms of its aristocratic values that Nietzsche takes his start; and the essence of such a super-quality of life is what he seeks to embody in his phrase "the will to power." Before, however, yielding to the glamor of a formula, one needs to determine very carefully in what precisely, in terms of concrete value, it is meant to issue. Now the will to power might naturally, perhaps, suggest an ideal in which positive fulness of life and abundance of worthy content is to be the dominating note. But its most characteristic feature after all, when Nietzsche comes actually to fill in the outlines, turns out easier to put in negative than in positive terms. As to what concretely constitutes the positive form of the good life, Nietzsche is, indeed, tolerably vague. Whatever his good intentions in the matter, the will to power becomes primarily in his hands not a fact of worthy accomplishment, but an extremely self-conscious protest against a certain abstract human attitude—the disposition to let up in our strenuousness, take our ease, be content with the aims of average humanity. This explains the strong dash of asceticism in his ideal, in spite of its attempt at an emphasis on life; it ministers to man's sense of power that he should practice "cruelty" on himself, and so feel his will tense and strong. Hence, too, the omnipresent demand that life should be a continual state of warfare—of combat. Nietzsche is filled with an almost pathological sense of the facts of evil, cruelty, pain and suffering, which envelop human existence. His master, Schopenhauer, had on the same foundation erected a system of pessimism, and had held

that to escape the pervasive evil of existence man should renounce the will to live. Nietzsche came to think that evil offered, rather, a positive content to life. Instead of trying to escape evil and gain happiness, the whole significance of life lies in the sense of power which the need for fighting hostile forces calls into being. Evil is thus not really evil; it is necessary for man's real end, and so a good. The true man lusts for conflict, for danger, for pain even, to assure the exaltation of his mood.

It is in this rather narrow sense, first of all, then, that we are to take Nietzsche's demand for "quality" of life; quality is definable as that consciousness of sheer virility and strenuousness, that aristocratic indifference to the common motives of love of ease or fear of danger, that profound respect for one's own superior excellence leading one never to intermit his effort, which, in his pages, always looms very much larger than the actual achievements of objective good that power may effect. Since the one good, the only thing really to be admired, is, indeed, power itself, the particular form it assumes is a matter of indifference, and the need for an objective description of the good life logically, therefore, tends to drop away. In the light of this large emphasis, Nietzsche's doctrines in detail are to be understood. Thus his repudiation of Christianity and the "social" virtues,—a morality of "the coward, the sneak, timid and modest, counselling peace of soul and end of hatred, love toward friend and foe." This is nothing but a herding animal morality, a sacrifice of quality to numbers, which is the denial of all grand values. "So arises necessarily the sand of humanity, all very like one another, very small, very round, very peaceable, very tiresome." It is evident there can issue from this nothing but contempt for the ruck of mankind, deficient as they are in that element which alone calls forth our admiring regard; and therewith, too, the fate of excellence becomes identified straightway and necessarily with the existence of an aristocratic class, and the consciousness of the good with the persuasion of superior force and breeding.

The doubt I have to raise about such an ideal is, in general, its self-defeating character. To identify, to begin with, the fate of human distinction and dignity with the pretensions of individuals or a class is at once to cheapen the whole enterprise. Immediately it begins to call forth the infinite capacities of self-delusion and conceit in human nature, and to turn away men's eyes from the true and objective standards of human good. No aristocracy ever did or ever could live up to the flattering portrait it draws of itself. It is under the romantic illusion; and to see things as they are would generate a humility fatal to aristocratic claims. From the standpoint of intellectual realism, therefore, the typical aristocratic temper implies a defect. A sense of superiority is sure to be the sign of a certain blindness, a lack of imagination and insight which is aesthetically disagreeable. The more thoroughly a man comes in contact sympathetically with his fellows, and the more completely he knows them, the more highly will he commonly be found to estimate the worth of the stuff that is in them. When this is questioned, I believe that the denial almost always will come from those whose dealings with men, though widely extended perhaps, have been of a narrow and official sort—who are interested in them only as laboring machines, or learners of lessons, or disciplined fighting animals, or in some other specialized capacity. In view of a great mass of testimony, the agnosticism of the aristocrat with reference to possibilities existing in the common run of men may be set down not to a superior intellectual grasp, but rather to an arrogant claim to finality which is intellectually unbecoming. This whole tendency to deal in large assertions which lump individuals by types and generalizations is a mark of an intellectual lack of precision. Any one with a sense for reality will have felt this limitation at least on the imaginative side, when he has been brought into contact with caste feeling. The blindness of masters and mistresses to the human quality of a servant class, except as this fits into conventional duties of service,—a blindness revenged in a way by the shrewd criticism from

the other side,—of men of superior races who suppose their slashing generalizations adequate to the infinite complexity of the peoples they despise, the self-sufficiency and calm assurance with which the aristocrat tends to leave out of the world to be reckoned with the tradesman and mechanic, should be recognized for what it is—mere obtuseness and dogmatism of mind, which deserves the condemnation that belongs to any willingness to be content with specious formulas.

And the same limitation comes to light in the other direction—the aristocrat's overestimate of his own worth. The universal odium that snobbishness calls forth rests on a true perception that no man is enough bigger or better than his fellows to justify him in pointing with pride to his own excellencies. When such a conceit fills his mind, he is bound to have a false standard of comparison which vitiates his judgment and hampers his performance. One has only to note the ease with which in a military caste the aristocratic pretensions of the officer pass into snobbery, and snobbery into inefficiency and dry rot. The claims of the "superior man" are in any case very easy to exaggerate. We habitually overestimate the wisdom of the wise, as we usually discover when we come into more immediate contact with them. The source of strength in aristocracies has commonly resided less in individual superiority than in greater cohesive power—itself a consequence not of intelligent foresight but of self-interest; in whatever way cohesion is secured, the same political superiority shows, as in the modern political machine. As an ideal adopted spontaneously by a lower class through the recognition of qualities in which it is itself deficient, aristocracy has its good points; though a lack of respect for unadorned fact, and a fondness for the more showy and specious aspects of the good, render it always a romantic ideal, with the shortcomings of romanticism. So true aristocratic virtues, molded by contact with reality, and before they become self-conscious through the need of being forced to defend themselves against "inferiors," are undoubted contributions to the

life of man, whose aberrations even may claim a degree of indulgence; as the genius may possibly be forgiven acts such as would condemn a lesser man. But when he starts in to argue for his own immunity on the ground that he is a genius, it is time for his immunity to cease. It is not well for a man to indulge his sense of being an exception to the human race, with special rights and a special destiny. Aristocracy as itself an aristocratic *ideal* has already lost its pungency and truth, and become little more than a conceit of past achievement. An aristocrat proudly conscious of his own superiority, is one of the least edifying of human spectacles.

Now while Nietzsche of course aims to escape the defects of historical aristocracies, it remains true that by his intellectual emphasis he is pointed straight toward them. Once begin to substitute a feeling of the superiority of one's own qualities for a disinterested concern with objective good, and the whole content of the good evaporates. True distinction consists in the ability to see the worth of objective values, and to identify one's personal fortunes with their achievement. But Nietzsche really denies all values save one alone. There is nothing in itself good or bad; an end becomes good only as it calls forth in man the sense of strength and power. But this leaves as the one thing worth going after the exercise of power itself, irrespective of the worth of the results through which our normal valuation justifies power in the end. Firmness of will, aggressiveness, self-control, "hardness," in the last resort get their established character as virtues from the service they perform, and cannot safely set up in business on their own account. The purpose of the Englishman's tub is cleanliness, not the cultivation of a sense of how admirable is the habit; and when one begins to take pride in never omitting his bath, he is on the road to spiritual destruction.

This appears strikingly, once more, in Nietzsche's doctrine of evil. That evil, pain, suffering, may elicit man's powers of combat and resistance, and so prove capable of

being transmuted into good, and that without them, indeed, he would fail to reach his true stature, is an insight valuable, though scarcely novel. But when Nietzsche goes on to deduce from this that we are, therefore, not to try to abolish evil, but to keep it in existence rather, and even augment it, that we may have so much more material to try the soul's strength on, he is going contrary to the whole moral instinct. The moment evil ceases for us to be really bad, and only a means to good carefully to be conserved, the sole motive that remains for fighting it is that of romantic self-glorification; the significant value of the crusade against evil lapses. For the moral man, evil is not something intrinsically indifferent, which gets a worth through conditioning the exercise of power; power itself becomes a genuinely defensible good only because it is enlisted in the task of securing ends good and admirable in themselves, and of abolishing things bad and hateful. Nietzsche does not deny that the good is also good. But it is, again, good only in the same way that evil is—as it supplies a bone for aggressive strength to gnaw upon. "Love gives the highest feeling of power"—such a justification is precisely the "selfish" theory of Hobbes, disguised in literary language.

The same tendency to overlook the true locus of the good appears in another form when Nietzsche makes of the man who most fully embodies power the end with reference to which all other men are to be utilized as a means. Quite logically, the superman must himself recognize his superiority, and calmly sacrifice the weak to his own enlargement. Now this clearly revolts our disinterested moral feeling. If a superman in a wreck were to save his own important life at the expense of helpless women, we should at once feel that his estimate of his worth needed drastic revision. A spectator may always be permitted a feeling of regret when the more valuable life is sacrificed to the less. But for a man deliberately to adopt this estimate of *himself*, and act upon it, apart from the claims of some special duty to which he may be committed, disgusts us. If,



indeed, the good were nothing but the will to power itself, perhaps a good and vital specimen of the race ought to be kept in existence at any cost. But if we think other values also needful to an ideal that can retain our allegiance, too high a sense of one's own necessity in the world might very well jeopardize this larger good. And throughout in Nietzsche the natural megalomania of the aristocrat keeps intruding, to moderate our appreciation of his merits. We catch continually the note of a proud disdain and self-sufficiency which marks a failure in intellectual realism. These new Lords of the earth are to replace God, taking all the affairs of man into their strong and capable hands, and winning the deep and unconditional trust of the ruled; renouncing happiness for themselves, they have an eye to the whole range of social need, redeeming the miserable by the doctrine of "speedy death," and favoring religions and systems of ideas according to their suitability to this or that grade of intelligence. We may perhaps, though at some considerable risk, hold this vision of an omnipotent will and an infallible wisdom before us to admire; but we may not hope to see it realized in human form. There is no such animal; and the man who thinks himself fitted to condescend to the universe, and play an earthly Providence, is simply revealing his own limitations. Nietzsche in person is not free from the defect; and when we find him talking of himself as powerful enough to "break the history of humanity into two parts," and anticipating as an effect of the appearance of his book that "in two years we shall have the whole earth in convulsions," the shock to our sense of proportion is itself a valid criticism of his ideal.

I have assumed hitherto that for Nietzsche the superman, as a concrete embodiment of power, is a final end, justified in exploiting lesser humanity in the interest of his own admirable qualities. But now there is another standpoint combined with this in Nietzsche which suggests a different mode of approach. Often, perhaps most often, Nietzsche is concerned to recommend the aristocratic ideal as an ideal, rather, of present imperfect humanity, led on

to aim at the creation of a human type as yet unrealized. It becomes an ideal of the future, to which we are called to sacrifice ourselves, and in the attainment of which the existing world and all preceding generations were well lost.

The setting up of the human race and its advancement as a goal for present and unideal human beings has, indeed, an objectivity which the ideal of the superman, looking to himself as an end, and subordinating the universe to the exercise of his talents, fails to offer. To sacrifice oneself for the "welfare of the race" is one of those phrases that sound well, and that have enough of truth in them not to be discarded outright. But in so far as it really means what it says, it combines the difficulties of the ordinary philosophy of self-sacrifice with others peculiar to itself. That we should refrain from doing what plainly is going to put the next generation at a disadvantage, and should try to build so solidly that the benefits we enjoy may hold over into the future, we might well keep in mind much more firmly than we do. But that we ought to subordinate the interests of the present generation to later ages, and have their welfare at heart in preference to our own, that we should "set ourselves to bring beings into existence who shall stand elevated above the whole species, and to sacrifice ourselves and our neighbors to this end," means surprisingly little when we get down to plain facts. If we cannot truly bring the good of life to others, even our own contemporaries, but have to leave them largely to their own devices, how can we work, save incidentally and in a very general way, for people yet unborn? And are we sure they would thank us if we were there to hear their opinion? Any effort to anticipate the future, apart from the immediate steps ahead, leads us into the field of guesswork and utopias, and removes the essential conditions of successful experiment. But besides being impracticable, the ideal lends itself to the cultivation in the present race also of a state of mind of questionable merit; and this brings us back to the defects of aristocracy again. It is almost inevitable that, with such a goal before us, our condemnation of un-

worthy qualities will begin to turn into a disdain of those who, as we think, show these qualities, and the preference for the noble over the ignoble into a separation of mankind into the sheep and the goats; and then we are laying ourselves open to the same criticism as before. Not only are conceit and snobbishness sure to be engendered in us, but this means that from the ideal itself there has to be left out the side of democratic sympathy, which nevertheless has, equally with virility, a claim to a position among the "higher" qualities. And the more thoroughgoing our attitude, the more we push ahead the attainment of the goal into the distant future and look to see a new species take the place of present man, the more we are bound in logic to despise man as we know him, and his present life; and the more, therefore, our sense of the value of life, and the possibilities in man, turns to pessimism and practical defeat.

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## BOOK REVIEWS.

**THE SKILLED LABOURER (1760-1832).** By J. L. Hammond and Barbara Hammond. London: Longmans Green and Co., 1919. Pp. x, 397. Price, 12s. 6d.

The third volume of Mr. and Mrs. Hammond's valuable contribution to the history of the Industrial Revolution closes the drama. It is no less masterly than the *Town Labourer* and the *Village Labourer*, which described the general character of the new life in town and country, but treats of the detailed history of certain bodies of skilled workers, the miners of the Tyne and Wear districts, the cotton and woollen and worsted workers, the Spitalfields silk weavers and framework knitters during those changes. It is therefore a more specialised account of some aspects of these significant periods of the history of England, but the moral is the same, and emphatically driven in like a third nail of the authors. The issue that divided the English people was whether the mass of the people were to lose the last vestige of initiative and choice in their daily lives when so much had been already lost that the upper classes came readily to think of the surviving elements as an anachronism.

The changes that the Industrial Revolution produced were so important that when the weaver in Oldham or the cropper in Halifax or the woolcomber in Bradford looked back in 1820 or 1830 to the beginning of his life, he thought he could remember a time when the worker was in all senses a freeman. The historian of the Lancashire cotton industry tells us that the cotton hand loom weaver often preferred famine to the discipline of the mill. At the beginning of the period covered by this volume the ordinary workman had still a large margin of freedom in his daily life. He was not entirely disinherited from the old village economy in which a man did not merely sell his labour, but had some kind of holding and independence of his own. The progress of the Revolution cut away this margin. The worker had to surrender his freedom and his home. His wife had now to spend the day at the mill; the child had to be sent or carried there as soon as it could walk. It was supposed that no home could be kept going unless the children of five or six went to the mill.

The aspect of industry, as an unrelenting and slave-driving master, was emphasized by the atmosphere of competition that dominated this new world. The Industrial Revolution made people think that their society was to be judged solely by its commercial success, and the test of success was the test of profits. If a society could make its social and political conditions favourable to the earning of high profits, that society was prosperous. Thus there grew up the fixed idea that workers were to be treated as the instruments of the capitalist, and this idea ruled the entire outlook of the age. The towns that belonged to this age are subdued to this aspect, and are built for a race that was allowed no leisure. A witness before the Factory Commission gave his impression of the Factory system in the vivid phrase—"Thinks they are not much better than the Israelites in Egypt, and their life is no pleasure to them." The long working day becomes the rule with the Industrial Revolution; and it is only by undoing as far as may be its results that we are lightening the harsh dilemmas of the new world.

M. J.

London.

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**EDUCATION FOR CHARACTER.** By Frank Chapman Sharp.  
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1917. Pp. 453.

The boy who put his hand into a jar of nuts and seized so many that he could not pull his hand out is used by Professor Sharp to illustrate the difficult necessity of choosing what to omit from his wide-reaching subject. I feel the same difficulty in reviewing "Education for Character." My hand eagerly grasps and reluctantly lets drop the kernels of nourishing wisdom packed into this book,—an extraordinarily compact and comprehensive account of moral education and training.

In describing plans for moral education already tried out in the Public Schools Professor Sharp is catholic in his scope. He holds no special brief for any one, for, as he puts it succinctly and truly "The proper place for moral education is wherever it can be given." The search of this skillfull teacher (whose success will surprise many who think moral education is not given in our schools) is to find and then to exemplify the many allies of the moral life. Among these allies let me single out three, described with exceptional skill by Professor Sharp and illus-

trating the three main phases of his subject: the influence of personality on personality, moral training, and moral instruction.

The greatest single factor in school life for the upbuilding of character is undoubtedly, Professor Sharp says, the influence of the teacher. Yet some of us who are teachers will find pathos as well as humor in the chapters on this subject. Professor Sharp is too truthful to disguise the fact that it is but a few of the many well-intentioned teachers who are admired by youth, and only a very few of the virtues of any teacher that are appreciated at all. Indeed boys may think of their teacher as "a somewhat uncanny creature, too different from themselves to be either intelligible or interesting." The good, unless it is a dramatic or a very individual deed, tends to pass unnoticed. "It is possible for a pupil (I speak from my recollection as a pupil) to be for many months with a teacher of exceptional devotion and yet until years of reflection have come, to be conscious of no element of the character except a few petty flaws."

There are exceptions to this rule. A few great teachers win a priceless reward—not gratitude, but the equipment of the coming generation with insight and vigor for its work. It is worth recording here Professor Sharp's belief that when standards of character are really recognized as the main end of schooling, greater respect will attach to the teacher and greater men be attracted to the profession.

As an example of active moral training nothing better could be given than the work of the Two Rivers (Wisconsin) High School described in Chapter X. One of the most pointed objections to moral instruction is that it is theory without practice. Boys and girls whose consciences are aroused ought to do something in particular and do it very well. The transformation of the Two Rivers High School Debating Club into a Civic Club that remade (one might say resurrected) a cemetery, is too interesting and stimulating a tale to be condensed here. When it is proved that moral training can remake a city and mould it nearer to the heart's desire, arguments against the value of moral education will dwindle and dry up.

The third division of Professor Sharp's book, the influencing of character through ideas, is well characterised by him in Thomas Arnold's phrase, "Moral Thoughtfulness," the power and the habit of reflecting upon right and wrong conduct. Moral training he defines as the nurture of character through the agency of ideas

and the ends sought by moral instruction are three:—knowledge of what is right, increased desire to do right, and knowledge of how to handle our character,—the last a most important and often neglected division!

Professor Sharp does discriminating justice to the enhancement of character through history, literature and civics, especially when “the teacher does not attach morals to incidents as a naughty boy attaches a tin to a dog’s tail!” But perhaps his most original and stimulating contribution to this side of moral instruction is given in his chapter on the use of biography. In the University of Wisconsin High School biography counts in the curriculum as literature and is systematically taught. I believe this course is the beginning of a movement that should have untold value. I call it a beginning, for the hurried biographical notes usually given by the history or literature teacher have almost withered our children’s love of Lincoln, Franklin or Longfellow. Who can love a date, a maxim, a summary, and an old-fashioned gentleman reproduced by the photographer? Yet love and admiration for the real man or woman who has done things can be revived since it is deathless, and through love, the sense that goodness is strong and is attractive can be learned.

Professor Sharp believes that for American children American biography, as more easily understood and more conducive to patriotism, should be used. Much as may be said for this view, I tend to the belief that for purposes of educating character and inspiring love, it is wiser to choose from the heroic or stirring good in all nations. Pasteur, Garibaldi, Florence Nightingale, Tolstoi, Foch may rouse some special boy or girl as the well worn names of Washington, Franklin and Lincoln cannot. Professor Sharp, however, gains width for his course in biography by a second year High School course to which biography is incidental,—a course in contemporary social progress.

Biography is not enough—not even with the help of literature, history, civics and civic activity—to complete our education for character. Like incidental moral guidance, these subjects touch life here and there, but not everywhere, and not in an ordered or thorough way. Therefore, with real valiance, Professor Sharp insists on a course in the Conduct of Life which shall develop in the pupil the power to discover right conduct; bring out its value, train his will and increase his resource against temptation. As he puts it: “The man who does right must in the first place know

what it is right to do in the conditions in which he finds himself; furthermore, he must love the right and finally he must know how to deal with temptation, *i.e.*, how to avoid or to conquer it."

There follows a detailed outline of the plan worked out by him and Mr. F. J. Guild for the grades and the High School. It is a notable contribution to the subject, and deserves to be studied rather than described.

There is but one essential element that I miss in Professor Sharp's book,—a permanent and universal foundation for right-doing. He is too keen not to realize this need and he suggests various standards, sometimes the Golden Rule, sometimes the Kantian precept, "So act that the maxim of your act might be made a universal law" put in the form of a question: What would happen if everybody should act in that way? On page 265 he gives the following standard: "The teacher must use his own code, having taken care to make it as clear, consistent, and complete as he is capable of doing." In so doing Professor Sharp believes that we shall get a fair representation of the best public opinion of our day. He adds that there is no need for the teacher in the class room to transcend this. His own creed he suggests in the beautiful form that love (in the sense of the spirit of service) is the fulfilling of the law and that the test of a good act is, Does it really serve in the long run the highest interests of those whom it affects? (Page 266.)

This test is an excellent application of our current standards of right and wrong. But I contend that unless we can attain to a moral law above current opinion we shall each give different meanings to the idea of what interest is the highest. Professor Sharp for example puts the saving of life ahead of the speaking of truth. "Life is more valuable in most cases than true beliefs. Hence, when to tell the truth would mean to cause loss of life, there can be no doubt that the claims of life are to be regarded as higher than those of truth." (Page 305.) I do not agree. If we were teachers in the same school, how could we clear the moral code of our pupils?

I agree with Professor Sharp that it is far wiser in most cases and especially with younger children to turn away from difficult issues such as I have just suggested. But I insist that the teacher himself must have a final criterion of what is ultimately right and why it is right. In other words, morality without some form of religious basis is lame and halt. It is customary to shudder at



any introduction of religious terms into the public schools. I believe that we have shuddered unnecessarily. Our nation, founded for religious ends, cannot survive free, united, and consecrated without them. Our moral teaching cannot carry its greatest message unless it bears with it the love not only of man, but of God. We have overweighted the second Christian commandment in our generation; we are so concerned with doing for one another that often enough we know not what we do. I mean this literally. How can we make sure that giving higher wages, better health, shorter hours, will not lead to extravagance, animalism, misuse of leisure? These gifts are only safe when they are used for good and not evil and they can only be rightly used when they are used in defence of the first commandment. It will be said at once that we cannot have any religious code in the public schools. After having accepted this statement for years I have come to doubt it. I believe that it would be not only a possible proceeding, but a salvation to our nation if we could put into the public schools the creed that Washington and Lincoln held as theirs. The Jews must welcome it for it is drawn from the Old Testament; the Greek, the Catholic and all the Protestant churches hold it; all the churchless respect it. I throw out, therefore, for full discussion this thesis:—

All public school teaching and especially all education for character should be openly based on the two Great Commandments, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength"; and, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

ELLA LYMAN CABOT.

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A REALISTIC UNIVERSE. By John Elof Boodin. New York: Macmillan Company, 1916. Pp. XXII, 412.

The period of the war produced a number of philosophical works of more than ordinary interest, which in the preoccupation of the time failed to receive the recognition which their intrinsic merit suggested, and which they would have received in less troubled circumstances. Among the most important of these is the stout volume of metaphysics before us, which is the sequel of the author's earlier book, *Truth and Reality*, published in 1911. Together the two volumes furnish a general survey of philosophy from the point of view of pragmatic realism, and, taken together

with the numerous articles published in various journals during the same period, bear praiseworthy testimony to the philosophic faith and industry of their author.

The work falls into five parts, entitled respectively "Energy and Things," "Consciousness and Mind," "Space and Reality," "Time and Reality," "Form and Reality." While the volume as a whole has ethical implications, and might even be said to culminate in ethics, the only parts devoted explicitly to ethical topics in the narrower sense are chapter XI, "Individual and Social Minds," and chapters XVI and XVII, "The Identity of the Ideals," and "Form and the Ought." I confine myself here to the ethical and sociological discussions in question.

The chapter on "Individual and Social Minds" contends against the common view of the isolation of minds, which is based on scientific abstraction, not on intuited facts. Both the process of external representation and of analogical inference presuppose immediate social acquaintance. "We become conscious of being minds through our interaction with other minds." Moreover, a true view of the self will reveal it as a product of this social intercourse. "The relation here, as in chemical compounds, affects the natures of the terms, and is not merely an external relation between abstract entities." The ego, conceived apart from its social situation, is an abstraction. The concept of a social mind, as something other than its component individual minds, is defended, and various traits, such as the subject-object character, unity, indentity, worth and immortality are attributed to it.

Chapter XVI sets forth the identity of the ideals of truth, beauty and virtue as regards their formal character, or the demands which their respective objects must meet, the demands for unity, harmony, simplicity and universality. In the case of a moral deed, for example, when it "follows from no principle. . . . we abandon the ethical criterion of good or bad." Science, art and morality are different in the concrete, as they are identical in the abstract. The matter of science is conceptual relations, that of art is the concrete imagination, that of ethics is impulse. Even here, however, "while the concrete values or ways of realization are different for thought, feeling and character; while they lead to unique satisfaction of the will, they must support and supplement each other, and, because subjected to the same ideal demands, they must fundamentally and ultimately

agree with each other. That is, the truth must, without surrendering its specific character as true, also be found beautiful and noble; and so with the other ideal values."

Chapter XVII, "Form and the Ought," discusses the concept of absolute direction, to which no definite content is assignable, but is merely the demand for law and worth in the moral life. Its discovery is provisional and tentative, coming "through the growing insight of the individual as he strives honestly to master his data." It is the categorical imperative, commanding unconditionally. "It does not grow out of our inclinations and impulses, but it determines the worth of these. . . . It means orderliness and comprehensiveness in the regulation of individual as well as social life. It is the law that there shall be law." It even transcends and determines reason. The universe itself is an ethical process, the direction of which is overindividual. Without such an objective form or direction, neither validity or worth would have any meaning. In radical empiricism no ideal could be valid. "If validity is made, is a matter of convention merely, what objective coerciveness can it exercise, what standard can it furnish for the permanency of values?" Nor would the difficulty be relieved by regarding the race as the unit. "Certain values prove permanent and necessary, not because the race has willed them, but because when the race in any of its members does will them or feel them, they prove themselves intrinsically superior or higher; they set conditions of survival to the race because of the social unity and co-operation thus made possible." Direction, if I read the author rightly, appears as something determined by a force outside history and humanity altogether. Evolution itself must derive its meaning from the concept of direction. Form or direction is not a product of reflection. "Reflection cannot create this demand for meaning and unity, for it presupposes this very demand." Here our thinker threatens to abandon thinking and take refuge in faith. "Why should we not trust our faith in the formal categories as we trust our faith in the mechanical?" Eventually, it would appear, the direction of evolution is after all not objective, but is entrusted to a perfect Socius, "an omniscient selective activity, with power commensurate with his formal demands. . . . Such a being would guarantee that universal efficacy of form in the cosmos which we implicitly postulate."

As will be seen even from the brief passages reported here, the

author often merely revives and restates, but hardly settles all the ancient controversies. In the style of the book, as in the thought, there are here and there loose ends, and rough places, as indeed there should be in a realistic universe like this. The book as a whole reveals an original, flexible and erudite intelligence, it abounds in shrewd and homely comments, and, with all that may be said in criticism of either conception or workmanship in the details, will stand as one of the substantial additions to the American literature of philosophy.

E. C. WILM.

Boston University.

#### SHORTER NOTICES.

LECTURES ON SEX AND HEREDITY. By F. O. Bower, J. Graham Kerr, and W. E. Agar. London: Macmillan and Co., 1919. Pp. vi, 119. Price, 5s. net.

A course of lectures delivered in Glasgow, and claiming to convey in as simple terms as possible the leading facts relating to sex in animals and plants. It forms a very useful little book which all who wish to talk at large on sex and heredity should read for the clear and exact basis of fact it provides. There is a good glossary and index; but the general reader will be disappointed in the absence of any reference to the difficulty he always wants solving as to how any evolutionary progress is possible without the inheritance of acquired characteristics. A. E. H.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONFLICT, AND OTHER ESSAYS IN WAR-TIME. (Second Series.) By Havelock Ellis. London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1919. Pp. 299. Price, 6s. 6d. net.

These collected essays of Mr. Havelock Ellis are a witness to the wide range and flexibility of his mind. He moves with ease among problems of conflict, eugenics, sex, and also among the lighter literary articles upon Cowley, Conrad and Baudelaire, which are, as it were, make-weights. The charm of his approach and his sympathetic method is over all; as in his classic contributions to the questions of sex.

THE MAKING OF HUMANITY. By Robert Briffault. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1919. Pp. 371. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

*The Making of Humanity* is verbose, when the author is dealing with theory, but often, fresh, graphic and vivid when he is in touch with solid fact. His historical *aperçus* such as the debt of the world to Arab science—Dar Al-Hikmet (p. 184) and the picture of the sterile kingdom of Byzantium are of no little interest and power. But when he leaves the paths of history, and bids us consider awakening science crashing "through the tinsel vaults of puerile cosmologies, discovering the sun-strewn infinities amongst which speeds our quivering earth speck," we recall Verlaine's advice, "Take eloquence, and wring her neck."

Stripped of verbiage, the thesis of the book is that man is a rational being, and rational thought is the thing that makes for morality and civilisation.

N. C.

**RACE AND NATIONALITY.** By John Oakesmith. London: W. Heinemann, 1919. Pp. xx, 291. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

The main substance of this book, which was written before the War, is race and nationality. Like many other people, the author, having unconsciously accepted the 'whig principle of nationality,' found when the principle was called in question, that he had no very clear idea as to what nationality was. It was certainly a conception that the generality of men took no pains to conceive clearly or define with precision; he found two opposing camps in existence, those who maintained that nationality was based on "race" and those who, having disproved the validity of all racial explanations of nationality, claimed that they had annihilated nationality altogether. With the first group Dr. Oakesmith has no sympathy; and he is unable to accept the position of the second group, in so far as it denies the existence of nationality. Nationality, for him, exists, but he was compelled to find for it some other explanation than "race," and states this as the principle of "organic continuity of common interest" (p. ix).

Chapter III which illustrates the racial fallacy in the mouths of historians and orators of the present day, and the artificially created element in race-consciousness (often due to false views of history) is well worth study, though these seductive fallacies are not here for the first time laid bare. Having disposed of such theories, Dr. Oakesmith turns to the potent fact that remains,—nationality. Unlike the pacifist he sees in nationality no primitive survival of narrow tribal instincts, but a simple and natural product of social evolution, that will prove the one instrument designed, if wisely directed, to secure universal and lasting peace. After such a vindication, it is surprising to find him characterising nationality as a phase, and hoping that the driving force may one day lose its intensive value. If nationality is based, not upon race, but upon organic continuity of common interest, then nationality must necessarily become less selfish and exclusive as the nations find the sphere of their common interests broaden.

As nationality is so defined, he is not in favour of easy naturalisation of aliens, and it seems to be questionable whether, as a rule, there should be any naturalisation of adults at all. Early sympathies and training in a foreign tradition are, not dissolved by "five years residence in the United Kingdom or five years work in the service of the Crown" as was abundantly proved during the war; and there is often no organic continuity of common interest to bind the alien to the country whose nationality he has assumed.

Dr. Oakesmith has written a thoughtful, well-documented study of the problems of nationality with special reference to the development of English nationality; and some pressing modern questions such as the relationship of nationality to the establishment of a League of Nations.

M. J.

**THE REVOLT OF LABOUR AGAINST CIVILISATION.** By W. H. V. Reade. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1919. Pp. 180. Price, 3s. net.

Mr. Reade has condensed a considerable thesis into this small and arresting pamphlet. He begins with the paradox that "progress in civilisation does always and everywhere manifest the working of a single and fundamental law—the greater the necessity of things, the smaller their importance." The meaning and substance of Bolshevism are comprised in the doctrine that the character of every political community ought to be determined by those who do the "necessary" kinds of work. To them

is opposed what Mr. Reade calls the law of civilisation, that just because certain kinds of work are "necessary" therefore those who perform such work are the least important and least fitted to shape the fortunes of their state. The issue is, of course, not so clear and absolute as stated by Mr. Reade.

The "necessary" work, he admits, has to be performed; and he is driven to the conclusion that as there is no servile class or caste in the modern world, the effect of letting loose upon the many the higher education now restricted to the few would be disastrous. The last chapter, "The Way of Escape," is curiously inadequate. The first step in reform, he thinks, is the reduction of our population by "five or ten millions," by the spread of "philosophy" or a true Malthusianism (p. 74), "the only cure for this distracted multitude is, I repeat, to get rid of it." Decimation is no solution, even though decimation reduced the scale of industrial problems.

J. E.

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Published for the Editors by

THE RUMFORD PRESS

CONCORD, N. H.

Chicago: JAMES H. TUFTS, University of Chicago, Manager

London: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN Ltd., 40 Museum St. W. G.

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1914, at the post-office at Concord, New Hampshire,  
under the Act of March 3, 1879.

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION, \$2.50 SINGLE NUMBERS, 65 CENTS



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